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1. Introduction  
 
 
Forget about psychologists, advertising managers, and football coaches. 
Here the ones who succeed are economists. In Argentina it is impossible to 
go out on the street without familiarizing yourself with thirty or forty macro 
statistics beforehand. In the morning, any good radio station has its experts 
ready to [explain the latest news and] provide the public with various 
brilliant metaphors to describe the economic situation. [...] At nine o’clock 
at night, on any television channel, you will see two or three experts ready 
to throw figures in your face and display their macro data like an assistant 
at the shop. Each of the 40 million Argentines knows that the official dollar 
was worth $8.09 five minutes ago. Or that the ‘blue’ dollar - the dollar sold 
in the informal or black market - was worth $12.55 on Tuesday. Or that the 
Central Bank reserves have dropped to 28 billion dollars. […] 
 
[Unfortunately, what would be useful is that] a country that in the last four 
decades has suffered several traumatic devaluations, exchange rate crises, 
and two hyperinflations had learned more than just a few figures and 
concepts. It should have learned to avoid these events. Instead, ordinary 
citizens had to learn to dribble the prices and survive. And some of the best 
economists learned to set up consulting firms and make money from 
companies seeking advice on how to navigate the storm.12 
 
 
In April 2018, newspapers from around the world reported the sharp devaluation of the 
Argentine peso. After the Federal Reserve announced the United States would raise 
interest rates, the peso’s value plummeted. According to the Financial Times, the 
Argentine currency even surpassed Turkey’s lira to become the worst-performer in 
foreign exchange markets in 2018.3 Once again, Argentina had amazed the world due to 
its monetary scandals. The questions were always the same: How is it possible for a 
                                                          
1 Fragment of the article: “Argentina, an economist’s paradise”, published in the newspaper La Capital on 
February 8, 2014. Available at: https://www.lacapital.com.ar/edicion-impresa/argentina-paraiso-
economistas-n637274.html Last access: 31.07.2020. 
2 In this dissertation, quotes from the bibliography (academic papers and books) are indicated with quotation 
marks. Quotations from primary sources (newspaper articles, central bank’s documents, speeches of the 
monetary authorities, etc.) are indicated with quotations marks and italics. Also, italics (without any other 
mark) are used to highlight that a theoretical concept is being used and (occasionally) to emphasize a phrase. 
Fragments at the beginning of each chapter are also in italics. All quotes originally in Spanish have been 
translated into English by the author. 
3 See the article: “Argentine peso overtakes lira to be worst-performing EM currency”, published in 
Financial Times on August 30, 2018, by Peter Wells. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/ca6b98c4-
ac7b-11e8-89a1-e5de165fa619#. Last access: 30.07.2020. 
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country to suffer recurrent monetary crises for seventy years and not learn from its 
mistakes? How can a nation that has experienced all kinds of monetary disorders cannot 
master monetary policy? Are economic problems more severe than is often believed? Are 
local policymakers particularly nonsensical? Is corruption the problem? Is it that 
subordinate integration prevents Argentina’s economy to take off? Why can Argentina 
not break the vicious circle of monetary instability and distrust in money? Most 
importantly, are there any lessons to be learned from Argentina’s misfortunes?  
 
In this dissertation, I use Argentina as a case study to understand the social, political, and 
institutional dynamics that foster (dis)trust in money and reproduce monetary instability. 
I study how trust in money is socially built and what processes cause trust in money to 
morph into distrust, thus endangering money’s reproduction as a social institution. In 
particular, I analyze two parallel processes. On the one hand, the long historical process 
which led trust in the Argentine peso to morph into distrust. I show how since 1946, 
monetary instability and distrust in money in Argentina have been reinforcing each other, 
leading to a vicious circle. Secondly, I study the dollarization of savings that accompanied 
the loss of trust in the national currency and highlight how the dollar’s growing popularity 
increased monetary instability even further. I stress how both national and international 
monetary dynamics have fostered local monetary instability.  
 
The Argentine case is particularly enlightening to analyze the relationship between 
monetary instability and distrust in money. The most obvious reason for this is that 
monetary instability has been one of the regularities of the economic field in the country 
for more than seventy years. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, Argentina 
experienced recurrent bouts of high inflation and repeated balance of payments crisis that 
ended in sharp devaluations. Argentina also suffered two dramatic hyperinflation 
episodes. Within Latin America, the Argentine economy is the one that has experienced 
monetary instability for the most extended period. Thus, Argentina is the perfect setting 
to understand the effects of monetary instability on trust in money.  
 
Taking Argentina as a case is also especially interesting for this research because of the 
high dollarization of savings. On more than one occasion, Argentina has been defined as 
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“the world champion of dollarization”.4 The statement does not seem exaggerated. In 
2006 a report from the Federal Reserve located Argentina as the country with the highest 
percentage of dollars per capita, after the United States5. In 2016 specialists estimated 
that Argentines hoarded around 400 billion dollars outside the local financial system, 
which is equivalent to the wealth produced by the national economy during a year6. High 
dollarization in Argentina is a clear indication of the lack of trust in the national currency. 
In fact, during the past seventy years, Argentines dramatically changed the strategies they 
use for saving. Until 1946 Argentines saved in pesos. However, since that moment on, 
important transformations in the national economy threatened trust in the peso. As a 
consequence, Argentines started to take their resources outside the financial system and 
invest them in other areas of the economy. By that time, assets flew to the markets for 
durable goods and real state. Moreover, since 1957 (the year that Argentina signed the 
Bretton Woods agreements), Argentines started to hoard cash dollars. Soon, the practice 
became an incredibly popular strategy to preserve savings and wealth. The dramatic 
instability that the country experienced since 1975, increased dollarization even further. 
Today, real estate and (cash) dollars are the Argentine’s main options to preserve savings 
and wealth (Corso 2015).  
 
Far from being occasional events, episodes of crisis and monetary instability are common 
phenomena in capitalism.7 As Hyman Minsky (1982) rightly argued, capitalist economies 
                                                          
4 Quotation from the article “Dólar y argentinos, más allá de pasión y calculo”, published in the newspaper 
El cronista comercial, on April 5, 2018. Available at: https://www.cronista.com/columnistas/Dolar-y-
argentinos-mas-alla-de-pasion-y-calculo-20180405-0018.html. Last access: 31.07.2020 
5 See the report: “The Use and Counterfeiting of United States Currency Abroad, Part 3.”  The Federal 
Reserve Board, United States, Federal Reserve. September 2006. Available at: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/counterfeit/default.htm#toc1.3. Last access 
31.07.2020 
6 See the article: “Encuentran al menos US$ 400 millones sin declarar en el blanqueo”, published in Perfil 
on April 15, 2019. Available at: https://noticias.perfil.com/noticias/general/2019-04-15-encuentran-al-
menos-us-400-millones-sin-declarar-en-el-blanqueo.phtml. Last access 31.07.2020. 
7 In this study, I refer to monetary instability as a general phenomenon that includes not only long periods 
in which there is a constant fluctuation on the value of money (i.e., sustained high inflation), but also 
moments of crises (events that happen in a relatively short period and in which money’s value changes 
sharply, such as currency devaluations and hyperinflationary peaks). Thus, I group three types of currency 
disruptions (high inflation, hyperinflation, and currency devaluations) into one category of ‘monetary 
instability’. There are two reasons why I do not draw a sharp distinction between these three types of 
disruptions. The first one is that, on many occasions in Argentina, these disruptions have emerged 
simultaneously, and it is hard to distinguish which one of them is the driving force behind instability and 
which would be the consequence. Secondly, it is not very helpful to distinguish sharply between these 
events in this study. This study aims to analyze how monetary instability has had an impact on trust in 
money. Thus, it focuses mainly on social actors’ experiences with instability, and in how do actors perceive 
changes in money’s value and try to develop strategies to cope with the loss of purchasing power. In this 
regard, I consider that a single category of monetary instability serves better this dissertation’s purposes, 
mostly because social actor’s responses to instability depend on the changes on money’s value. That is to 
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are prone to suffer financial and monetary upheavals by their very design. Since the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, the tendency towards 
greater monetary and financial instability has increased. Because of monetary crises’ 
unquestionable importance, many academic works have studied them, thus contributing 
to their understanding. However, there are still significant gaps regarding the causes, 
dynamics, and modes of reproduction of monetary instability. In this dissertation, I focus 
especially on studying how and why monetary instability episodes cause trust in money 
to morph into distrust. I approach the study of this topic from a theoretical perspective 
that integrates economic sociology and political economy contributions to the study of 
contemporary money. I also build on studies of monetary instability within economics, 
sociology, and political economy. I follow studies of currency crises within sociology and 
heterodox economics (Aglietta 2018; Théret 2007a; 2007b; 2015) in their claim that 
monetary crises are strategic windows for studying trust in money. Like these studies, I 
start from the recognition that studying monetary disruptions is particularly fruitful for 
understanding trust in money and how this trust produces and reproduces itself. It is 
because episodes of monetary upheaval (i.e., hyperinflationary peaks, sustained long-
term inflation, and exchange rate crises) lift the veil that conceals money during normal 
times, that they allow scientists to observe contemporary money’s inner institutional 
dynamics and workings.  
 
The analysis I present in this dissertation relies on two main findings of social studies of 
currency crises. First, that to understand trust in money, scientist need to study monetary 
crises. Second, that the reason why monetary crises undermine trust in money is because 
they reveal money’s inner workings. However, I contribute to ongoing debates on money 
and trust by pointing out that social studies of monetary crises have failed to specify what 
is exactly that monetary crises reveal about money that endangers trust. I argue that these 
studies have failed to explain what is it about money’s inner workings that crises reveal 
and that spooks people. In this study, I address this question directly and specify what is 
exactly that crises reveal about money that spooks people and endanger trust in money. I 
show what we learn about money through crises and how these revelations destroy our 
trust in money as an institution capable of storing value. In this regard, I study Argentina’s 
frustrating monetary history as a strategic window to study where is trust in money 
                                                          
say, these responses are independent of which one of these three events has been the actual source of 
instability of the national currency. 
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grounded, how trust in a currency can morph into distrust, and how such (dis)trust 
produces and reproduces itself within contemporary capitalist economies. I also study the 
role of contemporary monetary hierarchies in the reproduction of trust (or distrust) in 
contemporary (fiat) currencies. 
 
The central claim I put forward in this dissertation, which intends to contribute to social 
studies of currency crises and global debates on money and trust, is that in contemporary 
capitalist economies, trust in money relies on a false image of money and of the reasons 
why money can store value. I argue that in contemporary capitalist economies, trust in 
money is grounded in working fictions of money, which convey a false image of what 
money is and how it works. Popular fictions of money depict money as a commodity that 
possesses an intrinsic value that lasts over time. However, this is a false image of 
contemporary fiat money, which is not supported by any material asset. In the 
dissertation, I show that monetary crises cast a spotlight on the institutional reality and 
the inner workings of contemporary money. Because recurrent monetary crises expose 
the monetary institution’s regularities, they reveal the fictionality of monetary beliefs. 
Crises show there is nothing behind fiat currencies, no substance that supports their value. 
This shattering revelation causes trust in money to morph into distrust. Through this 
analysis, the thesis exposes the paradox of modern money: that once people are aware of 
money’s true nature, they do no longer trust it. Doing so, the analysis emphasizes the 




2. What is money, and why do we trust it? 
 
Money is an enigma and has always been. Especially after the abandonment of the gold 
standard in 1971, money’s widespread use represents a mystery. Why would anyone 
exchange real goods and services for a piece of paper, a token coin, or an electronic blip? 
Throughout history, the answer to this question has been summed up in a simple idea: 
people trust in money’s present and future value. The main reason people are willing to 
accept money in exchange for goods is that they trust in two things. First, they trust that 
money will maintain its value over time, and, second, they trust that other people will 
continue to accept money as a form of payment in the future. This double trust is the 
foundation of money’s essential mystery: that its value comes from each of us believing 
that everybody else will continue to believe in its value.  
 
As I will show in the following pages, the study of capitalist credit money has traditionally 
been associated with the study of trust. Most classical authors within economics, 
sociology, and political science – i.e., Knapp, Simmel, Weber, Keynes, Giddens, 
Luhmann, and others - have engaged more or less directly with this discussion and 
provided a variety of not always compatible definitions. However, once we accept that, 
indeed, to function correctly, capitalist credit money depends on the existence of trust, 
the literature does not offer much guidance on what trust in money is, where is it 
grounded and how it is socially produced and reproduced. Where does trust in money 
come from? What are the mechanisms by which monetary trust is produced and 
reproduced within society? Who produces this trust? Can trust in money be lost? If so, is 
it possible to restore it? 
 
In this chapter, I will engage with these questions directly and try to provide some 
definitions. In particular, I will review the literature on money and trust and highlight the 
most important contributions to this academic debate. Through this analysis, I will show 
that trust in money is systemic and has two fundamental dimensions. First, a passive 
dimension that relates to the reproduction of trust in money through monetary routines 
and habits. Second, an active sociopolitical dimension, which depends mostly on the 
monetary authorities’ actions to foster trust. At the same time, in agreement with social 
studies of money and monetary crises (Aglietta 2018; Orléan 2014; Théret 2007a; 2007b; 
2015), I will argue that crises are privileged moments for the study of trust in money, 
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precisely because during those moments trust in money breaks apart and its different 
dimensions unfold. Thus, during crises, social scientists can study trust’s different 
dimensions in detail. Moreover, in this chapter, I will contribute to debates on money and 
trust in specifying precisely what crises reveal about money that spooks people. I will 
argue that crises reveal that socially shared conceptions on money as an asset capable of 
storing value are grounded in (erroneous) collective monetary beliefs. My argument is 
that crises show that the promise of value that supports trust in a currency is rooted in a 
set of shared misconceptions on what money is, how it works, and why is it capable of 
storing value. However, to the extent that the false image of money depicted by these 
mistaken beliefs is crucial for the correct functioning of money as a social institution 
within capitalist market economies, these beliefs can be regarded as working fictions of 
money. It is the breakoff of these fictions that causes widespread trust in money to 
morphed into distrust.   
 
What is trust? 
 
There is perhaps no concept so extensively discussed within modernity as the one of trust. 
As anthropologist Matthew Carey (2017) puts it, from the broad plains of popular 
psychology to all corners of academia, trust is everywhere. And everywhere is lauded as 
both necessary and good. It is necessary, in the sense that is seen as a precondition for 
virtually all aspects of collective human existence. Whatever it is we value in our society, 
trust seems to be that what enables it to flourish. “For sociologists like Simmel, trust is 
the glue of society. [Indeed] we could not live alongside others without the minimal trust 
that allows us to periodically turn our backs to them” (Carey 2017, 1). However, this 
collective positive view on the benefits derived from trust should not be confused with 
any consensus on what trust actually is or how we can foster it. Though trust occupied a 
central position in the classical works of renown thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Niklas Luhmann, and Anthony Giddens, it was rarely 
interrogated directly, functioning instead as a sort of black box at the heart of social and 
political theory.  
 
It is not my intention here to delve deep into the general discussion about the concept of 
trust within social theory. However, I want to point out some aspects of this discussion, 
which will prove useful to better understand the specific debates about trust in money. A 
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first important point to reflect on is the debate on what trust is. From a broad perspective, 
trust can be defined as “a state of favorable expectation regarding other people’s actions 
and intentions” (Möllering 2001, 404). Indeed, as Katherine Hawley (2012) points out, 
one should think of trust in terms of commitment: when a person trusts on someone, she 
relies upon that other person to meet her commitments. A similar principle applies to trust 
in institutions. The commitment view also easily explains why we do not place our trust 
in objects, such as chairs, cars, and curtains: the curtains have not made any commitment 
to keep out the cold air, after all. And that is why this is not a matter of trust. Indeed, I 
rely on my alarm clock to wake me up every morning, and on my key to open the door. 
But I do not think of this in terms of commitment, obligations, or promises. So I do not 
think of this as trust, but merely as reliance. A second important element to keep in mind 
when defining trust is that this concept is, by definition, associated with that of risk. In 
fact, I do not speak about trust if I refer to perfectly predictable and accurate facts, such 
as ‘the sun will come out tomorrow’. On the contrary, trust helps us deal with other human 
beings’ agency and indeterminacy. And that is why, in contemporary western societies, 
where uncertainty and risk are all over, trust emerges as a fundamental social technology 
(Misztal 1998). In this regard, trust can be seen as a way of viewing the world that relies 
on familiarity as a basis for simplification. Thus, trust emerges as the result of a process 
of simplification by which social actors reduce the variety of possible futures; they limit 
them so that they can act and make decisions as if the future were unique and accurate. 
According to Simmel, for example, trust is “a hypothesis regarding future behavior, a 
hypothesis certain enough to serve as a basis for practical conduct” (Simmel 1950, 318). 
Given that, at any given moment, social actors are confronted with infinitely ramifying 
possible futures, and that this uncertainty is unmanageable for a human mind, trust 
simplifies this complexity by functionally limiting these possible futures. As Poggi 
suggests, for sociologists like Luhmann, trust “typically do not eliminate complexity, but 
rather reduce it: that is, make it livable with while in some sense preserving it” (Poggi 
1982, x). In this regard, “to show trust is to anticipate the future; it is to behave as though 
the future were certain” (Carey 2017, 6). A third important feature to keep in mind is that 
relationships of trust build over time and can be of different intensity: we trust different 
people, to different degrees, to do different things. We also should distinguish trust in 
people’s skills from trust in their intentions, and keep in mind that both types need to be 




But once we move beyond these three aspects of trust, there is considerably less 
agreement within the literature regarding what trust actually is, where it is grounded, and 
how it is socially produced and reproduced. A crucial first distinction concerns the 
opposition between trust as a strategy and trust as a psychological state or attitude. 
Strategic approaches predominate in mainstream economics and conceive social actors as 
rational individuals who are capable to deliberately and consciously decide whether to 
put or not their trust into someone or something (i.e., in a social institution). In this view, 
trust is an individual, deliberate, conscious and rational decision that is within a person’s 
own control: she can consider the evidence, weigh it up, and then decide whom to trust 
about what. In contrast, sociological and psychological literature tends to stress the 
attitudinal quality of trust. Whether located at the individual or the systemic level, this 
literature emphasizes that trust is not merely a matter of choice, but it is also a way of 
viewing the world (Carey 2017). Here, the concept of trust is close to that of faith or belief 
in the sense that, even when a person can try to base her own beliefs on the evidence, this 
is not always a process of considering the evidence, deciding what to believe, and then 
believing it. Unlike other activities, believing does not seem to be within our direct 
control, something we can switch on and off at will, whenever it is convenient. And the 
same can be said of trust. Very often, we simply find ourselves trusting one person and 
distrusting another, without having made a conscious choice in the matter (Hawley 2012).  
 
One of the first authors to note the relationship between trust and faith (or belief) was 
Georg Simmel, whose thoughts on the matter can be found in three short passages - one 
in Philosophie des Geldes and two in Soziologie. As Möllering clearly states (2001, 411) 
in Simmel’s view, “trust combines good reasons with faith”. Indeed, for Simmel, trust’s 
point of departure is our daily life experience, which is the real basis that our trust relates 
to. So, in his view, trust is, to a great extent, grounded in rational predictions about other 
people’s future behavior. However, equally important is that, for Simmel, trust also 
involves a ‘leap of faith’, a mysterious further element, a belief that is required to explain 
trust and grasp its unique nature (Möllering 2001). This ‘leap of faith’ is far from rational. 
So, ultimately, for Simmel, trust is both more and less than knowledge (Simmel 2011). 
Later on, Niklas Luhmann also elaborated on the nature of trust as a mixture of rational 
and irrational elements. In his influential book Trust and Power, Luhmann departed from 
Simmel’s notion of trust as a ‘blending of knowledge and ignorance’, and stated that “trust 
always extrapolates from the available evidence” that people gather through their life 
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experience (Erleben) (Luhmann 1982, 26). That is why trust is only possible within a 
familiar environment. However, for Luhmann, the most critical element is that, as I have 
already pointed out, trust reduces social complexity through generalization within social 
systems. So, as Sally Frankel notices, for both Simmel and Luhmann:  
 
“Trust is a functional alternative to rational prediction for the reduction of 
complexity. Indeed, trust succeeds where rational prediction alone would 
fail, because to trust is to live as if certain rationally possible futures will 
not occur. Thus, trust reduces complexity far more quickly, economically, 
and thoroughly than does prediction. Trust allows social interactions to 
proceed on a simple and confident basis, where, in the absence of trust, the 
monstrous complexity posed by contingent futures would again return to 
paralyze action” (Frankel 1977, 38). 
 
Contemporary debates on trust have also addressed the discussion on the extent to which 
trust originates in a rational process. Here as well, the debate highlights the emotional 
process that accompanies the development of interpersonal trust. Lewis and Weigert 
(1985, 972) consider that “trust is a mix of feeling and rational thinking”. From this 
perspective, trust has an affective component, an emotional bond among all those who 
participate in the relationship (Misztal 1998). And, indeed, it is a well-known fact that the 
loss of trust that accompanies situations of betrayal or deception involves some of the 
strongest emotional experiences we can have in our social life, creating great emotional 
turmoil for all parties implied (Möllering 2005).  
 
Another important discussion regarding the concept of trust is the one concerning where 
trust is grounded, whether at the individual or the systemic level. There is no doubt trust 
is, to a great extent, an interpersonal relationship. In this regard, and as I have previously 
stated, rich interpersonal trust is bound up with commitment. Trusting people involves 
relying upon them to meet their promises, to follow through on their undertakings. In the 
same way, trustworthiness involves matching our actions to our commitments, not least 
by exercising caution in incurring new commitments. Moreover, trust has moral 
overtones: it is a good thing to be trustworthy, to keep our promises, and we are entitled 
to resent people who prove untrustworthy, who do not live up to their commitments 
(Hawley 2012). But trust can also be present at the systemic level. In fact, for many 
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decades, if not centuries, sociologists and political scientists have widely accepted that 
trust can be directed towards institutions, public figures, and entire social groups 
(Möllering 2005). Social sciences have devoted an enormous amount of energy to try to 
explain the emergence of systemic trust. Indeed, this problem is deeply entangled with 
the questions of what holds societies together and how social order is maintained (Misztal 
1998). For thinkers like Anthony Giddens, the shift of trust in persons to trust in abstract 
systems is a characteristic of modernity, which is distinguished by time-space 
distantiations (Giddens 1991; 1994). But again, the problem is that, once we accept that 
trust can be present at both the personal and the systemic level, the question remains of 
whether these types of trust are one and the same thing. In other words, the enduring 
debate is whether there is a difference between trusting the political system and trusting 
politicians, or between trusting the church and trusting clergymen? Can institutions 
themselves display trustworthiness or only the individuals who populate those 
institutions? And here too, there is no widespread consensus. For some scholars, trust in 
the system is more than the sum of its parts. For others, the emergence of trust on the 
macro level always requires that individuals in the micro-level carry on actions that foster 
trust.  
 
For scholars such as Katherine Hawley (2012), trust or confidence8 in a social institution 
is an emergent property that is not (and cannot be) based on our independent assessments 
of the expertise and good intentions of those individuals who are part of such institution. 
It is not our confidence in the honesty of specific professionals (i.e., lawyers) what 
enhance our confidence in the institution they are part of (i.e., the legal system), but 
actually, the reverse is true. It is our trust in the institutional structures, objectives, and 
drivers that fosters or undermines our trust in both the institution and the professionals 
that are part of it. We trust in both the honesty and the competence of specific 
                                                          
8 While some authors use the terms trust and confidence interchangeably, others consider there are slight 
differences between the two. According to Beckert (2013), the difference between the two concepts is that 
while the concept of trust demarcates a situation in which the other party may take the deliberate decision 
to damage me for his own benefit; confidence refers to a situation in which I engage in incalculable risks 
that emerge from the openness of the future, which is unforeseeable for both parties. Also, in many contexts, 
the use of the term confidence over trust expresses more certainty in a positive outcome. In this dissertation, 
I will use both terms interchangeably. However, it must be noticed that, among the two, I prefer the term 
trust (mainly when referring to trust in money) and not the term confidence for two reasons. The first reason 
is simply that debates on money usually refer to the question of trust in money and not so much to 
confidence in money. More importantly, because I consider that the concept of trust fits better for this 
dissertation’s case study, in which actors’ trust in money is often damaged and leads to distrust. Still, this 
process is not necessarily the result of a deliberate decision on the part of the monetary authorities.     
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professionals because of the system of credentials, qualifications, and monitoring in 
which they are embedded, and not the other way around. From this point of view, it all 
comes down to the question: can institutions or organizations make commitments, 
promises, undertakings? And the answer is yes, in many cases they can and they do so: 
companies enter into legal contracts which are not precisely personal agreements between 
the individuals who happen to be in charge at the time of signing. And nations sign treaties 
with other nations, and these agreements outlast the individual leaders who have 
negotiated and signed them (Hawley 2012). More widely, many organizations have 
charters, statements of purpose, or constitutions that set out goals and guidelines. Let us 
take, for example, central banks. Most central banks have legal mandates that set out their 
public purposes, organizational structures, and powers. These purposes often include 
ensuring the stability of the currency, maintaining full employment, and safeguarding 
economic welfare. So, as long as it is possible to ask ourselves to what extent these 
institutions perform the function they are intended to perform or fulfill their primary 
purposes, it would seem appropriate to think of them in terms of trust and distrust. The 
better they are doing on these counts, the more trustworthy these institutions are.  
 
But for other scholars, this is not how systemic trust works. There is widespread 
agreement that institutional-based trust consists of a set of shared expectations that are 
relatively independent of time and space and that are, to a great extent, depersonalized. 
But the question remains of how is this depersonalized trust produced and reproduced. 
For many sociologists (i.e., Beckert, Garfinkel, Giddens, Luhmann, Wenzel), 
depersonalized trust cannot result from institutionalized practices and devices, which, 
ultimately, do not exist as such. In fact, institutionalized practices to foster trust are always 
the result of actions performed by specific individuals who act as authorized 
representatives of the institution in question. Thus, trust is always the result of the 
interacting agents’ performative acts and their definitions of the situation. Put differently, 
for depersonalized institutional trust to emerge, specific individuals (who act as 
representatives of an institution) need to signal and create trustworthiness through their 
performances. In this regard, it is not surprising that, in trying to find answers to how trust 
in abstract systems is produced, these scholars have referred to the concept of 
dramaturgic action introduced in the 1950s by Erving Goffman. As Beckert (2005, 19) 
points out, “Goffman developed this term in analogy to the theater where the actor on the 
stage has to give a credible expression to the character he embodies to the audience”. 
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From this standpoint, enhancing trust in institutions requires dramaturgic action: the 
personal communication of trustworthiness at access points where the nexus between the 
institution and the general public occurs. So, this means that, for trust in abstract systems 
to be produced and maintained, it must be possible for social actors to meet 
representatives of the abstract system in person. The latter must show their personal 
commitment, thus contributing to creating a ‘fiction of trust’ (Beckert 2005). The main 
idea here is that both actors involved in a trust relationship create a social fiction, in which 
the trust-taker seeks to create the impression of trustworthiness on the part of the trust-
giver. Moreover, besides producing the impression of trustworthiness, the trust-taker’s 
self-presentation acts (which are an indispensable component for creating the fiction of 
trust), also have to offer a common definition of the situation and express a confident 
control of it. Also, there has to be a clear separation between performances on stage and 
the implementation of activity backstage. This separation prevents negative repercussions 
on trust, which could result from the revelation of insufficient professional mastery and 
human error (Beckert 2002). 
 
Finally, a third important debate regarding how trust is socially produced and reproduced 
highlights the difference between active and passive trust. Sociologists from several 
academic traditions (i.e., symbolic interactionism, social constructivism, and reflexive 
sociology,9 among others), consider trust as a passive emergent of socialization (Misztal 
1998). From this standpoint, trust has an interactive and processual character. Trust is 
interactive because it is created through our daily contact with other human beings, 
through language, the interpretation of intentions, and the reading of faces, postures, and 
gestures. As Frederiksen (2014) rightly points out, trust is actually a verb and not so much 
a noun; it is a relational phenomenon that involves cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
elements. Moreover, trust is processual in the sense that it develops over time as a 
consequence of our experiences and routines and the social structures in which we are 
immersed. Remarkably, as I will show in the following section, this passive view of trust 
has been the dominant approach within the sociology of money. This tradition has tended 
to interpret trust in money as a disposition, mostly unconscious, that is produced by our 
constant exposure to the social structures in which we are socially embedded. Here, trust 
                                                          
9 While Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology is often linked to the study of social reproduction and class 
distinction, this tradition is not so often linked to the study of trust. One notable exception is the seminal 
work by Barbara Misztal (1998) on trust in modern societies. In her book, Misztal shows the link between 
the concept of trust and those of habitus and field. On this topic, see Frederiksen (2014). 
 
14 
is a mechanism that allows us to make sense of the world; it is a source of ontological 
security. Essentially, trust is habitus: the continuation of the past into the present, which 
secures the social order’s maintenance. Likewise, from this perspective, systemic trust is 
interpreted as grounded in the stability of the social system and the institutions that are 
part of it. In theoretical terms, this means that we trust because we are socialized to trust 
(Misztal 1998). But the problem is that, even if there is much truth in this argument, this 
conception of trust is also problematic because it excludes the self-conscious and rational 
component of trust. And as I have previously stated, there are different reasons we trust 
in others. The list includes emotions, familiarity, socialization, and experience, but also 
some degree of knowledge and rational assessment.  
 
In contrast to this passive interpretation of trust, some social scientists have tried to 
account for the rational and conscious component of trust in modern societies drawing 
upon the concept of active trust. As Beckert (2002, 262) points out, it was Anthony 
Giddens who introduced the term to express the notion that in the somewhat unstable 
contexts of late modernity, trust needs to be continuously worked upon, constantly 
renewed in communications processes. In The Consequences of Modernity (1991), 
Giddens emphasized that in modern societies, social actors can no longer rely on the 
structuring influence of kinship, tradition, custom, and religious cosmologies. Because 
there is no direct equivalent for those traditional institutions in modern societies, they 
require a different kind of trust, one that has to be won and actively sustained. Thus, from 
Giddens’ viewpoint, contemporary societies call for a distinctive kind of trust; 
specifically, one that rests on a vague and partial understanding of how the social world 
works and requires much more deliberate leaps of faith. Thus, while economic relations 
in premodern societies required a minimal amount of trust, trust must be actively fostered 
in contemporary environments. Modern societies need to produce trust deliberately and 
reproduce it and renew it through discursive and dialogic processes (Giddens 1994). As 
we shall see in the following, within studies of money, this active view of trust is linked 
to the concept of credibility, which has often been highlighted by political economists 
who study central banks. These studies show that within modern capitalist societies, trust 
in money is, to a large extent, dependent on the active creation of trust on behalf of the 




In the last pages, I have engaged with debates on trust within the social sciences and 
underlined some specific dimensions of scientific debates on this concept. So far, I 
showed that trust is mostly conceived as ubiquitous and good, for both the individuals 
and the community that enjoy it. Moreover, I showed that trust can be defined differently. 
For economists, trust is a rational decision. For most other social scientists, it is an attitude 
emerging from socialization. Furthermore, trust can be located at both the individual or 
the collective level and can be passively or actively reproduced. So far about trust, but 
what then about its flip side? 
 
What is distrust? 
  
About a hundred years ago, Georg Simmel (1950, 313) pointed out that “modern life is 
based to a much larger extent than is usually realized upon the faith in the honesty of the 
other”. He also stated that, in the contemporary world, the lie becomes particularly 
devastating as “something which questions the very foundations of our life.” As I have 
shown in the previous section, just like for Simmel, for most contemporary sociologists, 
trust is a positive feature, a universal virtue that benefits both the individuals and the 
group that possesses it. From this standpoint, trust is the grease that keeps the wheels of 
societies rolling over, and, as such, it must be maximized. Not surprisingly, this positive 
interpretation of trust came along with an equally negative conceptualization of distrust 
as an acid that would corrode human bonds, thus destroying trust’s positive effects. More 
often than not, this viewpoint meant that scholars tended to interpret distrust only as the 
flipside of trust. But can we say that distrust is the other face of trust? And what about 
concepts such as ‘mistrust’ and ‘lack of trust’? Are all these notions one and the same 
thing? I will argue that, indeed, they are not. If these concepts have remained the object 
of much confusion and scholarly disagreement, this is due to a lack of systematic research 
on the relationship between trust and distrust. The widespread assumption that theories 
of trust entail within them a theory of distrust has significantly contributed to this 
confusion. Not surprisingly, the absence of theorization on these concepts’ specific nature 
and the lack of clear guidelines on how to treat them led to a lack of coherence and 
understanding of the nature of distrust, mistrust, and lack of trust (Bertsou 2019).  
 
In the following, I intend to provide some solutions to this academic confusion. By 
examining these different concepts in their own right and signaling their differences more 
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clearly, I intend to provide some guidelines that will allow me to make a conscious and 
informed choice on which of them fits best the aims of this specific research. First of all, 
it is essential to provide some definitions on each one of these terms. As I have already 
pointed out in the previous section, trust in someone or something can be defined as a 
state of favorable expectation regarding other people’s actions and intentions (Möllering 
2001). In turn, to distrust is to have negative expectations regarding other people’s 
actions, intentions, motives, capacities, and expertise. These negative expectations lead 
to anticipate harmful outcomes (Bertsou 2019). As Carey (2017, 8) points out, the 
difference between distrust and mistrust is that “distrust is more likely to be based on a 
specific past experience, whereas mistrust describes a general sense of a person’s 
unreliability”. Lack of trust, on the other hand, is simply the absence of trust. In this case, 
we are merely undecided, so we do not trust, but nor do we distrust. If trust means that 
people have positive expectations despite some fundamental uncertainty, the lack of trust 
is the absence of such positive expectations. Similarly, the lack of distrust should denote 
the absence of negative expectations (Hawley 2012).  
 
Now that I have provided some definitions, I will signal the similarities between the three 
concepts. A first point to make is that, just like trust, distrust and mistrust describe a 
general attitude that leads to (un)favorable expectations, which stem from perceptions of 
(un)trustworthiness, (un)knowability, and (un)predictability. All three concepts originate 
from a conscious and rational assessment of reality but also have an unconscious and 
emotional dimension. All of them are always related to conditions of risk and uncertainty, 
in the sense that they help us deal with other people’s freedom and autonomy. In fact, 
both distrust and mistrust help us mitigating risk and bridging uncertainty. At the same 
time, they support our search for ways to subvert the vulnerability and over-reliance in 
other human beings. These concepts are also relational because they are always directed 
towards others, being those individuals or collective entities. Finally, and just like trust, 
distrust and mistrust can be located at both the personal and the systemic level (Bertsou 
2019). 
 
But there are also significant differences between these concepts. The first one is that 
while trust leads to a virtuous circle of further trust, effective institutions and 
trustworthiness, distrust and mistrust lead to a spiral of suspicion, ineffective institutions, 
and untrustworthiness. In this sense, all three (trust, distrust, and mistrust) are social 
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phenomena whose reproduction entails a cyclical and self-reinforcing dynamic. However, 
this dynamic actually works in opposite directions. Also, a second significant difference 
between them is that while trust is self-disconfirming, distrust and mistrust are not. “As 
the old adage states, ‘it is easier to destroy trust than to destroy distrust’” (Bertsou 2019, 
225). As Bertsou rightly points out, once failure or betrayal occurs, misplaced trust will 
result in distrust. But once is there, misplaced distrust will not offer opportunities for 
disconfirmation. In other words, since relations of distrust (even if they are unjustified) 
lead a person to avoid being put in a vulnerability position again, she will not have the 
necessary information and experience to dispel distrust. Overall, the fact that distrust is 
not self-disconfirming makes it extremely difficult to counter. That is why dispelling 
distrust requires a disproportionate amount of time and effort on behalf of both parties. 
 
Another critical debate for the present research is how distrust emerges? Interestingly, in 
a recent article, Bertsou provides some answers to this question when discussing the 
concept of political distrust. According to Bertsou (2019), political distrust is a perception 
of untrustworthiness that results from three broad types of evaluations: technical 
incompetence and failure, conduct that violates shared notions of right and fair, and 
conduct that is incongruent with the citizens’ best interest. So, according to this definition, 
distrust in one’s government would be motivated by an examination of its capacity to 
fulfill a specific task that leads to a judgement of its technical incompetence. Therefore, 
distrust in a state actor reflects the belief that this actor is incapable of fulfilling the 
technical requirements that are attached to its functions. Second, this technical evaluative 
component of distrust must be supplemented with an ethical one. Thus, political distrust 
is intrinsically normative, as attitudes of distrust are expressions of the belief that there is 
something fundamentally wrong, unfair, and unethical about the processes, conduct, 
and/or outcomes produced by the political system (Bertsou 2019).  
 
Money and trust 
 
Since the emergence of the social sciences in the early 19th century, money studies have 
always been a very popular research topic. Throughout history, not only economists but 
also anthropologists, historians, philosophers, and sociologists have held heated 
discussions on the nature of money and its consequences for capitalist market societies. 
Undoubtedly, within these debates, discussions on money and trust have occupied a 
 
18 
prominent place. However, it is essential to keep in mind that, often, this debate has not 
necessarily been addressed using this specific concept. While sociologists have 
extensively discussed why people trust in money, economists have more often referred to 
this issue by asking themselves what are the reasons that lie behind money’s universal 
acceptance. In either case, the fact remains that, at some point or another, all major social 
sciences have engaged themselves with the questions of why do people trust in (accept) 
money, where is this trust grounded and how is it (socially) produced and reproduced? 
Yet, despite almost two centuries of semi-permanent research on money, there are still 
significant gaps in our understanding of these issues. Luckily, discussions about money 
still occupy a predominant place within social sciences nowadays, and scholars from 
diverse academic traditions continue to make essential contributions to our current 
knowledge of contemporary capitalist credit money and its inner dynamics. 
Contemporary studies of money span sociology (Dodd 1994; Ganβmann 1988; Ingham 
2004; Zelizer 1994), anthropology (Graeber 2012; Guyer 2004; Hart and Ortiz 2014; 
Maurer 2011; Parry and Bloch [1989] 1996), economics (Aglietta 2018; Orléan 2014; 
Smithin 2002b; van der Spek and Van Leeuwen 2018; Wray 2002), history (Desan 2014), 
political economy (Bell 2001; Braun 2016; Giannini 2011; Redish 1993), law (Pistor 
2017), literary studies (Poovey 2008), and philosophy (Frankel 1977). In the following 
pages, I will summarize the research on money and trust with the aim to offer a detailed 
overview of the topic while, at the same time, providing the reader the coordinates to 
locate my perspective within the specialized literature. 
 
Money and trust within mainstream economics 
 
While it is undeniable that the field of economics has made outstanding contributions to 
current debates on money and trust, the truth is, most of the time, this debate has not been 
addressed as such. Even if economists have often discussed why people accept money as 
a means of payment, they have only rarely used the concept of trust to address this issue. 
Naturally, this absence is already very telling. Although classical economists –i.e., Smith, 
Knapp, Innes, and Keynes-, made essential contributions to the debate on money and 
trust, their studies on this topic have mostly been taken up again by political economists 
and economic historians, but, only rarely, by mainstream economists themselves. 
Meanwhile, debates on money and trust within contemporary economics (or, actually, on 
money and confidence) have remained limited to some specific areas. One example of 
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these debates is the studies on exchange rate movements and currency crises (Krugman 
2000; Obstfeld 1996; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Another exciting debate is that 
regarding the relationship between money and the state among proponents of modern 
monetary theory (Wray 2002), which I will refer to in the next section. 
 
In the meantime, orthodox economic theory has been satisfied with reproducing the 
definition of money as a neutral and functional commodity whose ultimate purpose is to 
make market exchange more efficient by providing liquidity. In such a view, trust in 
money is not a topic of discussion. In fact, mainstream economics does not theorize trust 
in money but simply ignore it or take it for granted. According to economic orthodoxy, 
money is simply a commodity within the economy, which is just like any other 
commodity except for the fact that it fulfills three crucial functions. That is to say, money 
is, at the same time (i) a unit of account, (ii) a means of payment, and (iii) a store of value. 
In other words, money is, all at once: (i) an abstract system that allows us to calculate and 
compare prices, (ii) a material element that simplifies exchange, and (iii) an object that 
preserves purchasing power over time (Dodd 1994, xviii). But if money is, in the end, no 
more than a technology that allows societies to avoid the so-called ‘double coincidence 
of wants’ which characterize economic systems based on barter, it then comes as no 
surprise that, from this standpoint, trust is no longer an issue. And indeed, to the extent 
that money is seen as a commodity that allows societies to overcome the inconveniences 
attached to an economic system based on barter, the reason for its acceptance is not public 
trust but a rational preference towards efficiency. It follows then that there is no room for 
an explicit debate on money and trust within orthodox economics. On the contrary, for 
most economic orthodoxy, the answer to how money gets into society has been dismissed 
as irrelevant. “As Milton Friedman famously remarked, economics might just as well 
assume that money is dropped by helicopter and then proceed with the analysis of the 
effects of different quantities on the price level” (Ingham 2004, 11).  
 
The widespread diffusion of the traditional idea that money is a commodity that emerged 
as an optimizing response to the technical inefficiencies of barter, and whose acceptance 
is due to its economic efficiency (and not to extended monetary trust) owes a lot to 
monetarism. Mainly associated with Milton Friedman and the University of Chicago, the 
monetarist school became very popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s and had 
considerable political influence in many of the advanced industrialized nations (Smithin 
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2003). Even if, as a practical policy doctrine, monetarism was very short-lived (actually, 
it scarcely lasted a decade in the United States and the United Kingdom), this school of 
thought was one of the most influential ones within economics. Indeed, the conservation 
of the underlying monetarist theory of money within mainstream economics is one of the 
best examples of its influence (Smithin 2002b). However, it must be noticed that the 
commodity theory of money is very old (Ingham 2004). Fundamentally, this theory derives 
from the Aristotelian philosophy, which conceptualized money as a thing that acts as a 
medium of exchange within the economy because it possesses intrinsic value. Later on, 
during the 17th and 18th centuries, Aristoteles’ ideas on money were taken up by many 
of the most influential political philosophers, such as Locke, Petty, Hume, Cantillon. They 
subscribed to the essentials of this theory. And yet again in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
the founders of economic science (Marx, Smith, Ricardo) also endorsed this view on 
money (Ingham 2004, 16). 
 
One necessary clarification is crucial at this point. As the reader might have already 
noticed, debates on money and trust go hand in hand with underlying theories of money. 
This is because any explanation on how trust in money is produced and reproduced within 
society ultimately depends on a set of underlying assumptions on what money is and how 
it works. In this regard, if one agrees with the monetarist assumption that money is a 
neutral commodity, a commodity that has no influence over real economic variables (at 
least not in the long run), extended money use needs no further explanation. In other 
words, if money is a thing that, even if it acts as a medium of exchange because it 
possesses value, is just like any other commodity in the economy, this means that it can 
be perfectly understood using the orthodox methodology of microeconomics: supply and 
demand, marginal utility, and so on (Ingham 2004, 7). Naturally, this explains why within 
the monetarist paradigm, trust plays no role in understanding how money works and why 
it is widely used. The ultimate proof of economic orthodoxy’s indifference towards the 
question of why do people trust in money stands out the moment we open any economic 
textbook. Once we move to the section that describes the IS-LM model - the model 
commonly used to illustrate a closed economy’s behavior in the short term -, we realize 
that the quantity of money demanded in the economy is positively correlated with two 
variables: the interest rate and the increases in total spending, or income. Strikingly, in 
this model, the only factors that influence the amount of money that a person decides to 
have are the amount of money that she or he earns per month and the interest rate paid by 
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the bank. How to explain then situations like widespread distrust in money leading to 
extended dollarization of savings and bank runs? Mainstream economics models have 
little to say about these kinds of phenomena. 
 
Monetarism’s indifference towards money is, of course, truly paradoxical. As Smithin 
(2003) has rightly pointed out, originally, monetarist economists did seem to place 
monetary policy and monetary theory at the very center of their concerns, drawing the 
attention of the economics profession to issues of monetary theory and monetary policy. 
However, in light of the ultimate outcome, it is doubtful whether, in the end, monetarism 
itself did much to re-establish the view that money matters within economics. On the 
contrary, such doctrine always tended to deny the importance of money and monetary 
factors in determining economic outcomes, thus making money “at once very important 
and yet unimportant” (Smithin 2003, 20). And indeed, one could correctly argue that, 
according to orthodox economic theory, “the theory on which we were all ‘brought up’ 
in the words of Keynes” (Smithin 2002a, 1), capitalists’ economies could very well be 
moneyless. Occasionally, some orthodox economists had claimed that the development 
of money must have made some difference to the economic system when money was first 
introduced. They argued that money probably improved the efficiency of economic 
exchanges and reduced transaction costs. However, monetarist economists’ most 
common assumption is that, once money was firmly established, subsequent changes in 
the monetary variables no longer have an impact in the real economy (Smithin 2002b). 
So, ultimately, variations in the quantity of money can only affect the level of prices, but 
not the output and growth in the economy. So real economic outcomes would be the same 
regardless of whether the monetary system existed or not. Thus, for all we know, from 
the monetarist viewpoint, economics remains a science that deals, fundamentally, with 
the real economy (materialized in the exchange of goods and services, as opposed to the 
accumulation of financial resources). Thus, logically, such science is not concerned with 
how trust in money emerges and spreads among society (Smithin 2003).  
 
From what I showed so far according to economic orthodoxy, trust in money plays no 
role in explaining money’s widespread use. Indeed, mainstream monetary theory, the 
theory developed after the important contributions of Hicks, Modigliani, Friedman, 
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Patinkin, and Tobin10 (Smithin 2003, 20), treats money as one among several other assets 
that individuals can hold within a market economy. Thus, mainstream monetary theory 
reinforces the idea that there is nothing particularly unique in money that would require 
a specific form of trust. But this overall picture of debates in money and trust within 
orthodox economics is not entirely correct. At least one realm within contemporary 
economics has paid more attention to the fluctuating nature of trust in money and its 
consequences. I am referring to studies on monetary instability and currency crises. 
Working at the crossroads between economics, political economy and economic history, 
there is a group of scholars who, for more than four decades, have been studying the 
causes, consequences, and dynamics of currency and financial crises (Claessens and Kose 
2013; Engelen et al. 2011; García and Olivié 2000; Glick and Hutchison 2012; 
Kindleberger and Aliber 2015; Krugman 2000; 1979; Lomelí 2005; Minsky 1982; 
Obstfeld 1996; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Rother 2009; Sachs 1989; Soto Esquivel and 
Correa Vázquez 2008; Streeck 2011).  
 
Hyman Minsky (1982) was one of the first economists who focused on studying financial 
instability and the critical role of debt structures as one of its leading causes. Since the 
1970s, a group of economists has taken up the tradition of studying financial crises and 
shown that excessive debt accumulation often poses high systemic risks, making 
economies vulnerable to crises of confidence (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Among these 
works, studies of currency crises are of particular interest for understanding the 
mainstream economics approach to the study of trust in money (or, as these studies say, 
confidence). Notably, these studies have argued that financial markets can be quite fragile 
and subject to crises of confidence. Still, even if many of them highlight the fickle nature 
of confidence in money and its dependence on the public’s expectations regarding future 
events, they mostly emphasize the strategic nature of such confidence. Thus, these studies 
primarily see confidence in money as a rational, individual, and deliberate decision. Even 
more so, they understand collective confidence in money as nothing but the result of 
aggregated individual decisions, or, at the most, the consequence of heard behavior. 
 
                                                          
10 In particular, I am refering to the influence of the following works in mainstream approaches to money 
within economic orthodoxy: Hicks (1935) A suggestion for simplifying the theory of money, and (1937) Mr. 
Keynes and the classics; Mogidliani (1944) Liquidity preference and the theory of interest and money; 
Friedman (1956) The quantity theory of money: a restatement; Patinkin (1965) Money, Interest and Prices; 
and Tobin (1958) Liquidity preference as behavior towards risk. On this topic, see Smithin (2003). 
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Studies on currency crises started gaining in importance in the 1970s when the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system and the abandonment of the gold-dollar standard gave way 
to a period marked by increasing speculative capital movements and greater monetary 
instability. Even if currency crises had been a recurrent feature of the international 
economy ever since gold and silver coins were replaced by paper, after 1971, they started 
playing a central role in world affairs. Understandably, from that moment onwards, they 
also became an important subject of academic study (Krugman 2000). It is essential to 
keep in mind that theories of currency crises have evolved as the nature of such crises has 
changed (Claessens and Kose 2013). In particular, the literature evolved from an initial 
focus on macroeconomic fundamentals as the main drivers of currency crises during the 
1970s and 1980s, to an increasing emphasis on the importance of expectations. Since 
1997, these studies also started to stress that currency crises can be contagious and unleash 
other types of financial crises (i.e., banking crises). Three generations of models are 
typically used to explain the currency crises that occurred during the past four decades 
(Glick and Hutchison 2012). 
 
First-generation models mainly emerged as economists tried to explain the currency crises 
of the 1970s and the sharp devaluations that followed the Latin American debt crises of 
the 1980s. In the post Bretton Wood era, as currency speculation increased dramatically, 
countries found it increasingly problematic to maintain a fixed exchange rate successfully 
(Eichengreen 2019).11 In a world where currencies were no longer tied to the dollar, the 
slightest indication that a country was considering adjusting its exchange rate could 
expose it to massive capital outflows. This, of course, discouraged the authorities from 
even contemplating such a change. However, the defense of a fixed and immovable parity 
was not simple either. Since markets challenged the values of currencies they suspected 
were unsustainable, the defense of a fixed exchange rate could require unprecedented 
intervention levels in foreign exchange markets. First-generation models highlighted the 
role of macroeconomic fundamentals (especially fiscal deficits, debt levels, and falling 
reserves), as the main drivers of currency crises. The seminal papers are those by 
                                                          
11 As Mundell (1962) and Fleming (1962) showed, a country cannot simultaneously have (i) a fixed or 
managed exchange rate, (ii) an independent domestic monetary policy (that is, control of domestic interest 
rates), and (iii) free capital mobility. The impossibility of simultaneously achieving these three goals is 
usually referred to in the literature as the Mundell-Fleming trilemma. Moreover, given that, since 1971, 
international capital mobility has increased considerably, most contemporary authors highlight the trilemma 
has morphed into a dilemma. This means that a country that pegs its exchange rate to another country’s 
currency must give up on pursuing an independent domestic monetary policy.  
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Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984). They argue that inconsistencies between 
domestic macroeconomic policies (such as an exchange rate commitment and a persistent 
government budget deficit that, in the end, must be monetized), eventually lead to a 
currency crash. The reason behind such an inevitable outcome is that governments cannot 
deplete reserves or borrow indefinitely to support an ultimately unsustainable exchange 
rate parity. Therefore, inconsistencies in macroeconomic fundamentals end up, sooner or 
later, in a sudden speculative attack on the currency, which leads to its collapse. First-
generation models, thus, highlight the mechanical link between weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals and currency crashes.  
 
The second-generation models were born due to first-generation models’ inability to 
explain a series of emerging market crises that occurred during the early 1990s (such as 
the European monetary system’s crisis of 1992-93, and the Mexican crisis of 1994). 
Interestingly, these crises called into question the mechanical link between 
macroeconomic fundamentals and currency crises and proved that the only requirement 
for a speculative attack on a currency to be successful, was that the investors’ bet against 
the currency was strong enough. In fact, in the post Bretton Woods era of fiat and floating 
currencies, challenging currencies’ values became a profitable business. In a world where 
strong investor sentiment against a currency could cause massive capital flight, even those 
macroeconomically sustainable currencies could be beaten by the unparalleled power of 
financial markets. To explain this new reality, second-generation models incorporate the 
interactions between market actors and governments into explanations of currency 
crashes. They focus on self-fulfilling market expectations and how they can lead to 
multiple equilibria. 
 
Well represented by Obstfeld (1996), second-generation models stress that money 
fundamentals cannot, in and by themselves, trigger a currency crisis. From this 
standpoint, the most critical triggers of a currency crisis are economic agents’ lack of 
confidence in money and their devaluation fears. Typically, in these models, doubts about 
a government’s willingness to maintain an exchange rate target can cause different 
outcomes. If investor sentiment against the currency is sufficiently strong, a speculative 
attack against the currency unleashes, leading the authorities to implement measures to 
sustain the exchange rate target (such as raising domestic interest rates). But, given that 
such measures tend to dampen economic activity and raise bank funding costs, they 
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increase the costs of defending the currency even further. Thus, in the end, fears of 
devaluation and lack of confidence in a currency’s value tend to bring about changes in 
fundamental economic parameters, which increase the costs of maintaining the exchange 
rate target. As the costs of maintaining the exchange rate level raise, private agents’ fears 
of devaluation grow still more, leading to a vicious cycle (García and Olivié 2000). In 
these models, self-fulfilling prophecies are possible. If private agents expect a 
devaluation, the costs of maintaining an exchange rate target rise until, eventually, the 
government is forced to devaluate the currency. So, there is a negative feedback loop 
between fears of devaluation and the deterioration of economic fundamentals, which 
eventually leads to a crash. Notably, second-generation models emphasize that financial 
markets can be quite fragile and subject to crises of confidence and that speculative 
attacks on fixed exchange rates can blow up overnight, hitting seemingly stable long-
lived regimes. In fact, because they incorporated these variables, these models could 
explain why there were crises that should not have occurred but did. Ultimately, they 
occurred because the agents participating in the market expected them to occur. 
 
I will come back to the importance of shifting expectations and lack of confidence in 
money within these models. Before that, it is important to notice one more feature of 
second-generation models. That feature is that, according to them, other outcomes are 
equally possible. Indeed, within these models, it is precisely the shifting nature of 
expectations that allows for different outcomes or (in their terminology) different 
equilibria. When market expectations are not sufficiently strong to unleash a speculative 
attack, and economic fundamentals remain unchanged, the economic authorities can 
sustain the exchange rate indefinitely. Thus, the crisis does not occur. Lastly, it is also 
possible that other equilibrium situations may occur during the time that the government 
is defending the exchange rate target, and economic agents have fears of devaluation 
(Obstfeld 1996). 
 
Third-generation models are harder to characterize in simple terms, but generally, they 
focus on how distortions in financial markets and banking systems can lead to a currency 
crash (Glick and Hutchison 2012). Mostly based on the empirical observation that 
exchange-rate and banking crises often co-occur, these models focus on analyzing the 
transmission mechanisms behind this co-occurrence. According to Mühlich (2014), three 
variants of third-generation models can be identified. The first strand emphasizes that 
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currency crises are related to the widespread use of foreign currency denominated 
financial liabilities. The second strand sees them as linked to a lack of prudential 
regulation. And the third strand stresses they are connected to capital account 
deregulation. Remarkably, most third-generation models start from the explicit or implicit 
recognition that international monetary relations are hierarchically organized and that 
developing economies are subject to the unequal dynamics of the global financial 
markets, which makes them more prone to experience financial crises. In this regard, 
these studies tend to emphasize that, due to the importance of shifting expectations as 
triggers of currency crises, these crises can be very contagious. These models were 
motivated mainly by the Asian crises of the late 1990s (Claessens and Kose 2013).  
 
To sum up, based on what I showed, it is clear now that second- and third-generation 
models of currency crises do take the role of (negative) expectations and (dis)trust in 
money into account when trying to explain the dynamics of contemporary financial 
markets, particularly the occurrence of currency crashes. Studies of monetary instability 
within contemporary economics rightly point out that confidence in money is a crucial 
element within present-day financial markets. With currencies no longer tied to any 
commodity like gold, and exchange rates that float freely, the instability within financial 
markets has increased dramatically. Logically, in such an unstable environment, 
uncertainty and lack of trust regarding a currency’s value can quickly spread among 
financial markets, thus triggering disciplinary actions on the part of economic actors, 
ultimately leading to a financial crash. In this regard, contemporary economic theory 
clearly shows that, due to the fickle nature of confidence in money, exchange rates can 
collapse in a puff of smoke. Still, economic fundamentals remain essential, even if they 
cannot in and by themselves, trigger a crisis. In fact, economic theory rightly shows that 
there is a fundamental link between financial crises and debt. What one does see, again 
and again, in the history of financial crises is that when an accident is waiting to happen, 
it eventually does. When countries become too deeply indebted, they are headed for 
trouble. But it can be challenging to guess the exact timing of a crisis. In fact, crises that 
seem imminent can sometimes take years to ignite (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009).  
 
All these findings are essential and help to bring trust in money to the forefront. Still, 
mainstream economics’ approach to the study of trust in money poses many problems. 
One such problem is that studies of monetary instability within economics tend to 
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overemphasize the speculative and rational aspects of trust in money. By stressing that 
currency crashes result from speculative attacks, these studies unrealistically assume that 
shifts on market actors’ expectations regarding money’s value are always deliberate, 
rational, and conscious decisions based on well-founded analysis and calculations. From 
this standpoint, a speculative attack on a currency is, ultimately, a good business. Thus, 
market actors voluntarily engage themselves in such attacks because they want to make 
profits. Moreover, in these models, market actors’ decisions are based on rational 
assessments, which are ultimately grounded in an unbiased analysis of complete 
information that lead to optimal solutions. Put differently, this scholarship’s approach to 
the study of confidence in money is grounded in two very old mainstream economics 
assumptions: the premise that markets are always efficient (and that prices reflect 
complete information), and the premise that actors’ expectations are rational. Of course, 
this is not to say that economists do not admit that, sometimes, financial crises appear to 
be driven by irrational factors. The idea of animal spirits (as a source of instability within 
financial markets) has long occupied a significant space within the literature attempting 
to explain crises (Kindleberger and Aliber 2015; Minsky 1982; Shiller 2017). But, for the 
most part, irrational factors are precisely seen as that: irrational behavior, deviated 
conducts, and market anomalies that can, only occasionally, account for specific 
divergences from overall trends (Kraemer 2013).  
 
Moreover, the second weakness of economics orthodoxy’s approach to money and trust 
is that this literature interprets trust as an individual decision. Even in those cases where 
economists agree that trust in money goes well beyond the individual level, collective 
confidence in money is seen as nothing more than the result of aggregated individual 
decisions. Another common approach (especially within behavioral economics) explains 
collective shifts in confidence as herd behavior, a concept that refers to situations where 
financial actors display herd-like behavior in their decisions to buy or sell an asset (or, in 
this case, a currency). Upon closer inspection, herd behavior is described as an expression 
of so-called contagion effects and is mostly attributed to information cascades (Kraemer 
2013). But again, the problem is that these models insist on leaving aside the important 
role of social institutions in shaping collective beliefs and perceptions regarding the 
sustainability of money’s value. So, all in all, economic models of currency crashes fail 
to consider the importance of culturally shared beliefs, social structures, and institutional 
settings for understanding trust in money and its dynamics. To sum up, I share with these 
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studies the aim of explaining sudden shifts in monetary trust, which can ultimately lead 
to a major currency crash. However, I differentiate from them sharply in calling attention 
to the importance of monetary institutions (and of the state) for understanding the 
dynamics that surround trust in money. 
 
Sociopolitical approaches to money and trust  
 
The orthodox idea that money is a neutral commodity whose widespread use is due to its 
effectiveness in facilitating exchange has been under attack since the beginning of the 
20th century (van der Spek and Van Leeuwen 2018). One of the most important critiques 
to the orthodox view was initially developed by some classical economists (i.e., Innes, 
Knapp, and Keynes), who put forward what has become known as the chartalist approach 
to money. According to this view, money is a creature of the state. It is a unit that acquires 
both its validity and its value as money because of the coercive power of the state and its 
ability to levy taxes on its citizens, taxes which have to be paid in the state’s own currency. 
From this standpoint, money is whatever the state announces it will accept in payment of 
taxes. It follows that trust in money is linked to the certainty that the state will continue 
to accept that which has been defined as money at the established price in payment for 
taxes. Thus, money’s acceptance does not depend on any inherent property or function of 
the actual means of payment.  
 
Once again, competing definitions on what trust in money is, ultimately, depend on 
underlying theories of what is money. In fact, as I have already shown in the previous 
section, the typical textbook story argues that money emerged spontaneously, from some 
hypothetical, pre-existing, ancient economy based on barter, to make market exchange 
more efficient. In this regard, within the commodity theory of money, money’s most 
distinctive function is being a medium of exchange, so exchangeability is the distinctive 
feature of money. Money is, essentially, the most liquid commodity, the commodity that 
it is exchangeable for all others. In sharp contrast, from the chartalist point of view, 
money’s most important feature is being a unit of account. From this view, money 
consists of claims and credits, not merely tradable objects or their symbols. For chartalists 
economists, money is, above all, transferable debt; it is a social relation of credit and debt 
denominated in a unit of account. Indeed, in the most basic sense, the possessor of money 
is owed goods. Put differently, according to the chartalist view money is an accounting 
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system, which is independent of any real money stuff (in the anthropologists’ lexicon); is 
“the means of translating the work of the barber into that of the farmer and of producing 
action at both spatial and temporal distance” (Ingham 2004, 4). In this conception, money 
is an abstract measure of value that makes it possible to compare the values of different 
things using the same scale. 
 
Quite ironically, it was precisely during the height of the gold standard when two 
economists, well-known today, started to argue that there was no evidence for believing 
that modern monetary economies evolved from ancient societies based on barter. For 
them, the essence of money was not to be a medium of exchange, but an abstract measure 
of debt. These economists were Mitchell Innes and Georg Friedrich Knapp, who were 
among the first to lay the foundations of what is still considered the basis of the chartalist 
(or state) theory of money. For those paradoxes of history, one of the most important 
contributions to the state theory of money was published in 1913, the same year in which 
the Federal Reserve Bank was established in the United States, and the country completed 
the construction of a sovereign monetary space that was defined by a dollar money of 
account based on a gold standard (Ingham 2004). Indeed, in 1913 and 1914, Mitchell 
Innes published two remarkably iconoclastic articles that appeared in the influential New 
York monthly publication, The Banking Law Journal (Innes 1914; 1913). In those pieces, 
Innes made a concise critique of the commodity theory of money and pointed out that 
“there was never any such thing as a metallic standard of value” (1914, 379). Obviously, 
in an intellectual climate dominated by metallism, Innes’ ideas did not have a favorable 
reception, but in fact, they caused short-lived indignation and a disdainful response from 
the established economic orthodoxy that relegated his views to oblivion (Ingham 2004). 
However, Innes was fundamentally correct. At about the same time, Georg Friedrich 
Knapp, an economist linked to the German historical school of economics, also 
contributed to giving shape to the chartalist theory of money. Knapp’s State Theory of 
Money (1924), first published in German in 1905, also opposed the metallist view, which 
stated that the value of money derived from that of precious metal (i.e., gold or silver). 
For Knapp – just like for Innes –, money was not a medium that emerged from exchange. 
Instead, money was a means for accounting for and settling debts, the most important of 
which were tax debts. Indeed, in Knapp’s view, money was that which is accepted at the 
public pay offices. Therefore, he considered absurd to separate the theory of money from 
the theory of the state, since it is the state that creates money by declaring what it will 
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accept for the discharge of taxes. So, ultimately, the state establishes both the items that 
will serve as money and the nominal unit of account, which defines the exact value of 
money. In this way, the state establishes both the validity and the value of money. It 
follows that trust in money is nothing but trust in the state’s commitment to maintaining 
the value of money, a value defined by the very same authorities that are the recipients of 
the taxes. Trust in money’s value is thus the positive expectation that those authorities 
will keep their promise of accepting what they defined as money at the established price.   
 
At this point, three crucial clarifications are essential. The first one is that, according to 
the chartalist theory of money, the existence of an authority is a necessary condition for 
money’s existence. As a result, money cannot be produced by the free interplay of 
economic interests in the market, nor emerge from barter. So, from this standpoint, the 
existence of money inevitably involves the question of sovereignty and raises the further 
question of the political nature of the relationship (or contract) between the guarantor of 
money’s value and its users (Ingham 2004, 49). Related to that, there is a second important 
point to notice. From the chartalist perspective, the state is not the only issuer of money; 
rather, it is the state’s acceptation which is decisive (Knapp 1924, 95). Therefore, credit 
notes and bills, issued by banks and denominated in the state’s money of account, become 
money when they are accepted as payment of tax debts owed to the state and reissued in 
payment to the state’s creditors (Knapp 1924, 143). This point uncovers a vital distinction 
within the chartalist view: the distinction between money’s validity (or valuableness) and 
money’s value. The basic idea is that money possesses a specific quality of valuableness, 
or validity, as opposed to its particular value, or purchasing power. States confer the 
quality of validity by accepting the tokens as payment for taxes and using them to make 
their own purchases. The substantive value of money is a closely related, but, none the 
less, distinct question (Ingham 2004, 48). In a metallic monetary system, the state 
establishes the value of money when it fixes the conversion rates, for example, so many 
ounces of silver or gold for a dollar or a pound. Finally, a third important point to be taken 
into account is that, since states confer moneyness, they can potentially allow different 
things to circulate and be used as money. This means that a whole range of different 
means of payment can circulate within an economy as money, and in reality, they do. In 
fact, not only have diverse objects successfully been used as money in different cultures 
and at very different points in time (from precious metals and metallic coins in Western 
Europe to cowry shells, leather, tobacco, cocoa and cattle in Africa and America). More 
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importantly, within contemporary capitalist credit economies, there are different means 
of payment that circulate simultaneously within a single monetary space: cash money, 
coins, debit cards, credit cards, checks, promissory notes, and traveler’s coupons, to name 
just a few. This multiplicity of money forms has several implications for how 
contemporary capitalist credit money functions, one of the most important of which is 
that monetary systems are hierarchically organized. Indeed, in contemporary capitalist 
economies, there are various financial claims circulate as money whose quality varies 
depending on the issuer (Bell 2001). I will come back to this point in a later section.  
 
Debates over the nature of money and trust continued during the 20th century. In fact, the 
state theory of money influenced many renowned thinkers, such as Max Weber and Georg 
Simmel. Later on, John Maynard Keynes also incorporated many of these debates in the 
general conclusions of his A Treatise on Money (1930). Moreover, in recent years, some 
heterodox economists within post-Keynesian economics and modern monetary theory 
have revived many of Knapp’s and Innes’ classical ideas on money and explored the 
reasons that lie behind its widespread universal acceptance (Bell 2001; Smithin 2003; 
Wray 2002). But the most important contemporary debates on money and monetary trust 
as sociopolitical creations that, ultimately, result from the power of the state have been 
held by political economists, especially those focusing on the study of central banks 
(Binder 2017; Braun 2014; 2016; Giannini 2011; Haldane and McMahon 2018; Holmes 
2009; Lockwood 2016; McNamara 2002; Riles 2018; Wansleben 2018). Both neo-
chartalists scholars within post-Keynesian economics and modern monetary theory,12 and 
political economists who study central banks share many ideas about money and trust. 
Most importantly, just like the classical chartalists, they all argue that monetary trust is a 
socio-political creation. In this regard, these scholars highlight the important role of the 
state and the monetary institutions for the emergence of trust in money. Logically, for 
both groups, trust in money features systemic characteristics. An important remark is that 
all these scholars consider that social scientists can aspire to build a reasonably precise 
historical understanding of the nature of money, its historical creation, and contemporary 
                                                          
12 It must be noticed that authors from very different disciplines can rightly be included within the neo-
chartalist framework, from some post-Keynesian economists (such as Stephanie Bell and Annina 
Kaltenbrunner), to economists within modern monetary theory (Randall Wray), as well as sociologists (like 
Geoffrey Ingham, Bruce Carruthers, and Aaron Sahr), legal scholars (Katharina Pistor), historians 
(Christine Desan), and academics coming from regulation theory (André Orléan, Michell Aglietta, Bruno 
Théret), among others. In this section, I use the label mainly to refer to the first two groups mentioned above 
(post-Keynesian economists and economists within modern monetary theory).   
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workings. This epistemological position is essential because, as Braun states, “a precise 
understanding of the economic workings of credit money is a prerequisite for the analysis 
of the social phenomenon of monetary trust” (Braun 2016, 1068). However, in some other 
aspects, both these approaches differ significantly from each other. In the following, I 
will summarize some of the main similarities and differences between neo-chartalists 
scholars and political economists studying central banks concerning the study of money 
and trust. Of course, this task does not exhaust, nor does it intend to exhaust, the varied 
number of topics that these studies address.  
  
The first important point to highlight is that, just like the classical chartalists and in 
contrast to political economists, neo-chartalists scholars do not bring the concept of trust 
into play when they refer to the reasons that explain the universal acceptance of money. 
Both post-Keynesian economists (Bell 2001) and economists who adhere to modern 
monetary theory (Wray 2002) state that money’s universal acceptance is mostly a result 
of the state’s coercive power. Thus, it is the state’s coercive power that allows it to impose 
taxes on its subjects and establish which means of payment should they use to pay their 
tax debts. These scholars draw attention to the concepts of coercion and force. They point 
out that it was precisely because of their coercive capacity that nascent modern states 
managed to extend monetary transactions based on credible metal standards to 
populations and areas where private and personal exchange modes were still dominant. 
In this sense, one criticism one can make to these studies is that they do not address how 
monetary trust is socially produced, nor do they try to identify what social and political 
processes may be involved in such production. Instead, neo-chartalist works limit 
themselves to point out that, since time immemorial, nascent modern states’ coercive 
capacity has been the reason why money has become widely accepted as a unit of account 
(and store of value, and medium of exchange) within market societies. In sum, within 
neo-chartalists approaches to money, state coercion precedes the emergence of any kind 
of trust. Thus, for many neo-chartalists, existing approaches to the study of trust in money 
(including predominant approaches within sociology) forget that monetary sovereignty is 
(or was) established, mainly, through extreme physical coercion (Ingham 2004, 65). In 
fact, practices such as branding on the forehead with coins and execution for 
counterfeiting were usual in ancient times. Still, the question of how monetary 




A second point to be noted is that, in contrast to the orthodox tale that claims that money 
emerged as a solution to the inefficiencies of barter, the neo-chartalist view of money as 
an institution that developed in parallel to modern states is historically well documented. 
Moreover, drawing on evidence from other social sciences, such as history, anthropology, 
numismatics, and sociology, neo-chartalists authors themselves have made great efforts 
to support their own claims (Ingham 2004; Wray 2002). And in fact, as far as we know, 
all the evidence about the origins of money points to state involvement and the shared 
origins of money, debts, and writing in the palaces’ tax levies (Aglietta 2018; Graeber 
2012; Wray 2002). For example, there are records of tally debts (in the form of clay 
tablets) in Mesopotamia that are at least 2,000 years older than the oldest known coins 
(Graeber 2012). There is also evidence to sustain that coins were probably invented to 
give the population a convenient means for paying taxes and that the use of early coins as 
a medium of exchange was probably an “accidental consequence of the coinage, and not 
the reason for [their invention]” (Wray 2002, 46). An important implication follows from 
this point, which is essential for studies of money and trust. While most social-
philosophical approaches to money (for example those predominant within the sociology 
of money) “generally subscribe to the epistemological position that the fundamental 
constitution of money is somehow unknowable”; neo-chartalists scholars and political 
economist alike shun away from that position. In contrast to most sociologists, neo-
chartalists scholars and political economists argue that a reasonably precise historical 
“understanding of the nature, making, and workings of contemporary credit money is 
possible” (Braun 2016, 1068). As I mentioned before, this claim is crucial for the present 
research, because, to understand monetary trust, we first need to understand money. That 
means that the question of how trust in money develops is inextricably linked to the 
questions of how money and monetary institutions developed historically, and how 
money works today. Auspiciously, there is a tradition of sociopolitical studies on money 
in which we can build on to address these questions. This tradition includes mainly the 
neo-chartalists and the political-economists who study central banks. Still, other scholars 
studying money from different academic disciplines (such as Geoffrey Ingham, Aaron 
Sahr, and Christine Desan) have also made important contributions in this direction. 
Overall, these scholars share the idea that knowing money is something social scientists 
can aspire to, as long as we can disentangle the material processes and the institutional 
architecture that led to the emergence of capitalist credit money as we know it today. As 
I will show in the last two sections of this chapter, trust creation in contemporary capitalist 
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credit money can only be understood once we understand the complex architecture of 
modern money.  
 
I will focus now on studies of central banks within contemporary political economy. It is 
important to highlight that these studies do address, explicitly, the question of how 
monetary trust is socially produced and reproduced today. Moreover, they try to identify 
what social and political processes may be involved in such production. Within the field 
of political economy, monetary trust is commonly defined as “trust in [money’s] future 
purchasing power and trust in the continued convention that a payment is complete when 
money changes hands” (Giannini 2011, xxv). According to this definition, trust in money 
is based on two main features: its capacity to maintain its value and to settle debts, both 
in the present and the future. Clearly, a central bank’s actions are an essential part of 
fulfilling both conditions. This fact shows how crucial institutions they are for building 
trust in a currency. It is not surprising then that political economists have devoted 
considerable efforts to analyze the role of these institutions as ultimate guarantors of the 
value of money within contemporary capitalist economies. These studies have mainly 
focused on studying how central banks legitimize their actions and sustain monetary 
governance. Still, in doing so, they have shifted the discussion of monetary trust to a 
discussion of how central banks create legitimacy and governability, thus building and 
ensuring the preservation of credibility in both money and the monetary authorities 
(Braun 2014; 2016; Giannini 2011; Haldane and McMahon 2018; Holmes 2009; 
Kaelberer 2007; Lockwood 2016; McNamara 2002; Riles 2018; Wansleben 2018).  
 
The first characteristic of central bank studies within political science is that they interpret 
trust in money as a collective and impersonal creation that develops through regular 
institutionalized practices. This is an interpretation I share. Moreover, in this view, trust 
in money is, above all, an abstract and impersonal relationship of reliance. It is a 
relationship that emanates vertically from the citizens to the state. Citizens rely upon the 
commitment of the monetary authorities. Thus, within studies of central banks, as well as 
in this dissertation, trust in money is systemic trust (Braun 2014; Kaelberer 2007; 
McNamara 2002; Riles 2018; Wansleben 2018). In particular, scholars working on central 
banks tend to emphasize that, while barter trade could rely on some elements of personal 
trust between individuals, monetized exchange is abstract. Since money is essentially a 
system that subjects participants to playing by given rules, people often have very few 
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options when it comes to the use of money. As Luhmann also pointed out, anyone who 
relies on the stability of the value of money and on the continuity of a multiplicity of 
opportunities to spend it assumes that a system is working and trusts that function, not 
people (Luhmann 1982).  
 
The second characteristic of these studies is that they highlight the importance of the trust 
taker in creating a ‘fiction of trust’ (Beckert 2005) as the base for trust in money. Even if 
these studies do not explicitly refer to Beckert’s concept, or to Goffman’s concept of 
dramaturgic action, they follow these two ideas in pragmatic terms. In fact, these studies 
interpret trust in money as a collective and impersonal construction emerging from the 
concrete actions performed by specific individuals (the monetary authorities) who act as 
legitimate representatives of the central bank. Accordingly, one of these studies’ primary 
focus is the analysis of the actions carried out by both policymakers and central bank 
governors and their interactions with their audiences. In this sense, it is important to notice 
that, with notable exceptions (Braun 2016; Kaelberer 2007), most these papers do not use 
the concept of trust when referring to money. Instead, they mostly refer to how central 
bankers create and sustain their legitimacy as the primary makers of monetary policy, and 
how they ensure monetary governance and enhance credibility in money (Braun 2014; 
McNamara 2002; Wansleben 2018). These studies tend to emphasize the political nature 
of monetary governability and trust. Also, they stress the fact that, ultimately, to enhance 
credibility in money, central bankers need to actively engage in specific actions and act 
as “the faithful spokespersons of collective monetary beliefs” (Orléan 2008, 8). Thus, 
ultimately, it makes sense that these studies refer to the concept of credibility in money, 
rather than to that of trust. In fact, the former stresses more the active role of central 
bankers in the production of trust in money. Crucially, these studies highlight the 
importance of three key elements which are the basis of a central bank’s authority: (i) its 
legal status, (ii) its expertise and (iii) its embeddedness in the political and social 
environment (Kaelberer 2007). First, the authority of a central bank always rests, to some 
degree, on the exercise of state power. That is, it derives initially from an act of political 
fiat. Thus, the monetary authorities’ continued commitment to maintaining the value of 
the currency is one of the essential foundations for credibility in a currency. However, 
state power is not the only source of a central bank’s public legitimacy and monetary 
credibility. The second source of a central bank’s authority is its expertise and 
competence. However, as Braun notices, central bankers cannot always have the 
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population as a whole to understand all the nuances of monetary policy. Thus, ultimately, 
they need to instill trust (Braun 2016). In this regard, the third source of a central bank’s 
authority is its successful interaction with its broader political and social environment. 
Indeed, one of the main challenges for monetary policymakers is to manage expectations 
and inspire trust in the monetary authority and in money itself (or, to use their own terms, 
to generate legitimacy, governability, and credibility). Therefore, it is reasonable that 
central banks’ communication strategies have become one of the privileged topics of 
analysis within political economy (Lockwood 2016).  
 
To sum up, in this dissertation, I draw on many concepts proposed by both neo-chartalists 
economists and political economists studying central banks. I have already mentioned 
some of them on passing. Still, I want to stress two crucial ideas that I share with many 
of these studies. First, I share the idea that trust in money is a sociopolitical construct, 
which is grounded at the institutional level. Moreover, just as these studies, I consider 
that even if trust in money is an impersonal and collective construction, it can be (and is) 
fostered by the actions of the monetary authorities. In other words, I share the idea that 
trust in money is, at the same time, actively fostered and systemically grounded. However, 
I differentiate from these studies in signaling that, despite the actions carried out by 
central bankers to foster trust, for trust in money to exist and endure, societies also need 
passive monetary trust. In other words, what this means is that trust in money can only be 
partially actively fostered. Yet, in the long run, for trust in money to exist and endure, 
monetary routines must also be maintained. Besides a successful management of 
expectations and crises on behalf of the central banks, trust in money is also grounded in 
successful money use. In the following section, I will come back to the importance of 
routines and habits for fostering trust in money, an idea which has mostly been developed 
by sociologists and anthropologists studying money. 
 
Money and trust within sociology and anthropology 
 
Over the last few decades, a growing number of scholars within sociology and 
anthropology, in Europe and the United States have placed money at the core of their 
concerns. Without doubt, contemporary studies of money remain one of the most dynamic 
fields within modern sociology and anthropology (Bandelj, Wherry, and Zelizer 2017; 
Carruthers and Ariovich 2010; Dodd 2014; Dufy and Weber 2009; Graeber 2012; Guyer 
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2004; Hart and Ortiz 2014; Ingham 2004; Parry and Bloch [1989] 1996; Polillo 2011; 
Sahr 2017; Zelizer 1994). Broadly speaking, two main approaches can be identified 
within contemporary social studies of money. First, a set of rather theoretical analyses 
that share a common critique to the orthodox definition of money as a neutral device and 
whose main aim has been to elaborate a theory of money capable of accounting for 
money’s social and historical character (Carruthers and Ariovich 2010; Dodd 2014; 
Graeber 2012; Ingham 2004; Polillo 2011; Sahr 2017). Second, a group of studies whose 
main interest has revolved around the question of money’s social meanings (Bandelj, 
Wherry, and Zelizer 2017; Dufy and Weber 2009; Hart and Ortiz 2014; Maurer 2011; 
Zelizer 1994). Among these studies, Viviana Zelizer’s work has been path-breaking. 
Zelizer’s fundamental contribution was recognizing how individuals use money in several 
ways to create, signal, and maintain their relationships with others (Bandelj, Wherry, and 
Zelizer 2017; Zelizer 2007; 1994). Also, somewhat across the board, a potentially third 
approach to the study of money within contemporary sociology could be identified, 
namely, a strand of research which focuses on the relationship between households and 
the universe of finances and the rapid expansion of financial practices in the everyday life 
of millions of families. Studies of financialization (Van der Zwan 2014) have extensively 
documented the transformation of financial practices that occurred since the late 1970s 
due to the market liberalization’ trends of the post Bretton Woods era. In this sense, even 
if this literature does not explicitly focus on the topic of money and trust, it provides a 
good overview of the financial repertoires and the uses of money which are present in 
contemporary capitalist economies (Davis 2009a; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; Fourcade 
and Babb 2002; Krippner 2011; Langley 2008). 
 
As I will show in the following, only a minor part of contemporary sociology and 
anthropology of money explicitly deals with the study of trust in money. However, one 
could sort studies of money within sociology and anthropology into, at least, two groups 
that make substantive contributions to our understanding of how money gets into society, 
why individuals accept it, how do they use it in their daily lives and how these uses are 
shaped and reproduced socially. On the one hand, there is a set of studies that focus on 
the different practices and financial repertoires used by different social groups (Davis 
2009a; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; González 2015; Krippner 2011; Langley 2008; Van 
Gunten and Navot 2016). One of these studies’ main focus is how people in contemporary 
capitalist societies use money for different purposes and assign multiple meanings to it 
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within each transaction (Bandelj, Wherry, and Zelizer 2017; Dufy and Weber 2009; 
Zelizer 2007; 1994). On the other hand, there is a set of studies that build on the theoretical 
contributions made by three French economists linked to the French school of regulation 
(Aglietta 2018; Orléan 2014; Théret 2007a). Mainly, these works analyze the effects of 
monetary instability and financial upheaval upon society, especially, how crisis lead to 
the emergence of public debates on money and its multiple and contested meanings 
(Bandelj, Wherry, and Zelizer 2017; Carruthers and Babb 1996; Dufy and Weber 2009; 
Hart and Ortiz 2014; Luzzi 2017; 2013; Neiburg 2010; Parry and Bloch [1989] 1996; 
Roig 2016; Théret 2007a; 2007b; Wilkis and Carenzo 2008; Zelizer 2007; 1994).    
 
Before delving deep into these two strands of literature, there is a critical remark that 
concerns all the studies of money I analyze in this section. That is that, despite few notable 
exceptions (Ingham 2004; Sahr 2017), studies on money within sociology and 
anthropology have generally (explicitly or implicitly) relied on the notion coined by 
Marcel Mauss ([1925] 2002) a century ago of total social fact to interpret money. 
Building on this concept, sociologists and anthropologists alike have stressed that, just 
like many other social phenomena, money is essentially a multidimensional institution 
that has social, moral, material, political and religious facets (Aglietta 2018; Aglietta and 
Orléan 1990; Carruthers and Ariovich 2010; Dodd 2014; 1994; Dufy and Weber 2009; 
Graeber 2012; Hart and Ortiz 2014; Orléan 2014; Théret 2007a; Zelizer 1994). In this 
sense, these studies define money as an expression of the social totality and its conflicts. 
Thus, they deeply challenge the orthodox conception of money as merely an economic 
instrument that is both socially and economically neutral. Undoubtedly, one of the great 
achievements of these studies is that they have unequivocally shown that money is, 
indeed, a complex social institution with multiple facets, and, as such, it is much more 
than a pure economic object that circulates within markets. Certainly, we have learned 
from these studies that, beyond its pure economic attributes and functions, money is also 
a means of communication within society (Ganβmann 1988), a social network (Dodd 
1994), a permanent cause of cultural debate (Carruthers and Babb 1996), a source of 
collective identity (Kaelberer 2007), and a cultural artifact that is appropriated through 
different practices (Dufy and Weber 2009; Zelizer 1994). Thus, social studies of money 
have broadened our understanding of money and cast a spotlight on the endless cultural 
uses of money and its social meanings, both of which go well beyond money’s mere 
economic features. However, more often than not, the approach to money as a ‘total social 
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fact’ has also led scholars to shy away from the study of money as a crucial socio-
historical institution of capitalist societies. In other words, with some exceptions, 
sociologists and anthropologists mostly ignore the question of how money reproduces 
itself institutionally. Instead, they focus on analyzing how money works as a cultural 
device or how it ignites fierce battles over its multiple meanings (Guyer 2004; Hart 1986; 
Hart and Ortiz 2014; Maurer 2015; 2011; Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz 2013; Parry and 
Bloch [1989] 1996; Zelizer 2007; 1994). However, with few exceptions (Holmes 2009; 
Riles 2018) they disregard both the study of the institutions that constitute money (i.e., 
the central bank, the government, and the financial sector) and the analysis of the 
mechanisms by which money is institutionally reproduced, including the sources and 
channels that foster monetary trust. In sum, these scholars systematically neglect the study 
of money as, precisely, money; that is, they overlook the study of the social processes by 
which money reproduces itself as a crucial economic institution at the core of 
contemporary capitalist economies. As stated in a previous section, often, this omission 
stems from an epistemological position (explicitly or implicitly) shared by these studies. 
As Bjerg (2014, 149) and Braun (2016, 1068) notice, mostly these studies subscribe to 
the idea that “the fundamental constitution of money is somehow unknowable” and that 
“any attempt to build a coherent theoretical conception of money is bound to fail” (Dodd 
2005, 571). As I have already pointed out, in this dissertation, I shun away from this 
epistemic position. In line with sociopolitical studies of money, I claim that social 
scientists can aspire to understand the nature, making, and workings of contemporary 
capitalist credit money. In turn, this understanding is essential to disentangle the 
theoretical and empirical underpinnings of trust in money. 
 
One of the most significant contributions to the study of trust within sociology and 
anthropology of money comes from the works of three French heterodox economists 
associated with the school of regulation, namely, Michell Aglietta, André Orléan, and 
Bruno Théret. They were among the first scholars to emphasize that, to understand how 
money works within contemporary capitalist societies, social scientists should start from 
the analysis of trust in money (Aglietta 2018; Aglietta and Orléan 1990; Orléan 2014; 
Théret 2015). In particular, they underline two very crucial points for the study of money 
and trust. First, that to understand the reproduction of money as a social institution, one 
should begin with an analysis of the ‘social faith’ in money, in other words, of monetary 
trust (Orléan 2008). Second, that social scientists should investigate episodes of monetary 
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disruption and contestation because these are privileged occasions to look into the social 
production and reproduction of trust in money. In fact, early on, these three economists 
pointed out that it is precisely during crises when the black box that money is during 
normal times suddenly opens-up, and that is the reason why these episodes constitute 
privileged windows for the analysis of trust in money (Aglietta 2018; Aglietta and Orléan 
1990; Orléan 2014; Théret 2007a; 2007b). However, these studies have failed to specify 
what crises reveal about money that, ultimately, leads to social discontent, a limitation I 
will try to overcome in this study.  
 
As a rule, in their different works, these economists distinguish between three different 
forms of trust in money, which they call methodical, hierarchical, and ethical trust 
(Aglietta 2018; Aglietta and Orléan 1990; Orléan 2014; Théret 2007a; 2007b; 2015). 
Methodical trust (a term they link to the English term ‘confidence’) denotes the routinary 
dimension of trust in money. It is the trust that emerges from routines and daily practices 
and leads social actors to accept money in exchange for goods simply because they are 
confident that all other individuals will accept that money in the future at the same price. 
Within this definition, methodical trust in money is partly rational, and it is reproduced 
in a mimetic way, that is, through the mechanism of imitation (Orléan 2014, 114). 
Hierarchical trust (a concept these scholars relate to the English term ‘credibility’) refers 
to the political dimension of trust in money. It is the trust that is actively produced by the 
state. It is vertical trust, a kind of trust that emerges due to the actions carried out by the 
political authorities. Thus, hierarchical trust is linked to the power of the money-issuing 
institutions which guarantee money’s value. Finally, ethical trust (a concept related to the 
English term ‘trust’), is the symbolic trust that results from the alignment between the 
rules that govern money issuance, distribution and destruction, and the values of the 
community where a specific currency circulates. It is trust in the principles that underpin 
monetary policies. Ethical trust is connected to the ethical-political project of a specific 
society and its conception of the common good. Ultimately, it is the trust in money’s 
capacity to represent the values held by a specific society (Aglietta 2018, 58).13 
 
                                                          
13 It is worth noticing that the concepts of methodical and hierarchical trust used by Aglietta, Orléan, and 
Théret correspond to the two dimensions of trust I signal in this dissertation, namely passive (or routinely) 
trust and active trust or credibility.   
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The works on money and trust carried on by economists from the regulation school gave 
rise to a long tradition of money studies within sociology and anthropology. In this 
tradition, debates on money have been inextricably linked to those of trust. Most of these 
studies emphasize that people accept money as a means of payment only because they 
assume money will maintain its purchasing power over time. Thus, they see trust in 
money’s enduring value as the ultimate source of money’s generalized acceptance (Dufy 
and Weber 2009; Luzzi 2013; Neiburg 2010; Roig 2016; Sánchez 2016; Wilkis 2013; 
2014; Wilkis and Carenzo 2008). Moreover, this literature highlights that monetary crises 
are privileged windows for the study of trust in money. During crises, trust in money 
denaturalizes, thus becoming a variable that social scientists can analyze. As trust breaks 
down and money moves from obscurity to political center stage, the institutional grounds 
of trust in money reveal themselves. Thus, it is because trust in money falls apart during 
crises, that its different dimensions unfold, and social scientists can analyze them in detail 
(Aglietta 2018; Aglietta and Orléan 1990; Orléan 2014; Théret 2007a; 2007b).  
 
As stated above, these studies emphasize that monetary crises reveal the intrinsically 
social, political, and symbolic dimensions of money (Théret 2015). Most of them show 
that, during crises, money ceases to be an everyday instrument and becomes a motive of 
public debate. In this regard, they stress how the denaturalization of trust in money that 
occurs during episodes of financial upheaval leads to an outburst of social representations 
on money. Indeed, social studies of money extensively document how, during episodes 
of monetary instability, widespread emotional distress translates into the emergence of 
social debates on money’s validity and the nature of its value (Carruthers and Babb 1996; 
Luzzi 2013; Neiburg 2010; Roig 2016; Théret 2007a; 2007b). Moreover, these studies 
also demonstrate how crises provoke moral and political conflicts regarding the possible 
definitions of money and its legitimate uses (Luzzi 2012). In fact, money’s meanings is 
one of these studies’ primary focus (Zelizer 1994). Thus, most of them analyze public 
discourses in social media, newspapers, magazines, and television. They mostly study 
how social actors engage in heated public debates and use different metaphors to 
reinterpret money (Luzzi 2013; Luzzi and Wilkis 2019; Neiburg 2010). In this regard, 
they highlight money’s cultural dimension, which expresses itself in money’s contested 
and conflicting meanings. Eventually, some of these studies also analyze how, during 
crises, monetary practices change, and social actors’ decisions on how to use money 
become increasingly complex (Luzzi 2012; Plasencia and Orzi 2007).  
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However, the critical point is that even if many of these studies rely on the works of 
Michell Aglietta, André Orléan, and Bruno Théret - who explicitly claim trust in money 
has multiple dimensions -, they have mostly limited themselves to the study of monetary 
routines and how crises transform them. Alternatively, they have focused on studying 
how multiple meanings emerge during crises. But for the most part, social studies of 
money have systematically overlooked the study of money’s political dimension 
(Bandelj, Wherry, and Zelizer 2017; Carruthers and Babb 1996; Luzzi 2013; Neiburg 
2010; Roig 2016). Moreover, most of these studies explicitly focus on the analysis of 
money and trust ‘from below’. Thus, they stress the importance of studying individual 
economic practices, of “following the actors”, “reconstructing their financial repertoires”, 
and “taking seriously the meaning these practices have for them” (Luzzi 2013, 205). A 
typical concern of these studies is the analysis of the strategies used by social actors to 
personalize and distribute money. Two key concepts are those of framing and 
earmarking, which were proposed by Viviana Zelizer (1994) more than twenty years ago. 
These concepts refer to how social actors distinguish money according to its origins and 
destinations, and how they separate and sort ‘different’ monies according to their specific 
uses. However, as stated previously, the problem is that, by focusing exclusively on 
money’s cultural dimension, these studies overlook money’s unavoidable economic and 
political dimensions. With few exceptions, these studies rarely focus on how the financial 
system’s dynamics or central bankers’ actions shape money as a socio-political 
institution. Interestingly, a few papers within this tradition have brought up the idea that 
monetary crises have ‘pedagogical effects’ among the population (Neiburg 2010; Sigal 
and Kessler 1997; Spitta 1988; Théret 2007a; 2007b), an idea that I consider central. 
Unfortunately, these papers have not specified where these pedagogical effects ultimately 
lie; in other words, what is that people learn about money during crises that end up 
undermining their trust. As I will show in the next section, in this dissertation, I engage 
with this question directly and try to explain what exactly people learn from monetary 
crises that they did not know before. Moreover, I link this ‘learning process’ to money’s 
institutional reality and its need for a successful politic of expectations to function 
correctly. 
 
At the crossroads between studies of money and studies of financialization, there is a 
strand of literature that studies the various routinely uses of money within contemporary 
capitalist market economies. These works study the various ways of paying, borrowing, 
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investing, and saving that social actors employ in their daily lives. Remarkably, these 
works account for several factors that shape the social uses of money. First, they point 
out that monetary practices differ among different social groups. Consequently, there are 
different monetary and financial repertories within societies, which can be specific to 
different sectors or social groups. These studies rightly describe the different economic 
strategies social actors use to consume, save, or invest. They also analyze the individual 
processes of decision-making that are behind the different options. Primarily they focus 
on those strategies directly linked to the financial system (Fourcade and Babb 2002; 
Grigoryeva 2016; Langley 2008).  
 
Second, these studies highlight the importance of cultural factors in shaping these 
different financial repertoires and show how they spread across society (Kuzina and Dodd 
2014; Wilkis 2013). For example, in a recent book, Luzzi and Wilkis (2019) describe the 
cultural process that led to the ‘popularization of the dollar’ in Argentina. Through this 
process, buying cash dollars became an increasingly common practice among Argentines 
to preserve their savings from the loss of value caused by the countries’ chronic inflation. 
In particular, the authors emphasize how the national press, graphic humor, theater, and 
television programs all play a role in bringing these monetary practices closer to the 
population. Third, these studies stress the importance of social class, economic welfare 
and financial literacy as variables that have a determinant influence in shaping financial 
repertoires (Fourcade and Babb 2002; Grigoryeva 2016; Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly ; 
Navickas, Gudaitis, and Krajnakova 2014; Titus, Fanslow, and Hira 1989). Finally, these 
studies also account for the global economic and socio-political processes that, in recent 
decades, led to the rapid expansion of finances in the everyday life of millions of families 
in the developed and the developing world, a process that began in the late 1970s (Davis 
2009a; 2009b; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; Krippner 2011; Langley 2008). For the most 
part, they refer to this process using the concept of financialization (Van der Zwan 2014). 
In particular, this literature shows the profound transformation of consumption habits that 
occurred in recent decades and the increasing importance of debt and credit, particularly 
in low-income sectors (González 2015; Hornes 2014; Wilkis 2013). Besides, this 
literature also studies what happens at the top of the social pyramid and describes the 
strategies used by elites and economically privileged groups when trying to preserve their 
wealth from the losses caused by financial crises or taxes (Atkinson and Piketty 2010; 
Harrington 2016; Keister 2014).  
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Even if the general rule is that these studies do not explicitly analyze the social 
reproduction of trust in money, I include them in this section because they contribute to 
understanding this process to the extent that they address the routinary reproduction of 
money and its uses within society. These studies do analyze how money is used daily as 
a generalized means of exchange and provide an overview of the different factors that 
influence and shape economic practices and money’s daily uses. As noted before, these 
studies underline the crucial role of social and cultural factors in shaping daily monetary 
practices. They stress the importance of social class, economic status, cultural 
background, personal preferences, education level and financial literacy in shaping the 
uses of money. They also stress how emotions, feelings, beliefs and identity play an 
essential role in the social reproduction of money. Moreover, they also stress the 
importance of global financial dynamics in fostering specific money uses (Fligstein and 
Goldstein 2015; Langley 2008). Overall, these works help us understand how money is 
collectively reproduced as a social institution due to socialization, routine, and familiarity. 
 
To sum up, at least two strands of social studies of money have contributed significantly 
to our understanding of how money reproduces itself socially. On the one hand, a set of 
studies that explicitly focuses on how trust in money denaturalizes during crises, forcing 
social actors to resignify their economic practices and engage in new money uses. These 
works call attention to the multiple rationalities that shape how people use money and 
have inspired a whole generation of researchers, thus fostering the discussion between 
sociologists, historians, anthropologists and other scholars from neighboring fields 
(Bandelj, Wherry, and Zelizer 2017; Dufy and Weber 2009; Hart and Ortiz 2014). These 
studies also stress how, during a crisis, social actors involve themselves in a constant 
exercise of symbolic definition and redefinition of money. This exercise inextricably 
leads to the emergence of public debates on money’s multiple and contested meanings. 
On the other hand, a set of studies of financialization and uses of money focuses on the 
various financial repertoires different social groups have and on the transformation of 
financial practices caused by the global financial trends that have been occurring since 
the late 1970s.  
 
Unmistakably, all these works have (explicitly or implicitly) started from a perspective 
on money as an institution that is socially reproduced through routines and daily uses, 
that means, passively. Thus, sociology and anthropology of money highlight the role 
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played by socialization, imitation, and repetition - in other words, of mimesis (Orléan 
2014) – as factors that help to explain why people use money in a certain way and not in 
another. These studies not always explicitly refer to the concept of trust. However, they 
help us understand how trust in money emerges as a natural by-product of successful 
socialization into a monetary economy, and how it reproduces itself due to habits and 
routines which are mostly unconscious and, to a great extent, collective. They show how, 
due to the endless repetition of exchanging money for goods, people become used to use 
money as a means of payment. It seems only logical then that the ways in which people 
use money are shaped by social and cultural factors, including social class, economic 
status, cultural background, personal preferences, education level, financial literacy, 
beliefs, culture, and identity.  
 
In this research, I follow these studies in their assessment that to understand money, we 
need to pay attention to its social uses. Moreover, I also share the interest of putting trust 
at the center when analyzing money and considering that this trust is deeply connected to 
the promise that money will preserve its purchasing power in the future (in other words, 
that money will store value). However, I differentiate from them in considering that trust 
in money is not only passively but also actively reproduced and in seeking to integrate 
the passive and the active dimensions of trust in money. Also, I depart from the analysis 
of money as a language, a cultural artifact embedded in society (a topic extensively 
investigated), and highlight the potential social sciences still have to contribute to the 
study of money as a key economic institution within capitalist societies and its socio-
political modes of reproduction.  
  
Trust and the working fictions of money  
 
So, after this extensive overview of debates on money and trust, it is time to go back to 
our original questions: what is trust in money, where is this trust grounded, and how is 
this trust socially produced and reproduced. In other words, where does trust in money 
come from? What are the mechanisms by which monetary trust is produced and 
reproduced within society? Who produces this trust? Can trust in money be lost? If so, is 




In this dissertation, in contrast to economics and in line with a long tradition in sociology, 
anthropology, and political economy, I conceive trust in money as systemic trust. As I 
have already stated in the previous sections, I support the idea that systemic trust in money 
can be fostered (and it is) by individuals who act as legitimate guardians of money’s value 
(i.e., the monetary authorities and monetary policymakers). At the same time, I consider 
trust in money is produced and reproduced within society thanks to both monetary 
routines and sociopolitical processes of trust creation. In other words, I consider that trust 
in money has two fundamental dimensions: a passive dimension and an active dimension. 
Thus, following studies of money within the fields of sociology and anthropology, I 
consider that trust in money is, in part, a by-product of routine and habit, a consequence 
of the endless repetition of successful money use. Thus, to no small extent, trust in money 
is passive, practical, pragmatic trust. It is an attitude that emerges as the logical by-product 
of monetary routines and the successful use of money from an early age (Ganβmann 
1988). However, unlike many sociologists and anthropologists, I also consider that trust 
in money does not exhaust itself in its passive, unconscious, and routinely dimension. 
Drawing on a tradition of sociopolitical studies on money, I consider that there is also an 
active, socio-political dimension of monetary trust. This active trust is a socio-political 
construction that, ultimately, relies on the enduring promise that money has and will keep 
its purchasing power over time. Here, the state, the monetary authorities, and the financial 
sector play a crucial role. Indeed, if, in addition to being rooted in successful monetary 
routines, trust in money needs to be socio-politically established, this means that 
academics must explore how the government and the central bank, above all, try to 
generate this trust. My argument is that to produce trust in money, the state and the 
government (materialized primarily in two institutions: the central bank and the ministry 
of economy and/or finance) need to produce an image of the long-lasting value of the 
national currency. For this, they have to reproduce and nourish socially shared monetary 
beliefs. At the same time, to fully understand the social reproduction of trust in money, 
social scientists also need to study the roles of the media and the networks of economic 
experts. Daily, these actors submit monetary imaginations to private and public scrutiny; 
therefore, they contribute to legitimize or undermine trust in money. However, again, it 
is essential not to lose sight that the everyday social reproduction of monetary beliefs 
(which, as I will show, are the very base of trust), is equally grounded in both monetary 
routines and politically nourished monetary credibility. In sum, both the passive and the 
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active production and reproduction of trust in money must be at work for money to work 
correctly. 
 
It follows from the statements above that, even if, to no small extent, trust in money “is 
created and maintained through discursive processes that take place between the actors in 
the field and the general public” (Beckert 2016, 129), trust in money is equally grounded 
in social actors’ continual successful experiences with the monetary system. In turn, these 
positive monetary experiences rely on the maintenance of monetary stability. That is to 
say that, to a great extent, trust in capitalist credit money requires that money maintains 
its actual purchasing power over time. However, for this to happen, many institutional 
conditions must also be met, among them: the government and the central bank must be 
committed to maintaining price stability; the transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy must function properly; the government must maintain fiscal discipline; the 
exchange rate must be relatively stable; the regulation and supervision of the banking 
system must be effective; there must be a central bank capable of properly fulfilling its 
role as lender of last resort; and, least visible of all, the payment system of the economy 
must function properly (Braun 2016, 1070).  
 
In sum, from the above, one can infer that money must be conceived as an institution 
ultimately grounded in social practices, material facts, and future expectations that are 
sustained by political means. Accordingly, trust in money must be understood as 
grounded in these three components. So, again, my argument is that trust in money is 
both, the product of monetary routines (which, of course, ultimately rely on the successful 
material reproduction of money as an economic institution), as well as a sociopolitical 
creation which rests on the ability of the monetary authorities and the government to keep 
the promise of money’s present and future value alive. Thus, both - the passive and the 
active - dimensions of trust are equally important, and both alike nourish the promise of 
value that keeps money rolling over. In turn, this promise of value is nothing but the 
state’s commitment to the people, that money has value today, and that it will continue to 
have value in the future. People must then not only trust that payments will be completed 
every time money changes hands. Even more importantly, they must also trust that money 
has value now and will have value in the future. Now, the question is, how is this promise 




If trust in money is grounded in shared collective beliefs (Orléan 2008) then what are 
these beliefs? In this dissertation, I build on the hypothesis put forward by Benjamin 
Braun (2016), that trust in contemporary capitalist credit money is mostly grounded on a 
set of socially shared beliefs on what money is and how it works - what Braun calls the 
prevalent folk theory of money -, which is a complete upside-down version of the money 
institution and its inner workings. Moreover, even if I agree with Braun that these 
widespread erroneous beliefs are not so much the consequence of a malicious conspiracy 
as the contingent debris of previous stages in the history of money; I claim that the 
preservation of - at least some aspects of - this folk theory of money is crucial for 
sustaining the institutional scaffolding of capitalist credit money. According to Braun, the 
folk theory of money prevalent in western societies nowadays consists of three myths, 
namely: (i) that all money is created equal (and thus non-hierarchical), (ii) that banks are 
intermediaries, and (iii) that money is exogenous, and can thus be controlled by the central 
bank. In agreement with Braun, I consider these myths (or fictions) regarding money are 
indeed at work in contemporary western societies. However, in this research, I depart 
from Braun in signaling two other fictions that are also part of collective monetary beliefs 
and which, I will argue, are at the very base of trust in money. In other words, I expand 
Braun’s conception of the folk theory of money by adding two further fictions whose 
existence I consider crucial, especially for the topic this dissertation address, meaning the 
study of how trust in money is socially produced and reproduced. In a nutshell, my 
argument is that trust in contemporary capitalist credit money is ultimately grounded in a 
promise of value. This promise of value, in turn, relies on three fictions of money, namely, 
the fiction that money is wealth, the fiction that money has (and holds) a stable value, and 
the fiction that all money is created equal.14 Moreover, I consider that preserving these 
fictions is crucial for money’s reproduction as a social institution. In this sense, they can 
be regarded as working fictions of money. In the following, I draw on a set of academic 
and historical data and fieldwork insights to propose, as a hypothesis to be tested, an 
interpretation of where is trust in money grounded in capitalist market economies. The 
goal of this study is not to provide the last word but to make a first step in this direction, 
thus blazing a conceptual trail for future research on trust in money while, at the same 
                                                          
14 The reader must keep in mind that the fiction (or myth) that (i) all money is created equal was signaled 
by Braun (2016), together with the fictions that (ii) banks are intermediaries, and that (iii) money is 
exogenous. The other two fictions – that (iv) money is wealth, and that (v) money has a stable value -, are 
a new addition that I develop in this dissertation. Still, the two new fictions are potentially complementary 
to those signaled by Braun. All five fictions could eventually be integrated into a more comprehensive 
version of the folk theory of contemporary capitalist credit money. 
 
49 
time, providing an example on how historical and empirical research on the topic can be 
carried out.  
 
The argument I put forward in this dissertation is that, in contemporary capitalist’s 
societies, trust in money is grounded in the promise that money will maintain its value 
and that, as a consequence, we will be able to use it to settle debts both in the present and 
in the future. However, this promise of value rests on a set of shared beliefs and 
misconceptions about the nature of money’s value. To trust in capitalist credit money, 
people must believe in its enduring value, but this belief rests upon a shared (inaccurate) 
notion on where this value is grounded. In this regard, as I will explain in the following, 
my argument is that, while always specific to a given currency and a particular context, 
the promise on money’s enduring value is always grounded in a set of shared 
misconceptions on what money is and why is it valuable in the first place. To be more 
specific, I argue that, for people to trust in the enduring value of money, they need to 
believe in three fictions of money, which, when put together, provide an erroneous image 
on money’s nature and on the reasons why money is capable of storing value. The first of 
these fictions is that money’s value stems from money’s (supposed) objective and 
material reality. In this sense, I argue that to trust money will keep its value over time, 
people need to believe that money is wealth. Second, and related to the above, to trust in 
money people need to believe that money’s value is constant, this means, that money has 
a (relatively) stable value, a value that does not change over time (or changes very little) 
and that is, therefore, more than a human creation. Finally, to trust in money’s long-lasting 
value, people need to believe that all money in circulation has the same economic and 
legal status; that is, that money is homogeneous. This implies that people must not only 
forget (or ignore) money’s immaterial and conventional nature, but also its hierarchical 
structure within contemporary capitalists’ economies. So, for money to be trustworthy 
and continue to function correctly, the promise of money’s enduring value, and the 
working fictions in which this promise is grounded, must be at work.  
 
It is now time to take a closer look at these three fictions of money. Money is complicated, 
and it is hardly surprising that the popular theory of money is wrong in all significant 
respects. In fact, for the most part, the history of money has consisted of a succession of 
different ways of obfuscating its true nature, namely: (i) that money is an immaterial unit 
of account, an accounting system, and a network of credit-debt relationships; (ii) that its 
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purchasing power is a convention institutionally sustained by the commitment of the state; 
and (iii) that, in capitalist economies, money is organized hierarchically. Undoubtedly, 
much of the blame for this misconception lies with orthodox economists, who have 
engaged themselves with spreading right and left two ideas which had a crucial role in 
shaping our collective beliefs about money’s value: the ideas that money is a commodity 
that is capable of storing value. As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, for most economic 
orthodoxy, money is a commodity whose value stems from its material characteristics. In 
this conception, money has an intrinsic value that originates in the value of the specific 
materials (i.e., precious metals such as gold and silver) of which money is made, and it is 
linked to their specific characteristics (their brightness, weight, durability, resistance, 
malleability, etc.). This conception of money as a commodity is, in turn, complemented 
by a second notion that money is capable of storing value towards the future. Thus, it 
seems only logical that when put together, these two ideas convey an (erroneous) image 
of money as an object with an intrinsic, stable, and enduring value; a valuable commodity 
capable of maintaining its value towards the future; an image of money as long-lasting 
wealth. These are, indeed, the two myths upon which the promise of value that sustains 
trust in money is grounded: the myth that money is an asset, it is wealth, and the myth 
that money has a stable value which stems for its material reality and that will last over 
time. However, nothing could be further from the truth.  
 
What is money’s true nature? As I have already pointed out, money is not material wealth; 
it is not an asset. On the contrary, money is credit; it is transferable debt. As the chartalists 
rightly showed, in its purest nature, money is a unit of account, an accounting system 
whose uniqueness rests in its ability to make comparable the prices of different goods 
against each other. Thus, in contrast to widespread social beliefs of money as a form of 
material wealth, the truth is money is an immaterial unit of account, a complex accounting 
system, a language capable of translating into a single tongue the value of things that 
would otherwise be incomparable. At most, money is credit; it is a legal right to claim 
goods in the future. But, whatever it is, money is not a material asset. Again, at best, 
money is only a right that has the potential to be a material asset. This, then, is the first 
fiction on which social trust in the enduring value of money rests: the belief that (fiat) 
currencies have ‘something’ behind them, meaning, a substance that supports their value. 
The second fiction on which trust in money rests is the belief that money’s value is stable 
and enduring. In fact, to the extent that people believe the value of money is an objective 
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property of money derived from its material constituency, they assume money’s value is 
permanent, constant, something more than a human product. But, again, the reality is that 
(at least in contemporary fiduciary monetary systems) the value of money is both 
conventional and contingent; it is an arbitrary number both defined and institutionally 
backed-up by the state (and eventually, the market). In other words, the value of money, 
its purchasing power, is no more than a socially-shared and institutionally-safeguard 
convention. Anyone who observes the dynamics of contemporary currency markets can 
assess that since the prices of most currencies float freely, they can fluctuate sharply in 
short periods. So, the truth is that instead of being a material source of endurable wealth, 
contemporary money is an immaterial system of financial claims whose value is a 
collective and contingent convention which can, therefore, change sharply. It follows then 
that there is a fundamental mismatch between what we collectively believe money is and 
money’s true nature.  
 
Finally, the third fiction of money is that modern money is homogeneous; it is all-purpose 
money; it is fungible. Thus, every currency has the capacity to transform itself into a 
different monetary form (Steiner 2009). Accordingly, the popular saying goes, we believe 
that ‘a dollar is a dollar is a dollar’. That means, we believe legal tender is standard and 
uniform. However, it turns out that this is not true either. Actually, in contemporary 
capitalist economies, the quality of financial claims that circulate as money varies, 
depending on the issuer (Bell 2001; Braun 2016; Mehrling 2012). While in every national 
economy, there are many different means of payment that circulate as money - cash, bank 
deposits, credit cards, checks, etc. -, these different types of money are neither 
economically nor legally equivalent.15 There is always a unique asset that constitutes the 
medium of final settlement or ‘medium of redemption’ (Smithin 2002a, 6). Despite this 
reality, and again as Braun (2016) noted, the fiction that all money is created equal 
conceals the differences between all these types of money, especially between outside 
and inside money. Outside money, or central bank money, consists of cash (notes and 
                                                          
15 One clarification is essential. When I state that in modern capitalist economies, different types of money 
trade at par despite their legal and economic differences, I am referring to the fact that monetary systems 
are hierarchical in the sense pointed out by Bell (2001), Braun (2016) and Mehrling (2012). This conception 
must not be confused with the idea proposed by Viviana Zelizer (1994) that within capitalists’ societies, 
money is framed and earmarked; thus, originating a multiplicity of currencies. While the first idea refers to 
the institutional differences between means of payment with different risk structures, the second notion 
stresses that, within contemporary market societies, all-purpose money can have different social uses and 
acquire different meanings. However, these differences remain at the level of social interactions and are not 
institutional and legal differences, like in the first case.  
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coins) and reserves (held by a commercial bank in accounts at the central bank). In 
contrast, inside money is a liability of the banking system created through private bank 
lending to businesses and households. It consists of bank-created credits held in checking 
accounts, term deposits, or savings accounts. Legally, only outside money is ‘legal 
tender’. In practice, this means that debts among banks and banks’ debts to the central 
bank or the government, can only be settled in outside money. Economically, the 
difference lies in the quality of the credit claims that circulate as money. Outside money 
is the safest asset in the financial system because it is the liability of the monetary 
authority that, for all practical purposes, has a default risk of zero. Private banks have a 
real default risk, which is why their liabilities occupy a lower rung in the hierarchy of 
money (Braun 2016, 1074). So, this means that inside and outside money are different in 
both legal and economic terms. However, the hierarchical distinction between outside and 
inside money usually remains hidden from the parties to a monetary transaction by the 
invisible operation of the payments system which – by trading inside money ‘at par’ with 
outside money - creates the illusion of non-hierarchical money and supports the fiction 
that all money is created equal. Still, contemporary capitalist credit money is 
hierarchically organized, both at the national and the international levels. Indeed, national 
monetary systems consist of various means of payment with different risk structures 
organized in a complex pyramid of private and public promises of future settlement. 
Equally important, the international monetary system consists of a hierarchy of 
currencies, at the apex of which is the dollar (Eichengreen 2011). In sum, while 
conventional economic theory and widespread monetary beliefs support the idea that 
money is the most liquid and exchangeable asset in the entire financial system and that 
all money in circulation is fundamentally the same, this notion is entirely false. 
   
At this point, one is forced to wonder, “how could people have entrusted their lives to this 
dubious co-production of banks and states […] despite the long history of financial 
scandals and crises extending from the 17th century to our own times?” (Streeck 2018, 
143). And the short answer is that because people are fundamentally misguided about 
money and its capacity to store value. Money is radically different from what we believe 
it is. We believe money to be an economic asset, the manifestation of material wealth, but 
it is not; fundamentally, money is credit, it is transferable debt. We believe money to 
poses intrinsic value, a value that will persist over time. Yet, money’s value is a 
convention whose purchasing power is only ensured by the warranty of an issuing state. 
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We believe all money within the financial system is fundamentally the same. Again, it is 
not: money is hierarchically organized. Therefore, not all money is equal both in 
economic and legal terms. Indeed, the hierarchical nature of money is present at the 
national level (where central bank reserves and cash top the pyramid) and at the 
international level, where dollars are not equal to euros, which are not equal to pesos. It 
follows from the above that the image of money as the most liquid asset, the manifestation 
of enduring wealth, the most exchangeable commodity, is, to say the least, completely 
inaccurate. Money’s true nature is very different from the feeling of material security that 
we usually have when we look at the bulky deposits in our bank accounts. “The feeling 
of personal security that the possession of money gives” described by Simmel (2011, 
179), and which he argues “is perhaps the most concentrated […] manifestation of trust 
in the socio-political […] order”, could not be more off-base.  
 
(Dis)believing money: the logics of distrust 
 
At last, the moment has come to address our two remaining questions, namely, can trust 
in money be lost? And, if so, is it possible to restore it? Indeed, there are many occasions 
in which monetary trust can be jeopardized and even lost. As Hyman Minsky (1982) 
rightly pointed out, contemporary capitalist economies are – due to their institutional 
design - inherently unstable. Therefore, there are many occasions where currencies 
(especially those at the bottom of the international currency hierarchy) become 
problematic, either because their value changes continuously or because it becomes 
highly uncertain. In countless situations, such as in a monetary crisis or during 
hyperinflation, the equivalency system that sustains a monetary economy breaks down, 
and the value of the currency changes abruptly or depreciates steadily. In those 
circumstances of monetary instability and financial upheaval, when monetary routines do 
no longer hold, and socio-politically established narratives break down, people can cease 
taking money for granted. But how does this process occur?  
 
As I intend to show in the following chapters, the ultimate reason why trust in money’s 
long-lasting value gets lost is the breakdown of money’s working fictions. As I will show, 
monetary disruptions are events that reveal the immaterial, conventional, and hierarchical 
nature of money. They show that there is indeed nothing behind money. Therefore, these 
disruptions may destroy trust in money, thus damaging the money institution to a point 
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where solutions are difficult. By calling into question the image of money’s value as 
something natural, immutable, and completely immune to social transformation, 
monetary crises can cause money to no longer serve as such.  
 
Like I will show for Argentina’s case, economies long exposed to severe monetary 
upheavals show how essential the preservation of these fictions is for the proper working 
of the monetary system. Indeed, if monetary crises tend to have a scandalizing effect on 
people, this is precisely because, in these moments, people are confronted with money’s 
true nature. To the extent that crises reveal money is not a safe commodity that stores 
value but an immaterial system of claims whose value is a convention, they cause people 
to stop taking money for granted. This is why moments of financial upheaval are moments 
of shock, often leading to an outburst of collective questions about money’s multiple 
meanings and the nature of its value. Because established beliefs break down during 
crises, social actors find themselves overwhelmed by a situation whose complexity and 
ambiguity exceeds them. In this sense, economic actors’ negative personal experiences 
with money damage their trust through a ‘learning’ process and lead to the emergence of 
distrust. It is not only the disruption of monetary routines but especially the realization 
that money is not what we believe it is, that causes monetary trust to morph into distrust. 
However, it should be noted that this ‘learning’ process is not a conscious realization by 
which social actors analytically understand the true nature of money’s value. Far from 
that, this is a pragmatic process of realization that leads people to avoid repeating the 
same ‘mistakes’ once again. Distrust in money is thus engrained in habitus; it is the 
product of a “long collective history, endlessly reproduced in individual histories, and 
which can be fully accounted for only by historical analysis” (Bourdieu 2005, 5). It is the 
succession of monetary crises (that continuously reveals the immaterial, hierarchical, and 
conventional nature of money), which leads to distrust. It is the long-term exposure of 
social actors to the regularities of the money institution (that occur through crises), which 
makes them ‘understand’ the real nature of money and its inner dynamics. Because social 
actors incorporate this knowledge in their “social and cognitive structures and their 
practical patterns of thinking, perception, and action” (Bourdieu 2005, 8-9), their distrust 
becomes part of their habitus.  
 
This is the paradox of modern money: once people are aware of money’s true nature, they 
do not trust it anymore. This, in turn, makes the politics of expectations on money crucial 
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to ensure its correct functioning. This is the reason why, as Carruthers and Babb (1996, 
1556) rightly notice, money “works best when it can be taken for granted”. To a great 
extent, one could argue that this feature is not exclusive to the institution of money. 
Indeed, as the anthropologist Mary Douglas pointed out more than three decades ago, to 
be effective and avoid challenges to their legitimacy, social institutions must appear to be 
based on “more than conventions” (Douglas 1986, 48). Thus, while it is undeniable that 
“the objectivity of the institutional world [...] is a humanly constructed and produced 
objectivity” (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 78), we humans need to naturalize our social 
world, we need to believe that this world is objective and unchanging in order for it to 
make sense to us. And indeed, if people became aware of their participation in the 
collective construction of their daily environment, this environment would suddenly 
become artificial, vulnerable, and ineffective. Naturalizing the social is, thus, the 
fundamental basis of institutional stability. In this regard, money is just like any other 
social institution. However, as I have been pointing out, there is a specificity in money. 
In fact, to the extent that trust in money is grounded on erroneous beliefs, a dose of reality 
can break these beliefs down, breaking down trust in money. It is not merely that, through 
a monetary crisis, social actors learn money’s value is a social product, the result of a 
social convention. Naturally, this realization is crucial. However, above all, what is 
central is that, through a monetary crisis, social agents fully grasp the true nature of money 
as both a product of social conventions and a hierarchical institution consisting of a 
system of immaterial claims. So, it is not only that, to use the same metaphor used by 
Carruthers and Babb (1996, 1558), for money as a social institution to make sense to us, 
we must ‘forget’ (through naturalization) our participation in the creation of money’s 
value. Moreover, we must also forget (or ignore) the immaterial and contingent nature of 
this value. However, given that monetary crises prevent us from forgetting (or ignoring) 
the conventional, immaterial, and hierarchical nature of money, they may end up 
destroying this institution. Thus, to the extent that monetary crises teach us the true nature 
of money, they prevent collective amnesia. It is precisely because of this collective 
memory that money can very well stop serving as such. Ultimately, it is deception that 
leads to disbelief; it is the breakdown of the working fictions of money, the frustrated 
expectations that money will keep its value, that leads to the production and reproduction 




In the following four chapters, I will return to the theoretical questions explored in this 
chapter and address them through a historical and empirical analysis of the Argentine 
currency. In the next chapter, I will go back to the global history of money and provide a 
general framework to locate Argentina’s monetary history in the broader global scenario. 
I will delve into the history of the international monetary system from the gold standard 
to the present, and show how the institutional foundations of trust in capitalist currencies 
changed over time. I will show how, from the 19th century to the present, trust in capitalist 
currencies stopped being linked to gold. I will also emphasize that widespread beliefs 
about the foundations of money’s value did not accompany these institutional changes. 
On the contrary, the fictions of money remained, and so did the image that what makes 
money valuable and reliable is its link to a particular source of material wealth. Also, I 
will underline how, from 1944 onwards, the international monetary system’s hierarchical 
character intensified. This exacerbated the monetary problems of countries with 
dependent economies and weak currencies, among them Argentina.  
 
In chapters 4 and 5, I will describe the long process by which the Argentine state sought 
to create a reliable and trustworthy currency and sustain trust in its long-lasting value. 
Through a journey across a long succession of monetary crises of different kinds (which 
starts in 1880 and continues until the present day), I will show the many attempts made 
by Argentina’s monetary institutions to build and sustain the value of its currency. Since 
1946, most of these attempts failed, and the Argentine state’s promise to keep the value 
of its currency broke to a point where solutions are difficult. Finally, in the last chapter, I 
will describe Argentina’s central bank’s most recent attempt to restore trust in money and 
reestablish monetary stability. I will show how, between 2016 and 2018, Argentina’s 
monetary authorities tried to stabilize the economy by implementing an inflation targeting 
regime. Finally, in a brief epilogue, I will show that, once again, the attempt to generate 
trust in the currency and stabilize the economy failed. Indeed, in early 2018, a significant 
exchange rate crisis hit the country and lasted for several months. 
 
In short, in the chapters that follow, I will invite the reader to delve deep together into the 
history of the Argentine currency. It will be a tortuous story whose path is not always 
linear. It will also be a story that paradigmatically exemplifies what happens when a 
society is condemned to permanently remember the conventional, hierarchical, and 
immaterial nature of money. When collective oblivion is prevented, money breaks down. 
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Thus, this is the story of an economy in permanent flux and a weak state incapable of 
sustaining the promise in the national currency’s long-lasting value. A state that 
condemned an entire nation to continuously remember the contingent, hierarchical, and 
immaterial nature of money. In doing so, it also condemned its people to seek alternatives 
to try to preserve the value of their wealth. It is a story of material loss and sovereign 
subordination, which led Argentina’s currency to lose some of its fundamental functions. 
These functions started to be performed by the global hegemonic currency, the US dollar. 
Through this story, we will dive into the ups and downs of the Argentine monetary history 
with the ultimate goal of understanding a fundamental sociological question: How is the 




3. Reshaping value: the transformation of money during 
the 20th century16 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that to trust in capitalist credit money, people must 
believe in its lasting value. I also stated that this belief in the value of money rests on a 
set of shared misconceptions about the nature of money and why money can store value. 
To trust in the enduring value of money, social actors need to believe in three fictions. 
The first of these fictions is that the value of money is ‘intrinsic’ and stems from the 
materials from which money is made. The second is that the value of money is constant 
and stable; that means it does not change over time and is more than a human creation. 
The third is that all money in circulation has the same economic and legal status, that 
money is homogeneous. In the previous chapter, I showed that these beliefs are mistaken 
and do not reflect contemporary money’s institutional reality. Still, they are present in 
most western societies. But where do they come from? In this chapter, I will show that 
these three fictions of money have their origin in capitalist money’s history.  
 
During the 20th century, the money institution has suffered significant transformations. 
Throughout this time, there had been different assessments of the reasons why money has 
and holds value. The different conceptions have been accompanied by different 
institutional arrangements and strategies to guarantee money’s value. All in all, during 
the 19th and 20th centuries, there had been different approaches on how to back up the 
value of capitalist currencies and establish trust in them. I will refer to these different 
approaches and institutional arrangements as money’s value regimes. Throughout 
history, there have been different value regimes for capitalist money. Indeed, capitalist 
societies have debated multiple times how to assess and maintain money’s value, 
engaging in fierce battles with enormous material and political consequences. An analysis 
of capitalist credit money’s global history shows how these different value regimes have 
followed one another over time. The general trend has been that money’s connection to 
the material world has become looser and more distant. Since the times in which coins 
                                                          
16 The historical account provided in this chapter is based on the following works: Aglietta and Coudert 
(2015); Arceo (2011); Braun (2016); Carruthers and Ariovich (2010); Carruthers and Babb (1996); 
Eichengreen (2011; 019; 008); Frieden (2015); Ocampo (2016); Redish (1993); Regalsky (2018); 
Richardson, Gou, and Komai (2018); Richardson, Komai, and Gou (2018); Rougier and Sember (2018b); 
Sember (2018); Williamson (1977) In the text, I only cite these works occasionally to avoid repetition and 
facilitate reading. Other works are quoted in parenthesis following the usual criteria.  
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were made of precious metals and money was a valuable commodity itself, capitalist 
societies have developed increasingly abstract forms of money and increasingly complex 
banking systems (Carruthers and Babb 1996, 1558). Monetary historians routinely use 
the concept of evolution to describe such development. The evolutionary metaphor aptly 
captures monetary developments since the Industrial Revolution, which saw a 
unidirectional movement from metallic coins, to paper money convertible into gold under 
the gold standard, to the gold-backed dollar standard under the Bretton Woods system, to 
pure fiat money (Braun 2016, 1069).  
 
For centuries, a fairly straightforward ‘anchor chain’ (Redish 1993) linked money to the 
physical world via the material identity of money and precious metals. Since early modern 
times and until well into the 19th century, precious metals (such as gold and silver) were 
used for the coinage of money. At the time, the ability of money to store value was seen 
as a result of money’s material substrate. The widespread belief was that money had an 
‘intrinsic’ value. During more than five centuries, the conception of money as a 
commodity with intrinsic value prevailed. Money’s value was seen as the result of 
precious metals’ specific material properties: their brightness, weight, durability, 
resistance, malleability. The argument that genuine money had to possess intrinsic value 
was typically made by analogy: just as a ruler had to possess length to measure length, so 
money had to possess value to measure value. The reasoning was that “as the yardstick 
becomes the measure of length by having length within itself, only metallic money having 
intrinsic value could become a measure of value” (Carruthers and Babb 1996, 1567). 
Thus, the ultimate source of trust in the long-lasting value of money resulted from this 
association between money and precious metals that (were supposed to) had intrinsic 
value.  
 
The first transformation of capitalist money’s value regime took place in 15th century 
Europe, in the context of long-distance trade, where the problem of shipping specie was 
greatest. At the time, northern Italian merchants began to develop paper substitutes for 
coin, and their innovations quickly spread to other parts of western Europe (Carruthers 
and Ariovich 2010, 26-27). It was risky to transport precious metal over long distances 
(witness the ongoing predations against Spanish treasure ships traveling from the New 
World to Spain). Under some circumstances, bills of exchange and promissory notes 
could function as money and, because they were written documents, were much easier to 
 
60 
transport. Thus, without intending to, the Italians who began to use these financial 
instruments initiated a crucial and long-term shift of money away from precious metal 
and towards paper that represented precious metal. As I will show in the following, the 
invention of gold-backed paper money produced two fundamental changes in capitalist 
money’s value regime. On the one hand, this invention transformed the link between 
money and precious metals. With the invention of paper money, money stopped being 
wealth and became a representation of it. However, to be effective, this transformation 
required the involvement of a political institution, which could guarantee there will be 
enough gold to back up paper money. At first, such institutions were private banks, but 
gradually modern states took over the responsibility of guaranteeing money’s value in 
gold (Redish 1993). With this shift, the system of fractional reserves was put in place. 
This meant that governments and central banks only had to back up a percentage of the 
paper money in circulation (generally less than 40%) with gold reserves (Richardson, 
Komai, and Gou 2018). Therefore, not only was money no longer wealth in itself but a 
representation of wealth. Moreover, the system of fractional reserves implied that states 
only had to have a portion of the gold necessary to support the total value of the money 
in circulation. With the invention of gold-backed paper money and the implementation of 
a system of fractional reserves, the monetary system became more unstable and exposed 
to the possibility of a crisis of confidence. Still, during the period the gold standard was 
in place, money’s value was always seen as a consequence of the link between money 
and gold, irrespective of money being coins or paper notes. 
  
The next level of abstraction and elasticity was reached with the international monetary 
agreement of Bretton Woods. With the establishment of the gold-backed dollar standard 
in 1944, the dollar was the only currency that retained gold convertibility. The major 
currencies were pegged to the dollar through a system of fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates. With this transformation, the link between money and gold became even looser. As 
the US dollar was the only currency that continued to be linked to gold, trust in money 
stopped depending only on each issuing state’s capacity to keep its promise to preserve 
money’s value. After 1944, the value of all capitalist currencies was inevitably tied to the 
price of the dollar, and to the US government’s ability to keep the promise of converting 
its currency into gold at the price of 35 dollars per ounce. Since the Bretton Woods 
agreements were signed, the trust in all currencies started to be inevitably tied to the 
Federal Reserve’s decisions. An important point to highlight is that, since the dollar 
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became the world’s official reserve currency, the asymmetries of the international 
monetary system increased even further. The problem was not only that the international 
monetary system’s architectural design was already hierarchical, and it prevented any 
search from symmetry. Moreover, the fact that one specific country’s currency started 
fulfilling the role of global reserve currency made the system even more hierarchical. In 
contrast to when gold was the international reserve currency, in the post Bretton Woods 
era, the US became the system’s primary beneficiary. Indeed, while gold was the principal 
reserve asset, there were, in principle, no obvious beneficiaries in the international 
monetary system. The most powerful country was the one who could appropriate the 
larger quantity of gold, and this place could, in principle, be occupied by any country as 
long as its government managed to hoard sufficient gold (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 
2018). However, in the post Bretton Woods era, the situation changed. Since the US was 
the only country capable of issuing dollars, there was no possible way to challenge US 
supremacy, except challenging the whole system. 
 
Finally, in 1971, with the breakdown of the gold-backed dollar standard, money’s link to 
the material world was wholly disrupted. When President Nixon ended convertibility in 
1971, the link between the US dollar and gold was broken. But since the whole 
international monetary system relied on the dollar, the consequence of Nixon’s decision 
was that all money became fiat money. Gold stopped being the reference for money’s 
value. Suddenly, money lost its relationship with any material asset. Moreover, due to 
Nixon’s decision, money’s value became increasingly self-referential. As money became 
more and more detached from its material base, trust in capitalist currencies stopped being 
linked to the promise of turning money into gold. In this new reality, what makes fiat 
money trustworthy is the certainty that others will accept it as a means of payment for 
any good or service, now or in the future. In fact, to no small extent, the value of 
contemporary fiat money stems from its ability to be interchangeable. So, fiat money’s 
value is a synonym of liquidity, is the result of a collective decision to give value to a 
particular currency or asset. If people believe that a paper dollar has value, if they trust it 
has, that fact alone is enough to make the dollar a trustworthy currency. Thus, in our 
contemporary world of fiat currencies, where the relative values of most currencies float 
freely, money’s value has become increasingly dependent on market movements. 
Moreover, due to these transformations, the management of expectations regarding 
money became a crucial feature of national and international monetary politics. Political 
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agreements and government decisions also play a crucial role in determining money’s 
value. In the following, I will describe the transformations of the money institution during 
the 20th century in more detail.  
 
The value of money from the gold standard to Bretton Woods 
(1875-1944) 
 
Between 1875 and 1936, the international monetary system was organized according to 
an institutional arrangement known as the gold standard. The gold standard was a system 
in which gold was the dominant international trade currency. During that time, all the 
countries that participated in the world trade network had to set the values of their 
currencies in gold, a practice that encouraged and facilitated international trade. Given 
that the countries kept the prices of their currencies in gold fixed, they had to buy or sell 
gold at pre-established prices. Similarly, their gold reserves had to be sufficient to back 
their money issuance according to the specific conversion rate. Due to this very automatic 
conversion mechanism, the monetary agencies’ activity was limited (at least in theory) to 
passively monetize trade balance surpluses and, conversely, to contract the monetary base 
when there was a trade deficit. It was only when foreign currency (mainly pounds sterling) 
or gold bullion entered a country, that the monetary authorities were able to print 
banknotes, as many banknotes as metal entered the country’s vaults. On the other hand, 
if for some reason the country’s gold reserves decreased, the monetary agencies had to 
withdraw the excess of money accordingly, taking as many banknotes back from 
circulation as metal had been exported, and keeping them until a net inflow of gold 
allowed them to enter the circuit again. For obvious reasons, then, during the gold 
standard, the policy toolkit at monetary agencies’ disposal was extremely limited – or 
rather nonexistent –, especially when one compares it to the variety of tools central banks 
have nowadays. 
  
Historically, this was a time in which the conception of commodity-money prevailed. The 
dominant view was that precious metals (gold and silver) had an ‘intrinsic’ value, a value 
that resulted from their material features (their brightness, weight, durability, strength, 
malleability, etc.). According to this idea, money’s ability to store value was a 
consequence of money being made of precious metals. However, when paper notes 
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started to be used more frequently, this conception started to change. As money stopped 
being made of precious metals, it stopped being wealth and became a representation of 
it. Still, during the gold standard, money’s value was always seen as an attribute of money 
that resulted from the link between money and gold. It is essential to notice that the 
replacement of commodity money by gold-convertible paper money during the late 19th 
century coincided with the rise of modern nation-states, which alone had the institutional 
capacity to implement the shift towards representational money at all levels of the 
economy. Thus, this was the time when national states began to assume the role of 
ultimate guarantors of money’s value.  
 
Between 1915 and 1930, two significant events disrupted the international monetary 
system: the First World War and the Great Depression of 1929. The 1920s and 1930s 
were a time of important changes in money’s institutional foundations. On a global scale, 
significant economic and political transformations followed to the end of the First World 
War. At that time, one of the biggest global concerns was finding strategies to reactivate 
international trade and create conditions that could foster political and economic stability. 
Thus, countries tried to return to the gold standard and stabilize the value of their national 
currencies (Sember 2018). A first attempt to re-establish the gold standard took place in 
1920. In a conference held in Brussels, developed countries reached a post-war monetary 
consensus, which anticipated many of the changes that were to occur in the following 
decade. The Brussels consensus stipulated that nations should seek to restore their 
currencies’ credibility by returning to the gold standard. For that, they could choose 
between restoring the exchange rate of the pre-war period or establishing a new exchange 
rate parity that was considered sustainable (Aglietta and Coudert 2015). During the 
conference, the governments officials decided that central banks would have a prominent 
place in the new international monetary system. Therefore, countries that still did not have 
such institutions were encouraged to create them. According to the Brussels consensus, 
the new central banks had to be independent of any political pressure.  
 
The emphasis on promoting the creation of central banks was a consequence of a 
fundamental concern industrial countries had during the postwar period: the management 
of increasingly scarce gold reserves. In a world that was just starting to recover from the 
effects of the First World War, the global restoration of the gold standard required a 
substantial increase in existing gold reserves. Indeed, if the gold standard was to be re-
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established, there had to be sufficient gold to provide the necessary liquidity to 
accompany the expansion of world trade (Eichengreen 2019). However, between 1919 
and 1925, the world gold reserves were growing slower than needed. In this context, 
discussions about how to manage existing gold reserves became central. In the Brussels 
conference, two solutions were proposed. First, to create central banks that would 
monopolize and administer gold reserves. Second, to adopt a gold-exchange monetary 
standard. This meant that currencies would be backed by a combination of gold and 
foreign currency (preferably pounds sterling).17 These debates were the first signs that the 
value regime of capitalist currencies had started to suffer deep transformations. A second 
important monetary event followed the Brussels conference: the Genoa conference of 
1922. During this conference, industrial countries insisted that governments from all over 
the world (but especially those of peripheral countries) had to implement an exchange-
gold standard. As noted, this was a monetary standard in which central banks were 
allowed (and encouraged to) maintain part of their foreign reserves in pounds sterling (or 
eventually dollars). Meanwhile, the plan was to concentrate gold reserves in the central 
banks of the industrial countries. The League of Nations (the historical predecessor of the 
United Nations) played a central role in this attempt to restore the international order. The 
league actively encouraged member states to return to the gold standard and to 
simultaneously adopt a system of mixed reserves (Redish 1993). However, the 
conclusions reached at the Brussels and Genoa conferences soon proved too simplistic 
for the 1920s and 1930s’ monetary reality. 
 
The world of the early 20th century was, for several reasons, a world in transition. On the 
one hand, it was a world in which European nations needed to rebuilt themselves almost 
entirely. After the war, European countries were devastated. Their economies were 
bankrupt. In the context of rising inflation and massive unemployment, the use of 
monetary policy for domestic purposes soon became more important than the sole 
objective of exchange rate stability (which had been the hallmark of the previous era). In 
these new circumstances, the return to an international standard of fixed exchange rates 
soon proved unrealistic (Eichengreen 2019). To complicate matters further, the 
                                                          
17 The preference for the British pound as the preferred currency is not coincidental. Many of the 
conclusions reached at the Brussels (1920), and Genoa (1922) conferences reflected British interest. To a 
large extent, this had to do with Britain’s ability to exert global influence in a context where the United 
States, its main competitor, opted for isolation. In fact, the United States refused to join the League of 
Nations and attended these international monetary conferences only as an observer. On this topic see 
Eichengreen (2011; 019). 
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international political scene was shifting towards a new equilibrium by the end of the war. 
The center of gravity of the international monetary system was moving from the United 
Kingdom to the United States. Before the First World War, England had been the world’s 
most important economy, and the pound sterling had been at the apex of the international 
hierarchy of currencies. However, during the interwar period, the United States was 
disputing England’s economic power. As the United States consolidated itself as the new 
global hegemonic power (both commercial and financial), the pound sterling started to 
give up its privileges as the global reserve currency. With time, this position was occupied 
by the US dollar (Eichengreen 2011). However, far from being a passive transformation, 
this transition was an active political race, in which both countries tried to preserve their 
respective areas of influence. In the US, the government sought to promote the national 
commercial and monetary interests by implementing a new foreign policy: the ‘Dollar 
diplomacy’ (Rosenberg 2003). The United Kingdom also implemented a series of 
measures to preserve and strengthen the country’s area of influence. As part of them, it 
created the Commonwealth, a preferential area for buying and selling products with its 
former colonies (Australia, New Zealand, and Canada). The objective was to secure a 
commercial area for the pound sterling. 
 
Still, despite their clashing interests, by 1930, England and the United States shared the 
ambition of restoring the gold standard. However, regardless of their joint efforts, 
attempts to re-establish the old monetary order ultimately failed. As Barry Eichengreen 
(2008, 44) notes, the “lesson drawn was the futility of attempting to turn the clock back”. 
From 1929 onwards, the uncontrollable leakage of gold led different countries to suspend 
convertibility gradually. The United Kingdom suspended gold-convertibility in 
September 1931. On the other hand, the French government managed to sustain the parity 
for a few more years but ended up suspending gold convertibility in September 1936. 
Even if the US dollar was the only currency that continued being convertible into gold, it 
still received some shocks. For example, in April 1933, President Roosevelt decided to 
modify the parity between the dollar and gold. The change shook the foundations of the 
world’s monetary system (Richardson, Komai, and Gou 2018).  
 
Overall, during the 1920s and the 1930s, the international monetary landscape was 
complex and unstable. The gold standard had proved impossible to restore. Furthermore, 
in a context in which there was no longer a metallic anchor to which to tie the values of 
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the national currencies, volatility increased dramatically. As exchange rates were 
continually changing, policymakers worldwide tried to find strategies to stabilize the 
prices of their national currencies. But in a world where gold was no longer money’s 
measure of value, policymakers were increasingly lost. Still, the solution only appeared 
some years later during the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, when countries found a 
new anchor to tie money’s value: the US dollar. All in all, between 1929 and 1944, 
capitalist currencies’ value regime underwent its second significant transformation. With 
the breakdown of the gold standard in 1936, the qualitative differences between national 
currencies became more evident. In a context in which global trade based on gold was no 
longer possible, countries needed to access different currencies, depending on who their 
trading partners were. By 1932, due to the monetary transformations that occurred during 
the beginning of the 20th century, the world was divided into three monetary blocks. First, 
a block of countries led by the United States that still adhered to the gold standard. 
Second, the pound sterling area, which included the United Kingdom and many of its 
former colonies. And third, the countries of central and eastern Europe, led by Germany, 
where exchange controls prevailed. Only a few countries (such as Canada and Japan) 
were outside these three blocks (Eichengreen 2008, 49). 
 
The Bretton Woods agreements and the US dollar supremacy 
(1936-1960) 
 
In 1936, when France announced the suspension of gold-convertibility, the world was 
still trying to rebuild the international monetary system. At that time, there were two 
significant concerns: how to control the chaos prevailing in the international payment 
system and how to curb the sharp exchange rate movements. In September 1931, the 
United Kingdom had declared the suspension of gold convertibility. As a consequence, 
many countries imposed foreign exchange controls and established protectionist 
measures. This caused a series of competitive devaluations and unleashed international 
monetary chaos. The existing problems threatened to annihilate multilateralism (Ocampo 
2016). In September 1936, after the French government announced a devaluation of the 
franc, the three dominant economic powers of the time (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France) made the first attempt to restore the lost order. The three countries 
signed an agreement and committed to sustaining their exchange rate values constant. 
They also promised to cooperate to maintain an orderly evolution of their currencies’ 
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value and avoid a new wave of competitive devaluations. Moreover, they agreed to 
exchange gold at a pre-established price. This way, a new international monetary system 
was put in place, which established the three currencies would be used for international 
trade. Unfortunately, the beginning of the Second World War put an end to this 
arrangement (Aglietta and Coudert 2015, 39). 
 
Renegotiations to rebuild the international monetary order had to wait until 1941. At that 
time, the United Kingdom and the United States governments requested their respective 
advisers, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, to prepare, each one separately, 
a strategy to rebuild international trade. The negotiations that would later lead to the 
Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 were initiated based on these two reports. While both 
proposals were rivals on several points, they also reflected a certain degree of consensus, 
especially regarding three problems. First, both Keynes and White agreed that the gold 
standard’s failure had one main reason: the impossibility of the system to cope with the 
main postwar economic problem, namely, rising unemployment. In this regard, both 
officials highlighted the need for an international monetary system that would allow 
greater flexibility in the management of domestic economic policy. Thus, in the new 
international monetary system, countries should be able to implement anti-cyclical 
policies during times of crisis. A second common goal was to put an end to the sharp 
exchange rate movements that were occurring at the time. Finally, both advisors agreed 
that capital flows needed to be regulated, so that global financial stability could be 
guaranteed (Ocampo 2016). 
 
However, beyond these common points, there were also significant disagreements 
between both proposals, especially regarding the design of the global reserve system. 
Keynes’ project proposed an international monetary system that abolished foreign 
currency markets and instituted a single world reserve currency. Also, Keynes proposed 
creating a central bank of central banks (the International Clearing Union). This 
institution would be responsible for issuing the world reserve currency, which could not 
be appropriated by private agents or specific countries. The project also contemplated 
mechanisms to provide liquidity to countries that needed to adjust their trade balances. 
Keynes argued that both countries with trade deficits and those with trade surpluses had 
to share the adjustment burden. So, countries with surpluses would be forced to finance 
countries with deficits and help them to correct trade imbalances. But in the world of the 
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second postwar period, the Keynesian solution meant that the United States (which was 
the country with the highest world surplus) would have to become the main financier. 
This proposal was unacceptable to the host of the Bretton Woods negotiations (Ocampo 
2016, 4). The project of the American Harry Dexter White, on the other hand, proposed 
to restore convertibility between national currencies. Specifically, White recommended 
that countries should establish a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. This would 
help to avoid competitive devaluations. White’s project also proposed the creation of two 
international institutions: a foreign exchange stabilization fund (the International 
Monetary Fund) and an international reconstruction bank (the World Bank). Both 
institutions would be responsible for providing the necessary capital in cases where 
private financing was scarce. 
 
The discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom lasted almost two 
years. Finally, on October 8, 1943, the two countries reached an agreement. Both 
countries then wrote a joint Anglo-American proposal, which should serve as a basis for 
a global conference. However, other countries also showed an interest in participating in 
the monetary reform when the text was published. A joint global proposal on how to 
reformulate the international monetary system was only published on April 22, 1944. The 
proposal included a set of common principles that were to be discussed at an international 
conference held in Bretton Woods. The conference started on July 1, 1944, and lasted 
three weeks (Aglietta and Coudert 2015, 45). What happened next is known history. As 
a result of the negotiations, a series of measures were adopted, many of which reflected 
the US interests. Countries agreed to adopt a system of fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates. Each country had to establish an exchange rate parity set in gold or a gold-
convertible currency. In principle, the exchange rate had to be fixed, but it could 
eventually be adjusted to correct ‘a fundamental imbalance’ (Ocampo 2016, 3). Besides, 
countries were allowed to implement controls to limit international capital flows. Also, 
two new international monetary institutions were created. The International Monetary 
Fund would be in charge of monitoring national economic policies and extending 
financing to countries that suffered trade deficits. The World Bank, on the other hand, 
would have the mission of financing the reconstruction of countries devastated by the 
Second World War. As for the problem of how to deal with the global gold shortage and 
guaranteeing global liquidity, it is a well-known fact that the Bretton Woods agreements 
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placed the US currency at the heart of the international monetary system. However, the 
negotiations that led to this outcome were less linear than is usually acknowledged. 
 
By 1944, already for several years, the international monetary system’s architects had 
been considering how to expand international reserves. But in a reserve system 
exclusively based on gold, this was very hard to achieve. Thus, policymakers started to 
consider allowing central banks to complement their gold reserves with foreign currency. 
As a matter of fact, complementing gold reserves with foreign currency was already a 
usual practice since, at least, the beginning of the 19th century. For example, in 1913, 
foreign currency reserves represented 20% of the total global reserves, against 80% of 
reserves in gold and silver. In the 1920s, the proportion of foreign currency reserves rose 
rapidly, reaching 28% in 1925. In 1948, this proportion rose even more, up to 42%. Until 
the beginning of the 1940s, both the US dollar and the pound sterling were used as reserve 
currencies. In fact, in 1941, the pound sterling guaranteed 57% of total international 
foreign exchange reserves (Aglietta and Coudert 2015, 32). But in 1944, the situation of 
the pound sterling had changed. In fact, for the officials who participated in the Bretton 
Woods conference, it was already evident that the US dollar was the only currency that 
could be placed at the center of the international monetary system. As much as they had 
wished a different scenario, everyone knew that the pound sterling would hardly ever 
recover the central role it had had in the past. The end of the Second World War had 
found the British economy weakened, with enormous debts and obligations contracted 
with other countries and no real capacity to pay. England’s last attempt to foster the pound 
sterling role as a world reserve currency took place in July 1947, when the British 
government tried to re-establish gold convertibility. However, the rapid reduction of the 
country’s gold reserves forced the British government to suspend the parity again only a 
month later. The event demonstrated the British weakness. Meanwhile, the United States’ 
intention to raise the dollar to the international reserve currency status was evident. 
However, the US government knew that this goal was only possible if the country 
assumed the commitment to convert US dollars into gold. However, even for the country 
that monopolized three-quarters of the world’s gold reserves by the end of the Second 
World War, this commitment was difficult to face (Ocampo 2016). 
 
The officials at Bretton Woods agreed on a peculiar solution. Since January 1934, the 
United States government agreed to sustain the gold convertibility of the US dollar. 
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However, the Federal Reserve was only obliged to convert into gold other central bank’s 
dollar reserves, at the established price of 35 dollars per ounce of gold (Richardson, 
Komai, and Gou 2018). Meanwhile, as established by Roosevelt in 1933, the rest of the 
dollars in circulation continued to be inconvertible. Moreover, the Bretton Woods 
agreements forced all other countries to set their exchange rate parities either in gold or 
in a currency convertible into gold. However, since most countries were devoid of gold, 
they set their exchange rate values in dollars. Since then, all world nations considered the 
dollar as reliable as gold. The trust in the dollar’s value was reflected in the composition 
of central banks’ reserves (Aglietta and Coudert 2015). This way, the US dollar became 
the international unit of account. Thus, since 1944, the US currency has been used to set 
prices in the world market, negotiate transactions, and grant credits to countries and 
companies. 
 
An important point to notice is that, since the dollar became the world’s official reserve 
currency, the asymmetries of the international monetary system increased even further. 
Even if, at first, there was a general presumption that the monetary system would become 
more harmonious over time, this did not occur. On the one hand, the international 
monetary system’s architectural design, which was already hierarchical, prevented any 
search from symmetry. However, there was a second reason why the system became even 
more hierarchical than before. During the time gold was the international reserve 
currency, there were, in principle, no obvious beneficiaries in the system. That is to say, 
while gold was the primary reserve asset, the most powerful country was the one who 
could appropriate the larger quantity of gold. In principle, this place could be occupied 
by any country as long as its central bank managed to hoard sufficient gold 
(Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2018). However, in the post Bretton Woods era, the 
situation changed. To the extent that the global reserve currency is the currency of one 
specific country, there is indeed one primary beneficiary of the system. Moreover, since 
the only institution capable of issuing the global currency is the Federal Reserve, there is 
no possible way to challenge US supremacy, except for challenging the whole system. 
This architecture has considerable implications and increases the hierarchical nature of 
the global monetary system.   
 
The American victory, consolidated both in the battlefields and in the field of industrial 
development, was also reflected in the supremacy of the US currency in international 
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monetary relations. However, in contrast to the initial predictions, the disappearance and 
replacement of the pound sterling as the second international reserve currency was a 
process that happened gradually. Even if at the beginning of the Second World War, the 
global proportion of reserves in pounds sterling (which until then amounted to more than 
50%) fell sharply; by 1960, this proportion still amounted to 30% of global foreign 
exchange reserves. Until the late 1960s, a significant part of world trade continued to take 
place in pounds sterling (Schenk 2010). Meanwhile, in a context where the pound sterling 
role was declining, and the global supply of gold was rigid, the United States was forced 
to provide the liquidity to sustain world trade. Even though, in theory, the US had the 
option of ignoring foreign governments’ wishes and limiting the number of dollars issued 
by the Federal Reserve, the country chose to flood the international system with dollars. 
Logically, the increasing quantity of dollars led to an equally increasing deficit in the US 
trade balance (Ocampo 2016).  
 
All in all, the crisis of the gold standard was solved in 1944. Due to the decision, sealed 
at Bretton Woods, to raise the US dollar to the status of the global reserve currency, the 
world found a new anchor to tie trust in money’s value. Until 1944, trust in capitalist 
currencies had been grounded in money’s gold convertibility. However, in that year, the 
value regime that sustained trust in money changed. After Bretton Woods, trust in 
capitalist currencies started to be tied to the US government’s ability to keep the promise 
of converting its currency into gold at the price of 35 dollars per ounce. With this 
transformation, the link between most capitalists’ currencies and gold became even more 
distant. Also, the dependence on the US dollar increased the infrastructural instability of 
the system. By the end of the 1950s, however, as the number of dollars in circulation in 
the world increased at a dizzying rate and, consequently, so did the US trade deficit, 
doubts about the US government’s real capacity to keep the promise in the value of its 
currency deepened. During the 1950s and 1960s, the increasing deficit of the United 
States’ trade balance became the privileged barometer of global trust in money’s enduring 
value. As I will show in the following, in the early 1970s, the deepening of the 
international monetary system’s inherent design problems led the Bretton Woods 
arrangement to finally collapse. The lack of agreement on how to design an alternative 
system led to the emergence of a ‘non-system’ of fiat currencies that has survived until 
the present. In this ‘non-system’, the US dollar (now fiat) has retained its exorbitant 
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privilege as the dominant global reserve currency. How long this privilege may last is 
something only time will tell. 
 
The fall of the Bretton Woods international monetary system (1960-
1973) 
 
The Bretton Woods international monetary system had two fundamental problems that 
stemmed from its architectural design. The first one was related to the use of a national 
currency as the world’s reserve currency. The second was the absence of mechanisms that 
could help to balance trade imbalances between different countries of the world. Both 
issues were related.  
 
Since 1944 the dollar had become the world’s trade currency. This situation was not 
surprising given the United States’ dominant position in both international trade and 
finances and its abundant gold reserves. However, the fact that the global reserve currency 
was the currency of a specific country created irresoluble contradictions. On the one hand, 
the international monetary system had increasing liquidity needs. In fact, in a world where 
world trade was booming, global liquidity needs were increasing. The increasing demand 
for dollars was not only caused by the fact that world trade was carried on in that currency. 
Since governments and central banks were trying to supplement their gold reserves with 
dollars, the global shortage of gold also caused pressure on the dollar supply. Thus, more 
and more dollars were needed. However, the main problem was that to feed the growing 
global dollar demand, the United States had to increase its spending. This was the US 
‘exorbitant privilege’ (Eichengreen 2011): it was the only country capable of running a 
trade deficit for years without either generating significant imbalances in its domestic 
economy or facing fierce disciplinary responses from international financial markets 
(Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2018).18 Moreover, the US external deficit could be as large 
as the ambition for dollars of private agents and central banks worldwide. However, the 
system had a severe contradiction. This contradiction was that the sustained increase in 
the number of dollars in circulation (which had been issued to satisfy the growing global 
demand), put at risk the US capacity to deliver an ounce of gold in exchange for 35 
                                                          
18 As Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2018, 42) point out, as the currency at the top of the international 
currency hierarchy, the dollar can defer external adjustment and allow external imbalances that elsewhere 
would trigger a fulminant disciplinary response from international financial markets.      
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dollars, as the Federal Reserve had committed to do in the Bretton Woods agreements. 
The increase in global liquidity implied a potential loss of credibility in the promise of 
the Federal Reserve to convert US dollars into gold at the agreed price. But if during the 
1950s and 1960s the world wanted dollars, it was because the dollar was, at that time, the 
only currency still convertible into gold and, therefore, the most trustworthy on the globe. 
However, once the external US trade deficit grew faster than the country’s gold reserves, 
the credibility in the dollar’s enduring value was meant to collapse. 
 
The first economist to notice this contradiction was the Belgian economist Robert Triffin. 
This is why this problem is known today in specialized literature as Triffin’s dilemma. 
Indeed, as Triffin had anticipated in 1947, in 1960, the growing US trade deficit began to 
threaten the Bretton Woods international monetary system’s survival. During the 1940s 
and 1950s, the US balance of payments had recorded constant annual surpluses. However, 
by the late 1950s, the situation changed, and the strong current account surpluses that had 
characterized the post-war years weakened. In the second half of the 1960s, and for the 
first time, the United States’ external deficit exceeded its gold reserves. The main reason 
behind the imbalance between the US gold reserves and the number of dollars in 
circulation was that money issuance was growing faster than gold mining. But there was 
a second cause behind the increasing gap. That is that the United States was no longer the 
country to which new gold extractions were flowing. In fact, since the 1960s, newly-
minted gold was concentrated in European countries. The big winner was Germany, 
which by 1957 had overtaken Switzerland and would soon overtake the United Kingdom 
as the second largest gold reserve holder in the non-communist world (Ocampo 2016). 
This meant that the United States’ gold holdings, which by the end of the Second World 
War had accounted for three-quarters of the world’s gold reserves (excluding the 
communist countries), were reduced to about half by the end of the 1950s.  
 
The delicate circumstances made it increasingly clear that if foreign central banks tried to 
convert their dollar reserves into gold, their actions could have the same effect as a group 
of depositors lining up outside a bank. Sooner than later, other countries would join in for 
fear of being denied access to gold. As countries would rush to convert their dollars, the 
US would be forced to suspend gold convertibility or devalue its currency, or both. By 
1960, the pressure on the dollar was huge and growing. Logically, the United States was 
more than interested in preventing the loss of its gold reserves. But other countries also 
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had a collective interest in the stability of the dollar. Indeed, a devaluation of the dollar 
would mean an inevitable loss of the value of other countries’ own dollar reserves. So, 
for a while, the governments and central banks of several industrial countries agreed to 
collaborate with the United States and support the dollar, precisely because it was the 
backbone of the Bretton Woods system. 
 
Between the 1960s and the 1970s, as a result of the common interest in supporting the 
exchange rate between gold and the dollar established at Bretton Woods, industrial 
countries implemented several actions. One of these actions was to create a Gold Fund in 
1961. The fund consisted of eight industrial countries’ central banks: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Its goal was to fix the price of gold and share responsibility for stabilizing the market. 
Besides, industrial countries also increased their central banks’ dollar reserves and 
committed not to exchange them for gold. All these actions were aimed at preventing a 
devaluation of the US currency. The US government, in turn, imposed capital controls to 
contain international pressures. These mechanisms worked relatively well between 1962 
and 1965. But from 1966 onwards, the doubts about the sustainability of the gold-dollar 
parity started to grow again. Global distress regarding the value of the US dollar had its 
reasons. Although the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations recognized the 
seriousness of the situation, truth is they were not willing to address the causes behind it. 
The main problem was that the United States was running an expansionary monetary 
policy intended to finance the Vietnam War. Thus, as the government increased the 
country’s fiscal deficit, fears of inflation were rising. The US government, however, was 
unwilling to consider a change in its domestic economic policy. But this attitude 
jeopardized the sustainability of the international monetary system. Logically, the other 
industrial countries’ governments and central banks were unwilling to keep collaborating 
with the United States without limit. Even if, at the time, no one looked favorably on the 
potential breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the truth is that the measures needed 
to support it were becoming increasingly harder to accept.  
 
The first impact on the Bretton Woods system occurred during the spring of 1971 when 
a massive volume of capital fled from the dollar into the German mark. Germany, fearing 
inflation, stopped monetary intervention and allowed the Deutsche mark to fluctuate 
upwards. The Netherlands joined in, and other currencies followed. The flight from the 
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dollar, once started, was not easy to stop. During the second week of August, the financial 
press reported that France and Great Britain were planning to convert their dollar reserves 
into gold. As a response, on the weekend of August 13, the Nixon administration closed 
the gold window and suspended the US commitment to convert gold at the official price 
of 35 dollars an ounce (or at any other price). Instead of consulting, Nixon’s 
administration simply reported its decision to the International Monetary Fund. Over the 
next four months, industrial countries held extensive negotiations that sought to reach a 
consensus on reforming the international monetary system. These negotiations 
culminated in an agreement signed at a conference on December 18-19, 1971, at the 
Smithsonian Institution in Washington. In the Smithsonian Agreement, industrial 
countries agreed that the US dollar would be devalued by only 8% and that floatation 
bands would widen between the different currencies. But the United States was not forced 
to reopen the gold window, as long as it complied with the agreement to keep exchange 
rates within the established parities. 
 
However, nothing fundamental had changed. Triffin’s dilemma had not been resolved, 
and the US economic policy remained too expansionary to be compatible with a system 
of fixed exchange rates between the dollar and other currencies. Moreover, since the US 
government had already devalued the dollar once, there was no reason to doubt it could 
do it again. In early 1973 the Bretton Woods system finally collapsed. A new run against 
the dollar led Switzerland and other countries to let their currencies fluctuate freely. 
Although European countries negotiated a second devaluation of the dollar, the 
underlying imbalances remained, and there was no guarantee the system of fixed 
exchange rates would last. When the flight from the dollar resumed later in 1973, 
Germany and its partners in the European Economic Community jointly decided to let 
their currencies fluctuate upwards. This decision finally broke the Smithsonian pact, and 
the Bretton Woods international monetary system ceased to exist.  
 
The international monetary system after Bretton Woods (1973-
2020) 
 
“The transition to floating following the breakdown of Bretton Woods was a leap in the 
dark” (Eichengreen 2008, 136). Until then, the exchange rate’s stability had been the 
paramount goal to which monetary policy was directed. Except during exceptional times, 
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monetary policy had mostly been an instrument used to peg the exchange rate. However, 
in 1973 policy was cut loose from these moorings, and exchange rates were allowed to 
float. In the new situation, currencies lost all connection to the material world. Without a 
clear anchor to which to tie trust in money, policymakers found themselves with no firm 
footholds in the new monetary world. As anxiety grew, so did the fears that the global 
economy would enter a phase of monetary upheaval and financial instability. Still, there 
were a few who argued that the disappearance of a system of fixed exchange rates would 
allow currencies to float towards their equilibrium position. This movement would 
eliminate misalignments between currencies. Today we know both predictions were 
wrong. Indeed, after the breakdown of Bretton Woods, nominal and real exchange rates 
became more unstable than they were before. Thus, exchange-rate volatility increased. 
Moreover, on many occasions, changes in money’s prices were not driven by economic 
fundamentals but by speculation (Rose 1994). However, the financial chaos predicted by 
those who opposed floating exchange rates did not occur.  
 
The US abandonment of gold-convertibility resulted in two parallel attempts to reform 
the international monetary system. The first was the attempt to reconstruct a system of 
exchange rate parities among major currencies. The second was comprehensive 
negotiations to design a new international monetary system. The first took place in the 
context of the Group of Ten (G-10) and the second of the IMF, in the Committee of 
Twenty (C-20) that was created for that purpose (Ocampo 2016). Both attempts failed. 
The result was a de facto transition to what can be adequately characterized as an ‘ad hoc 
non-system’ (Williamson 1977, xiii). In Williamson’s word: “what emerged after the C-
20 cannot be described as an international monetary ‘system’, in so far as the word system 
implies a well-defined set of rights and obligations. [In the current arrangement, 
however,] countries are free to do in large measure as they please” (Williamson 1977, 74-
75). With a similar argument, Eichengreen has pointed out that even if it is true that the 
Bretton Woods international monetary system was hardly fully coherent, the ad hoc non-
system that emerged later is even further away from any coherent design (Eichengreen 
2019). The two most salient features of this ad hoc non-system are: (a) a global reserve 
system mainly based on an inconvertible (fiat) dollar - a fiduciary dollar standard -, but 
open in principle to competitive reserve currencies; and (b) freedom for each country to 
choose the convenient exchange rate regime, as long as they avoid ‘manipulating’ their 
exchange rates, a term that has never been clearly defined (Ocampo 2016, 21). After 1973, 
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two main changes took place: capital mobility and monetary instability increased sharply, 
and more and more countries tended to adopt floating exchange rates. The US dollar, on 
the other hand, continued to be the global reserve currency. 
 
After the breakdown of Bretton Woods, the difficult economic circumstances of the 1970s 
decreased, even more, the likelihood of re-establishing a coherent international monetary 
system. In August 1973, only two months after Nixon had closed the gold window, the 
world faced one of the most important economic challenges of the 20th century: the oil 
crisis. When the member countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) resolved to stop supplying oil to the western nations that had supported 
Israel in the Yom Kippur War, oil prices skyrocketed. By December 1973, oil prices had 
quadrupled. The increase caused a sharp rise in the global inflation rate and led to an 
international crisis. A drop in economic activity of a magnitude not seen since the Second 
World War was followed by a massive rise in unemployment. The oil crisis marked the 
end of the post-war golden age and the beginning of a period of slower global growth and 
higher inflation rates that came to be known as stagflation.  
 
Due to the joint effects of the oil crisis and the collapse of the Bretton Woods international 
monetary system, the 1970s was a period of high instability and turmoil in global financial 
markets. Initially, the Europeans and the Japanese were confident that, sooner than later, 
it would be possible to go back to a system of fixed exchange rates. The United States, 
however, had soon moved from the restoration of adjustable pegs to advocacy for floating. 
Officials - especially those of organizations like the International Monetary Fund that 
were heavily committed to the old system - did not jump willingly to the new reality; they 
had to be pushed (Eichengreen 2008). Over the years, however, the tendency towards 
floating exchange rate regimes deepened. Still, during the 1970s, exchange rate volatility 
was lower than it would be later on. Two main reasons explain this reality. The first is 
that governments actively intervened in foreign currency markets during the years that 
followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. The Canadian dollar, the French 
franc, the Swiss franc, the lira, the yen, and the pound sterling were all actively managed 
(Ocampo 2016). The second is that, at that time, countries were still willing to adjust their 




However, from the mid-1970s onwards, flexible exchange rates started to become more 
and more common.19 One of the main reasons behind this trend was the dramatic increase 
in capital mobility. Naturally, this was not a new phenomenon. Already since the late 
1950s, the recovering of world trade and the development of the euro-dollar market in 
London had contributed to increasing capital flows. But in the 1970s, there was a big leap 
in capital mobility. In 1974, a notable trend towards market liberalization started in the 
US and spread to the rest of the developed world (Krippner 2011). Increasing capital 
movements also increased currency volatility. And increasing volatility went hand in 
hand with floating exchange rates. In fact, given that increasing capital mobility reduced 
the effectiveness of capital account regulations, it also threatened the stability of fixed 
exchange rate regimes. With no real possibility to implement effective capital controls, 
countries started to adopt floating exchange rates, only because this was one of the few 
solutions they could put in place to protect themselves from currency speculation. So, 
from the 1970s onwards, global financial markets had to get used to large capital masses, 
which moved without limits in the search for better profit opportunities. In the new 
context, the old trilemma described by Mundell and Fleming in the early 1960s became a 
dilemma.20 Deprived of the option of stopping transnational capital movements, countries 
could only choose between having a fixed exchange rate or an independent monetary 
policy. In this context, it is not surprising that governments gradually embraced more and 
more flexible exchange rates. In fact, as Barry Eichengreen (2019, 175) noticed, since 
1973, the evolution of exchange rate regimes shows a significant decline in the percentage 
                                                          
19 One necessary clarification is that, while there is an agreement that, since the mid-1970s, an increasing 
number of countries adopted floating exchange rate regimes, there is no clear definition of what does it 
mean to float. Rose (2011) noted that, while a fixed exchange rate regime with capital mobility is a well-
defined monetary regime, floating is not. If the central bank does not fix the exchange rate, it has to do 
something else, but what? There is a consensus among economists on what the central bank does in a fixed 
exchange rate regime. However, there is no clear consensus regarding floating exchange rate regimes, 
except that central banks do not explicitly maintain a specific (and publicly known) exchange rate value. 
Thus, in a floating exchange rate regime, the central bank retains the discretion to decide at what value to 
stabilize its currency (Klein and Shambaugh 2010). Some countries that float maintain an inflation-targeting 
monetary policy framework (i.e., New Zealand, Sweden, and Chile). However, not all of them do that. For 
some countries, monetary policy’s objective is the growth of monetary aggregates (i.e., Nigeria). Others 
have a somewhat opaque monetary policy. In these circumstances, scholars have noted it is not reasonable 
to group all non-fixers under one single floating regime category. Some economists’ response to this 
dilemma has been to point out that the academic profession should stop trying to classify countries 
according to their exchange rate regimes. Instead, they should start classifying countries according to their 
monetary policy frameworks (Rose 2011). An example of this position would be group countries whose 
central banks follow an inflation-targeting policy into a single category. The list is surprisingly consistent 
with countries that float their currencies. Still, it provides a better criterion for grouping and avoids 
distinguishing between empirically and theoretically confusing categories, such as ‘pure floating’, ‘dirty 
floating’, and ‘managed floating’. However, other economists have not lost hope of classifying exchange 
rate regimes into different categories that retain some explanatory power.  
20 On the Mundell and Fleming monetary trilemma see footnote 11 in the previous chapter. 
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of operating soft pegs (from 57% to 46%) and corresponding increases in the percentage 
of countries with hard pegs (including monetary unions) and floats. Of course, it was 
mainly Europe’s advanced countries that moved to hard pegs and mostly emerging 
markets that moved to floating regimes.  
 
A second important process contributed to transforming the monetary landscape during 
the 1980s and played a key role in consolidating floating exchange rate regimes, namely, 
the United States’ decided to place inflation control at the top of its policy agenda. After 
Paul Volcker was named its chairman in 1979, the decisions taken by the Federal Reserve 
made it evident that the world was becoming increasingly dependent on the US monetary 
policy. Doubts about the US economic priorities were dispelled by the appointment of 
Paul Volker. Volker was willing to raise interest rates and tighten monetary policy as 
much as needed to bring down US inflation, which was in double digits. Thus, from 1979 
onwards, the Federal Reserve implemented a strongly contractionary monetary policy that 
resulted in a significant rise in interest rates. Volker’s policy caused massive capital 
inflows and led to an appreciation of the dollar. Moreover, the policy also made it 
dramatically clear how dependent the world had become on the US monetary policy 
decisions. In fact, during the 1980s, Paul Volker managed to tame US inflation. However, 
his policies had enormous global consequences. The sharp rise in US national interest 
rates led to a slowdown in global growth. Moreover, it increased financial fragility and 
caused one of the most significant crises of the 20th century, the Latin American debt 
crisis, which led to Latin America’s ‘lost decade’ (Ocampo et al. 2014). In this regard, 
one of the most important lessons of the 1980s was that, as long as the dollar remained 
the preferred global reserve currency, the world would have to withstand the pro-cyclical 
capital movements that followed the Federal Reserve’s decisions.  
 
During the 1990s, the trend towards floating exchange rate regimes strengthen further. 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, as money’s value 
became increasingly self-referential, currency speculation increased sharply (Krugman 
2000). Since money’s value was no longer tied to any material asset, it became more and 
more dependent on market movements. In these circumstances, investors quickly realized 
that challenging currencies’ values could be a profitable business and started to test these 
values in the search for profits. The combination of floating exchange rates, lower central 
bank intervention levels, and increasing speculation was explosive and led to a period of 
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tremendous instability in global financial markets. The problem started in 1992 and 1993 
when a series of currency crises hit Europe’s developed economies. Between 1994 and 
2001, currency crises spread all over the world. Starting in Mexico in 1994, they reached 
Asia’s economies in 1997. Only a few years later, currency crashes extended to other 
developing economies, such as Russia, Brazil, and Argentina.  
 
As the Asian crises of 1997, clearly showed, in the post-Bretton Woods monetary world, 
currency attacks could succeed even in those cases where exchange rates were 
macroeconomically sustainable (García and Olivié 2000). Thus, floating exchange rates 
seemed to be the only refugee governments had left. Naturally, over the years, more and 
more countries started to abandon fixed exchange rate regimes and move towards floating 
ones. Gradually, central bankers and monetary policymakers got used to floating 
exchange rates’ dynamics, and global fears of monetary chaos were slowly dispelled. The 
conclusion is that a decade after the breakdown of Bretton Woods, many countries had 
followed the US and adopted a flexible exchange rate policy. The most notable example 
of this trend was Japan. Until the 1970s, Japan had always maintained a fixed exchange 
rate. Indeed, during the 1970s, Japan tried to keep its exchange rate stable and intervened 
heavily in the foreign exchange market. However, after the second oil shock, in 1979, the 
country’s monetary authorities implemented an increasingly flexible exchange rate 
policy. On the other hand, the share of emerging countries adopting floating exchange 
rate regimes increased from 13% to 47%. Examples of this trend include Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, India, Mexico, South Korea, Thailand, Russia, Poland, and Turkey 
(Eichengreen 2019). 
 
The two big exceptions to the trend towards floating exchange rate regimes were Europe 
and China. For historical reasons, European countries had more faith in intervention and 
cooperation and opted for a monetary regime of fixed exchange rates between the 
countries of the European Community. Over time, this system led to creating a monetary 
union governed by a regional central bank (the European Central Bank), which issues a 
common currency (the euro). However, it must be noticed that, as in the case of the yen 
and the US dollar, exchange rate movements between the euro and the other currencies 
float freely. Thus, the great exception to the tendency towards increasing floatation has 
been China. For some scholars, such as Barry Eichengreen (2019, 178), “China did not 
face the same pressure as other countries to increase exchange rate flexibility. Since it 
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still had capital controls, it had some scope for running an independent monetary policy. 
Because it was not a democracy, political pressure to orient monetary policy toward 
targets other than the exchange rate was also less intense”. In this view, China’s secret 
has been that the country managed to avoid Mundel’s dilemma due to the combination of 
underdeveloped financial markets and a politically authoritarian regime. These two facts 
allowed China to control capital movements much better than other countries.  
 
After the Bretton Woods monetary system’s fall, the US (now fiat) dollar continued to be 
the global reserve currency. Even if, for several decades, economists had foretold that the 
US currency would lose its dominant position, the truth is that, after 1973, the supremacy 
of the US dollar strengthened even further. Several factors explain this outcome. 
Undoubtedly, the international monetary system’s history was crucial in consolidating the 
increasing prominence of the dollar. As I showed, the dollar became the world’s reserve 
currency to no small extent because the United States emerged from the Second World 
War in a better position than all other countries. It was the country with the highest gold 
reserves and the only one that could sustain convertibility. What other countries did was 
also decisive for the dollar supremacy. Britain’s economy was devastated and in debt after 
the war. Therefore, the country was incapable of sustaining the pound sterling’s role as 
the world’s reserve currency. Germany and Japan, for their part, chose to restrict the 
internationalization of their currencies. The consequence of all these actions was that the 
dollar found itself without competition (Eichengreen 2019, 215). Moreover, the fact that 
the dollar remained the dominant currency in international transactions since 1944 
allowed the US currency to consolidate itself financially, thus today, several other 
structural economic reasons reinforce its supremacy. 
 
The first structural economic reason that reinforces contemporary dollar supremacy is 
that, like all social institutions, the international monetary system has inertia. In a world 
where all currencies are fiat, there would be no reason, in principle, to choose one 
currency over another. Prices are already denominated in dollars, and the world is already 
used to making transactions in dollars. So, if there are enough dollars to make these 
transactions, why to change the situation? The second reason is that the dollar has 
‘structural power’ (Strange 1971). That means that, because the US is already dominant, 
it can exercise its power, which, in turn, helps it to increase its power even more. An 
example of this structural power is that the US has always had the capacity to orient 
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negotiations on the international monetary system’s potential reforms towards its 
interests. Another example is that, in a world where everyone has dollars, there is a 
collective interest in preserving both the value and the importance of the dollar for 
international trade. However, the most crucial reason behind dollar supremacy is that, 
because the dollar is the currency at the apex of the international currency hierarchy, it 
has a built-in tendency to strengthen, even when the global economy experiences a crisis. 
In fact, in a world of fiat currencies where a currency’s most essential property is its 
liquidity, the United States is the country with the deepest and most liquid financial 
markets in the world. In this context, the power of the dollar is self-reinforcing. Why is 
this? Precisely, because the dollar has a status as a safe haven, and that means it can 
stabilize itself in times of crisis, increasing its power even further. Today, the US treasury 
securities market is the largest, most liquid financial market in the world. Because US 
treasuries are so widely held, anxious investors can buy and sell them without moving 
prices. In turbulent times, when speed and flexibility are essential, and when there is 
nothing investors value more than liquidity, the US treasury securities market’s liquidity 
allows them to keep their options open. Thus, during crises, when financial survival may 
require investors to move quickly in or out of other assets and currencies, capital flows 
towards the US stabilizing its financial markets, precisely when those markets come under 
strain. This tendency of the dollar to stabilize itself during crises is evident even when 
America itself is the epicenter of the crisis, as it was in 2008. This is America’s ‘exorbitant 
privilege’ as the issuer of the leading safe-haven currency. The international architecture 
of money, increasingly hierarchical, in which the US dollar is located at the apex, has 
enormous consequences for the global economy. Several works have described the 
advantages the US dollar dominance brings to the United States (Agnew 2010; Cohen 
2017; Eichengreen 2011; 2019; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2018; Kirshner 2008; 2003; 
Mehrling 2012; Oatley 2014; Ocampo 2016). However, there are still very few studies 
that focus on what are the problems suffered by the countries located at the bottom of the 







The monetary reality in Latin America after Bretton Woods (1973-
2020) 
 
In much of the industrialized world, then, the post-Bretton Woods period was marked by 
a movement towards more flexible exchange rates. Large countries, like the United States, 
Japan and Canada, for whom the importance of international transactions was still limited, 
opted to float. For them, the uncertainties of a fluctuating exchange rate, while not 
pleasant, were tolerable. The same trend was evident in the developing world, although it 
was slower in coming. Like in the industrial world, in developing countries, this transition 
was a consequence of the rise of international capital mobility. However, for smaller, 
more open economies, especially countries with thin financial markets, floating exchange 
rates were even more volatile and disruptive. In such circumstances, for much of the 
1970s and 1980s, the vast majority of developing countries (including the Latin American 
countries) opted for a different alternative: attempting to establish a fixed currency peg. 
Thus, during the 1980s, most Latin American countries implemented fixed exchange rate 
regimes (Eichengreen 2008, 135). 
 
During the 1980s, most countries in the Latin American region chose to tie their 
currencies to the US dollar. The policy was reasonable in light of the region’s monetary 
history. Since the mid-1940s, most Latin American countries had been part of the Bretton 
Woods agreement and maintained fixed, adjustable exchange rates tied to the dollar, 
under the shelter of capital controls. Throughout the Bretton Woods years, capital controls 
had provided some insulation from balance-of-payments pressures for governments that 
felt a need to direct monetary policy toward other targets. Controls offered the breathing 
space to organize orderly adjustments of the adjustable peg. At that time, Policymakers 
could still contemplate changing the peg without provoking a destabilizing tidal wave of 
international capital flows (Eichengreen 2019). But the effectiveness of controls started 
to erode over the years. The ongoing development of financial markets, powered by 
advances in telecommunications and information processing technologies, hampered 
efforts to contain international financial flows.  
 
There was no turning back the clock. Moreover, with the development of competing 
financial centers, countries imposing onerous controls risked losing their financial 
business to offshore markets. Thus, developing countries that failed to liberalize risked 
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being passed over by foreign investors. Though inevitable, liberalization exacerbated the 
difficulty of pegging the exchange rate, leading a growing number of developing 
countries to float. Stripped of the insulation provided by capital controls, governments, 
and central banks in the Latin American region found the operation of pegged but 
adjustable exchange rates increasingly problematic. The merest hint that a country was 
considering a parity change could subject it to massive capital outflows, discouraging 
officials from even contemplating such a change. Defending the parity did not prevent 
balance-of-payments pressures on pegged rates from continuing to mount, or the markets 
from challenging pegs they suspected were unsustainable. In a high capital mobility 
world, defending a parity required unprecedented levels of foreign-exchange market 
intervention and international support. Support of this magnitude was something 
countries hesitated to extend when they doubted the government’s willingness and ability 
to eliminate the source of the balance of payments imbalance.  
 
Still, the post-Bretton Woods monetary reality did not offer many options. The 
alternatives to pegged but adjustable rates were polar extremes: floating and attempting 
to peg once and for all (Eichengreen 2008, 135). There were different pegging strategies: 
implementing a hard peg, a currency board, a monetary union, or going to the extreme of 
replacing the national currency for another currency.21 At first, most Latin American 
countries ruled out floating and opted for the second option: to harden the exchange rate 
peg further. A few countries – Mexico (until 1994), Brazil (until 1999), and Argentina 
(until 2001) – did so by establishing currency boards. That is to say; they adopted 
parliamentary statutes or constitutional amendments requiring the government or central 
bank to peg the currency to that of a trading partner. A monetary authority constitutionally 
required to peg the exchange rate was insulated from political pressure to do otherwise 
and enjoyed the markets’ confidence.  
 
The problem with currency boards was that monetary authorities were constrained even 
more tightly than under the 19th-century gold standard from engaging in lender-of-last-
resort intervention. Currency boards were attractive only for countries in exceptional 
circumstances: they were typically very small, their banks were closely tied to institutions 
overseas, and hence could expect foreign support, they possessed exceptionally 
                                                          
21 On the American continent, two examples of countries that have adopted the dollar as their national 
currency are Ecuador and El Salvador.  
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underdeveloped financial markets, or (like Argentina) had particularly lurid histories of 
inflation. The diversity of developing-country experience during the 1980s and 1990s 
spawned a debate about alternative policies’ efficacy. However, the global exchange-rate 
turbulence that began in 1994, abruptly closed that debate and led to a mass exodus 
towards more and more flexible exchange rate policies. The period opened with the Asian 
crisis, a shattering event for a region accustomed to stability and one in which exchange 
rates played a central role. Crises in Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina followed ad seriatim. 
The message seemed that emerging markets were incapable of managing the explosive 
combination of capital mobility and political democracy (Eichengreen 2019, 175). From 
the late 1990s a growing number of emerging markets, foremost in Latin America but 





This chapter showed that, during the 20th century, capitalist credit money’s institutional 
reality was wholly transformed. From 1875, when the gold standard prevailed, and the 
value of currencies was considered to be the result of money being backed by gold, the 
monetary system evolved into a system of fiat currencies. After the fall of Bretton Woods, 
both developed and developing countries have increasingly adopted floating exchange 
rates. However, this type of monetary policy is far from adequate for developing 
economies. Floating has increased monetary instability and the risk of crisis. The post-
Bretton Woods world is far from a panacea. Today, no real-world variable limits the 
ability of countries to issue money. In the contemporary non-monetary-system, the value 
of money has become increasingly self-referential and dependent on market movements. 
This chapter also showed that, in the contemporary world, the dollar did not lose its 
exorbitant privilege. On the contrary, it has consolidated it. Moreover, instead of tending 
to symmetry, during the 20th century, the international monetary system became 
increasingly hierarchical.  
                                                          
22 Indeed, the list of countries that have recently adopted inflation targeting regimes includes Australia 
(September 1994), Brazil (June 1999), Canada (February 1991), Colombia (September 1999), Czech 
Republic (January 1998), Finland (February 1993-June 1998), Israel (January 1992), South Korea (January 
1998), Switzerland (January 2000), Mexico (January 1999), New Zealand (March 1990), Peru (January 
1994), Poland (October 1998), South Africa (February 2000), Spain (November 1994 - June 1998), Sweden 
(January 1993), Thailand (April 2000) and the United Kingdom (October 1992).Data taken from Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002), footnote 15. 
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In contemporary fiat money systems, the value of contemporary money is no longer 
linked to the real world. For mainstream economists, however, contemporary money’s 
value is not a completely arbitrary number. In their view, money’s value still depends on 
the evaluation that social actors make of a set of economic variables, known as the ‘money 
fundamentals’ (i.e., the size of the economy’s GDP and the export rate). However, an 
important remark that, even if the value of money (and, thus, trust in money) depends on 
the evaluation that social actors make of money fundamentals, these evaluations are 
nothing more than a complex system of expectations that make some exchange rates to 
be perceived as more sustainable than others. In other words, confidence in contemporary 
capitalist money depends, above all, on people’s expectations about the future 
sustainability of an economy. In the meantime, there is increasing evidence that, in 




4. One hundred years of value: the Argentine currency 
during the 20th century (1880-1970) 
 
In 1818 the Frenchman José Rousseau, a master engraver, opened a shop 
in the city center of Buenos Aires. The shop was located on Cabildo Street, 
just one block from the main square, facing towards ‘the countryside’ (or 
at least that is what the advertisement in the newspaper said). Rosseau was 
in charge of printing the first Argentine banknote, issued by the then Banco 
de Descuentos, a bank founded with British capitals during the government 
of Martín Rodríguez in 1822. For 20 years this would be the only bank in 
the country. Rousseau used to work in an old copper sheet that had an image 
of Our Lady of the Rosary on the backside. The image had been painted in 
1786. The banknote had a very simple design, with free spaces in its upper 
corners where one could write down the note’s number and value by hand, 
a ribbon or banner in the center with the bank’s name, and below, the text. 
Rousseau printed 7,002 notes at Pedro Ponce’s printing house, which were 
put into circulation the same day the bank opened: Friday, September 6, 
1822. At the time, the monetary authority set the minimum and a maximum 
number of notes issued to regulate the scope of banknotes in circulation and 
control if the notes would circulate only among business people or if they 
would also be offered to consumers.23  
 
Each country has its unique monetary history, but Argentina exemplifies well the most 
important standard features of the history of capitalist credit money during the 19th and 
20th centuries. During most of the 19th century, the domestic money supply in Argentina 
was heterogeneous. There was not one uniform national currency, and there were several 
foreign currencies (mainly English and Spanish currencies and that from neighboring 
countries, such as Chile and Bolivia) circulating within the national economy alongside 
domestic money. At the time, paper notes issued by private banks and public agencies 
were printed both at home and abroad. For the most part, they were inconvertible. 
Although at the time, the nominal value of paper money seemed uniform, a banknote’s 
real value varied according to the issuing bank’s creditworthiness and reputation 
(Regalsky 2018). It was only in 1881 that Argentina issued its first national currency: the 
Peso Moneda Nacional. From then on, a single currency started to circulate within the 
                                                          
23 Fragment from the article published on Infobae on May 18, 2020, by Adrián Pignatelli: “Cuando los 
primeros billetes en Argentina llevaron las imágenes de Washington, Franklin y Bolívar”. Available at: 
https://www.infobae.com/sociedad/2020/05/18/cuando-los-primeros-billetes-en-argentina-llevaron-las-
imagenes-de-washington-franklin-y-bolivar/. Last access: 23.06.2020.  
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country, in place of a mixture of currencies that flowed across national borders. However, 
to impose the circulation of the new banknotes within the national territory, the Argentine 
state needed to guarantee their value. At that time, the way states had to make their 
currencies trustworthy was by guaranteeing their conversion into gold. It was the gold 
standard era, in which the prevailing idea was that the value of money derived from its 
material backup in precious metal, usually gold. Thus, in 1881, the government set the 
conversion rates of the new currency into gold and silver. However, during the period in 
which the gold standard was in force in Argentina, the lack of genuine gold inflows 
frequently led to balance of payments crises that, in turn, caused repeated devaluations of 
the national currency and resulted in long periods of inconvertibility (Vitelli 2004). But 
even in these circumstances, as I will show in the following, between the 1880s and 1940s, 
Argentines learned to trust their currency and continued to do so for many years. 
 
However, as of the 1930s, the money institution started to suffer deep transformations, 
both in Argentina and the world. The disruption caused by the First World War and the 
Great Depression led to the breakdown of the gold standard. In turn, the collapse of the 
international monetary system based on currencies that were all convertible into gold, 
called into question the very idea that currencies’ values were an ‘intrinsic’ property of 
money. As gold became increasingly scarce, huge discussions emerged regarding where 
to tie money’s value. Argentine politicians at the time shared the global distress caused 
by the breakdown of the gold standard. Indeed, they were as desperately looking for a 
new anchor to tie the value of the national currency (thus stabilizing its price) as everyone 
else. It was precisely at that time that discussions about the changing value of the peso 
began to appear in the national press. Journalists and members of the editorial boards, all 
published articles where they tried to find answers to the question of how much the peso 
was worth. But despite the public debates surrounding the national currency, critics had 
no real correlation in the local financial system, where all savings were held in pesos until 
well into the 1940s. However, from 1946 onwards, with the arrival of Juan Domingo 
Perón in government, fundamental changes took place in Argentina. These changes 
triggered a dramatic loss of trust in the peso, which led Argentines to take their bank 
savings outside the financial system and invest them in other areas of the economy, such 
as the market for durable goods and, to a lesser extent, the real estate market. What is 
more, since 1949, the country started to suffer from recurrent balance of payments crises, 
which only worsened the situation of the national currency. The cycles of boom and 
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recession, which alternated on average once every three years between 1949 and 1967, 
caused repeated currency crashes, which, in turn, started to uncover the immaterial, 
conventional and contingent nature of money’s value. Thus, 1946 marks the beginning of 
inflation and of the daily and passive experience of the peso as a currency that could 
slowly lose its purchasing power in terms of goods. Moreover, the currency crashes that 
started in 1949 added the further realization that money’s external value could plummet 
in record time. Accordingly, if in 1946, the Argentines started to take their savings outside 
the national financial system, by 1958, they were already saving in dollars. Already back 
then, the threats to the Argentine peso were looming on the horizon.  
 
The Argentine peso during the gold standard (1883-1929) 
  
In Argentina, attempts to establish a national monetary system only took shape in 1881, 
once the country was politically consolidated under the government of Julio Roca 
(Rapoport 2010). Before that date, Argentina did not have a homogeneous or stable 
monetary system. Although the first banknotes had begun to circulate around 1822,24 it 
was only in 1867 that the political authorities tried, for the first time, to establish paper 
money as the main instrument for commercial exchange in the Argentine national 
territory. However, given that, at that time, the country was immersed in total monetary 
anarchy, the authorities needed to guarantee money’s value if they wanted the population 
to accept paper money as the primary means of payment. Thus, in 1867, following the 
guidelines of the time, the Argentine political authorities created the Oficina de Cambios 
(the Exchange Office) within the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (the Bank of the 
Province of Buenos Aires). This entity would be responsible for issuing the first 
Argentine gold convertible currency (Rapoport 2010). It was a time where, globally, most 
paper currencies in circulation were backed by a fixed amount of precious metal, usually 
gold. This prevented, at least in theory, arbitrary expansions of the money supply.25 
                                                          
24 The first Argentine entity authorized to issue banknotes was the Banco de Descuentos, a private bank 
with English capital, founded in 1822. Before that date, only metal coins had circulated in the national 
territory, but never paper bills (Vitelli 2004, 33). The bank put into circulation the first Argentine banknote: 
the Peso Moneda Corriente, an inconvertible currency which was enforced on January 9, 1826 and lasted 
until November 4, 1881. The bills were made in England, and some of them even portrayed the faces of US 
politicians, such as George Washington (Cámara Argentina de Comercio y Servicios 2018, 1). 
25 I point out that it prevented the issuance of paper money above gold reserve levels only in theory because, 
in practice, countries often suspended gold convertibility and issued banknotes without any metal backing. 
Moreover, during the gold standard, metallic coins were usually not traded for their gold weight but their 
face value. Both figures often differed. On this topic, see Redish (1993). 
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Unfortunately, like other banknotes issued before 1881 (mainly by private banks), the 
first banknotes issued by the exchange office only circulated in the area of the City of 
Buenos Aires and its surrounding district. Meanwhile, in the rest of the country, foreign 
metal coins (predominantly from Bolivia and Chile) continued to circulate, as well as 
banknotes and coins issued either by governmental agencies or by private banks, all of 
them mutually inconvertible (Vitelli 2004). 
 
It was only in November 1881, with the enactment of Ley 1.130 de Unificación Monetaria 
Nacional (Act 1,130 of National Monetary Unification) during the government of Julio 
Roca, that Argentina managed to have a single gold convertible currency that circulated 
throughout the national territory: the Peso Moneda Nacional (see Image 1). The Act 1,130 
created two currencies convertible into precious metals and set their conversion values: 
the gold peso (equal to 24.89 grams of gold) and the silver peso (equivalent to 385.8 
grams of silver) (Rapoport 2010). However, the silver peso lasted only a short time and 
was taken out of circulation by the end of 1883. Moreover, in that year, the government 
ordered that both new banknotes and those already in circulation had to be backed by 
gold-denominated pesos. In these circumstances, banks were forced to renew their total 
emissions (Vitelli 2004). Thus, the year 1883 represents the official beginning of the gold 




 The 5-cent Peso, with the image of Nicolás Avellaneda (1884) 
 
Source: Historia de la Moneda Argentina. Report published by the Cámara 
Argentina de Comercio y Servicios (2018) 
 
 
As I showed in the previous chapter, it was a period when the conception of commodity-
money prevailed. Although for a long time, a large part of the money in circulation in the 
world had already consisted of paper notes, during the gold standard, the dominant view 
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was that money’s value was a consequence of the ‘intrinsic’ value of the precious metals 
that served as money’s backup. Even if, at that time, the money circulating in the global 
economy was no longer wealth itself, but a representation of it, the link between money 
and gold was still a crucial feature of money’s value. Moreover, the responsibility for 
maintaining the parity relationship between the notes issued and gold was on the states, 
which gradually assumed the role of ultimate guarantors of the value of money. In 
Argentina, since the adoption of paper money in 1883, this function was fulfilled by a 
multiplicity of public issuing banks first and, since 1899, by the Caja de Conversión (The 
Conversion Office). Thus began the story, which I intend to narrate in this chapter, of the 
Argentine state’s construction of the promise in its national currency’s long-lasting value. 
 
Unfortunately, the first national-scale money experience of 1883 lasted only a short 
time.26 In October 1885, economic and financial problems forced the government of Julio 
Roca to suspend convertibility due to a lack of gold. Gold convertibility did not resume 
again until fifteen years later, in 1899. When in 1885 gold convertibility was suspended, 
different means of payment came back into circulation within the country’s economy. 
Foreign currencies, which had been banned in 1881, were allowed to circulate again. As 
a consequence, between 1885 and 1899, economic transactions in Argentina were still 
made in a variety of different means of payment: metals (such as gold and silver), foreign 
currencies from different countries (mainly bordering countries, such as Chile and 
Bolivia, or pounds sterling) and various types of banknotes issued by different banks and 
national agencies. As a rule, these different monies were not only inconvertible into gold 
but also among each other (Rapoport 2010).27 Argentina could finally reestablish gold 
convertibility in 1899. That year, the government enacted a Ley de Conversión 
(Conversion Act), that forced the conversion office, created in 1890, to convert paper 
money into gold at a different exchange rate than the one established in the original act 
of 1881. The new price was set at 44 cents of gold peso for each paper peso (that is, 2.27 
                                                          
26 Technically, there were two convertibility experiences before 1883 in which gold convertible banknotes 
were issued locally. However, the circulation of these notes was limited to the City of Buenos Aires and its 
surrounding district. The first experience took place between 1822 and 1826 when the Banco de Descuentos 
was allowed to issue gold convertible notes that could circulate within the City of Buenos Aires. The second 
took place between 1867 and 1873 when the Oficina the Cambios within the Banco de la Provincia de 
Buenos Aires was authorized to issue notes backed by the national government (Vitelli 2004). 
27 Remarkably, during this phase of inconvertibility, the government passed an act (the Ley de Bancos 
Garantidos), that allowed any bank, private or public, to issue inconvertible banknotes. Instead of solving 
the country’s economic problems, the act fueled a strong speculative bubble, which led to a dramatic crisis 
and the first national default in Argentine history. The Argentine currency was then devalued in 209%. On 
this topic, see Rapoport (2010). 
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paper pesos per each gold peso), and was in force until the beginning of the First World 
War (Regalsky 2018). Therefore, from 1899 onwards, Argentina was again into the gold 
standard, and its monetary system was structured around the conversion office, which 
was in charge of money issuance. 
 
As mentioned, between 1875 and 1936, gold was the dominant international trade 
currency (Eichengreen 2019). Therefore, all the countries that participated in the world 
trade network had to set the values of their currencies in gold, a practice that encouraged 
and facilitated international trade. Given that the countries kept the values of their 
currencies in gold fixed, they had to buy or sell gold at pre-established prices. Similarly, 
their gold reserves had to be sufficient to back their money issuance according to their 
specific conversion rates. Due to this very automatic conversion mechanism, the activity 
of the currency-issuing agencies (in this case, the conversion office), was limited to 
passively monetize trade balance surpluses and, conversely, to contract the monetary base 
when there was a trade deficit (Regalsky 2018). The close relationship between the inflow 
and outflow of gold from the country, on the one hand, and the internal circulation of 
money, on the other, had significant consequences for the national economy. In fact, 
under the rigid conditions imposed by the gold standard, fluctuations in the money supply 
were continuous and had little to do with the growth or lack of growth of the real 
economy. On the contrary, they had much to do with the inflow and outflow of 
international reserves. Thus, in those occasions where the leakage of reserves reached 
critical points, it was common for countries to suspend convertibility to preserve their 
gold stocks (Rapoport 2010). During the gold standard, Argentina’s recurring lack of 
reserves triggered long periods of inconvertibility (see Table 1). In fact, gold 
convertibility was only maintained at specific times, while the norm was rather 
inconvertibility (Vitelli 2004). In fact, in those years, Argentina was already suffering 
balance of payments crises. Back then already, the frequent crises led to the development 
of a stormy relationship between the state of the country’s external accounts and the ups-
and-downs of its national currency. 
 
To better understand the dynamics behind the convertibility-inconvertibility cycles 
characteristic of the Argentine monetary system during its early days, it is necessary to 
briefly review the main features of the Argentine growth model at that time. Between 
1880 and 1930, as a result of the industrialization process that Europe was going through, 
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world trade was booming. At that time, European nations (mainly England) offered 
manufactured goods and financial capital in search of raw materials and high value-added 
extraction circuits. In this scheme, Argentina’s economic strategy was based on the 
exploitation of its comparative advantages. Thus, the national economy was mainly 
oriented towards producing and exporting agricultural products to industrialized 
countries.28 With the money collected by this trade, Argentina could pay for its imports 
from European countries (Ferrer 2012). Moreover, given its lack of domestic capital, the 
Argentine economy was highly dependent on foreign capital inflows. These capitals used 
to enter the country either as loans or as direct foreign investments and allowed to finance 
different infrastructure works, such as ports and rail networks (Rapoport 2010).29  
 
As it was, an economy that exported primary goods, Argentina was very vulnerable to 
possible international trade disturbances, which were incredibly frequent during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. The vulnerability of Argentina’s economy had to do with 
the fact that its exports were mostly raw materials, whose prices were set in international 
markets and were very variable in the short term. In contrast, Argentina’s imports, were 
mostly manufactured goods and supplies and had higher and more stable prices. This 
trading scheme made Argentina very vulnerable to rapid changes in its trade balance 
(Ferrer 2012). Indeed, the country’s dependence on international trading conditions often 
led to a lack of genuine capital inflows, which had to be replaced by foreign loans or 
direct capital investments. Due to these circumstances, during the gold standard, the 
country suffered successive economic crisis (including the crises of 1873-74, 1884, 1890, 
1913-14, and 1929-30), which lead to a deterioration of its trade balance and a lack of 
genuine gold inflows (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). Although the specific reasons that 
triggered each one of these crises were different, almost always they included a 
combination of the same factors, namely: climatic fluctuations that affected crops and 
livestock production; price variations of Argentina’s exports within the international 
markets; and interruptions in international trade, that were caused by the significant war 
conflicts of the first half of the 20th century (Ferrer 2012).30  
                                                          
28 During the late 19th century, leather and wool were the main Argentine export products. Later on, meat 
and cereals (such as wheat and flax) were added to this list. Cereal production was especially important 
until the beginning of the First World War.   
29 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Argentina went through two cycles of indebtedness. The 
first cycle lasted from the early 1880s until the crisis of the 1890s. The second cycle began in 1905 and 
extended until the outbreak of the First World War.   





Beyond each crises’ specificities, the important thing is to emphasize that, in each of 
them, Argentina did not have enough gold to cover its expenses. These expenses came 
from two items: the cost of imports and the repayment of its external debt. Thus, the 
negative trade balances resulted in an almost chronic lack of gold reserves that led to long 
periods of inconvertibility of the national currency into gold. Seen from this perspective, 
it is not surprising that the conversion office only became fully functional in the early 
years of the 20th century. This was precisely the moment when Argentine exports made 
a formidable quantitative leap, which allowed - together with foreign investments -, to 
generate a positive net inflow of gold that made the country capable of sustaining 
convertibility for several years. This period of prosperity, the longest of this phase, ended 




Alternating periods of convertibility and inconvertibility in Argentina during the 
gold standard (1867-1929) 
 
Year Monetary regime Description 
1867-1873 
Different agencies and 
private banks issued gold 
convertible banknotes that 
circulated within a limited 
territory. 
Both public and private banks were allowed to issue 
gold convertible currencies for the first time. 
However, these currencies only circulated within a 
small territory, which usually included the City of 
Buenos Aires and its surrounding district. 
1873-1881 
A phase of inconvertibility in 
which different means of 
payment circulated within the 
national territory. 
The lack of gold led to the suspension of gold 
convertibility in 1775. That same year, the president 
Nicolás Avellaneda created the Peso Fuerte and 
tried to restore gold convertibility. However, the 
approval of the Ley de Bancos Garantidos in 1887 
fueled uncontrolled money issuance, thus leading to 
a new crisis. 
1881 
The national government 
issued the first gold 
convertible currency: the 
Peso Moneda Nacional. 
In 1881 Act 1,130 of National Monetary Unification 
was enacted. The act created two national currencies 
convertible into gold and silver that would start to 
circulate within the national territory. The 
circulation of foreign currencies was prohibited. 
1883-1885 
The Peso Moneda Nacional 
became the only convertible 
currency within the national 
territory. 
The government took the silver peso out of 
circulation, and the gold standard prevailed. 
1885-1899 
A new balance of payments 
crisis forced the government 
to suspend gold 
convertibility for 15 years. 
The Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires were authorized to issue legal 
tender without converting the banknotes they issued 
into gold. There were two parallel monetary systems 
in the country. Within the national economy, 
transactions were paid with paper money, whereas 





Gold convertibility was 
restored, but the exchange 
rate was modified. 
In 1890 the government created the Caja de 
Conversión. The agency started to function in 1895 
and was responsible for issuing banknotes only in 
those moments when gold entered into the country 
due to a trade surplus. 
1914-1927 
A new balance of payments 
crisis put an end to gold 
convertibility. 
Following the outbreak of the First World War, the 
gold standard was suspended, and international trade 
fell sharply. Argentina faced enormous difficulties 
with exporting its production. When the country’s 
trade balance became negative, Argentina had to 
suspend gold convertibility. The crisis continued 
until 1918. 
1927-1929 
The government restored 
gold convertibility and fixed 
the exchange rate. 
In the 1920s, Argentina’s economy began to 
recover. During the post-war period, Argentina’s 
exports recovered, and the country enjoyed a trade 
surplus for several years. To preserve the level of 
exports, the national government fixed the exchange 
rate and restored gold convertibility. 
1929 
The 1929 Crash caused the 
breakdown of the 
international monetary 
system based on the gold 
standard. 
The 1929 crisis unleashed a worldwide recession 
that led to the definitive breakdown of the gold 
standard and multilateral trade collapse. Like other 
nations, Argentina suspended gold convertibility in 
order to avoid the leakage of gold. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Ferrer (2012); Fundación de  Investigaciones Económicas 
Latinoamericanas (1989); Gahn (2016); Gerchunoff and Llach (2003); Kiguel (2015); Rapoport (2010); 
Vitelli (2004). 
 
After 1913, two other significant events led the government to suspend gold 
convertibility, again for an extended period: the First World War and the 1929 Crash. By 
1914, the postwar period’s enormous economic imbalances led to a general disruption of 
the gold standard on a global scale (Eichengreen 2019). In that context, Argentina was no 
exception. At that time, the country was facing enormous economic difficulties, 
originated mainly in its inability to export its products to the European nations, which 
were devastated by the war. This lack of markets interested in buying the Argentine 
agricultural production resulted in a deep deficit in its trade balance, which led the 
government to suspend gold convertibility between 1914 and 1927 (Rapoport 2010). 
Although Argentina was able to reestablish gold convertibility in 1927, this did not last. 
The worldwide recession unleashed after the breakdown of the New York Stock 
Exchange in 1929 caused the collapse of global trade and led to the international 
suspension of the gold standard, which, at the time, faced its terminal crisis. In such 
circumstances, industrial activity and world trade fell in tandem, and commodity prices 
plummeted due to a lack of buyers. As a result, Argentina not only exported less 
agricultural products but also did so at lower prices than before. Thus, its foreign 
exchange surpluses fell sharply, and the trade balance became negative again (Ferrer 
2012). The combination of adverse factors forced the country to reduce its purchases of 
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manufactures and machinery. Despite this, the government encountered severe 
difficulties to cover its obligations and repay the external debt. 
 
All in all, during the gold standard, Argentina suffered recurrent crises and a chronic lack 
of gold reserves, which led to long periods of gold inconvertibility and forced the 
government to devalue the national currency on more than one occasion. However, 
despite the difficult circumstances, until well into the 1940s, the Argentine state 
established and maintained a trustworthy currency. While it is undeniable that during the 
gold standard era, the country faced severe difficulties and broke, on more than one 
occasion, the promise to convert its currency into gold, the Argentine people at that time 
learned to trust their currency and continued to do so for many years. This trust was 
manifested, for example, in the consolidation of a financial system which, as I will show 
in the following, was able to offer long-term saving options in pesos until well into the 
1940s.  
 
But how can we explain sustained trust in money despite the recurring crises? The lack 
of further research that directly addresses the topic leaves us with only hypotheses. There 
are probably several reasons to consider. In part, the reason behind the Argentines’ 
sustained trust in their national currency could be that they did not have much contact 
with foreign countries and cared little about their currency’s external price in gold. 
Alternatively, the reason could be that, at the beginning of the 20th century, 
inconvertibility was far from being a local singularity. A third reason is perhaps that the 
political authorities of the time were careful enough to (and politically capable of) solving 
monetary crises in a way that allowed them to preserve the value of the most popular 
long-term saving options back then. As I will show in a moment, by maintaining the value 
of the National Mortgage Certificates (Cédula Hipotecaria Nacional) during the crises of 
1890, the authorities protected Argentine savers from incurring dramatic losses. This 
would change in later times. Furthermore, a fourth reason may be that, in the years of the 
gold standard, the US dollar was not yet a socially-widespread instrument to measure and 
quantify the losses brought by each monetary crisis, as it would be later on. So, all in all, 
despite the difficult political and economic circumstances that characterized the 
beginning of the 20th century, when monetary shocks were permanent, Argentines were 
capable of start and continue to trust their currency for many years. However, as I will 
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show in the following, the complex monetary circumstances of the 1930s and 1940s 
would start to shake the foundations of public trust in the Argentine peso.  
 
The early debates about money’s value (1930-1946)  
 
The 1920s and 1930s were years of essential transformations in monetary affairs. As I 
showed in the previous chapter, by 1930, the breakdown of the international monetary 
system based on a gold standard led developed countries to start to think of new solutions. 
Eventually, negotiations gave rise to a new international monetary system that would take 
its final shape in 1944 during the Bretton Woods agreements. Since then, the dollar would 
remain at the apex of the international hierarchy of currencies. But by 1930, the world 
was in a crisis, and so it was the Argentine currency. England’s abandonment of the gold 
standard in 1931 had forced countries under British influence (including Argentina) to 
take urgent measures to prevent the massive drainage of gold. In a world in crisis, the 
local government was no exception. Since gold was no longer sufficient, everywhere, the 
economic authorities faced the same problem: how to continue guaranteeing money’s 
value in the absence of sufficient gold? In Argentina, the first answer came in 1931 with 
the imposition of exchange controls intended to stop gold leakage. Later on, in 1935, the 
government took a second measure; namely, it created Argentina’s central bank and 
established that gold reserves had to cover the value of, at least, 25% of the banknotes 
issued by the bank. The measures that the government adopted during those years sparked 
off a heated debate that reached the national press and lasted several years. Both the 
journalists and the business elites of the time accused the government of manipulating the 
‘natural’ or ‘real’ value of the national currency. However, despite the widespread social 
debate, savings within the local financial system continued to be in pesos until, at least, 
the mid-1940s. 
 
In 1931, the difficult international situation caused by the gold standard breakdown was 
aggravated by some internal conditions. By that time, Argentina’s national economy was 
in a critical situation due to the Great Depression, which shrunk exports, thus deteriorating 
the country’s external accounts sharply. Besides, the bad harvest of 1930 only worsened 
the situation, leading to a sharp increase in the trade deficit (Gahn 2017). In this 
unfavorable context, the government (which needed the country’s gold to pay the external 
debt and import essential supplies) was forced to find mechanisms to stop the leakage of 
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gold and foreign currency. Thus, on October 10, 1931, just three weeks after England 
abandoned the gold standard, the conservative (de facto) government of general José Félix 
Uriburu founded the Comisión de Control de Cambios (Exchange Controls Commission), 
which started to operate in November 1931. From that moment on, exchange controls 
were frequently enforced in Argentina (Fundación de  Investigaciones Económicas 
Latinoamericanas 1989).  
 
The exchange controls imposed in 1931 consisted of a selective restriction of gold and 
foreign currency movements, which was intended to curb the continued outflow of gold 
reserves from the country, thus allowing to reestablish the trade balance. The primary 
function of the exchange controls commission was to monopolize and regulate gold and 
foreign currency outflows and inflows to the country, a task for which it implemented a 
series of measures, namely: a) setting the exchange rate; b) forcing exporters to settle 
export transactions in the official foreign currency market; and c) imposing a series of 
controls on foreign currency movements, which, from that moment on, had to comply 
with a predetermined list of priorities. In this regard, the commission established as a first 
priority the use of gold reserves for the payment of the external debt. In the second place, 
were imports of raw materials for the provision of local industries, fuels, and 
indispensable consumer goods. Other transactions, such as tourism expenses and the 
sending of remittances abroad, were severely limited, as well as the import of non-
essential goods. Most imports were regulated through a permit system. The commission 
also established that foreign currency transactions had to be made in specially authorized 
banks (Gahn 2017). 
 
Not surprisingly, the Argentine politicians shared the global distress generated by the 
breakdown of the gold standard. As everywhere else, in Argentina, the government was 
desperately seeking a new anchor to which to tie the value of the national currency, thus 
stabilizing its price. The “situation of uncertainty and expectation” caused by the British 
abandonment of the gold standard was mentioned in the Decree of October 10, 1931 (the 
norm that imposed foreign exchange controls in Argentina). More than that, the norm also 
stated that the time had come “for the peso to take its natural price”.31 Interestingly, the 
exchange controls commission decided not to follow the 1931 devaluation of the pound 
                                                          
31 Quotation from the Decreto del Poder Ejecutivo 1.060 (National Decree 1,060), published in the Official 
Gazette on October 19, 1931.  
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sterling. Instead, the commission decided to link the Argentine peso’s price to the US 
dollar and the French franc, two currencies whose prices were still linked to gold 
(Fundación de  Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas 1989). However, the 
devaluation of the dollar in 1933 shook the foundations of the international monetary 
system. The movement reopened the question about the ‘real’ or ‘natural’ value of the 
Argentine peso. As expected, the distress caused by the fluctuating price of the national 
currency was not exclusive of politicians, but radiated to society as a whole, especially to 
journalists and business elites. Discussions about the changing value of the peso were 
reproduced in several spheres, including the national press of the time, where journalists 
and members of the editorial boards published articles where they tried to find answers 
to the question of how much the peso was worth. These articles usually distinguished 
between what they called the ‘real’ value of the peso from another ‘artificial’ value set by 
the government through its exchange controls policy (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019, 37). 
 
During the 1930s and 1940s currency regulations became a permanent motive of criticism 
in Argentina. Remarkably, the critique was always the same: financial experts, journalists, 
and politicians from opposition parties, all accused the government of manipulating the 
value of the national currency and preventing the Argentine peso from taking its ‘natural’ 
price. As noted in an editorial published in the national newspaper La Prensa in 1940: 
“since Argentina is subject to foreign exchange controls, national development is delayed 
due to a lack of foreign currency. Moreover, foreign currencies are missing because, for 
18 years, the government has been taking them from their natural owners”.32 In this 
climate of widespread public contestation, the government was permanently trying to call 
off the debate, always without success. In 1933, for example, the minister of finance, 
Federico Pinedo, introduced a reform in foreign exchange regulations in an effort to 
contain widespread criticism and eliminate the illegal foreign currency market. Mainly, 
Pinedo’s reform split the foreign currency market in two. On the one hand, a free market 
in which the dollar price was higher and fluctuated following market variations. On the 
other, an official foreign currency market in which the exchange rate had a lower fixed 
value established by the government (Gahn 2016). The official market was the place 
where the profits obtained from all transactions legally authorized by the exchange 
                                                          
32 Quoted in Luzzi and Wilkis (2019, 42). The quote belongs to an article published at the newspaper La 
Prensa. Unfortunately, the authors do not indicate the exact date in which the article was published nor the 
article’s title.  
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controls commission had to be settled,33 including the profits coming from the trade of 
traditional exports. On the other hand, the free market was the place for trading profits in 
foreign currency coming from all remaining transactions. Illustratively, the text of 
Pinedo’s Decree noted that the decision to split the foreign currency market in two was 
of “an obvious public convenience”. For the minister, the division allowed “the prices of 
foreign currencies to reflect the real value that the market attributes to the national 
currency”, and allowed the peso “to take its natural price”.34 The reform gained some 
support during the first months after its introduction. However, criticism soon reappeared, 
and the complaints that the government was manipulating the peso’s value spread across 
the public once again. The following passage of an editorial published in 1934 in the 
national newspaper La Prensa clearly illustrates the situation:  
 
“The government ensures itself extraordinary profits [...] it trades foreign 
currency, but it does not do it openly [...] but, actually, inside a darkroom 
[...]. The real availability of foreign currency is unknown […] the total 
number of transactions is also unknown, [we only know] the average 
exchange rate [that results from these transactions]. Thus, the government 
always wins, and the merchant always loses [...]. This system [is] not 
democratic, but secret and arbitrary for those governed, because the 
government is the only one that can see inside the darkroom that the foreign 
exchange market is today”.35  
 
All in all, during the 1930s and 1940s, monetary debates were commonplace in Argentina. 
For many years, public contestation surrounded the national currency and its supposedly 
‘artificial’ value in gold (or foreign currency). Still, the truth is that these critiques 
remained limited to a handful of journalists and business people, and had no correlation 
                                                          
33 The official foreign currency market worked as follows. Through a gauging system, the government 
established the official price at which traditional exports had to be traded in international markets. Thus, 
exporters were obliged to settle their official profits on the official dollar market. These profits had to be 
converted into pesos at the official exchange rate. In the meantime, other profits could be traded in the free 
dollar market. So, if, for example, exporters were able to sell their products at a higher price than the one 
established by the government, they could liquidate the additional profits (those profits earned above the 
official price of the goods traded) on the free market, at a higher exchange rate. Foreign exchange 
transactions related to non-traditional exports, exports to neighboring countries, foreign investment and 
remittances to Argentina also flowed to the official foreign currency market. 
34 Quotation from the 1933 Decree, which modified exchange rate controls in Argentina, quoted in Luzzi 
and Wilkis (2019, 34). 
35 Quotation from the editorial note “El cuarto oscuro de los cambios”, published in 1934 in the newspaper 
La Prensa, quoted in Luzzi and Wilkis (2019, 36).  
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in the local financial system, where savings were still overwhelmingly held in pesos. 
However, as I will show later in this chapter, from 1946 onwards, with the election of 
Juan Domingo Perón as president of Argentina, fundamental transformations took place. 
These changes deepened the public’s uneasiness about the long-lasting value of the 
national currency and triggered a dramatic loss of trust in the peso that, this time, was 
indeed felt in the financial system. However, before turning to that part of the story, I will 
first review other remarkable transformation occurred in Argentina in the 1930s: the 
creation of its central bank. 
 
The creation of the Argentine central bank (1935) 
 
By 1932, Argentina had two agencies that performed functions that would have 
corresponded to a central bank: the Caja de Conversión and the Comisión de Control de 
Cambios. In addition to these two agencies, there was also a third important entity: the 
Banco Nacional de la República Argentina (the National Bank of Argentina), the most 
important bank in the country. The national bank was a public bank that managed the 
government’s accounts and the clearinghouse, which also granted rediscounts to other 
banks (Sember 2018). However, given that the system regulated by these three entities 
had proved insufficient to prevent the leakage of gold - and the subsequent currency 
devaluations - during times of crisis, there was already for several years the ongoing 
project to create a central bank.36 Indeed, without a central bank that could regulate the 
monetary system, the excessive rigidity of the gold standard had long prevented the local 
management of the monetary policy, causing external cycles to have a decisive influence 
on the national economy (Ferrer 2012). 
 
The world of the 1930s was a world in which the creation of central banks that could 
regulate monetary systems and help to stabilize domestic economies, was becoming 
increasingly important. By that time, John Maynard Keynes’ ideas had gained enormous 
popularity within economics, and states had started to be seen as key actors in the 
economic sphere. In essence, the Keynesian paradigm strongly opposed the liberal 
doctrine and pointed out, instead, that in the face of a severe economic crisis, the national 
                                                          
36 Already in 1917, president Hipólito Yrigoyen together with his minister of finance Pedro Salaberry 
proposed the creation of a central bank. However, the National Senate sent the project to the commission 
of finances, which never discussed it. In 1919, a second project was submitted, which addressed previous 
objections, but it had the same fate as the previous one and was never discussed (Rapoport 2010). 
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economy could not return to a state of equilibrium in and of itself. On the contrary, one 
of Keynes’s central ideas was that, in times of recession, the government needed to 
intervene in the economy, increasing public spending and stimulating demand, although 
this implied an increase in the fiscal deficit. Within this scheme, central banks played a 
crucial role (Rougier and Sember 2018b). 
 
Other factors contributed to giving even more impetus to the creation of central banks 
during the 1920s and 1930s. As I showed previously, it was a context in which the value 
regime that sustained trust in capitalist currencies’ enduring value had entered into crisis. 
As gold was becoming increasingly scarce, the different countries’ governments were 
forced to reconsider the relationship between the value of their national currencies and 
the gold reserves that backed such value. In the new circumstances, two solutions were 
proposed: first, to find a global system that could efficiently manage increasingly scarce 
gold reserves; and, second, to diversify the metallic material foundations that sustained 
trust in capitalist currencies, thus granting more elasticity to the system (Ocampo 2016). 
In line with these proposals, countries gradually began to create central banks, which will 
now be in charge of concentrating and managing gold reserves. Thus, the creation of 
central banks around the world received a significant boost. Under the aegis of the League 
of Nations, several central banks were created in Europe, such as the ones in Austria, 
Hungary, Greece, and Bulgaria. Simultaneously, several missions of ‘money doctors’ 
(groups of advisors, mainly from England and the United States) were sent to different 
countries in both the American continent and the former British colonies (Rosenberg 
2003). Mainly, these experts sought to advise non-developed countries on how to impose 
banking and monetary reforms in general, and, especially, on creating rather orthodox 
central banks (Sember 2018). Several of these missions encouraged the creation of central 
banks in many Latin American countries. Among them, the missions of the American 
Edwin Walter Kemmerer, for example, had an essential role in the creation of the central 
banks of Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, countries which, in turn, benefited 
greatly from significant capital inflows coming from the United States (Drake 1989). 
 
On the other hand, in Argentina and Brazil, the relationship with England prevailed. Thus, 
both countries’ chief advisor was Otto Niemeyer, who, in 1932 (after having advised 
Brazil), traveled to Argentina to evaluate its financial system. In 1933, the British 
specialist prepared a report advising the Argentine state on how to design the future 
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central bank (Sember 2018). Unsurprisingly, many of the measures proposed by 
Niemeyer in his report reflected the British interests. At that time, it had been several 
years since England had been pressuring the Argentine government to modify its 
monetary and banking system. The British government wanted Argentina to remove its 
exchange controls and allow British companies to remit their profits to England. Also, 
England asked Argentina to restore gold convertibility (suspended in 1929) and adhere to 
the gold-exchange standard. For the British, Argentina had to accept keeping a substantial 
part of its foreign reserves in foreign currency (preferably pounds sterling). This way, a 
large amount of gold would be released (Sember 2018). Such demands were part of a 
broader strategy, with which England sought to strengthen the role of the pound sterling 
as a world reserve currency and of London as an international financial center. In that 
context, the creation of a central bank in Argentina was functional to the British interests, 
since it would serve both to strengthen the international role of the pound sterling and to 
cope with the global gold shortage. Niemeyer indicated these advantages in his report:  
 
“One immediate benefit to the world at large of the establishment of a 
central bank in Argentina would be the release of a considerable amount of 
gold. Owing to the present currency system the gold held in Argentina is 
considerably in excess of the amount considered necessary in countries 
where the note issue is in the care of a central bank. Even now the 
proportion of gold in the Conversion Office and the Banco de la Nación to 
notes actually in circulation is in the neighborhood of 100%, and as the 
gold holdings of the country are about 90 million pounds, it will be seen 
that if a proportion of even 50% gold - or better still a gold exchange 
standard - were adopted, probably as much as 40 million pounds would be 
released”.37 
 
As it has already been said, it was a context in which the central countries were looking 
for strategies to deal with the global gold shortage. In such circumstances, the debate 
about how much gold a country needed to give credibility to its monetary system became 
increasingly important. The discussion was not new. It had begun in the 16th century 
                                                          
37 Quoted in Sember (2018, 77). Original source: Internal Memorandum Argentina, January 3, 1930. Folder 
OV9/3, Overseas Department: Papers of Otto Ernst Niemeyer: Argentina. I thank Florencia Sember for 
giving me access to the original quote in English. 
 
104 
when the European nations started to replace gold and silver coins with paper notes. At 
that time, banknotes used to be fully backed by gold coins. However, western economies 
had long since realized that they did not need to back their banknotes with 100% gold 
coins to give credibility to their monetary system. Thus, since the end of the 18th century 
(especially after the Bank of England suspended convertibility to gold in 1797), there 
were great debates that addressed this issue. The Bank of England Charter Act of 1844, 
for example, regulated the ratio of notes to gold with a reserve ratio of 30%. This meant 
that gold reserves had to cover the value of, at least, 30% of the banknotes issued by the 
Bank (Redish 1993). For its part, the US Act of 1913, which provided the Federal Reserve 
with a regulatory framework, established that the US central bank needed to support its 
paper currency with at least 40% of its value in gold (Richardson, Gou, and Komai 2018).  
 
Naturally, beyond England’s wishes, Argentina had its own interests to defend. But 
avoiding British pressure was not easy at the time. Especially because England was 
Argentina’s main commercial and financial partner. England did absorb not only most of 
the meat exports but also had significant investments in the country. British capitals 
controlled most of the meat processing plants and rail transport, thus monopolizing the 
meat trade (Murmis and Portantiero 2019). In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
commercial and financial dependence led Argentina to make significant concessions to 
the British. Still, the design of the central bank was not part of these concessions (Ferrer 
2012).38 In 1934, and after several failed projects, the minister of finance Federico Pinedo, 
entrusted Raúl Prebisch (at that time an advisor in the ministry of economy), the task of 
reviewing Niemeyer’s project. In his review, Prebisch introduced significant changes, 
which mostly had to do with an early conception of the use of the bank’s countercyclical 
policy, aimed at counteracting the effects of balance of payments crises (Rapoport 2010). 
Unlike the British project, which proposed that Argentina adopted a gold-exchange 
standard, Prebisch was against the idea that Argentina had to maintain its international 
reserves in foreign currency, an option that he limited to 10% of the total reserves. 
Convincingly, Prebisch argued that such an option was risky since the 1929 crisis had 
shown that even countries with the strongest currencies could leave the gold standard. 
And in fact, during the Great Depression, the losses suffered by those central banks that 
                                                          
38 In 1933 Argentina signed a tariff pact with England (the Roca-Runciman Pact). In this pact Argentina 
made several concessions to England, among them, it agreed to sell it the meat at a preferential price, to 
give it facilities to remit the profits of the British companies to England and it granted the concession of all 
the means of transport of the City of Buenos Aires to a British company (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). 
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had kept their foreign reserves in currencies of countries that later abandoned gold 
convertibility were significant (Sember 2018). Regarding the general composition of the 
international reserves, the project proposed by Prebisch envisaged a gold guarantee for 
the national currency in circulation (mainly banknotes and deposits) of 25%. The guaranty 
would also secure transactions abroad and establish a limit to money issuance.39  
 
At the beginning of 1935, and after countless failed projects, the National Congress 
passed Act 12,155, which created the Central Bank of Argentina. The entity began to 
operate in May of that same year (Sember 2018). The central bank’s primary function 
was to issue the national currency and maintain its value. For these tasks, the central bank 
needed to “concentrate sufficient foreign reserves”, and to “moderate the sharp 
movements in the currency’s value and in the stock of internal credit”.40 The central bank 
also had to regulate the amount of credit within the economy; to promote commercial, 
industrial and agricultural activities; and act as the government’s financial agent (Rougier 
and Sember 2018b). On the other hand, the initial idea that the central bank had to be a 
completely private entity did not prosper, and the state ended up contributing 50% of the 
share capital. Consequently, in its origin, Argentina’s central bank was a mixed agency. 
That means, that all the national and regional public banks, the national private banks and 
the foreign banks based in the country, participated in the central bank’s direction. 
However, the central bank’s legal mandate established that it was the national government 
that was in charge of appointing the president of the entity. The first president of the 
institution was Enrique Bosch. Raúl Prebisch, in turn, took over the general management 
of the bank (Rapoport and Guiñazú 2016). Once the central bank was created, it partially 
took over the tasks related to foreign exchange controls. However, the exchange controls 
commission continued to be responsible for granting the permits authorizing imports and 
remittances. Meanwhile, the central bank was in charge of buying and selling foreign 
currency to banks in the official foreign currency market (as long as the commission had 
authorized the transaction). Also, the central bank monitored transactions in the free 
foreign currency market. 
 
All in all, by 1935, Argentina had managed to establish its central bank, implement a 
monetary policy capable of fostering the economy’s internal growth, and guarantee 
                                                          
39 The British Project proposed a gold backing of 33% (Sember 2018). 
40 Quotation from Ley No 12.155, Artículo 3; cited in Sember (2018, 83). 
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stability conditions that could support the value of its currency. With a central bank whose 
gold reserves were sufficient to backup almost one hundred percent of the currency in 
circulation, in 1935, Argentina’s currency was completely trustworthy. In fact, developed 
countries (with England in the lead) demanded the Argentine government to release some 
of its gold reserves, thus contributing to alleviating the global economy’s liquidity 
problems. In sum, even in the complex monetary scenario of the 1930s and 1940s, and 
having to resort to exchange controls and protectionist policies, which were a permanent 
source of public contestation, Argentina had been able to guarantee the value of its 
currency. One of the strongest evidences of such a situation was the existence of a 
financial system in which long-term saving options in pesos were dominant. However, as 
I will show in the next two sections in 1946 the situation would change dramatically. 
From that year onwards, with the election of Juan Domingo Perón as president, 
fundamental transformations took place in the Argentine economy, which deepened the 
public’s uncertainties about how stable the national currency’s value was. In particular, 
two dramatic changes (the rise of inflation and the disappearance of saving options from 
the national financial system) triggered a dramatic loss of trust in the peso, which this 
time would indeed be felt in the financial system.  
 
The transformations of the Peronist’s years (1946-1955) 
 
Foreign exchange controls imposed in Argentina in 1931 had sparked off a heated social 
debate on the nature of money’s value. The debate can be found in the national press of 
the time, as well as in graphic humor, theatre plays and other cultural productions that 
were published during those years (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019). Still, setting public debates 
aside, an analysis of the national financial system in the early 1940s clearly shows that 
the Argentine population still trusted their currency. Indeed, until 1941, Argentines saved 
in pesos. At the time, almost forty years of low inflation had fostered the development of 
local currency denominated saving options, some of which had become very popular. As 
Table 2 shows, in December 1941,41 all saving instruments within the financial sector 
                                                          
41 This data is taken from the dissertation of Eduardo Corso (2015, 75). In footnote 43, the author explains 
why he chose 1941 to analyze the Argentine non-financial private sector asset portfolio (that means the 
asset portfolio of the Argentine families and business companies). In particular, Corso points out that this 
year is particularly good for assessing the asset portfolio composition of the Argentine families and business 
companies. This is because it was precisely in 1941 that the government carried out a debt swap that 
included all saving instruments that private agents at the time could have. In this regard, the records of that 
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belonging to Argentine families and companies were denominated in the local currency. 
Short-term saving options included different instruments. Around 51% of this portfolio 
consisted of sight deposits in pesos held at private and public banks. Meanwhile, term 
deposits were not yet a significant option for placing one’s savings in the country. In 
addition to bank deposits, Argentines also used to hold their savings in deposits accounts 
at the Caja Nacional de Ahorro Postal (the Bank of the National Post Office), an agency 
founded in 1915, which sought to capture small deposits (Rougier and Fiszbein 2004). 
On the other hand, long-term savings represented around 33% of all savings and were 
mainly concentrated in two assets: the Cédula Hipotecaria Nacional (the National 
Mortgage Certificate) and public bonds. Both instruments had a maturity of more than 
thirty-seven years, were denominated in pesos, and yielded a fixed interest rate, also in 
pesos (Corso 2015).  
 
Table 2: Financial asset holdings of the Argentine families and companies as of 
December 1941 
 
 Nominal Value 
 
Millions of pesos Percentage of total 
assets  
Percentage of GDP 
Money in circulation 1,147.0 14.4% 7.1% 
Bank deposits  4,058.9 51.1% 25.2% 
Checking   
accounts 
1,543.5 19.4% 9.6% 
      Sight deposits 2,125.1 26.8% 13.2% 
      Term deposits 390.3 4.9% 2.4% 
Government debt  1,325.2 16.7% 8.2% 
Mortgage certificates  1,300.2 16.4% 8.1% 
Stocks 112.0 1.4% 0.7% 
Total 7,944.0 100% 49.3% 
Source: Corso (2015, 68)  
 
As noted by Eduardo Corso (2015), for more than 50 years, there had been a specific 
instrument that captured the preferences of the public and became the main instrument 
used by Argentine families for long-term saving: the national mortgage certificate. 
Created in 1886, it was an instrument for enabling Argentines to acquire property through 
mortgage loans granted by the Banco Hipotecario Nacional (the National Mortgage 
Bank), with a fixed interest rate of around 6% and with very affordable installments, 
                                                          
year provide an overall picture of the stocks of the different financial assets Argentine families and 
companies had at the time.  
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which facilitated access by small savers. Until 1946, the national mortgage certificate was 
the Argentines’ most popular long-term saving instrument. According to Corso, the 
reason behind its success was the certificate’s triple guarantee: the guarantee provided by 
the mortgaged property itself, the guarantee provided by the payments already deposited 
at the bank, and that provided by the National Treasury as a backup to the bank (Corso 
2015). An interesting aspect to highlight is the fundamental role the financial crisis of 
1890 played in cementing public trust in the national mortgage certificate. In fact, during 
the crisis of 1890, the national mortgage bank was one of the few institutions which was 
able to maintain the value of its mortgage deposits, thus protecting its customers from 
incurring massive losses on their assets. This behavior was remarkable. In fact, due to the 
magnitude of the crisis, many other banks went bankrupt. For example, this was true of 
the Banco Hipotecario de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (the Mortgage Bank of the 
Province of Buenos Aires), a public, regional bank, dependent on the regional 
government, well-established, and with a better reputation than the national mortgage 
bank. However, the mortgage bank of the province of Buenos Aires defaulted, was 
liquidated, and its mortgage certificates were compulsorily converted into government 
bonds to be repaid 15 years later and with a large discount (Gómez and Gilbert 2019). In 
contrast, the national mortgage bank, which was also a public bank but depended on the 
national government, managed to emerge relatively unscathed from the crisis and 
maintain the value of both its mortgage certificates and the real estate properties they 
related to (Olarra Giménez 1971). Remarkably, fifty years after the 1890 crisis, people 
still placed deep trust on the national mortgage bank’s mortgage certificates. In this 
regard, the example clearly illustrates the importance of public authorities’ decisions and 
actions for preserving trust both in the currency and in saving instruments. Indeed, by 
preventing savers from suffering dramatic losses, the government’s officials and the 
authorities of the public financial institutions affected by the 1890 crisis had a decisive 
impact on preserving trust. Put differently, it was not just the crisis but also how the crisis 
was managed and resolved, which had a crucial effect on the preservation of trust both in 
money and in the financial system.  
 
During the 1940s, the second most important long-term saving option of the Argentines 
were government bonds. It is essential to notice that the market for government debt was 
a relatively new market at that time. It had only started in 1935, in parallel with the 
creation of the central bank. Understandably, it was a rather small market whose 
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participants included insurance companies, banking and financial institutions, and some 
large businesses (Corso 2015). Still, the government’s efforts to provide the sovereign 
debt market with a more solid structure allowed the market to develop to the point of 
becoming an option for long-term saving capable of competing with the national 
mortgage certificate within a few years. Still, Argentine families did not participate in this 
market. The stock market, on the other hand (that had developed significantly during the 
last decade of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century), failed to recover 
from the losses suffered during the First World War and maintained a low level of activity 
until the second half of the 1940s (Corso 2015).  
 
All in all, until well into the 1940s, most Argentine companies and families had their 
long-term and short-term savings within the national financial system. However, from 
1946 onwards, with the election of Juan Domingo Peron as president of Argentina, three 
fundamental transformations took place, which deepened the uncertainty surrounding the 
value of the national currency and triggered a dramatic loss of trust that, this time, had an 
impact in the national financial system. The first significant transformation of these years 
was that, as of 1946, the national inflation rate increased steadily, reaching an 
unprecedented 30%. The second transformation was the disappearance of long-term 
saving instruments capable of storing value from the national financial system. In turn, 
the combination of these two processes resulted in a repressed financial sector (Corso 
2015, 79) - that is, a financial sector in which the nominal interest rates were 
systematically below the inflation rate, thus the real interest rates were negative -, and 
triggered a flight of resources which flowed to other areas of the economy, such as, the 
market for durable goods and, to a lesser extent, the real estate market.  
 
Last, the third significant transformation of these years was the re-emergence of external 
constraints (in Spanish, restricción externa) (Gaggero, Schorr, and Wainer 2014), that is, 
the lack of international reserves, a situation that would become chronic. Especially since 
1949, the lack of international reserves (first gold and then later dollars), became a regular 
feature of the Argentine economy, which would leave an indelible mark on Argentines 
for many generations. The recurrent balance of payments crises caused by the chronic 
lack of international reserves, which were extremely frequent between the 1950s and 
1960s, resulted in dramatic and recurring devaluations of the national currency, which, 
eventually, would end up destroying the trust of Argentines in the peso. In fact, in the 
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heat of the recurring monetary crises that characterized these years, the constant changes 
to money’s value and the uncertainty surrounding the overall economy would cause 
Argentines to stop taking their national currency for granted. During those years, as the 
trust in the peso began to disappear, the US dollar would start to become the favorite 
reserve asset of Argentines, as well as their chosen barometer to interpret national crises. 
During those years, the US dollar would start to gain a prominent place within 
increasingly broad sectors of the Argentine population (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019).  
 
The financial reform of 1946 and the disappearance of saving instruments  
 
In 1946 the general Juan Domingo Perón became Argentina’s president. From that 
moment on, the Argentine economic policy took a radical turn and focused on promoting 
the national industry. Indeed, during his first government, which lasted until 1952, Perón 
implemented an industrial policy that stressed the state’s role as the primary agent 
promoting development. Peron’s economic program had three main axes: the promotion 
of industry, the active construction of a welfare state,42 and the transformation of the 
country’s income distribution (a policy mainly oriented towards favoring the labor sector) 
(Ferrer 2012). In this regard, Perón’s policies resulted in a profound transformation of the 
national growth model. While in the old model, economic growth depended on the 
political support of the traditional elites and national and international business people 
linked to agricultural production, the new model relied on mass consumption and internal 
demand. Thus, Peron’s main political support came from the labor sector and other less-
favored social groups (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). Remarkably, in order to provide a 
fertile ground for the new economic policy, the new government implemented a series of 
measures, including two financial reforms (one in 1946, and the other in 1949), which 
caused dramatic changes to the national economy whose effects would be felt by 
generations. 
 
Shortly after taking office, the new government approved a series of decrees, which, as a 
whole, drastically changed the structure of the country’s monetary and financial system. 
Among the most significant changes introduced by the financial reform of 1946 were the 
                                                          
42 Perón carried out an active policy of nationalization of companies providing public services. The list of 
nationalized companies includes most providers of rail and maritime transport, the telephone network, 
energy companies and other companies oriented to manufacturing activities (i.e., grain elevators). On this 
topic, see Ferrer (2012).  
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nationalization of the central bank,43 the modification of its legal mandate and the 
establishment of its role as lender of last resort. At the same time, the reform ordered the 
nationalization of all bank deposits within the financial system; the channeling of 
financial loans towards industrial activities judged to have priority; and the regulation of 
interest rates by the state (Rougier 2018). The reform had dramatic consequences for the 
economy. Most notably, it led to a sharp increase in the national inflation rate. Between 
1903 and 1944, the average annual inflation rate in Argentina had been 1.48%. However, 
as of 1945, the inflation rate began to accelerate and reached an alarming 30% in 1948 
(Corso 2015). Thus, from the mid-1940s, inflation slowly started to become part of 
Argentines’ everyday life, a daily problem that hit those who had fixed incomes especially 
hard. In addition to being a concrete everyday life experience, inflation also became a 
subject of academic debate, a technical problem that required scientific explanations that 
could provide effective solutions (Berrotarán, Rougier, and Tenewicki 2006). But in a 
world in which the old orthodox economic toolkit had lost effectiveness, and in which the 
new Keynesian economic paradigm was not fully developed, there was no clear 
consensus, and local experts discussed among themselves on the causes of national 
inflation and the best ways of fighting it.   
 
At first, from 1943 to 1946, most experts associated the increase of the internal prices 
with the lack of goods caused by the trade restrictions that followed the Second World 
War. However, from 1947 onwards, the persistence and severity of inflation made it 
evident that its origins had to be traced back to the national economic dynamics. Although 
there is still an ongoing debate about the ultimate causes of inflation in Argentina at that 
time, there can be no doubt that the state’s industrial policy played a crucial role. This 
policy resulted in a significant increase in banking credit (which grew significantly more 
than bank deposits during the whole period). In turn, the expansion of the monetary base 
fostered the rise of inflation (Rougier 2018). Thus, for economists such as Marcelo 
Diamand, Richard Mallon and Juan Sourrouille, the main cause of inflation was the 
excessive money issuance (Berrotarán, Rougier, and Tenewicki 2006). According to their 
vision, the industrial policy based on a massive supply of subsidized credit and loans (that 
is, credit and loans with negative real interest rates) to national industries, had resulted in 
an excess of money in circulation. The excessive money issuance led to an equivalent rise 
                                                          




in prices44. In addition to the excessive money supply, the sustained increase in wages 
promoted by Perón’s government also contributed to accelerating inflation, this time via 
the increase in production costs. Thus, it was the combination of both an expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy, together with a sustained increase in wages that ultimately led 
to inflation (Rougier 2018).  
 
However, according to the government, rising inflation was not the consequence of the 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. For the economic authorities, the increase in 
the inflation rate was the consequence of a supply shortage, whose origin was the decline 
in imports coming from European countries. In this view, rising inflation resulted from 
the lack of synchronization between an aggressively expansionary policy (which 
encouraged public spending and increased the purchasing power of the population) and 
an underdeveloped industrial sector (that could not increase its production to fulfill the 
increasing demand). In short, there was more money to spend than products to buy within 
the national economy. In turn, the supply shortage resulted from the combination of two 
factors: the difficulties in importing European products in the context of the second 
postwar period, and the lack of development of the local industry, which was unable to 
provide substitutes for those goods that could no longer be imported. Thus, the national 
economy suffered from supply rigidity. In August 1947, the minister of economy Miguel 
Miranda referred to the problem in one of his speeches:  
 
“What we are doing vigorously right now is the first phase, we are building 
factories and installing machinery, which provide employment but do not 
produce goods or provide income yet. Naturally, [with this policy] we are 
creating a buying capacity in the population, which at the moment cannot 
be satisfied because consumer goods are still lacking. But as soon as our 
industry begins to produce, a stream of new consumer goods will flood the 
market. Then, the main driver of inflation will disappear. Keynesian 
principles support this explanation and show that excess demand is not 
caused by excessive monetary expansion. Instead, inflation is caused by the 
                                                          
44 After the nationalization of bank deposits, all sources of money creation were under the direct control of 
the state. Thus, while it was true that private banks could continue to take deposits, these entities could only 
lend the funds that the state made available to them. Thus, the decision on the granting of loans was 
ultimately taken by the monetary authorities. On this topic, see Rougier (2018). 
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current lack of development of our industry, where investments have not yet 
matured”.45   
 
As illustrated above, the government saw inflation as a transitory problem that resulted 
from a lack of manufactured goods that could satisfy the populations’ increasing demand. 
In their view, rising inflation would stop once the economic investments promoted 
through the industrial policy had had enough time to mature.  
 
Moreover, from 1946 onwards, in addition to these two factors (the monetization of the 
fiscal deficit and the scarcity of goods), a third source of inflation appeared: distributive 
struggles. Because Perón’s policies improved the working class’s wages, they 
transformed the income distribution and helped exacerbate class conflicts. During Perón’s 
government, both the industrial elite and the working class gradually started 
monopolizing an increasing percentage of the national wealth. Naturally, the traditional 
elite and the foreign investors (whose incomes were not linked to the industry, but to 
agricultural production), were not willing to see their participation in the national wealth 
distribution diminished in favor of other social groups (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). The 
result was that distribute struggles increased. Whenever the different social sectors 
(landowners, foreign investors, industrial leaders and workers) were unsatisfied with the 
outcome of wage bargaining, price controls or taxes (all policies that tended to restructure 
relative prices and, therefore, affected the income distribution), they tried to re-establish 
their income by using different strategies. These strategies included making wage claims, 
increasing the prices of their production, or even withholding exports to exert pressure on 
the government. In turn, these actions fostered distributive struggles, which then fueled 
inflation. Thus, inflation became one of the primary expressions of political, social, and 
economic conflicts among different sectors of society (Gerchunoff and Rapetti 2016). 
 
Unfortunately, in 1946, Argentina’s problems did not end with inflation. In addition to 
the daily experience of money’s loss of value, a second problem arose: saving options in 
pesos disappeared from the local financial system. In fact, in 1946, the state implemented 
a deliberate policy of swapping saving instruments that, overall, sought to reduce interest 
                                                          
45 Quotation from: Miranda Miguel (1947). “Cómo se dirigió nuestra economía y se retrasó el progreso 
industrial del país”, in Hechos e Ideas. VI. 42. August. Buenos Aires; article quoted in Berrotarán, Rougier, 
and Tenewicki (2006, 55).  
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rates on the financial market. In this regard, the government implemented a series of 
actions, two of which had a crucial impact on the national financial system’s overall 
dynamics and, especially, on saving strategies. One of these was the compulsory bailout 
of outstanding national mortgage certificates. With this policy, all national mortgage 
certificates were exchanged for mortgage bonds issued by the central bank, which paid 
an interest rate of around 2.5% a year. Thus, after sixty years of success, the government 
of Perón eliminated the market for national mortgage certificates, which were replaced 
by bonds that yielded negative real interest rates (Corso 2015). As if that was not enough, 
the government also ordered the compulsory exchange of public debt instruments for 
others with a lower yield.46 In this regard, the financial reform of 1946 carried out a 
massive policy of compulsory swap of public debt instruments, which were exchanged 
for new instruments that yielded lower interest rates. For example, the government 
exchanged different national bonds that paid an interest rate between 4% and 3,5% per 
year for other liabilities, which paid interest rates around 3%. Something similar 
happened with regional and municipal bonds (Corso 2015).  
 
As a result of these two measures, the government ended up eliminating all profitable 
saving options in local currency from the national financial system. To the extent that the 
interest rates paid by all saving options still available were below the inflation rate, the 
real returns of all financial assets in local currency became negative. As noted by Marcelo 
Rougier (2018, 193) between 1946 and 1955, all the interest rates in the national financial 
system (which were fixed by the state) were negative in real terms for both credit takers 
and savers. The combination of rising inflation and interest rates that the government 
intentionally maintained below the inflation level resulted in the emergence of a repressed 
financial sector (Corso 2015, 79). That is, it resulted in a financial sector whose intrinsic 
design systematically favors debtors; in other words, a financial sector designed to 
transfer resources from those who have financial wealth to those who need resources in 
the form of credits. In this context, the real returns of all financial assets in local currency 
became systematically negative. The situation eliminated the incentives for Argentines to 
keep their savings within the local financial system. Thus, negative returns led to an 
intense process of financial disintermediation. Argentines began to take their savings out 
                                                          
46 As noted by Corso (2015), the nominal interest rates of all public bonds (national, regional and municipal) 
oscillated between 3 and 5%. In a context where the inflation rate comfortably exceeded 20% per year, 
these bonds yielded a negative real interest rate of at least 15 points for keeping savings in these assets.  
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of the national financial sector and look for other options that would allow them to 
preserve the value of their wealth. Naturally, since the 1950s, real estate became a popular 
option to maintain the real value of wealth (Corso 2015).  
 
Short-term saving options were also affected by the policies of the early Peronist years. 
Deposits in the bank of the national post office, which had performed well between 1946 
and 1949 and amounted to more than five million in 1949, fell dramatically. The 
economic crisis of 1949 pushed the volume of savings to very low levels. By 1952, the 
volume of deposits was barely half what it had been in 1948 (Rougier and Fiszbein 2004). 
Although the government was not indifferent to this fall in the general level of deposits 
and put in place a policy that tried to encourage small savers47, the results of this policy 
were modest. Even though by 1955, short-term deposits recovered slightly, their volume 
never reached the levels of the first years of Perón’s first government. In sum, during 
Perón’s two governments (which lasted from 1946 to 1955), there were no financial 
options that allowed the Argentine people to preserve the value of their savings and 
wealth. Some of the few alternatives available were the purchase of durable goods and, 
especially, real estate investments, which started to register very high levels of demand 
at the time, a situation only explicable by the circumstances described (Corso 2015). 
 
In 1946, with the rise of inflation, the monetary problems of the Argentines became even 
more complicated. In addition to the public debates about the value of the national 
currency in gold that already circulated within the national press, and which as I will 
show, continued, the early years of Perón’s first government added the everyday 
experience of inflation. Thus, in 1946, Argentines began to suffer from a disease that 
would become dramatically familiar: the daily experience of their currency losing value, 
the experience that the money they had was no longer worth enough to buy what it had 
yesterday. Furthermore, although no one knew it at the time, that passive, pragmatic, 
everyday experience of money disappearing between their fingers had come to stay. So, 
from 1946 onwards, the Argentine’s monetary problems were no longer restricted to the 
social debate, which appeared in the media of the time, about whether the state was 
                                                          
47 From 1949 onwards, the government of Juan Domingo Perón tried to encourage saving and investment. 
With this aim, the government implemented education programs to promote saving in primary and 
secondary schools and carried out film and radio campaigns, as well as activities and talks in trade unions 
and factories. The government also published magazines and books on the topic. On this subject, see 
Rougier and Fiszbein (2004). 
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artificially manipulating the value of the national currency in gold. Now, the Argentine’s 
money problems were coming close to home. Now, the loss of value of the national 
currency was no longer a far-away issue but a daily, personal, persistent and material 
experience of incomes that were not enough and of savings that were fading away. To 
make matters worse, there seemed to be no escape from this situation. If it was already 
difficult to deal with the lack of sufficient income, the disappearance of all saving options 
from the financial system that could allow people to preserve what they had saved, made 
the experience only more desperate. Over the years, the persistence of inflation convinced 
Argentines that the peso was no longer a valuable currency, but a paper piece that could 
dramatically and irreversibly lose its purchasing power. 
 
The financial reform of 1949 and the debate about the gold reserves 
 
The debates about money that began in 1931 continued for many years, although the 
topics addressed varied. Just as in 1931, the debate had focused mainly on the exchange 
controls recently imposed by the government of general José Félix Uriburu; in 1949, 
public discussions about money mainly referred to the level of gold reserves that were 
supposed to back up the national currency. As always, the underlying problem was the 
lack of gold. As I have already shown, Argentina had always suffered from balance of 
payments’ problems and a chronic lack of reserves; a situation that since the gold standard 
had ended up in a row of currency crashes and long periods of inconvertibility. However, 
between the 1940s and 1950s, the lack of foreign currency became a chronic issue for 
Argentina and turned into the most critical limitation for its national development. But 
how did this process occur? As I will show in the following, one of the leading causes 
behind the increasing lack of dollars was that industrial development increased the 
country’s need for foreign currency. At the same time, the complex international situation 
of a world where all currencies (except the dollar) had stopped being convertible into 
gold, left Argentina with few possibilities on how to pay for its imports. Thus, between 
1946 and 1949, the government decided to use part of the national gold reserves to meet 
the country’s external commitments. Faced with a situation that was not improving, in 
1949, the government sent a bill to Congress that sought to reduce the percentage of gold 
reserves that the central bank had to have to 20% (instead of the 25% that was in force). 
The debate in Congress was virulent and soon became the cover story of every newspaper. 
The extensive media coverage was a clear indication that debates about the national 
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currency’s value were far from settled. As Luzzi and Wilkis (2019) point out, the 
discussions of those years about the value of money significantly impacted the popular 
culture of the time. Proof of this impact is the magnitude that issues related to the 
country’s political and economic situation acquired in different expressions of popular 
culture, such as graphic humor and musical theatre plays. However, without a doubt, the 
most enduring legacies of those years would be the increase in the economy’s need for 
dollars and the decrease of the national gold reserves, two processes that only aggravated 
the country’s overall economic situation. Moreover, the lack of gold and dollars became 
a chronic problem since 1949 and laid the foundations for the enormous macroeconomic 
instability that would characterize the Argentine economy until, at least, 1967. Since then, 
the lack of dollars became the most dramatic limitation to sustained long-term monetary 
stability and monetary trust. 
 
During the first decades of the 20th century, Argentina’s economic growth depended on 
its exports of raw materials and low-value-added agricultural products. However, with 
the arrival of Perón in government, Argentina’s growth model gradually shifted towards 
a model based on a domestic industry specializing in the production of final goods. In 
Argentina, as in many other Latin American countries, some industrial branches were 
already developing by the mid-1930s. Still, in the beginning, industrial development in 
the country had emerged as a short-term solution, a way of dealing with the supply 
shortage caused by the lack of imports coming from Europe in the first half of the 20th 
century (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). In contrast, in 1946, the industrial policy stopped 
being a short-term solution and became a deliberate state policy. Perón actively promoted 
the development of the national industry and a growth model driven by domestic demand. 
Such a model was not only more inclusive but also (it was expected to be) more 
sustainable in the long run. However, the late industrialization model that the Argentine 
economy followed between the 1940s and 1960s - which is known in the literature as 
import-substitution-industrialization (Rapoport 2010, 9)- had severe limitations. Mainly, 
it supported the development of an industry that demanded plenty of foreign reserves but 
could not produce them (Ferrer 2012).  
 
Until the 1960s, the Argentine domestic industry was a light industry oriented towards 
the early-stage transformation of the agricultural production. It was an industry which 
produced low value-added supplies. Mostly, the industry produced non-durable 
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(perishable) final consumer goods for the supply of the domestic market. During the 
1940s, existing industries linked to the production of food, beverages, textiles, leather and 
tobacco, were complemented with new branches, mostly oriented to produce glass, paper, 
rubber, and also household appliances, such as kitchens, radios and refrigerators (Ferrer 
2012). Without a doubt, the industry contributed to national development. However, one 
of the most pressing problems posed by this light industry was that it was highly 
dependent on importing machinery, equipment and supplies from Europe and other 
developed countries. Moreover, since the Latin-American region rarely developed state-
of-the-art technologies, productive innovation also depended on the licensing or 
purchasing of technology (Rapoport 2010). Thus, the Argentine industry was - due to its 
internal structure -, an industry that could only function as long as Argentina had 
sufficient gold to import the supplies that its industry required. But the problem was that 
the gold (or the foreign currency) necessary to sustain the industrialization process came 
from the country’s exports, which were still overwhelmingly produced by the agricultural 
sector. 
 
The Argentine industry, thus, suffered from two main problems: an economic and a socio-
political one. The economic problem was that the Argentine economy had an unbalanced 
productive structure (Diamand 1972); that is, it had an economic structure with a 
fundamental imbalance between its agricultural and industrial sectors. This imbalance 
had to do with the fact that, on the one hand, Argentina exported fundamentally raw 
materials (such as grain and meat) and low-value-added agricultural supplies. Thus, its 
capacity to export was frequently affected by factors beyond the country’s control (i.e., 
variations in the international price of agricultural commodities, or unfavorable weather 
conditions, etc.). In contrast, the industry required capital goods and manufactured 
supplies, whose prices were higher and more stable (Ferrer 2012). Because the industry 
was highly dependent on importing supplies, it was also dependent on foreign exchange 
inflows. However, Argentina’s industrial production was oriented to satisfy the internal 
market. Therefore, it was an industry with little or no capacity to generate the necessary 
resources to sustain its own development. As always, the foreign exchange came from the 
exports of agricultural products. As a result of this dynamics between the agricultural and 
the industrial sectors, Argentina often suffered trade imbalances, which restricted the 
availability of genuine gold inflows, that is, gold inflows that did not come from 
international loans or foreign direct investment. Moreover, due to its characteristics, 
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Argentina’s industrial model was frequently labeled as unsustainable. However, it must 
also be noticed that Argentina’s industry’s sustainability was also dependent on political 
support. In this regard, the second problem of Argentina’s industrial growth model was 
fundamentally a socio-political one. The traditional national elites and the groups of 
foreign investors did not look favorably on industrial development. In fact, since these 
groups’ incomes came from agricultural production, industrial development entailed 
potential economic losses for both of them. Moreover, industrial development also 
empowered the labor sector and other low-income groups. In this regard, elites and 
foreign investors often intentionally boycotted the national industry, thus preventing it 
from taking off (Ferrer 2012; Gerchunoff and Llach 2003).  
 
The transformation of the national growth model that started in the 1940s also had a 
monetary counterpart, which, in turn, contributed to aggravate the country’s trade deficit 
even further. Until the 1930s, the Argentine economy had worked according to a bilateral 
trading scheme. Until that time, the country exported its agricultural production to many 
European countries, especially England. From this trade, Argentina obtained gold and 
foreign currency, which it could then use to import the manufactured goods it needed, 
also from Europe. However, between the 1930s and 1940s, this bilateral scheme was 
gradually replaced by a commercial triangle that included not only Argentina and 
England, but also the United States. While in the new scheme, Argentina still exported 
most of its production to England and other European nations, the imports that the country 
needed to supply its domestic market mostly came from the United States. By 1947, half 
of Argentina’s imports came from the dollar area (Sember 2018). Naturally, in these 
circumstances, Argentina needed to obtain the gold (or the dollars) to buy goods and 
equipment from the United States. Typically, this gold had come from Argentina’s 
exports to England and continental Europe. But the highly complex monetary reality of 
the 1940s made it difficult for Argentina to sustain this triangular trading scheme. In fact, 
during the second postwar period, many European countries (including England, the 
primary buyer of Argentine meats), had suspended gold convertibility on their national 
currencies. Not only did England not have a gold convertible currency; even worse, it also 
had no real ability to pay for its imports. In this situation, Argentina could not use the 
pounds sterling obtained by its commercial exchange with England. The ‘blocked 
pounds’ (Rougier 2018, 159) accumulated in Argentina’s central bank, but they could 
only be used to trade with countries within the sterling bloc. Since these pounds could not 
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be converted into other currencies either, Argentina found it challenging to obtain the 
dollars it needed to buy the goods from the United States and other countries outside the 
sterling area to provide its domestic economy. In 1947, the dramatic situation was 
described at the national press of the time:  
 
“The truth is that our country makes large purchases to the United States. 
But for these purchases to be effective, we need to have dollars, either in 
the form of foreign currency reserves or in the form of dollar deposits 
credited in US banks. However, dollar reserves […] can only be obtained 
if we can sell [our products] to US merchants. We emphasize this point, 
especially now that the conversion of British pounds to US dollars is still a 
problem whose solution does not seem to be near”. 48 
 
Under these circumstances, the trade balance with the United States became increasingly 
negative. The persistent lack of dollars forced Argentina to spend a significant part of its 
gold reserves to pay for its imports (Rougier 2018). As a result, while in 1946, the central 
bank’s gold reserves reached 1686 million dollars, in 1947, they fell to 1100 million 
dollars, and they decreased to almost half of that number in 1948 (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019). 
Initially, the government of Juan Domingo Perón tried to solve the problem by increasing 
exchange controls and restricting the imports of goods that were not considered essential, 
including cars, silk yarn and expensive beverages such as champagne and whiskey. But 
gold reserves continued to decline. Slowly running out of options, in September 1949, the 
national government sent to Congress a bill that intended to reform the central bank’s 
legal mandate. Among other measures, the bill proposed to modify the relationship 
between the country’s gold reserves and the amount of money in circulation within the 
national economy. The project reduced the percentage of total reserves backing the 
national currency to 20% (instead of the 25% in force). Moreover, because the new 
regulation intended to suspend the central bank’s obligation to maintain sufficient gold 
and foreign currency reserves to cover the value of at least 25% of all pesos in circulation, 
it allowed the government greater liberty to manage the monetary policy. In light of the 
extensive and heated debate in the Chamber of Deputies, this measure was, without a 
                                                          
48 Quotation from the editorial “Envío de oro a EEUU”, published in June 1947 in the national newspaper 
La Prensa, cited in Luzzi and Wilkis (2019, 38). 
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doubt, the most controversial point of the 1949 financial reform (Rougier 2018). The then 
deputy (and future president) Arturo Frondizi was one of its most fierce critics:  
 
“This bill includes more than 50 sections whose sole purpose is to leave our 
currency without its gold backup. [...] This project pursues two fundamental 
purposes. First, the purpose of leaving the national government hands-free 
to spend the little gold and foreign currency reserves the central bank has 
left. Second, that of leaving their hands-free to continue issuing currency 
without limitation of any kind”.49  
 
Perón, on the other hand, pointed out that the decline of the foreign reserves was part of 
a national strategy aimed at promoting industrialization and improving workers’ living 
conditions. For the president, the critical point was that Argentina used the resources it 
had in pursuit of achieving its economic independence: 
 
“They accuse us of having no foreign currency left; they say that we 
suspended the import of perfumes, whiskey, silks, and luxury cars. […] But 
we will not take loans to obtain foreign currency. And it makes sense that 
those who trade with foreign currency are against us. [However] today, our 
currency has a backup that it lacked before. [Today] our peso is backed by 
151% gold, which is an unprecedented situation in Argentina. Until we 
reduce that back up to 33%, as they did, we have much gold to hand over. 
They argue that we should not hand over the gold, and I wonder: if a period 
of hunger comes, will we eat the gold? […] What is the state going to do 
with the gold piles in the central bank? If we leave them where they are, in 
five years from now they will reap no benefit. Is it not better to exchange a 
couple of those piles for ships that will repay themselves with their freights 
in four years?”.50  
 
The cross accusations marked the tone of the debate. Perón, on the one hand, denounced 
the existence of a dirty campaign aimed at discrediting the government, a campaign 
                                                          
49 Quotation from Arturo Frondizi’s press statements published in the newspaper Clarín on September 9, 
1949; quoted in Luzzi and Wilkis (2019, 43). 
50 Quotation from Juan Domingo Perón speech at the signing of the agreement for food workers on June 
23, 1947; quoted in Luzzi and Wilkis (2019, 39). 
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organized by “those who trade with foreign currency”, that meant by the traders working 
at the dollar’s illegal market. “Yes, we have no dollars, but we have vehicles and 
machinery” the president said, and added that what was necessary regarding the 
sustainability of money’s value was not the amount of gold reserves but the productive 
capacity of the economy:  
 
“When the country has to buy or sell its production in international markets, 
we do not [want to] use currencies which lose their value. We buy with 
wheat, meat, leather, which will always have value. We do not [want to] use 
currencies based on a gold-standard, because those [currencies] can lose 
their value. We already know that game: it depends on the price of gold. 
[Instead] we will pay with what our land and our work produce because the 
value of that production will never be lost”.51 
 
However, critics did not stop. According to those who opposed the reform, the public had 
“the right to know why their pesos had lost so much proportion of their value [in gold], 
and what future awaited the national currency”.52  
 
Finally, after 29 hours of uninterrupted debate and despite the open resistance of the 
legislators who opposed the government, the bill intended to reform the central bank’s 
legal mandate was passed in the Chamber of Deputies. As Luzzi and Wilkis (2019) point 
out, the discussions over money that took place during those years (including the 1949 
debate about the reduction of the country’s gold reserves and its consequences for the 
value of the national currency) had a significant impact on the popular culture of the time. 
The political and economic debates of those years received incredible coverage by the 
national press. Moreover, they also inspired graphic humor and even theater plays, such 
as the musical piece “El dólar esta cabrero” (The dollar is mad/annoyed) released in 
1939, or the comedy “La Risa es la mejor divisa” (Laughter is the best currency) released 
in 1949. However, the most enduring legacy of those years would be a chronic lack of 
dollars. Indeed, since 1949 Argentina’s external constraints would become the 
fundamental limitation for the country’s future development.  
                                                          
51 Quotation from Juan Domingo Perón speech at the ceremony held by the Railway Union on December 
19, 1949; quoted in Luzzi and Wilkis (2019, 45).  
52 Quotation from an editorial published at the newspaper La Prensa in September 10, 1949; cited in Luzzi 
and Wilkis (2019, 43). Unfortunately, the authors do not indicate the title of the article.  
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The crises of the Stop and Go phase and the emergence of monetary 
distrust (1949-1967) 
 
From 1949 to 1967, the Argentine economy went through a phase characterized by 
repeated balance of payments crises known in the literature as the Stop & Go period. The 
root cause of these recurrent cycles was the country’s chronic lack of foreign reserves. I 
already showed Argentina suffered from a lack of foreign reserves since the beginning of 
the 20th century. At that time, the country mainly needed gold to build infrastructure 
works and pay its foreign debt. However, during the 1940s, industrial development 
increased the country’s need for dollars even further. Since the national industry required 
to import supplies and technology from developed countries, and these had to be paid 
with either gold or dollars, Argentina’s need for dollars increased with industrialization. 
Because the industry needed dollars, whenever industrial development started to take off, 
the country ran into a structural shortage of foreign currency and suffered from a balance 
of payments crisis. Due to this economic dynamic, between 1949 and 1967, cycles of 
industrial expansion (1947, 1961 and 1965) alternate with periods of crises and economic 
recession (1950-52, 1959 and 1962-63) (Gerchunoff and Rapetti 2016). Typically, the 
cycle began with a boom phase, in which industrial expansion led to an increase in 
imports. When the lack of foreign exchange made it impossible to continue the 
expansionary phase, a balance of payments crisis occurred and a period of recession 
followed.   
 
The recurring crises of the Stop & Go phase enlarged the list of factors driving inflation. 
Until 1949, this list included excessive money issuance, supply rigidity and distributive 
struggles. But in 1949, a new factor was added to the list: exchange rate driven inflation.53 
From 1949 onwards, exchange rate crises became one of the main drivers of inflation in 
Argentina. From the last years of Juan Domingo Perón’s first presidency to the 
interruption of the democratic government of Arturo Illia by the military, inflation 
continued to be a cause of public concern and government unrest. In the search for 
stability, the economic authorities often implemented austerity plans. These plans 
generally comprised a series of measures to restore monetary and fiscal balance, including 
                                                          
53 Exchange rate-driven inflation results from the increase in the cost of tradable goods caused by each 
devaluation of the national currency. 
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fiscal adjustment, currency devaluation, interest rate increases and credit restriction 
(Kiguel 2015). Alfredo Gómez Morales implemented the first austerity plan in 1952. 
Adalbert Krieger Vasena, the last one of this phase, in 1967. In between other four 
austerity plans were put in place. But despite the six austerity plans implemented between 
1949 and 1967 (1952, 1955, 1956-57; 1959, 1962 and 1967) (see Table 2 in the following 
chapter), inflation continued (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). With a crisis every three years 
on average, the Stop & Go period set the pace for Argentina’s economic development for 
almost 20 years. 
 
On top of inflation, was the political drama. In fact, between 1955 and 1973, Argentina 
lived through tumultuous years. No democratic government managed to finish its 
mandate, and the national army was in permanent confrontation with groups of armed 
civilians (Ferrer 2012). Moreover, during 1949 and 1967, monetary crises contributed to 
political unrest. In those years, Argentina suffered four mega-devaluations of its national 
currency and many exchange rate shocks. With each devaluation, the currency crashes’ 
economic and social impact deepened Argentines’ unrest and increased their distrust in 
the peso’s ability to store value. With each devaluation, the real wage of the working class 
and other fixed-income sectors decreased further. The psychological impact of each of 
these crises was significant. Each movement in the exchange rate showed that the national 
currency’s value was nothing more than an arbitrary number that moved capriciously. 
Without even understanding the logic behind each jump in the exchange rate, Argentines 
watched the changes in the peso’s value like someone watching a horror movie. They 
were frightened and mesmerized at the same time, between the anguish of not knowing if 
their salary would be enough to survive that month and the fascination of those who watch 
a magician’s spectacle trying to understand the hidden trick. During those years, the 
Argentine society witnessed the melting of its currency. 
 
The first significant currency crash of the Stop & Go period occurred in 1955. At that 
time, the self-proclaimed ‘Liberating Revolution’ led by general Pedro Aramburu 
overthrew president Juan Domingo Perón, who ended up in exile in Spain. One of the 
military government’s goals was to ‘recover the health’ of the national currency. The 
austerity plan began with a sharp devaluation. The system of multiple exchange rates that 
was in force during Peron’s two governments was abolished. Instead of three different 
official exchange rates ($5, $7.5, and $15), the government imposed one official exchange 
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rate. One ‘official’ dollar costed $18. On the other hand, the government re-established 
the free market, where each dollar costed $36 (Rapoport 2010). The second major 
currency crash of this phase occurred in 1958, during the government of Arturo Frondizi. 
At that time, Argentina had been running a trade deficit for four years in a row. To re-
establish the trade balance, the government decided to liberalize the exchange market and 
modified the exchange rate. The liberation of the foreign exchange market was not a 
minor event. It was the first time since 1931, there would be a single free exchange rate 
again for all economic activities (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). To give time for the 
drafting and the communication of the new regulations, Frondizi enforced a twelve-day 
holiday. The day after the activity resumed in the exchange market, the press reported in 
its cover stories how crowdings of people had flooded the San Martín Street, the 
privileged setting for exchange houses in Buenos Aires (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019). In the 
course of a few days, the dollar appreciated 68.2% against the peso. The third significant 
devaluation occurred during the presidency of José Guido in April 1962. Federico Pinedo, 
who was again minister of economy, forced the central bank to withdraw its interventions 
and the dollar appreciated by 64.5% (Odisio 2018). Finally, in March 1967, the (de facto) 
government of general Juan Carlos Onganía, announced (what was intended to be) ‘the 
last great devaluation’ of the national currency. The exchange rate jump rose the dollar 
from $290 to $350. The government’s optimism at the time in its ability to put an end to 
the exchange rate crises hardly allowed it to see that Argentina’s monetary problems were 
about to become even more dramatic. 
 
In 1955, the dollar’s value rose from $5 to $18 within a few days. In 1958, from $48 to 
$80, and in 1962 from $83 to $154. All of these crises had significant psychological 
effects. Each devaluation was a stark demonstration that the currency’s value was a 
convention. Each crisis showed that money was no more than an accounting instrument 
with no intrinsic value outside its state guarantee. To make matters worse, each jump in 
the exchange rate impacted the national inflation rate. Thus, inflation increased, 
undermining even further Argentines’ purchasing power. The state that was supposed to 
guarantee the currency’s value seemed to be as baffled as the citizens themselves. All the 
governments - from Perón (1952) to the (de facto) government of Pedro Aramburu 
(1956), to the government of Frondizi (1959) and the government of Guido (1962) -, 
implemented austerity plans, that sought to reestablish economic equilibrium. All these 
plans included abrupt devaluations, among other dramatic measures. But not only the 
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plans did not help to reestablish economic equilibrium, but they also produced incredibly 
traumatic blows that evaporated the already damaged trust of Argentines in the peso. Each 
one of these devaluations was a demonstration of the conventional and contingent nature 
of money’s value. 
 
The dollarization of savings and the early popularization of the 
dollar in Argentina (1950-1970) 
 
The Stop and Go crises caused Argentines to lose trust in the enduring value of the peso. 
Crucially, this loss of trust was accompanied by a second process: the beginning of 
savings dollarization. The monetary world of the 1950s and 1960s was a world in which 
the value of all capitalist credit currencies was inextricably linked to the value of the 
dollar. Thus, worldwide the dollar had become money’s measure of value. 
Unsurprisingly, in Argentina, the dollar also became an instrument for interpreting and 
measuring the national currency’s loss of value. During this time, two processes took 
place. First, Argentines started to save in dollars. Second, the dollar also started to be used 
as a unit of account, a reference to measure and quantify the losses caused by each 
monetary crisis. 
 
There is not much research on the early beginnings of dollarization in Argentina. 
However, few studies show (Corso 2015; Luzzi and Wilkis 2019) that in 1957 the 
dollarization of Argentines’ savings was already underway. In fact, in 1957, the central 
bank authorized banks to take deposits in dollars for the first time. Thus, several financial 
entities began to promote investments in foreign currency as a strategy to preserve savings 
in pesos from the loss of value caused by the recurrent crises. As noted by Luzzi and 
Wilkis (2019), by 1957, advertisements on dollar investments had already started to 
appear in the national press. In a financial system where there were no saving options in 
domestic currency, it is not surprising that dollar deposits became increasingly frequent. 
Moreover, the archives of the Argentine stock market also show that, between 1958 and 
1959, financial investments in dollars were growing.54 Other investments also started to 
gain popularity, such as purchasing real state or durable goods, including cars. 
 
                                                          
54 I thank Eduardo Corso for pointing out this fact during an interview.  
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The material dollarization of savings was accompanied by symbolic dollarization. Since 
the 1950s, the US dollar became a guide, an instrument that the public could use to 
understand their economic surroundings. The dollar (used as a unit of account) started to 
orient Argentines cognitively and practically amid so many crises. The popularization of 
the dollar (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019) and its status as a public number (Daniel 2013) 
capable of helping Argentines understand their national economic reality is evident in the 
national press of the time. As Luzzi and Wilkis (2019) show, since the early 1950s, the 
US currency gained more and more pre-eminence in the national press and became the 
principal reference value for understanding the national economy. The frequent exchange 
rate crises began to occupy an increasingly prominent place on the newspapers’ front 
pages. And so did the US dollar. The use of images and easy language by the press 
contributed to making the dollar a reference for many who, until then, had had little 
contact with the financial and foreign exchange markets. 
 
Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s, the US currency reached broader sectors of the 
Argentine population. In every crisis, newspapers reproduced images of the crowds 
gathered in front of the exchange houses’ windows in downtown Buenos Aires. The 
pictures showed citizens anxious to know the value of the US currency and to be able to 
make transactions (see image 2). These images made the dollar market more visible and 
easier to understand. They put a face to an activity that, until then, had only been 
associated with large import or export transactions and with the world of banks. In this 
period, the exchange rate would start to be announced daily in national newspapers, a 
practice that still exists today. Naturally, the press contributed to making the practice of 
hoarding dollars increasingly visible. Moreover, it helped the dollar becoming an ‘object 
of the popular culture’ (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019). As mentioned, this was the moment when 
the preference of Argentines for saving in dollars started to be portrayed in graphic humor 














The public gathered in front of the exchange houses on the day the 




Source: Illustration that appeared in the newspaper La Nación, on January 
13, 1959. Illustrated in Luzzi and Wilkis (2017).  
 
 
Aside from becoming an increasingly standard option for keeping savings, and a public 
number capable of orienting Argentines amid so many crises, the US dollar also became 
a unit of account to calculate losses and profits. In an economic environment enormously 
complex and dramatically changing, the dollar became a source of stability. As the peso’s 
inability to provide a reference of value increased, more and more companies started to 
promote the dollar as a reference price. At that time, transactions were still made in pesos. 
But in an environment where the recurrent crises had wholly distorted the system of 
equivalences, people were increasingly lost. Thus, companies started to promote the use 
of the US dollar as a price to calculate profits. From the purchase of real state and land to 
the purchase of plane tickets to travel abroad, more and more companies advertised their 
prices in dollars. For example, in December 1958, the construction company Geofinca 
S.A. published the following advertisement:  
  
“You and the dollar are intimately connected through the value of the 
Argentine peso. When the dollar costed $30, you could buy much land for 
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only $60 a month. But now [...] you and the peso have lost purchasing 
power. Now, the same piece of land costs $170 a month. If inflation keeps 
rising at the actual pace, shortly $170 will also be a meager price. So, what 
should you do? [...] Buy land. The land is the only effective way to save your 
money from devaluation”.55 
  
During the late 1950s, real estate investments started to be a typical store of value in 
Argentina. Many apartments were built in seaside cities close to Buenos Aires and 
became an alternative to store wealth in a context where there were no real saving options 
in the financial system (Corso 2015). Besides an instrument to calculate profits, the dollar 
also became a measure to quantify the harmful effects of inflation and the loss of value 
of the national currency. Besides the advertisements that intended to help Argentines 
calculate prices, newspapers started to compare the prices of some mass consumption 
products (such as beef) to the dollar’s price. For example, during 1958 and 1959, for 
several months, the newspaper Clarín (one of Argentina’s most influential newspapers) 
illustrated the price increase in mass consumption products compared to the prices of beef 
and the dollar (see image 3). In a box for outstanding news, the newspaper stated the 
following:  
  
“Beef – U$S. In Buenos Aires, the price of one kilo of meat competes with 
the price of the dollar. Meet closed yesterday in the butchery at $60. The 
dollar closed in exchange houses at $67.30. The price of meet rose $30, 
while the dollar price only rose $4.60 in the last 48 hours”.56 
  
Thus, in a context that made it difficult for Argentines to keep track of prices, the dollar 
became an instrument that helped to quantify and measure the dramatic effects of inflation 




                                                          
55Quotation from an advertisement made by the construction company Geofinca S. A.. The announcement 
occupied a full page in the December 18, 1958 edition of the newspaper Clarín. The company (which had 
branches in different cities of Argentina) promoted the sale of land in the coastal city of Mar del Plata. Cited 
in Luzzi and Wilkis (2019, 77) 





Comparison between the price of beef and that of the US dollar that 
appeared on the cover of the newspaper Clarín (1958). 
 
 
Source: Comparison between the prices of beef and the dollar that appeared 
in the newspaper Clarín, on the cover of its December 17, 1958 edition. 




Argentina established its national currency in 1883. Until well into the 1940s, the state 
could guarantee money’s value in gold and sustain a reliable currency. Until 1946 
Argentines trusted their currency. However, in 1946, Argentina’s growth model changed 
sharply. Industrial development and the rise of the working class transformed the 
Argentine monetary landscape forever. From that moment on, inflation increased steadily. 
In a context where saving options in pesos were no longer profitable, Argentines started 
to take their savings out of the financial system. At first, they invested them in real estate 
and durable goods. By the 1950s, the US dollar (which had become the world’s reserve 
currency) started to be regarded as an excellent option to store local savings. Over time, 
the dollar also became a unit of account to measure the effects of crises. Since 1949, 
Argentina’s balance of payments problems became more severe. Even if Argentina had 
suffered from a chronic lack of foreign currency reserves since 1880, from 1945 on, the 
country’s need for dollars increased. Argentina’s external constraints increased with 
industrialization. Thus, currency crises started to be more frequent and severe. During the 
1970s and the 1980s, the lack of dollars would increase even further. Macroeconomic 
instability would also increase dramatically in the decades to come. 
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5. (Dis)believing money: the consolidation of currency 
distrust in Argentina (1970-2010) 
 
The day before I left for Brussels, in June 1976, I went to a travel agency to 
convert into dollars all the pesos […] I had obtained earlier that day from 
the sale of my car and some other trifles. I remember that the line at the 
counter was very long, and no matter how fast the cashier rushed, the price 
of the dollar was moving faster than his fingers when counting the bills. 
Behind that little gray man with a mustache […], there was another man, 
thinner and more agile, who was holding a telephone tightly between his 
jaw and his shoulder, while with his other hand, he turned a crank to change 
the dollar price on the sign. As the queue stepped forward, the value of the 
bills I had in my pockets vanished like the dew at sunrise. 
 
With the dollars I got that day, I was able to survive a few months in a 
community house we rented with some friends near the European economic 
community building in Brussels. […] After some time, I went to France, and 
for seven years, I counted inflation in pennies. It was a new world for me. I 
adapted quickly because my life in Argentina with galloping inflation had 
only lasted a few months. The shock was when I returned. 
 
In 1985, in Buenos Aires, it was no longer possible to buy anything at night 
at the same price as in the morning. In the cafés, the cashier went crazy 
between the customers’ orders and the demands of his boss, who listened to 
inflation rates broadcast on the radio. Rents, salaries, the whole of life was 
- still is - indexed. Our pockets were filled with shabby, worn banknotes, in 
which the face of general San Martin was lost between people’s messages 
of love, insults, and requests for help. […] [Back then] wallets were not a 
good gift for anyone. There was no room in their pockets to store the 
banknotes of 100,000, 500,000, and one million pesos.  
[…] In the 1960s, the inflation rate in Argentina was as it is now in Uruguay 
and Venezuela, between 30% and 40% per year. Seen from today, that was 
not inflation. […] [Today] all Argentines are small or large investors who 
are used to putting their money for only seven days in a bank to make an 
interest. [...] Huge masses of money are routinely deposited for a single 
night, between the closing and the opening of the banks. [...] Distracted 
savers [who do not take precautions] are left with useless paper in their 
hands. However, this is also a part of the inflation culture. […] As I write 
this article, the price of the cigarettes I smoke in front of the computer had 
increased from $11 to $13 to $14. This movement does not worry me, 
because I know it is inevitable. […] [Today in Argentina] nobody agrees on 
the price of a service or a contract in australes, but in dollars. […] We 
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cohabit with inflation as with the landscape. The businessman [...] no 
longer thinks about reinvesting. Today, the only good businesses are those 
that allow you to make money right away.  […] 
With the presidential and legislative elections of May 1989 in sight, the 
government has declared once again its intentions to lower inflation. 
However, the truth is that the printers at the Mint do not stop.57  
 
 
The early fight against inflation (1946-1973) 
 
In the early 1970s, Argentine economic policymakers had two central concerns: the 
relentless rise in inflation and the remarkable macroeconomic instability that had been 
hurting the country for the past twenty years. Argentines had been living with inflation 
since 1946. Currency crashes were frequent since 1949. By 1970, both inflation and crises 
were long-standing problems. In such circumstances, one could think the economic 
authorities only needed to apply well-known methods to bring about long-awaited price 
stability. However, despite multiple attempts to stabilize the economy, anti-inflation 
policies had not produced the desired results (Heredia 2015). By 1967 six anti-inflation 
plans had already been put in place. Alfredo Gómez Morales had implemented the first 
plan in 1952. Adalbert Krieger Varsena, the last one (until that date) in 1967 (see table 
3). But although the different governments had been tirelessly fighting the uncontrollable 
rise in prices, in 1970, inflation remained unharmed.  
 
To make matters worse, the problems of the Argentines did not end with inflation. On 
top of the economic drama was political chaos. Since 1955, while a succession of de facto 
governments overthrown the ones rightfully elected by the people, the country had been 
immersed in violence. Between 1955 and 1973, Argentina lived through tumultuous 
years of political unrest and economic turmoil. In this period, three democratic 
governments were interrupted by four dictatorships. The democratic governments of 
Arturo Frondizi (1958), José María Guido (1962) and Arturo Illia (1963), were 
overthrown by the dictatorships of Pedro Aramburu (1955), Juan Carlos Onganía (1966), 
Roberto Levingston (1970), and Alejandro Lanusse (1971). In this period, the Peronist 
party was outlawed. Thus, the working-class demands that in the past had been voiced 
                                                          
57 Fragment from Soriano, Osvaldo. 1989. “Vivir con la inflación.” Nueva Sociedad 100: 38-43. 
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through democratic channels were now put forward through all kinds of violent acts, 
including factory boycotts, armed clashes and clandestine kidnappings (Gerchunoff and 
Llach 2003). Thus, while inflation continued to hurt Argentines’ pockets, the enormous 
political instability and the exacerbated social conflict became the second hallmark of 
those years.  
 
Since 1952, all governments had made considerable efforts to eradicate inflation. 
However, they had not always used the same recipes. Indeed, during the 1950s and 1960s, 
debates about which were inflation’s primary drivers and potential solutions were already 
commonplace. Worldwide, economists had been discussing inflation since at least the 
1920s, when a set of deep hyperinflations had flourished in inter-war Europe (Williamson 
1985). In the Latin American region, debates about inflation began in the second half of 
the 1940s. In those years, the acceleration of price rises in Chile and Argentina started to 
be regarded as a problem by local scholars and politicians. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
the debate grew in importance when inflation spread to other Latin American economies, 
including those of Perú, Brazil and Mexico (Fairlie 1992). The worsening and diffusion 
of inflation to a larger area encouraged the search for more general explanations and 
policy instruments to help governments combat spiraling prices.58 Over time, the debate 
polarized between two leading positions that proposed different explanations of inflation 
and the mechanisms that helped it disseminate within an economy. Naturally, these 
different views also led to different solutions on how governments should fight inflation.  
 
On the one hand, a group of scholars who mostly came from economic orthodoxy offered 
a monetarist explanation of the phenomenon. On the other, there was a second group of 
economists, who were linked to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (a regional commission of the United Nations that, at the time, was directed by 
Raúl Prebisch), and offered a structuralist explanation of inflation (Cáceres and Jiménez 
1983). Economists favoring the monetarist position emphasized the relationship between 
a rising inflation rate and the quantity of money in circulation within an economy. In their 
view, the most frequent driver of inflation was an expansionary monetary policy. 
Monetarist economists argued that if the state’s fiscal deficit was too large so that it had 
to be financed through increasing money issuance, such a policy tended to foster inflation. 
                                                          
58 On this debate, see, for example, Dornbusch and Fischer (1986); Hirschman (1981); Noyola-Vásquez 
(1957); Anibal Pinto (1963); Aníbal Pinto (1968); Sargent (1982); Williamson (1985). 
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Thus, from this perspective, inflation was primarily a consequence of irresponsible short-
term economic policies on the part of policymakers (Parkin 2017). In stark contrast, 
structuralist economists gave little weight to monetary factors in explaining inflation. 
Their main argument was that inflation in Latin American countries resulted from 
imbalances in their economic structures. Thus, asymmetries between the industrial and 
the agricultural sector were responsible for creating supply-side imbalances that 
eventually led to a balance of payments crisis. As a result, within these economies, 
attempts to grow always ended up in currency crises that fostered inflation. For 
structuralist scholars, distributive struggles were another primary source of inflation 
within Latin American economies (Rodríguez 2006). 
 
Table 3 
Stabilization plans and anti-inflation policies in Argentina between 1952 and 2001 
 
Year Stabilization Plan  Details 
1952 
Plan quinquenal (5 years 
plan). Economic plan led 
by minister Alfredo 
Gómez Morales during the 
second government of Juan 
Domingo Perón 
The plan included several fiscal and monetary measures 
oriented towards containing inflation. The most 
important ones were the imposition of wage freezes and 
price controls, the elimination of subsidies, and the 
promotion of savings. The government also tried to 
promote agricultural exports to re-establish the trade 
balance. 
1955-57 
Stabilization plan imposed 
by the (de facto) 
government of general 
Pedro Aramburu  
  
The austerity policy began in 1955 with a sharp currency 
devaluation that brought the price of the dollar to a 
single official exchange rate of $18. Price controls were 
eliminated. Argentina signed the Bretton Woods 
agreements and became a member of the IMF and the 
World Bank. On August 2, 1956, the government 
implemented a financial reform. The reform 
denationalized all bank deposits, limited monetary 
expansion, and reduced domestic credit. Deposits in 
dollars were allowed. The central bank’s legal mandate 
was modified. The entity became independent. Also, it 
was established that the monetary authorities would be 
in office for seven years.  
1958-59 
Stabilization Plan led by 
minister  Emilio del Carril 
during the government of 
Arturo Frondizi 
The plan included measures to lower the fiscal deficit, 
curb rising inflation, and stabilize the exchange rate. The 
most important measures were: the increase of taxes, the 
elimination of import controls, and the suspension of 
pension payments. Also, the foreign currency market 
was unified and liberalized. The government put in place 
a floating exchange rate regime. The liberalization of the 
exchange rate caused a sharp devaluation, and the price 
of the dollar rose from $48 to $80. Argentina signed an 
agreement with the IMF to receive financial aid. 
1962 
Stabilization Plan led by 
minister Alvaro Alsogaray 
during the government of 
José María Guido  
In a context of extreme political instability, the 
government implemented drastic adjustment measures. 
The foreign exchange market was liberalized. The central 
bank was not allowed to intervene. As a consequence, the 
currency devalued sharply. The dollar rose from $83 to 




Stabilization Plan led by 
minister Adalbert Krieger 
Varsena during the (de 
facto) government of 
general Juan Carlos 
Onganía 
The austerity policy included several measures to contain 
inflation and reduce the fiscal deficit. Among them, the 
government devalued the currency around 40%, rose 
interest rates, and froze prices (including wages, public 
tariffs fuel prices). The government also deregulated the 
economy to promote foreign investment and signed an 
agreement with the IMF to access a foreign loan.  
1973-1974 
Stabilization Plan led by 
minister José Ber Gelbard 
during the third 
government of Juan 
Domingo Perón 
The plan was based on a heterodox diagnosis of 
inflation. Gelbard blamed the distributive struggles for 
price increases. The measures he launched included: 
wage increases for workers, price freezes. The 
government also sought to increase industrial exports 
and contribute to the development of a sustainable 
industry. The central bank retook its place as lender of 
last resort.  
1975 
Rodrigazo.  
Austerity policy put in 
place by minister Celestino 
Rodrigo during the 
government of ‘Isabel’ 
Perón   
Shock therapy. Rodrigo implemented a sharp 
devaluation of the national currency of around 150%. He 
also increased the prices of fuel, gas and electricity. 
Price controls were abolished, and all other prices in the 
economy were liberalized.  
1976-1977 
I Stabilization Plan led by 
minister José Alfredo 
Martínez de Hoz during 
the (de facto) government 
of general Jorge Rafael 
Videla  
The orthodox adjustment plan included a devaluation, 
the release of process, wage freeze, dismantling of tariff 
protections, and a financial reform (1977) that fostered 
massive speculation. The financial reform deregulated 
interest rates and encouraged speculation and debt in 
dollars. Until December 1978, the government 
implemented a traditional monetarist policy based on the 
control of monetary aggregates.   
1978-1981 
Tablita cambiaria.  
II Stabilization Plan led by 
minister José Alfredo 
Martínez de Hoz during 
the (de facto) government 
of general Jorge Rafael 
Videla  
In December 1978, the government imposed a crawling 
peg. The plan (nicknamed the tablita cambiaria) 
consisted of a calendar of scheduled devaluations. Since 
the devaluations were lower than the inflation rate, the 
exchange rate was delayed, and Argentina became very 
expensive in dollars. The policy gravely harmed the 
national industry. 
1981 
Stabilization Plan led by 
minister Lorenzo Sigaut 
during the (de facto) 
government of general 
Roberto Viola 
The tablita was abandoned. A succession of devaluations 
occurred. The government split the foreign exchange 
market and imposed tariffs to protect the industry. The 
state agreed to pay the foreign debt of the private sector 
(thus private debt was nationalized). For this, the central 
bank extended exchange-rate insurances. 
1981-1982 
Stabilization Plan led by 
minister Roberto Alemann 
during the (de facto) 
government of general 
Leopoldo Galtieri 
Roberto Alemann implemented liberal policies once 
again. He deregulated the foreign exchange market and 
abolished protections to the national industry again.  
1982-1983 
Stabilization Plan led by 
ministers José Dagnino 
Pastore and Jorge Wehbe 
during the (de facto) 
government of general 
Reynaldo Bignone  
The most important policy of the two ministers was that 
they nationalized the debt of the private sector (a process 
that had begun with Sigaut). The most critical measures 
took place when Dagnino Pastore was the minister and 
Domingo Cavallo, the president of the central bank.  
1982-1985 
Stabilization Plan led by 
minister Bernardo 
Grinspun during the 
government of Raúl 
Alfonsín 
 
Grinspun’s initial economic plan was based on increasing 
public spending to foster credit and keep employment 
high. Grinspun increased wages and imposed price 
controls. It also tried to control the exchange rate and 
public’ tariffs from rising. However, because these 
policies did not work, Grinspun had to change his 
strategy. The minister then relied on conventional anti-
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inflation instruments: he devalued the currency, increased 
public tariffs, and decreased money issuance. He also cut 





I Stabilization Plan led by 
minister Juan Sourrouille 
during the government of 
Raúl Alfonsín 
 
The plan included various measures to combat spiraling 
prices. Most importantly, the plan included a monetary 
reform that replaced the peso with a new currency: the 
austral. Also, the government raised tax revenues, 
rationalized expenditures, slowed down monetary 
emission, and resorted only to financing provided by an 
IMF loan. Proces were frozen. The government also 
forbade indexation and designed a complex system of 





II Stabilization Plan led by 
minister Juan Sourrouille 
during the government of 
Raúl Alfonsín 
The Australito was an austerity plan that included 
different measures, among them: a generalized tax 
increase, restriction of money emission, and elimination 
of state subsidies. Many prices were frozen. There was 
also an unsuccessful attempt to privatize state-owned 
companies, such as the railway company, the state 
airline, and the telephone network provider. 
1987 
Plan Primavera.  
III Stabilization Plan led 
by minister Juan 
Sourrouille during the 
government of Raúl 
Alfonsín 
The Primavera plan was an austerity plan, an orthodox 
economic plan. The plan encouraged the opening of the 
economy and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
Most measures were part of the usual toolkit: wage 
freezing, currency devaluation. The measures were not 
supported, and inflation soared, reaching hyperinflation. 
1991-2001 
Plan de Convertibilidad  
Stabilization Plan led by 
minister Domingo Cavallo 
during the government of 
Carlos Menem 
The convertibility plan was a currency board. It was 
implemented through the Law 23,928 of convertibility of 
the austral. The plan re-established the peso as the 
national currency and eliminated the austral. The policy 
established a fixed pegging of one-to-one parity between 
the peso and the US dollar. It also guaranteed the full 
convertibility of pesos into US dollars. The government’s 
goal was to re-establish local and international credibility 
in the peg and to ensure tight control of the monetary and 
fiscal policy. Since the convertibility law established that 
any adjustments of the exchange rate had to be decided at 
the congress, the central bank was no longer in charge of 
the monetary policy. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Ferrer (2012); Fundación de  Investigaciones Económicas 
Latinoamericanas (1989); Gahn (2016); Gerchunoff and Llach (2003); Kiguel (2015); Rapoport (2010); 
Vitelli (2004). 
 
An essential difference between structuralist and monetarist economists was the role 
given to fiscal deficits. Monetarists argued that inflation resulted from a 
disproportionately large fiscal deficit of the country, which had to be financed through 
money issuance. In this regard, they often encouraged foreign debt accumulation to 
counteract the excessive emission of money. Structuralist economists, on the other hand, 
looked favorably on public spending. From their standpoint, the state had a pre-eminent 
role in creating mechanisms that could help these economies overcome their imbalances. 
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Thus, public spending was both necessary and desirable because it could help reduce 
disparities between different economic sectors, between different social groups and 
between cities and the countryside. Consequently, many structuralist economists argued 
that inflation resulting from deficit financing through monetary emission was a necessary 
compensation, a price to be paid in the present in exchange for sustainable future 
development (Cáceres and Jiménez 1983). Moreover, structuralist economists also 
stressed the role of expectations and inflationary inertia. Especially during the 1980s, 
structuralists made essential contributions to the fight against inflation and designed 
several anti-inflation plans that were mostly oriented towards managing the public’s 
expectations on future prices (Williamson 1985).  
 
So overall, already in the 1950s and 1960s, inflation was a contested topic. Accordingly, 
there were anti-inflation plans closer to the structuralist view (i.e., the plan implemented 
by Gómez Morales in 1952), and others that had more in common with monetarist ideas 
(i.e., the plan implemented by Álvaro Alsogaray in 1962). Most democratic governments, 
for example, promoted heterodox policies that relied heavily on public spending. These 
governments mostly shared the vision of an industrial and inclusive Argentina, a vision 
that had fully emerged in 1946, during Perón’s first government. This vision found an 
echo in the developmental governments of the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, the governments 
of Arturo Frondizi and Arturo Illia, supported by both the industrial elite and the great 
mass of workers, sought to promote an industrial and more inclusive growth model. In 
the few years of democracy that Argentina had between 1958 and 1970, the 
developmental governments bet on industrial development. Therefore, they took an active 
role in promoting the creation of a technologically advanced industrial sector and 
encouraged the expansion of new and more sustainable industrial branches, such as the 
steel, petroleum and chemical industries (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). Admittedly, these 
governments’ main aim was to create a more sustainable national industry, which could 
gradually generate the foreign exchange it needed to sustain its own development. 
 
In contrast, most de facto governments implemented liberal economic policies intended 
to weaken the national industry and favor a return to a less diversified economic structure 
(Azpiazu, Basualdo, and Khavisse 2004; Rapoport and Guiñazú 2016). In this regard, it 
is no coincidence that most military governments were often politically supported by the 
traditional local elites who envisioned an Argentina mainly oriented towards agricultural 
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production. Thus, more often than not, de facto governments put in place anti-inflation 
policies that sought to reduce the real wage of the working sectors. Typically this goal 
was achieved through a combination of sharp devaluations that were accompanied by 
wage freezes. Political repression facilitated the imposition of such policies. Interestingly, 
the return of Juan Domingo Perón in 1973, after almost 20 years of exile, seemed to be a 
signal that the moment had come for Argentina to embrace a growth model based on 
industrial development. However, in 1974, the death of Perón and the political turmoil 
which followed were the first signs that Argentines still had to fight the last major battle 
to decide which would be the country’s political project (Ferrer 2012).  
 
Beyond their different orientations, all anti-inflation plans carried out in Argentina 
between 1952 and 1967 failed to control inflation. Even if most of them were relatively 
successful in the short-term, they all failed in their final attempt to stabilize the economy 
in the long-term (Ferrer 2012). Many of these plans were initially able to contain inflation 
for a while and reestablish economic equilibrium. However, the equilibrium was 
precarious and lasted only a few months. Sooner or later, something triggered a movement 
in relative prices, and the inflationary spiral began once again. At times, the cause behind 
the reappearance of inflation were cost increases. Other times, it was distributive 
struggles, currency crashes, supply shortages, or excessive money issuance. But no matter 
what the cause was that triggered a new rise in prices, once inflation reappeared, all the 
other factors contributed to fuel it.  
 
By the early 1970s, Argentina had already tried every method known to bring inflation 
down. From monetary tightening to price controls and wage freezes, local policymakers 
had tested it all. But the rise in prices seemed unbeatable. Over time, no matter their 
ideological and theoretical preferences, most Argentine economists started to disbelieve 
in both the applicability and the effectiveness of orthodox and heterodox recipes alike 
(Heredia 2015). Moreover, even if some measures were still regarded as potentially 
helpful (such as price controls or fiscal and monetary tightening), Argentine policymakers 
new none of them would be supported long enough to achieve long-lasting results. 
Against the Argentine leaders’ perplexity, the world did not have an effective and 
universal treatment against inflation to prescribe. The 1970s, and especially the 1980s, 
were decades of significant disorientation and confusion on how to combat inflation. In 
Argentina and all over the world, there were heated debates on the causes behind inflation 
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and the best ways to fight against it (Williamson 1985). Certainly, with time, monetarist 
discourses gained strength and became more and more common. However, to the extent 
that most tools within the traditional monetarist policy toolkit had already been tried out 
without success, local economic policymakers started to test new and more radical 
strategies to combat the rise in prices.  
 
The debate between competing monetarist and structuralist theories of inflation was not 
closed in 1971 when inflation started to increase even further (Llach 1988). Between 1945 
and 1971, the country’s rate of inflation had remained around 30% a year. But in 1971, 
due to the increase in the international prices of meat and oil, inflation escalated to 60% 
a year (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). As if that was not enough, in 1975, Argentina’s 
inflation reached triple digits, thus inaugurating two decades of high inflation. In 
bewilderment, politicians and policymakers witnessed the galloping rise in prices reached 
triple digits in 1975 and kept wondering how to stop it. Since that moment onwards, the 
persistence of inflation encouraged the search for ever bolder solutions. As debates 
between monetarists and structuralists became progressively more antagonistic, 
Argentina’s anti-inflation policies became more and more drastic. In the heat of the 
debates between monetarist and structuralist economists, Argentina became a testing 
ground for radical experiments in inflation (Heredia 2015). During the 1970s and 1980s, 
monetarist and structuralist attempts to battle inflation followed one another in an endless 
succession of failures, which only served to increase public mistrust and political unrest. 
Paradoxically, each failed attempt to bring inflation down made it more resistant and 
immune to the policies in place. With each failure, the antagonism between orthodox and 
heterodox economists grew even further. Society’s mistrust in policymakers’ capability 
to stabilize the national currency’s value also increased with each unsuccessful attempt 
to control spiraling prices. 
 
Thus, even if Argentine anti-inflation policies had already experienced sharp turns since 
1952, these turns became more radical over time. As stated before, the political and 
ideological fracture within the country also contributed to fuel economic chaos. 
Competing definitions on how to fight inflation were not the only factor that impacted 
policymakers and their decisions on which anti-inflation policies should be applied. On 
many occasions, the sudden shifts and turns in the anti-inflation policy were also a 
symptom of the conflicts between the ruling elites (Rapoport 2010). Frequently, the 
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sudden changes in the anti-inflation policy reflected the social and political fractures in 
national society. On several occasions, the antagonism between two contrasting political 
visions of Argentina resulted in abrupt shifts in the country’s economic policy. In the 
following, I will delve deep into the succession of anti-inflation policies implemented in 
Argentina between 1975 and 2001. I will show how, instead of solving the Argentine’s 
monetary problems, the endless sequence of failed anti-inflation policies only worsen 
them. Indeed, the unhealthy succession of anti-inflation plans and austerity policies only 
fostered distrust in the governments’ ability to control inflation. At the same time, it 
contributed to uncovering the conventional contingent and hierarchical nature of money’s 
value. 
 
Living with high inflation (1973-1976) 
 
In 1973, after more than a decade of exile, Juan Domingo Perón returned to the country. 
The restoration of Peronism to the national political landscape brought along winds of 
hope. After winning the elections, an aged and sick Perón dedicated entirely to fighting 
the evil he had created back in 1946. Perón’s minister of finance, José Ber Gelbard, was 
convinced that the real root causes of inflation were the exacerbated social conflict and 
the constant distributive struggles between workers and price setters. Thus, right after 
taking office, he set in motion a heterodox anti-inflation program that, above all, called 
for social agreement. Gelbard increased wages, froze prices and sought to promote 
industrial exports (Ferrer 2012). In the beginning, the plan was successful. But in the 
inflationary international landscape of 1973, the rise in the price of oil impacted the costs 
of industrial supplies and led many Argentine companies to raise their prices. Ironic, that 
a country specialized in producing inflation was forced, this time, to import it. But that is 
how it was. After a few months of initial success, prices in the country started to increase 
once again. The social pact was broken. Within a few months, the inflation rate reached 
40%. It was the beginning of the end (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003).  
 
The death of Perón followed the failure of the Gelbard plan. After the leader’s passing, 
his widow - María Estela Martínez de Perón (alias Isabel) -, took over the presidency. But 
since the new president lacked the skills to lead an unruly Argentina, the country was 
thrown into economic and political chaos. The rapid acceleration of the crisis makes it 
difficult (and perhaps useless) to describe the events that followed in detail. Suffice it to 
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say that, in the twenty months that ‘Isabel’ was in government, Argentina had six different 
ministers of finance: José Gelbard, Alfredo Gómez Morales, Celestino Rodrigo, Pedro 
Bonanni, Antonio Cafiero and Emilio Mondelli. Except for Gelbard (who was in office 
for almost two years), the others remained in office for about one hundred days each. 
Aside from modest economic growth, which lasted until early 1975, all the other 
economic indexes portrayed the bleak picture of that time (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). 
While two antagonistic groups were fighting to gain influence over Perón’s widow at the 
presidential level, the country’s economic policy fluctuated wildly from one end to the 
other. In the ministry of finance, the changes in names and policies followed the violent 
political struggles at the core of the government. While the government was tearing itself 
apart, the liberal and more conservative sectors of the Argentine society began to plan a 
new military coup, which finally occurred on March 24, 1976.  
 
The most dramatic experience that preceded the 1976 military coup was the traumatic 
austerity policy put in place by one of ‘Isabel’s’ ministers of finance: Celestino Rodrigo. 
Rodrigo’s anti-inflation plan’s unparalleled violence earned him a prominent place in the 
collective memory of Argentines. The Rodrigazo (the Rodrigo stroke) marked a before 
and after in the history of Argentine inflation. Although, in essence, the plan was, once 
again, a devaluation of the national currency in response to a balance of payments crisis, 
its magnitude was unprecedented (Kiguel 2015). The plan (announced by Rodrigo on 
June 2, 1975) was conceived as a ‘shock therapy’, a package of measures that included a 
devaluation of the national currency of 150%, as well as sharp increases in the prices of 
all national public services (including transport, gas and electricity). The policy also 
eliminated existent price controls. Thus, it led to a sharp increase in all prices (Restivo 
and Dellatorre 2005). The effects of the plan were immediate. In just a few days, the 
inflation rate reached an unprecedented 300%. For the trade unions, which had just 
negotiated wage increases of 38%, the announcement was a declaration of war. 
 
When the president confirmed that the unions’ demands would not be met, the country 
came to a standstill (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). The mass mobilization forced Celestino 
Rodrigo to resign, and Antonio Cafiero took over the ministry of finance. By the time 
(mid-1975), the economy was already moving from expansion to recession. The country’s 
external accounts were in a desperate situation, and the new economic team had to sign 
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (the first of a Peronist government). 
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In early 1976 a new cabinet change removed Antonio Cafiero, who was succeeded by 
Emilio Mondelli. By that time, nobody believed in the economic policy any longer. The 
minister announced he had no definite plan, only specific ‘measures’ (Rapoport 2011). 
Meanwhile, the president seemed only concerned with maintaining an image of dignity 
in the face of the upcoming end. The fiscal deficit had reached an unprecedented 12.4% 
of GDP, and it was totally out of control (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). In March 1976, 
price increases reached a technically hyperinflationary pace: for the first time in 
Argentina’s history, wholesale prices rose by more than 50% in a single month. But the 
government of ‘Isabel’ never announced this record. On March 24, 1976, the military 
removed from power the democratically elected government of ‘Isabel’ Perón.  
 
The third government of Juan Domingo Perón left deep scars in Argentine history. The 
Rodrigazo inaugurated a phase of high inflation in Argentina that lasted for approximately 
sixteen years. From the austerity plan of Rodrigo in 1975 to the convertibility regime in 
1991, Argentina’s economy lived its most dramatic years. During this entire period, the 
inflation rate was never below three digits. In addition to the uncontrollable rise in prices, 
a succession of balance of payments crises continued to hit the national economy. As 
always, the government’s attempts to reestablish the trade balance ended in sharp 
devaluations of the national currency. And with each currency movement, the inflation 
rate increased even further. This poisonous self-reinforcing dynamic led to the emergence 
of an economic regime that is known in the literature as a high inflation regime (Frenkel 
1990). In this regime, the economy suffers from very high inflation that remains stable 
over time due to the widespread use of indexation mechanisms. Yet, to the extent that 
currency crises fuel the rise in prices, the high inflation regime is one in which inflation 
grows in steps. So, after each currency crisis, inflation stabilizes at a higher level (Frenkel 
1979). 
 
From 1975 until 1991, Argentina lived in a high inflation regime. During that time, the 
magnitude of the price increases was never below three digits. This traumatic experience 
radically transformed the economic life of Argentines. From the mid-1970s onwards, 
Argentines found it increasingly difficult to protect themselves from the spiraling of 
prices. As the experience of inflation began to affect all social groups, people’s attention 
focused more and more on the national economic drama. Suddenly, the increase in prices 
began to take over the present. As time went by, inflation started to colonize 
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conversations, increase the efforts dedicated to daily purchases, and discourage medium-
term economic projects (Sigal and Kessler 1997). It also made calculations more 
complex, fostered economic speculation and brought along a fundamental uncertainty that 
impacted all economic decisions. As the writer Osvaldo Soriano stated in the fragment 
presented at the beginning of the chapter, since 1975, Argentines “cohabited with 
inflation as with the landscape” (Soriano 1989, 43). As everyone (business people, 
workers, and the state itself) sought to defend themselves from the violent rise in prices, 
new mechanisms to cope with inflation emerged. Notably, the widespread use of 
indexation helped citizens protect themselves (at least partially) from alarming price 
increases. For many years, both prices and wages increased according to private and 
public indexes (Frenkel 1979). However, indexation also helped to fuel inflationary 
inertia. Inflation indexes fostered a cyclical dynamic in which competing inflationary 
expectations lead to repeated increases in price levels. With time, sustained high inflation 
led to economic chaos. To the extent that the prices of individual goods did not increase 
at the same rate, the national economy’s price structure became utterly distorted. Over the 
years, nobody knew anymore how much each thing should cost. Moreover, as the 
inflationary dynamic took a new dimension, the traditional measures to curb it lost the 
effectiveness they had left. In turn, the lack of effectiveness of economic policies fed the 
image that the authorities did not know how to control inflation. Understandably, 
Argentines stopped trusting in the authorities’ capability to put an end to the economic 
chaos. While social despair increased, inflation started to seriously compromise the 
monetary functions of the Argentine peso.   
 
The military dictatorship and the use of the dollar as a nominal 
anchor (1976-1981) 
 
Between March 24, 1976, and December 10, 1983, Argentina was governed by the 
military. The 1976 military coup was the sixth and last successful coup within the series 
of coups that had begun in the 1930s. The presidential military board (in Spanish junta 
militar) was comprised of the generals Jorge Rafael Videla, Emilio Masera and Orlando 
Agosti. The military coup that started in 1976 was the worse and deadlier coup in 
Argentine history. In six years, the dictatorship put in place a violent plan of state 
terrorism. The military kidnapped, tortured and disappeared more than 30,000 people. 
Regrettably, in early 1976, amid the political and economic upheaval that Argentina was 
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going through, the military coup was received with relief by a part of society. Even the 
government (or what was left of it) seemed anxious to get rid of a responsibility that had 
become too heavy (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003).  
 
When the military retook power, Argentina had already been suffering from chronic 
inflation for thirty years. Faced with a society that was getting increasingly tired of 
political conflicts and economic failures, the military government joined the collective 
search for a remedy against inflation. This time, however, this remedy came from the side 
of economic orthodoxy. In stark contrast to the heterodox anti-inflation plan put in place 
by Gelbard in 1973 (which saw inflation as the outcome of distributive struggles), the 
military government identified a different culprit. According to José Alfredo Martínez de 
Hoz, the new minister of finance, inflation was a direct consequence of the previous years’ 
industrialization model, which had grown under the shelter of excessive protectionism. 
Based on such a diagnosis, the economic team implemented a series of measures that had 
mainly two aims: reducing what they saw as a disproportionately large fiscal deficit and 
fostering market deregulation (Rapoport 2010). It must be noticed, however, that the 
measures implemented by the military government between 1976 and 1981 were not a 
coherent and consistent anti-inflation plan. Instead, the anti-inflation ‘plan’ of the last 
military dictatorship was an incoherent succession of measures that followed one another 
more or less spontaneously (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003).  
 
At first, the government of Jorge Videla set up a rather gradualistic economic program. 
The memory of the Rodrigazo was still too vivid to attempt anything of the sort. During 
1976 and 1977, the economic authorities gradually introduced a series of policies aimed 
at reducing state intervention and promoting market self-regulation. The list of measures 
included several well-known ingredients: a currency devaluation, wage freezing and price 
liberalization (Rapoport 2010). Martinez de Hoz argued that dismantling protectionist 
policies would encourage the development of a more competitive industry. The military 
government, thus, opened up the economy to indiscriminate international trade. Crucially, 
the government implemented two measures that transformed Argentina’s economy 
forever. The first was the financial reform of 1977, which put an end to the project of an 
industrial Argentina. The second was a crawling peg exchange rate policy nicknamed the 
‘Tablita cambiaria’. The ‘tablita’ would be the first anti-inflation plan in Argentina to use 
the dollar’s price to coordinate inflation expectations. The plan was the first in a series of 
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several anti-inflation plans using the dollar as a ‘nominal anchor’. Through this policy, 
the central bank became the chief promoter of dollarization. 
 
The financial reform of 1977 
 
One of the most important policies of the early years of Videla’s government was the 
financial reform of 1977. Financial reforms were nothing new in Argentina. Indeed, since 
the central bank’s creation, the national financial system underwent numerous 
transformations. Times of greater openness alternated with others of higher restrictions 
and regulations (Rougier and Sember 2018a). However, the 1977 financial reform marks 
a turning point in the history of Argentina’s economy. The reform produced profound 
changes in the national economic structure, changes that had a decisive impact on the 
country’s growth model and that, still today, continue to shape the national economy 
(Cibils and Allami 2010). In this regard, the financial reform of 1977 was a crucial step 
for the emergence and consolidation of a new growth model. After the reform, Argentina 
finally abandoned the idea of becoming an industrialized country and fully embraced a 
model of international economic insertion based on the exploitation of its natural 
resources (Azpiazu, Basualdo, and Khavisse 2004). The consolidation of such a growth 
model was only possible because of the enormous repression of the military dictatorship 
against industrial workers and other social groups committed to the project of having an 
industrialized country. As a consequence of the reform, the Argentine economic structure 
became less and less diversified and focused increasingly on the production of 
commodities (such as wheat and meat) and low-value-added agricultural supplies 
(Gaggero, Schorr, and Wainer 2014). In parallel, financial deregulation fostered 
speculation, foreign indebtedness and capital flight (Basualdo and Kulfas 2000).  
 
The reform of 1977 was the result of two specific laws: Act 21,495 (which enforced the 
decentralization of bank deposits) and Act 21,526 (which provided a new regulation for 
financial entities within the country) (Cibils and Allami 2010). These two acts completely 
transformed the Argentine financial system. As noted by Daniel Fridman (2010, 288), the 
new laws produced crucial changes. Among them, the central bank stopped being the 
exclusive manager of deposits; thus, private banks could take their own deposits. 
Moreover, interest rates were liberalized. This way, financial firms could decide the 
interest rates of their financial products and compete among themselves. Last, all financial 
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deposits were fully guaranteed by the central bank. That meant that if a financial firm 
broke, the state would return one hundred percent of the capital invested to depositors. 
The liberal spirit of the deregulation of national interest rates was clearly incompatible 
with bank deposits’ full guarantee. Therefore, the reform resulted in massive speculation. 
Between 1976 and 1980, the financial market boomed. As financial firms competed to 
attract more and more customers, they started to offer higher and higher nominal interest 
rates. Due to the lack of regulation, real interest rates surpassed the levels that would have 
been sustainable. The speculation game between financial firms resulted in real interest 
rates that were considerably above the inflation rate. As financial assets became a very 
profitable business, resources in the financial system grew enormously (Fridman 2010). 
The reform thus created a high-risk scenario and encouraged fraudulent financial 
operations. Self-loans (i.e., the channeling of loans to related companies of doubtful 
solvency) were frequent. Short-term investing in the financial market became extremely 
popular. The most common strategy was nicknamed ‘la bicicleta financiera’ (the 
financial bicycle). The financial bicycle was a speculative practice aimed at obtaining 
interests in pesos and converting them into dollars.59 Between 1978 and 1981, the 
‘financial bicycle’ was so typical in Argentina that it was portrayed in films and theatre 
plays. The Argentine writer Osvaldo Soriano (whose article I quoted in the beginning of 
the chapter) describes the practice as follows:  
 
“In November 1988, depositing money on a term deposit at any bank paid 
an interest of 8% monthly (in dollars). The dynamic attracted foreign 
capitals that were briefly deposited in the [national] financial market only 
to return, well augmented, to their safe havens in New York or Switzerland. 
It is estimated that 10 billion dollars came from abroad and were deposited 
in Argentine banks. These capitals increased due to speculation at the 
expense of the state. The transaction was simple. [...] If someone had, for 
example, 100,000 dollars, he exchanged them for australes and deposited 
them on a bank. The deposits paid a 10% interest (or 14 % in the black 
                                                          
59 The ‘financial bicycle’ was the nickname for a trading strategy usually known in the literature as carry-
trade. It is a trading strategy that involves borrowing at a low-interest rate and investing in an asset that 
provides a higher return rate. In 1978 carry-trade in Argentina typically involved three steps. First, the 
investors borrowed in dollars in the international market, where interest rates were systematically lower 
than the local ones. Second, they converted the dollars obtained into pesos and invested them in the local 
financial market. Finally, since the exchange rate was fixed and they faced no exchange rate risk, investors 
converted the profits in pesos back into dollars and deposited them in a foreign account.  
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market). Interests accumulated every seven days. Because the dollar price 
was fixed, after a month, you could buy 108,000 dollars (with the original 
100,000). Interest rates were announced many times every day by radio and 
television, before the weather report”.60 
 
To aggravate the situation, it was not only the private sector that profited from 
speculation. The state also joined the game of indebtedness and financial gambling. The 
combination was explosive. Naturally, although the system was able to survive for a 
couple of years, it eventually collapsed. In 1980, the Banco de Intercambio Regional (the 
Regional Exchange Bank), one of the country’s largest financial institutions, went 
bankrupt. This event triggered a bank run that ruined three other major banks. By the end 
of 1980, the state had to take control of 60 financial institutions. 
 
All in all, Martínez de Hoz’s early years’ gradualist measures did not succeed in 
stabilizing the economy. Although inflation fell, it remained in triple digits. From a rate 
of over 300% per year in 1975, the annual inflation rate fell to 160% in 1976 and 140% 
in 1977. After gradualism, the time came to try monetary targeting the traditional way. 
Throughout 1978, the government drastically reduced the rate of money creation. But, 
again, the strategy failed spectacularly. Although the money supply increased at a rate of 
2.6% per month, prices rose at a rate of 10% per month (Rapoport 2010). By the end of 
1978, the government was desperate. No matter what the authorities did, inflation could 
not be tamed. In the ministry of finance, nobody trusted traditional recipes anymore. The 
turn for experimentation had finally come.  
 
Anti-inflation policies and the use of the dollar as a nominal anchor   
 
In late 1978 the economic authorities were desperate. The pressure to find a cure for 
inflation was increasing, and the traditional recipes were not helping. The authorities were 
increasingly lost. A potential solution reached Martinez de Hoz advisors somehow 
curiously. As pointed out by Mariana Heredia (2015, 93), at the time, two young 
Argentine economists who had just graduated from the University of Chicago, 
approached the national economic authorities with a brand-new proposal. The strategy 
                                                          
60 Quotation from Soriano, Osvaldo. 1989. “Vivir con la inflación.” Nueva Sociedad 100: 41. 
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was inspired in a recent theory that had just been developed in Chicago’s monetarist 
circles, and which eventually came to be known as ‘the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments’. The theory was an extension of classical monetarism to the case of open 
economies. The approach’s basic premise was the recognition that balance of payments 
disequilibrium was fundamentally a monetary phenomenon. The theory explained trade 
deficits and surpluses as a consequence of money demand and supply. Robert Mundell 
and Harry Johnson developed the approach at the University of Chicago. The advantages 
of the policy seemed undeniable: the strategy promised a reduction in inflation with the 
simultaneous achievement of better growth levels. The program’s rationale was no longer 
grounded on the central bank’s control of the money supply. Instead, the policy relied on 
the government’s ability to establish prices that could act as guidelines: minimum wages, 
public tariffs, and the nominal exchange rate. According to the theory, as long as these 
prices were fixed, they would act as an ‘anchor’ for inflation expectations; that is, they 
would serve as a guideline that would help social actors to predict future prices.  
 
The policy proposed to use the price of the dollar as a ‘nominal anchor’. Using the price 
of the dollar as an anchor to guide expectations was not an entirely new idea. The use of 
the exchange rate as a tool for coordinating inflation expectations had already been tested 
in some historically well-known stabilization programs, such as the plans implemented 
in Austria in 1922 and Germany in 1923 (Dornbusch and Fischer 1986). For example, in 
the German case, the government had set an exchange rate target and used a significant 
amount of reserves to sustain it against speculators. The policy was incredibly successful 
and brought price stability. As for the stabilization plan implemented in Austria in 1922, 
contemporary accounts stress how the exchange rate helped to coordinate inflation 
expectations despite the economic chaos: “The foreign exchange rates were a guide to 
understand prices’ movements. The first question which the Austrian population asked 
every afternoon was “How are the foreign exchanges moving?” or more exactly “What 
does Zurich say about the crown?”, (“Wie kommt die Krone aus Zurich?”)” (Van Walre 
de Bordes, 1924, p. 197; cited in Dornbusch and Fischer (1986, 12)).  
 
The logic of the underlying theory was simple. Primarily it emphasized the importance of 
controlling inflation expectations to control the inflationary process. The main argument 
was that reducing the fiscal deficit and limiting monetary emission was not enough to 
control inflation. This was especially true for economies that have been exposed to a high 
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level of inflation for several years. In these economies, once the monetization of the fiscal 
deficit had come to an end, the monetary authorities still needed to find tools that could 
help them channel economic agents’ expectations on future prices. That meant that during 
the transition from a period of high inflation to one of lower inflation, the government 
needed to provide guidelines for economic agents to calculate future prices. Thus, by 
setting some key prices, the government could provide a stable and trustworthy index that 
the public could rely upon to calculate future prices. In most cases, in Latin America, 
inflation stabilization plans used the price of the US dollar with such purpose.  
 
While the idea of using the price of the US dollar as a nominal anchor was not entirely 
new, it is not surprising that it reappeared between the late 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, 
during that period economists were having great debates regarding the role of 
expectations in shaping economic dynamics. Especially crucial at the time were the 
discussions about the role of expectations for the reproduction of inflation and the debate 
on whether inflation expectations were either ‘rational’ or ‘adaptive’. Proponents of the 
rational expectations hypothesis argued that economic agents’ predictions on future 
inflation were based on the information they had about the present and their expectations 
of the future (Sargent 2013). In contrast, proponents of the adaptive expectations 
hypothesis stated that individuals predicted future inflation based on their past 
experiences (Parkin 2017). So, while for rationalist economists, social actors formed their 
inflation expectations by looking to the future, for the adaptive hypothesis advocates, they 
did so by looking to the past. The debate never really settled. In any case, the critical point 
for the present discussion is that, during the late 1970s and 1980s, economists were 
vigorously debating the role of future expectations in the reproduction of inflation. In the 
midst of these debates, both orthodox and heterodox economists went back to the idea of 
using nominal anchors as a strategy to guide the population’s inflation expectations. As I 
have just described, monetarist economists were the first to propose using the exchange 
rate as a coordination tool during the late 1970s. Later on, structuralist economists made 
a similar proposition. In fact, many heterodox anti-inflation plans designed during the 
1980s (i.e., the Plan Austral in Argentina and the Plan Cruzado in Brazil) proposed to 





In Argentina, the first use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor can be traced back to 
the stabilization plan implemented by José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz in 1978. With the 
advice of the Argentine economists who had just graduated from the University of 
Chicago, the economic authorities developed a specific exchange rate policy. The policy 
was a crawling peg; that means it was a fixed exchange rate regime with frequent small 
adjustments. The policy consisted of a schedule of preannounced small devaluations, and 
exchange rate calendar that was nicknamed by the public as the ‘Tablita Cambiaria’ (the 
exchange rate schedule). The new exchange rate policy was launched on December 20, 
1978, and remained in effect until February 1, 1981. The calendar would be (together 
with lower import tariffs) Martinez de Hoz’s last attempt to control inflation until he left 
office in March 1981.  
 
The ‘tablita’ was a calendar that specified the US dollar’s future value for the upcoming 
months (Fridman 2010). The calendar’s purpose was to provide a clear guideline that 
could help economic agents forecast future inflation. Ultimately, the only thing 
Argentines had to do was check the dollar’s future value in the calendar and use it as a 
proxy to calculate future prices. The calendar established a set of predetermined 
exchange-rate values that increased over time. Crucially, however, each increase was 
smaller than the previous one. Therefore, it was expected that the exchange rate’s value 
would stabilize at a level that was consistent with the inflation rate. According to the 
government, domestic inflation would follow the exchange-rate movements and 
eventually converged with international inflation rates. In addition to the dollar’s price, 
there were also other prices that the government had to keep fixed. The list included public 
tariffs and minimum wages. Each of these prices had their specific calendars. It was 
assumed that convergence of all these prices would ensure a decreasing and orderly 
evolution of the inflation rate (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003).  
 
The policy extended from 1978 until the beginning of 1981. However, it proved 
dramatically unsuccessful. Prices resisted taming and grew much faster than the fixed 
exchange rate values. In fact, between 1978 and 1979, inflation barely fell from 171% to 
163%. Strikingly, wholesale inflation increased from 146% to 149% (Gerchunoff and 
Llach 2003). The exchange rate lag, in turn, made imports extremely cheap and ended up 
severely damaging the national industry. Many industrial companies could not compete 
with imported products and had to close down (Fridman 2010). As always, the big 
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question was why inflation remained high. In this case, the answer is that most prices 
were not subject to external competition. The markets for food and services could not be 
tamed by opening the economy to indiscriminate trade. The same rule applied to those 
goods provided by the state. So, in the end, the elimination of trade restrictions did not 
affect inflation and only served to destroy the national industry (Rapoport 2010). 
Moreover, the low price of the dollar during these years only fostered speculation and 
made the crisis at the end more dramatic. In February 1981, the exchange rate policy was 
abandoned. The abandonment of the ‘tablita’ was followed by a sharp devaluation that 
spoiled Martinez de Hoz’s last attempt to stabilize the economy. The minister and his 
team resigned, leaving his successors a climate marked by increased currency speculation 
and massive capital flight. Martinez de Hoz’s administration summary was a 
deindustrialized economy with a very high fiscal deficit and an unprecedented level of 
foreign debt. Inflation persisted in the three digits.  
 
One of Martinez de Hoz’s administration’s most lasting legacies would be, precisely, his 
exchange rate policy. Despite the lack of success of the ‘tablita’, the idea that a guide was 
needed to help coordinate inflation expectations persisted. Thus, during the 1980s and 
early 1990s, several stabilization plans in Argentina attempted to stabilize future inflation 
expectations by establishing a fixed exchange rate. The most notable example of a 
stabilization plan based on exchange rate fixing would be the Convertibility Plan in 1991. 
The policy of using the dollar as a nominal anchor would have enormous consequences 
for Argentina. Through these policies, the central bank encouraged Argentines to use the 
dollar to calculate future prices. This way, the monetary authority became the chief 
promoter of dollarization. Over time, the continuous use of the dollar as a nominal anchor 
contributed to an economic dynamic in which the exchange rate would tend to increase 
less than the inflation rate for an extended period, only to increase suddenly and 
unexpectedly at a given point. Thus, the use of the dollar as a nominal anchor increased 
sudden exchange rate adjustments. 
 
When Martinez de Hoz left office, the economy was thrown into chaos once again. 
General Jorge Videla, until then president, was replaced by General Roberto Viola. Later, 
Viola was succeeded by Generals Leopoldo Galtieri and Reynaldo Bignone. As if the 
president’s succession was not enough, in the twenty-two months between Videla’s 
departure (in March 1981) and the restoration of democracy (in December 1983), 
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Argentina had four ministers of finance: Lorenzo Sigaut, Roberto Alemann, José Dagnino 
Pastore and José Wehbe. The four ministers launched an unhealthy succession of 
stabilization policies, all of which contradicted each other. Lorenzo Sigaut set in motion 
a heterodox program and enforced exchange rate controls. Roberto Alemann’s brief 
counter-reform followed. He drastically reduced public spending and liberalized interest 
rates. Faced with the breakdown of the financial system, José Danino Pastore and José 
Wehbe decided to nationalize the private sector’s enormous foreign debt. They 
transferred the responsibility for paying the loans to the State, even though this debt was 
caused by speculative trading by the Argentine private sector. With this, they bequeathed 
to the young democracy, a structurally insolvent country. Once again, each of these 
policies failed to control inflation. 
 
Argentina’s lost decade: from high inflation to hyperinflation 
(1980-1990) 
 
When, in 1983, Argentina became a democracy again, president Raúl Alfonsín had to 
take charge of an economy suffering severe imbalances. He received an inflationary, 
indebted and recessive economy and had no room for maneuver to provide a fundamental 
solution to Argentina’s long-standing problems. The end of the military government and 
the return to democracy coincided with the beginning of the Latin American Debt Crisis. 
This event would leave an indelible mark in the region’s countries, including Argentina 
(Ocampo et al. 2014). The crisis constrained even further Alfonsín’s little room for action. 
The main problem was the overwhelming magnitude of the country’s foreign debt - which 
was far beyond its real capacity to repay. The concern was not exclusive of Argentina, 
though, but extended to most Latin American countries. The cause of the crisis had to be 
traced back to the 1970s. In an international context characterized by high liquidity and 
low-interest rates, foreign banks had encouraged Latin American countries to borrow at 
an unprecedented level. Although it is difficult to understand such excessiveness, both 
the private and the public sector had indebted themselves far beyond their real capacity 
to repay.  
 
In Argentina’s case, when the military took power in 1976, the foreign debt amounted to 
$5.3 billion. Instead, in 1983, the country’s foreign debt accumulated $45 billion 
(Rapoport 2010). The issue was not just the scale of the debt. In the early 1980s, the global 
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situation led developed countries to implement monetarist policies that led to an 
exponential increase in international interest rates. The change of circumstances made the 
debt burden intolerable for Latin American countries. In 1982, the Mexican default 
caused the interruption of external financing to the countries of the region. Without access 
to new loans, Argentina found itself without resources to repay its enormous foreign debt. 
The lack of options left the government without strategies other than monetary issuance. 
Naturally, the issuing of money to repay the country’s foreign debt only aggravated the 
inflationary problems even further (Ferrer 2012). Thus, the Latin American debt crises’ 
problematic external conditions added to Argentina’s endemic problem: the indomitable 
inflation. Between 1983 and 1991, inflation in Argentina surpassed a new record. From a 
333% rate in 1983, inflation rose to 626% in 1984, producing the country’s first 
hyperinflationary crisis. In 1985, the rate fell again to 385.4% but remained in the three 
digits (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003).  
 
In these circumstances, it is surprising that the priority of Bernardo Grinspun - president 
Raúl Alfonsín’s finance minister - had not been inflation but full employment. In fact, in 
1983, the national economic policy was oriented, above all, towards seeking economic 
recovery and increase the wages of the working class. To achieve these objectives, the 
minister had implemented gradual measures that included: the state’s control of the 
exchange rate and interest rates, cheap credit and increasing public spending (Heredia 
2015). However, as inflation reached dramatic figures, the government started to focus 
more on the fight against inflation. Grinspun turned to the usual tools: he devalued the 
currency, increased public tariffs, cut public spending (i.e., salaries and pensions), and 
restricted money issuance. But in a country that had already used every possible tool to 
try to control inflation for almost four decades, the anti-inflation measures did not get the 
support they needed. Once again, the plan failed. With Grinspun and his team accused of 
lack of ability, Alfonsín asked the minister to resign. In February 1985, Juan Vital 
Sourrouille took his place.  
 
Shortly after the change of authorities, preparations for the launch of a new stabilization 
program began. Minister Sourrouille summoned a group of economic experts (mostly 
coming from the structuralist school) who started to work secretly on the design of a new 
anti-inflation plan. The main idea was that to be successful the policy needed to stop the 
inertia of inflation expectations. According to the experts, the lack of results of the former 
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plan, mostly based on a monetarist strategy, proved the need to act directly on the public’s 
expectations to eradicate inflation (Heymann 1986). The economic reform (soon to be 
renamed in the press as the Plan Austral) was announced on Friday, June 14, 1985. The 
plan was inspired by the 1920s inter-war Europe’s plans. The policy eliminated 
indexation mechanisms and sought to act on people’s inflation expectations, and to curb 
the inertial tendency of price increases to perpetuate themselves (Gerchunoff and Llach 
2003). Minister Sourrouille spoke on the national television and announced the measures. 
Based on a heterodox conception of inflation, the plan proposed various measures to 
combat spiraling prices. As a remedy to the deficit, the government committed to raise 
tax revenues, rationalize expenditures, slow down monetary emission, and resort only to 
financing provided by an IMF loan. As a remedy to the inertia caused by indexation 
mechanisms and distributive struggles, the authorities proposed freezing prices. Also, the 
plan included a complex system of deindexation for contracts. As a remedy to the 
imbalance between productive sectors of the economy, the policy promoted industrial 
exports. Finally, the plan included a monetary reform that replaced the peso with a new 
currency: the austral (Heredia 2015).  
 
The austral plan was received with relief. Moreover, it achieved complete stabilization. 
Astoundingly, price freezing and fiscal tightening worked, and inflation expectations 
started to decrease. Capital flight also moderated. At the beginning of 1986, the austral 
plan was an economic, political and intellectual success. The achievement of the 
Argentine economists was of interest to everyone. Moreover, the plan served as a model 
for other countries seeking to combat chronic inflation, including Brazil. The Cruzado 
Plan (1986) was a copy of the austral plan. Beyond the public’s euphoria, however, the 
economic authorities knew that the hardest challenge was still ahead. After the initial 
shock, the critical concern was successfully deactivating inflation’s root causes (i.e., the 
fiscal deficit and the excessive money issuance). 
Only then could the economic authorities guarantee that inflation expectations would 
remain low over time. Unfortunately, policymakers were in the middle of these 
discussions when prices began to rise once again. Stability had been short-lived. As prices 
rose, public tariffs and the price of the dollar were left behind. As the relative price 
structure began to distort, policymakers wondered how to make prices more flexible 
without feeding distributive struggles. In April 1986, the authorities decided to change 
the policy of ‘frozen prices’ for one of ‘managed prices’. They also determined that public 
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tariffs and the exchange rate would gradually increase to adjust to the increase in wages 
and other key prices. However, the announcement of the policy change reopened the 
distributive struggles, and inflation shot up. When, in mid-1986, inflation began to move 
away from the path designed by the economic authorities, the government no longer had 
a structured strategy. Caught with their guard down, the economic team implemented an 
unorganized succession of individual measures with no clear direction. Once again, 
inflation had shown its never-ending capacity to attack again when society least expected 
it.   
 
At that point, the government was utterly disoriented. Also, they had less and less room 
for maneuver. While its monetarist opponents rejoiced over the failure of the economic 
authorities, society became increasingly impatient. The economic team’s approach to 
inflation was judged to be increasingly inadequate. It no longer mattered what the real 
causes of inflation were. It was not possible to wait for the development of specific 
productive sectors that could balance the economy. As the seriousness of the price 
increase rose, society demanded more and more urgent solutions. The government needed 
to act quickly and effectively. But the public authorities did not know what to do. The 
persistence of inflation over time had diminished the effectiveness of the most common 
anti-inflation policies. On the one hand, the authorities knew that traditional strategies 
alone (such as fiscal and monetary adjustment) would not lower inflation because they 
could not redirect inflation expectations (Heredia 2015). On the other, strategies to 
contain distributive struggles (such as price and wage freezes) had been used so often that 
they were already worn out. The time needed for pursuing structural changes in the 
economy was too long; therefore, this approach was unsustainable. The international 
context did not help either. With international markets that were closed, Argentina could 
not turn to them to finance its fiscal deficit. Fighting inflation seemed an impossible task. 
An economist close to the government described the situation as follows:  
 
“Economists from the old structuralist school, that was very strong in 
the region stated that you had to modify the economic structure to 
fight inflation. Of course! But to modify the structure takes years. And 
in the meantime, what do you do with inflation? So we started to work 
based on what we knew from the German experience of hyperinflation 
in the 1920s. The idea was that to stop inflation a shock was needed. 
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And that was the austral plan. […] If a guy has a fever of 37 degrees, 
you say, okay; but if he has a fever of 42 degrees for three months, the 
situation is different. That cannot be fixed with an aspirin. Inflation 
of the kind Argentina had was not a cold. Therefore, it could not be 
cured with aspirin. And the truth is there was no theoretical 
knowledge on how to deal with such reality. [...] Over time, tools wear 
out. [...] Price control work only for some time or when you have little 
inflation. But in cases like Argentina, price controls were a permanent 
source of conflict between the state and the companies. In Argentina, 
there were price controls from the 1950s to the 1980s. [...] So, at the 
time, there were economists who came back to the old tools and those 
who tried to come up with new ones”.61  
 
Cornered on all fronts, the economic authorities did what they could. A second phase of 
the Plan Austral (1986) was followed by the Australito (1987) and the Plan Primavera 
(1988), two austerity policies of a liberal orientation, which followed each other. The 
second phase of the austral plan began when, by the end of 1986, the International 
Monetary Fund loan ran out, and the need to finance the public deficit with money 
issuance reappeared. Thus, in early 1987, monthly inflation threatened to return to double 
digits. The economic team froze prices: that was the Australito. The Australito was 
followed by the Plan Primavera, implemented in August 1988. The plan was a typical 
orthodox stabilization plan, whose most crucial stabilizing tool was the exchange rate. 
That is to say, it was part of the family of anti-inflation plans that used the dollar as a 
nominal anchor. In this regard, it was similar to the ‘tablita’ and the austral plan. However, 
the scarcity of international reserves (which was only temporarily covered by speculative 
capitals that took advantage of the high-interest rate in dollars) and the political and 
economic uncertainty contributed to putting an end to the Alfonsín’s government last 
stabilization attempt. 
 
By April 1989, economic disruption was total. The state had lost control of the economy. 
The public authorities were entirely lost. At the end of April, Juan Carlos Pugliese (the 
                                                          
61 Quotation from an interview made to an advisor of the ministry of finance during the government of Raúl 
Alfonsín. Interview cited in Heredia (2015, 115). 
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new and short-lived minister of finance),62 declared on television: “I do not know why the 
price of the dollar is rising or how to stop it”. And on May 26, he responded to a 
journalist: “I do not know what is happening. I do not know how this situation came 
about” (Sigal and Kessler 1997, 171). At the time, the inflation rate was 200% per month. 
Even if the government knew that they needed to lower monetary issuance to reduce 
inflation, this was not an option. The state was bankrupt, and foreign debt payments could 
only be financed by issuing money. In these circumstances, the only question for the 
government was when the debacle would occur. The final blow came in 1989 when the 
World Bank announced that it would no longer continue helping Argentina. The 
announcement resulted in massive capital flight. The central bank used $900 million to 
try to stop the crisis but failed to do so. The national currency depreciated heavily. While 
in May 1989 a dollar costed 100 australes, in November 1989 it costed 1000 australes and 
in December 1990 almost 10,000 asutrales. The rate of inflation exceeded 3000% per 
year. 
 
On May 14, 1989, Carlos Menem was elected president (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). By 
then, the country was in complete chaos. The main economic groups had withdrawn their 
support for president Alfonsín. In concrete terms, this meant that many deposits from 
banks were withdrawn, export companies suspended their sales in the foreign exchange 
market, and firms stopped paying their taxes. Political movements carried out massive 
social protests in principal cities, such as Rosario and Buenos Aires. Spiraling prices did 
not stop. Prices in supermarkets increased during the time between people collected the 
products and paid them at the counter. Wages were not sufficient, and people were 
starving. Society plunged into despair. President Alfonsín decided to resign and hand over 
the presidency to the recently elected Carlos Menem. Menem accepted but imposed 
conditions. He forced the radicalism (Alfonsín’s party) to endorse the profound reforms 





                                                          
62 Juan Carlos Pugliese became Minister of Economy on March 31, 1989, after the resignation of Juan Vital 
Sourrouille. He was in office until May 24, 1989, that is, less than two months. He resigned for health 
reasons. Jesus Rodriguez succeeded him. 
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The advance of dollarization (1970-1990) 
 
As I showed in the previous chapter, in the 1960s and 1970s, saving in US dollars was 
already part of Argentines’ financial practices. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
popularity of the US dollar increased. As Luzzi and Wilkis (2019) show, in the 1970s and 
1980s, broader sectors of the population started to hoard cash dollars as a strategy for 
keeping their savings. The habit of buying dollars in exchange houses became such a 
popular way of preserving savings from inflation in Argentina that it started to be reflected 
in television programs and in highly successful films, such as the well-known film Plata 
Dulce (Sweet money), directed by Fernando Ayala and released on July 8, 1982. 
Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s, as Argentina’s high inflation morphed into 
hyperinflation, most markets adopted the US currency as the primary reference to publish 
prices. One of the leading promoters of the use of the US dollar was the monetary 
authority itself. The Argentine central bank explicitly promoted the use of the US 
currency as a reference to calculate prices. Since 1978, when Martinez de Hoz had 
enforced the ‘tablita’, until the implementation of the convertibility plan in 1991, the 
monetary authorities increasingly encouraged citizens to use the dollar as a reference. 
During the military government, the government even carried on television campaigns 
that proposed to Argentines that they had to ‘change their minds’ and learn to calculate 
in dollars (Fridman 2010). Since December 1978, Argentines were encouraged to rely on 
the ‘tablita’ (a calendar that stated the exchange rate value for the upcoming months) to 
predict future prices. Moreover, the anti-inflation plans implemented during the 1980s 
(the austral, the australito and the primavera plans), also relied heavily on the exchange 
rate as a coordination tool. Mainly, these policies were intended to counteract inflationary 
inertia. Thus, they encouraged Argentines to use the dollar as a source of stability in an 
increasingly chaotic monetary world. However, with the imposition of anti-inflation plans 
based on the dollar as a nominal anchor, the central bank became the chief promoter of 
dollarization. Thus, the state contributed to intensifying the dollar’s social use and 
displace the peso from the monetary scene. 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the dollarization of references extended to many markets. 
Mostly markets for goods that were used as a store of value. In 1977, prices in the real 
estate market started to be systematically advertised in dollars (Gaggero and Nemiña 
2016). Prices also dollarized in other markets, such as the market for durable goods, 
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including the car market and the market for household appliances, and imported luxury 
goods. The tourism market and the market for works of art also dollarized during the 
1970s (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019).  
 
As the tendency to advertise prices in dollars became more and more common, so did the 
practice of hoarding dollars. While currency crises and inflation continued to hit 
Argentina, people started to save in cash dollars. Again, the central bank not only allowed 
but also validated this practice. Probably due to increasing social pressure, the central 
bank allowed (during many periods) Argentines to purchase dollars. As rising inflation 
consolidated the feeling that something had to be done with the savings to prevent them 
from disappearing, the purchase of dollars became a usual strategy for protecting savings. 
Financial openness encouraged dollarization even further. Since the 1977 financial 
reform, the financial sector increasingly promoted US dollar deposits and loans (Fridman 
2010). After 1977 hoarding foreign currency became increasingly accessible. While 
before 1977, to save in dollars, Argentines needed to buy government bonds issued in 
dollars; since May 1977, restrictions on foreign currency purchase and sale were 
removed. For the first time since 1971, the public could acquire dollars without 
restrictions (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019). Moreover, the foreign exchange market’s opening 
also enabled the financial sector to offer foreign currency deposits to its customers. Also, 
exchange houses were allowed to sell cash dollars.  
 
The US currency also received increasing public attention in the press. This attention also 
helped to promote the use of the dollar as a strategy for saving. In the unstable economic 
circumstances of the 1970s and 1980s, the dollar was frequently in the national 
newspapers’ covers. Sometimes the reason for the increasing populatirty of the dollar 
were currency crises and monetary chaos. Currency runs occurred almost every week. 
Currency holidays and urgent regulations imposed by the government also led the dollar 
to gain more space in the press. The exchange rate was a daily news item in all the 
newspapers. The dollar also appeared in advertisements. Sometimes it even appeared in 
the crime section. Especially during the 1970s, the illegal dollar market received a lot of 
media coverage. At the time, the central bank carried conduct undercover operations to 




No doubt, hyperinflation led dollarization to the climax. A four-digit price increase is an 
extremely infrequent phenomenon. The most frequently cited case is the German 
hyperinflation of the 1920s. Hyperinflation is the most severe crisis that can hit a 
monetary economy. During hyperinflation, the state loses total control of the currency 
and the economy. The price structure is no longer coherent. The whole system of 
equivalence becomes incoherent. Price increases are exponential. Inflation becomes 
uncontrollable and unpredictable. The national currency can no longer perform any of its 
functions, including being a means of payment. The monetary authority vanishes. In 
1988, inflation in Argentina reached 387.7% annually. In 1988 the rate rose to 3,079.5% 
and in 1990 to 2,314%. During those years, the Argentine economy dollarized 
completely. In 1987, the newspaper La Nación reported that the number of dollars in the 
public’s hands had already reached 5.5 billion dollars (Luzzi and Wilkis 2019, 165). By 
1989, practically all markets were dollarized. The real estate market and the art market 
were no longer the only markets that advertised their prices in dollars. The prices of most 
products were advertised in dollars. The list included the most varied items, including 
chemical reagents, raw materials for the food industry, automobile parts, musical 
instruments, household appliances and photographic products. Services such as plumbing 
and even psychological assistance were also dollarized. In almost all cases, the 
transactions themselves were also paid in dollars. Hyperinflation caused the virtual 
destruction of the currency. At their peak, price lists in supermarkets and other shops did 
not last more than a day. The forms of financing disappeared. The country’s economy 
was in chaos. Prices, interest rates, and even the dollar rate varied from city to city (Sigal 
and Kessler 1997).  
 
The dollar became the antidote to the damaged argentine currency. Even if by 1984, 
spiraling prices were not new in Argentina, the familiarity with inflation did not make 
hyperinflation any less traumatic. Even if three decades of inflation had allowed citizens 
to develop some strategies to protect themselves (at least in part) from price increases, 
hyperinflation gave these practices a dizzying pace and an unprecedented magnitude. 
There were individual and collective strategies. At the individual level, the time horizon 
for transactions shortened. Principal transactions were dollarized. Usually, individuals 
bought cash dollars when they received their salaries at the beginning of the month. 
Alternately they put their money on fixed-term deposits in dollars, which were renewed 
every week. Payments were delayed as long as possible (Sigal and Kessler 1997). 
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Collective strategies included purchase communities and saving circles. Purchase 
communities were groups of different families that organized themselves to buy products 
in advance. This way, they could survive the whole month. When they received their 
salaries, each family made bulk purchases of specific products they had assigned (milk, 
noodles, canned food). The different products were then distributed among the 
participating families (Spitta 1988). Saving circles also became common. These circles 
were closed groups of people who created a collective saving fund to purchase expensive 
goods, such as cars or house appliances. All group members had to pay a monthly fee. 
Thus, they created a joint fund that allowed them to buy goods that were too expensive to 
purchase individually, including televisions, refrigerators, air conditioners, washing 
machines, dishwashers, sound equipment, video recorders (Sigal and Kessler 1997). This 
practice attempted to make up for the lack of banking credit. 
 
From stabilization to a new crisis. The Convertibility Plan (1991-
2001)   
 
From 1973 onwards, a process of profound financial liberalization began in the world. 
After the Bretton Woods system fell, Conservative governments gained power in both the 
US and Great Britain. Thus, the liberal tendency deepened even more. Neo-liberal and 
monetarist ideas became more popular and progressively occupied places in academic 
circles and economic institutions (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). As is often the case, the 
new ideas gradually transformed how the economic policy was made. As national and 
international financial policies became increasingly liberal, monetary institutions and 
financial systems underwent major transformations (Fourcade and Babb 2002; Krippner 
2011). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, countries lifted restrictions on capital 
movements. Floating exchange rates began more and more frequent (Eichengreen 2019). 
Although all these transformations had local particularities, the rule was that these 
transformations helped to consolidate an increasingly international capital market. In the 
1990s, the neoliberal trend deepened and reached unknown dimensions. The fall of 
communism had an enormous symbolic impact that legitimized neoliberal policies around 
the globe. Neoliberalism had won the battle. Countries only had to surrender to its 
advantages. The internationalization of trade and finance intensified. Across the globe, 
countries signed trade integration agreements. In Latin America, the Mercosur emerged.  
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The economic transformations that occurred during the 1990s had enormous 
consequences for the countries of Latin America. Under pressure from international 
monetary agencies (mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), 
governments in the Latin American region were forced to adopt policies that, above all, 
promoted the liberalization of goods and capital markets. As international organizations 
valued more than ever the benefits of free trade, they made the granting of credit 
conditional upon the adoption of openness policies. Undoubtedly, the most paradigmatic 
case of these transformations was the recommendations included in the Washington 
Consensus (Babb 2013). The Washington Consensus was a set of ten policy 
recommendations that served to design several reform packages during the 1990s. Based 
on a combination of monetary theories and neoliberal concepts, the reforms were 
expected to help Latin American nations fight persistent inflation and other economic 
disorders.  
 
The various international agencies agreed to assist the countries on the periphery with 
credit only if accepted to implement adjustment policies. The changes they asked were 
not superficial. On the contrary, the measures involved profound transformations in all 
the major political, social, and economic institutions of these countries.  The list of 
measures included: reducing national fiscal deficits and money growth, fixing the 
exchange rate, decreasing state intervention, privatizing enterprises, and deregulating the 
market (Williamson 2003). The overall claim was that these packages would ensure long-
term macroeconomic stability and promote economic development. However, in most 
cases, they resulted in a slowdown in growth and a rise in unemployment. In those cases 
where the reforms succeed, the success was only temporary and negligible concerning the 
objectives the policies explicitly pursued. 
 
Argentina was an extreme example of the transition to neoliberalism. In a brief period, 
the country carried out a set of profound market reforms: it privatized most of its public 
enterprises, opened its commercial and financial borders, and eliminated much of the 
state’s protection to the national industry. Undoubtedly, this dizzying transition had much 
to do with the dramatic history of inflation that I have been showing. Far from being an 
initial disadvantage, the experience of hyperinflation paved the way for structural 
reforms. No modern economy had suffered from such high inflation for so long. 
Argentines were exhausted from social conflict and extreme monetary and political 
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instability. Thus, the Argentine society was prepared to make any sacrifice to stabilize its 
economy, including dismantling its state and opening up its markets completely. 
Politically, the 1990s were a singular time in Argentina. For the first time since Perón’s 
death, Peronism managed to unify behind a single leader’s leadership. The new leader, 
Carlos Menem, had been governor of the province of La Rioja. He imposed himself on 
the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Antonio Cafiero, in the 1988 Justicialist 
internal elections of the Peronist party. He was elected president on May 14, 1989. Carlos 
Menem took office in July due to Alfonsín’s decision to handover the government five 
months before the finalization of his mandate. 
 
Shortly after Menem took office, the government set in motion a profound reform of the 
state. The reform sought the same thing as always: to stop inflation. The diagnosis of 
Menem and his team was that hyperinflation was a consequence of the state’s political 
crisis. Therefore, once the government had solved the structural crisis, inflation would 
automatically come down (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003). The international pressure on 
the countries of the region to implement structural reforms was already being felt. The 
Washington Consensus was underway. In the first months of 1989, a group of officials 
from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the State Department and 
Treasury of the United States had met in Washington. The finance ministers of the seven 
world’s most powerful countries and the major international banks’ presidents had also 
participated in the meeting (Babb 2013). The conclusions were ten recommendations that 
crystallized into what would later be called the Washington Consensus. The consensus 
established that international agencies would help countries on the periphery with credit. 
The condition for the help was that these countries agreed to implement harsh adjustment 
policies. The prescriptions included lowering the fiscal deficit and reducing the state’s 
size, privatizing state enterprises, facilitating the installation of foreign companies, and 
liberalizing financial markets (Williamson 2003). Thus, in Argentina in the 1990s, 
domestic needs and external pressures were all pointing in the same direction: 
implementing structural reforms.  
 
Contrary to his campaign ads (which were preferably oriented to the traditional pro-
industrial and progressive discourse of Peronism, which Menen was supposed to 
represent), Menem’s economic policies soon showed that he was more than willing to 
follow the path of structural reforms (Heredia 2015). The first step of the new government 
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was to proclaim a set of economic emergency laws. These laws suspended the few tariff 
protections that had remained in place after the dictatorship. The industrial promotion was 
suspended, as were preferences that benefited domestic over imported manufactures. 
Also, the government started to privatize public enterprises (Rapoport 2011). Due to its 
intensity and speed, the privatization of public services in Argentina was a unique process. 
The first privatizations took place during the 1990s. In a few years, Argentina privatized 
many state-owned enterprises, including telephone companies, railways, roads, ports, 
commercial aviation and other state-owned enterprises in areas such as the steel and 
petrochemical industries. Health services were also transferred from the nation to the 
province, and the pension system was privatized (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003).  
 
Regarding the fight against inflation, the policies of the first year of Menem’s government 
followed the most classical monetarist tradition. The government established a strict 
monetary control and drastically reduced the amount of money in circulation (Rapoport 
2010). As a complement, in 1989, the central bank compulsorily refinanced all savings 
deposits in the financial system. The government confiscated all savings and exchange 
them by public debt. The plan is known at the Bonex plan. Through this policy, the state 
converted fixed-term deposits (the most common form of savings) into long-term public 
debt securities. As a result of these policies, inflation went down but remained in four 
digits. From 3,079% in 1989 it went to 2,314% in 1990. Technically, Argentina was still 
in hyperinflation.  
 
Together with Domingo Cavallo (who would become his chief minister for five years), 
the president Menem understood that the economic conditions required radical solutions. 
Once again, Argentina was forced to propose radically innovative strategies. The result 
was the Plan de Convertibilidad (the Convertibility Plan). Technically, the convertibility 
plan was a fixed exchange rate regime. However, it was much more than that. The major 
difference between a traditional fixed exchange rate scheme and the new plan was its 
institutional design. The plan was based on a new law: the Ley 23.928 de Convertibilidad 
del Austral (Law 23,928 of the Austral Convertibility) (Rapoport 2010). The law changed 
the currency again, from the austral created by Sourrouille back to the traditional 
argentine currency: the peso. According to the law, australes would be converted to pesos 
at a fixed exchange rate of 10,000 australes in exchange for one peso. Simultaneously, 
the law forced the central bank to maintain a fixed exchange rate between the dollar and 
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the peso. With a measure charged with great symbolism, the exchange rate between the 
peso and the dollar was ‘one to one’ (so that one dollar costed one peso). In other words, 
the Argentine peso was worth the same as a dollar. In addition to stipulating that a peso 
was worth the same as a dollar, the law indicated that pesos issued by the central bank 
had to be fully backed by dollars. Thus, the law required the central bank to maintain 
sufficient foreign exchange reserves to purchase the entire monetary base at the exchange 
rate established by law (Roig 2016).  
 
Due to its design, the plan was much more than a traditional exchange rate regime. The 
fact that the value of the dollar was fixed by law was not a minor detail. It was a promise 
that the national currency would keep its value that was engraved in the legislation. The 
central bank thus abdicated all power to conduct monetary policy. It only had to maintain 
the fixed exchange rate, and it was directly unable to make any decisions on the national 
currency. In fact, to the extent that the exchange rate was fixed by law, changing the 
exchange rate required the National Congress’s official approval. Just like during the gold 
standard, the Argentine central bank’s only task was to expand or contract the monetary 
base according to foreign exchange inflows or outflows. Overall, the convertibility plan 
implied that the central bank renounced to have any control over its currency. So after 40 
years of having failed successively in keeping the promise on the enduring value of its 
currency, the Argentine state abandoned any attempt to keep that promise. With an 
exchange rate fixed by law, the Argentine state chose to link its currency’s value to the 
value of the dollar and then tied its hands.  
 
In sum, the convertibility plan had two central features, which are crucial to understanding 
its success. First, with the new policy, the monetary authorities were no longer in charge 
of the national currency. The hidden notion was that, if the monetary authorities could 
not control the currency, the best they could do was to leave the task altogether. This way, 
at least, society (which for years had learned to fear the state) could begin to recover some 
of its sullied trust. The second important feature of the plan is that, in practice, the 
convertibility law did nothing but materializing an ongoing reality, namely, dollarization. 
In fact, by 1991,  transactions and contracts were dollarized in Argentina (Corso 2015). 
During the 1980s, hyperinflation had destroyed the only monetary function that the peso 
retained, which was to be a means of payment. So, as Menem’s finance minister, 
Domingo Cavallo, confessed, the convertibility plan emerged from an observation of the 
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national reality. The plan did nothing more than to convert ‘the people’s desire’ into law 
(Roig 2016).    
 
On March 20, 1991, the project developed by Domingo Cavallo and two of his 
collaborators (Horacio Liendo and Juan José Llach) was announced to the country and 
sent to the national congress for debate. On March 27, the bill was approved by both 
Chambers (Roig 2016). In his presentation to Congress, Cavallo made clear his diagnosis 
of inflation. In his opinion, the main problem was the fiscal deficit. Thus, to solve it, it 
was necessary to put an end to excessive monetary emission. Once the law was adopted, 
the government would be legally unable to issue currency without reserves. As a 
consequence, investors and price-makers could feel safe. The law would make it possible 
to achieve economic stability. Simultaneously, the plan included a policy of open trade, 
which would allow for greater competition between foreign and domestic products and 
would help reduce prices further. Stability would bring growth and stem the tide of 
speculation. Many claimed that convertibility was a step towards dollarization. But 
Cavallo insisted he aimed to give Argentina a currency (Heredia 2015).  
 
The success of the plan was resounding. From 2,314% inflation in 1990, the rate dropped 
to 84% in 1991 and 17.5% in 1992. In 1993, Argentina’s inflation was barely 7.4%. After 
forty years of fruitless struggle, Menem and Cavallo had finally defeated inflation. No 
one could believe it. In just two years, Argentina had become one of the most stable 
economies on the planet. Euphoric, Argentines returned to the financial system. They 
created deposits in dollars and took loans and mortgages. The United States’ government 
and the IMF, who had not initially supported the plan, started to recommend the Argentine 
recipe to other countries in problems. Meanwhile, in Argentina, pesos and dollars traded 
at par in the national economy. Banks were allowed to lend in dollars. Both assets 
(deposits) and liabilities (credits) could be legally established in foreign currency. 
Conversion costs were minimal. Strikingly, banks were not forced to support their dollar 
operations with foreign currency. Argentine banks were authorized to ‘create dollars’ 
without backing (Rapoport 2010). Thus, during the 1990s, Argentines used the dollar and 
the peso indistinctly. National entrepreneurs were not the only ones who supported 
convertibility. North American and European bondholders also supported the plan by 
lending dollars to the government (Heredia 2015). The Argentine state reduced its deficit 
and even transformed it into a small surplus. Stability brought economic improvement. 
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The purchasing power of wages improved. Also, foreign credit reappeared. Menem’s 
political support grew. The virtuous circle feedbacked itself. Everyone enjoyed the 
benefits of convertibility.  
 
But the plan was flawed. On the one hand, there was the problem of currency mismatch. 
While banks could offer their customers the possibility of making deposits or borrowing 
in dollars, this was a mirage. The banks did not have dollars. Customers whose salaries 
were paid in pesos could not return dollars either. But people gladly accepted the mirage 
of convertibility. The truth is, in the Argentina of the 1990s, no one wanted to save in 
pesos. The laxity of financial regulation contributed to the creation of a time bomb 
(Caputo 2012).  
The second major deficiency of the plan was related to its long-term sustainability. 
Argentina did not issue dollars. In these circumstances, the state could only sustain the 
"one-to-one" if it managed to obtain the dollars necessary to guarantee its currency’s 
convertibility at the exchange rate established by law. In the 1990s, Argentina needed 
dollars for everything. It needed dollars to pay its foreign debt. It needed dollars to allow 
companies to remit profits abroad. It needed dollars to pay for its imports. And now it 
needed dollars to ensure that these could circulate in its domestic economy. But, as usual, 
the country’s balance of payments was in deficit. The deficit was growing. Thus, 
Argentina became highly indebted.   
 
The convertibility plan favored deindustrialization and worsened the trade deficit. 
Because one peso was worth the same as one dollar, the exchange rate was too high for 
Argentina’s needs. Therefore, national products became too expensive. As the trade 
deficit increased, and the country’s debt augmented massively, the sustainability of the 
model started to be put into question. At the beginning of the 1990s, and in contrast to 
what had happened in the 1980s, foreign investment and capital inflows were abundant. 
But in 1994 the situation started to change. The Mexico crisis of 1994 (the Tequila crisis) 
caused a banking crisis in Argentina that shook the financial system. Moreover, after the 
Mexican default, international investors began to doubt about Latin American countries’ 
real capacity to pay their debts. Thus, after the Mexican crisis, the questions regarding the 
sustainability of the convertibility plan increased.  By the mid-1990s, opinions were 
divided. For some, the tequila crisis had shown that the convertibility model was 
unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, they argued that the logical thing to do was to 
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start looking for a way out of the model now that it was still possible. For others, however, 
Argentina’s ability to sustain the model even in the difficult circumstances of the mid-
1990s was only a proof of the model’s robustness. All in all, the fear of monetary chaos 
prevailed. After such a traumatic history trying to eradicate inflation, Argentines feared 
that, if convertibility was abandoned, inflation would reappear. In the presidential 
elections of 1995, Carlos Menem sought to position himself as the only leader capable of 
preserving the currency board. Opinion polls showed that the majority of Argentines 
wanted the continuity of the regime. Even the International Monetary Fund defended the 
parity between the Argentine currency and the dollar. Argentines joined their destiny to 
the destiny of convertibility. They did so not so much because they approved the regime 
but because of the fear of the consequences that the abandonment of the regime could 
cause.  
 
By mid-1998, the economic circumstances became even more complicated. The crises of 
the  Southeast Asian countries in 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998s created doubts 
among international investors. Gradually they stopped investing in emerging countries. 
With less credit and increasingly high-interest rates, Argentina found it increasingly 
difficult to finance its deficit. In 1999 a crisis hit Brazil, Argentina’s leading trading 
partner. This only made the situation worse. The situation became increasingly unstable. 
At the beginning of 2001, many Argentines began to take their money out of the financial 
system. Bank deposits in pesos or dollars were converted into cash dollars and transferred 
abroad. Alternatively, people hoarded their savings in cash dollars and kept them outside 
the financial system (literally in their houses). Because the central bank was forced by 
law to convert pesos into dollars, during 2001, foreign reserves dropped sharply. Between 
March and November 2001 twenty million dollars scaped from the financial system. To 
prevent the collapse of the financial system, the government enacted a set of laws that 
banned the withdrawal of deposits from the financial system. The measure came to be 
known as the ‘corralito’ (the little yard). The ‘corralito’ consisted of weekly restrictions 
to the amounts of money people could withdraw from their accounts in the financial 
system. Individuals were allowed to make transactions within the banking system, but 
could not withdraw more than 250 dollars per week. The monthly limit for cash 




Since Argentina’s economy has a large informal sector that depends on cash, the corralito 
worsened the recession. It also encouraged the emergence of all kinds of transactions in 
which people exchanged money blocked within the financial system for cash. In most 
cases, those with cash benefited greatly, as they could exchange their money for a higher-
value than the value of bank deposits. The second important measure imposed during the 
collapse of the convertibility was the ‘asymmetric pesification’. In early 2002, the finance 
minister Jorge Remes Lenicov ordered the compulsory pesification of all financial assets 
in the financial system. Because the national currency devalued sharply, the measure 
resulted in massive losses for savers. Strikingly, the pesification converted saving 
deposits in dollars to pesos at a different exchange rate that loans and credits. Saving 
deposits were pesified at an exchange rate of 1.40 peso for each dollar. Debts higher than 
100,000 dollars were pesified at the original exchange rate of one by one. As many times 
in the past, the measure benefited debtors and severely damaged savers. Between March 
and June 2002 the value of the peso continued dropping sharply. By June, one dollar 
costed four pesos.  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina had suffered inflation for about fifty years. 
Nobody had been able to control it. Finally, in April 1991, the government of Carlos 
Menem launched the convertibility plan. The plan immediately stopped the continuous 
rise in prices. For the first time in many decades, the country had stable prices. Soon after 
the implementation of convertibility, a period of intense growth of the local economic 
activity began. Not surprisingly, these conditions led a large part of the population to 
support the government. However, the plan was unsustainable in the long run. By the year 
2000, the Argentine economy was again in a crisis. The state tried to refinance its debt 
without success. When the state froze bank deposits, close the foreign exchange market 
and declared the asymmetric pesification of deposits and loans Argentines exploded in 
anger. In December 2001, social mobilization spread all over the country. The political 
chaos caused the minister of finance and the president to resing. The political crisis was 
the most severe in the history of the country. In only one week, Argentina had five 
presidents and several ministers of finance and central bank governors. 
Between 2003 and 2015, Argentina was governed by a sector of the Peronist party known 
as Kirchnerism. Between 2003 and 2007, Nestor Kirchner was president of the Nation. 
He was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Kirchner, who governed the country until 2015. 
During the 12 and a half years (three presidential terms) that the Kirchnerist party was in 
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government inflation reappeared. During the government of Nestor Kirchner, Argentina 
had an exchange rate that remained high and stable. Such an exchange-rate policy helped 
the national economy to be competitive. However, the reappearance of inflation in 2005 
put the economic model in crisis. Between 2007 and 2015, inflation in Argentina rose 
again and maintained around 20% and 30%. During the two governments of Cristina 
Kirchner, there was no systematic anti-inflationary plan. The government resorted to 
well-known policies (such as price controls or wage-setting agreements), but these 
measures were not part of a systematic plan. Besides, the government altered public 
statistics and systematically reported lower inflation levels than those reported by private 
consultants. Thus, between 2003 and 2015, inflation became the subject of significant 
public controversy in Argentina. Also, since 2013, the government of Cristina Kirchner 
imposed severe restrictions on the purchase of dollars. As always, these restrictions led 
to massive protests. In 2015 Mauricio Macri was elected president. As we will see in the 
next chapter, his government would propose a policy to fight inflation. Again the recipe 




6. “We will give back the people their currency”. The Macri 
administration and a new promise of value (2015-2018) 
 
Mauricio Macri, leader of the Argentine political coalition party Cambiemos (Let’s 
Change), came to power on November 22, 2015, after triumphing over Daniel Scioli in 
the second round of the presidential elections. Daniel Scioli was the candidate of the 
ruling party at the time, the Frente para la Victoria (FPV, Front for Victory), the faction 
of the Partido Justicialista or Peronismo (Justicialist Party or Peronism) led by the former 
president Cristina Kirchner. The result marked a significant turning point in the country’s 
political landscape since it was the first time in the history of Argentine democracy that a 
candidate who did not belong to either of the two main traditional political forces (the 
Partido Justicialista and the Unión Civica Radical [UCR, Radical Civic Union]) had 
managed to win a national election. Indeed, Macri’s party, Propuesta Republicana (PRO, 
Republican Proposal), the main political force within the Cambiemos coalition,63 was a 
relatively new party, which had been born less than 20 years earlier, directly after the 
deep economic and political crisis of 2001 and 2002. The party had consolidated at the 
local level after Mauricio Macri was appointed mayor of the City of Buenos Aires in 
200764 and remained in power for two consecutive periods. The breakdown of 
bipartisanship and the defeat of Peronismo after twelve years of government thus opened 
up the possibility for a new national political force outside of the two traditional political 
parties to gain strength, a political force that aimed to lay the foundations of a new 
Argentina. 
 
                                                          
63 The coalition party Cambiemos was founded in June 2015 as an opposition force to the Frente para la 
Victoria (the newest branch of Peronismo, associated with the political figures of Nestor and Cristina 
Kirchner) with an eye on the future presidential elections of October 2015. The coalition was formed by 
three political parties: Propuesta Republicana, led by Mauricio Macri; Coalición Civica ARI (ARI Civic 
Coalition), led by Elisa Carrió, and Unión Cívica Radical, one of the two traditional Argentine parties. 
Although it was a party alliance, Propuesta Republicana was the strongest of the three forces within the 
coalition. This unequal distribution of power within Cambiemos was mostly due to the fact that Mauricio 
Macri, founder of Propuesta Republicana, became the official candidate of the alliance in the national 
elections, and he had made his leadership intentions clear. Indeed, Macri announced that, in case of winning 
the elections, his government would not be a coalition, but rather “the candidate who wins [and its party] 
are going to govern” (Vommaro and Gené 2017) 
64 At the time of his election as president of Argentina, Mauricio Macri had been mayor of the City of 
Buenos Aires for two consecutive periods (from 2007 to 2015). At present his party continues to govern 




In keeping with a national political tradition of incoming governments with 
‘refoundational aspirations’ (Vommaro and Gené 2017, 234), Cambiemos proposed a 
political and cultural ‘refoundation’ of the country’s politics, the main goal of which was 
to establish a new political agenda focused on the modernization of the state. It was a 
pragmatic, post-ideological party, whose leaders mostly came from the social worlds of 
business management and non-governmental organizations. They had mostly either 
worked in foundations and non-governmental organizations close to the party or came 
from corporate business, where they had served as chief executive officers of large 
international companies. To a lesser extent, some had been recruited from some of the 
common social networks in which many of the party members tended to spend their free 
time, such as the soccer club Club Atlético Boca Juniors, as well as some educational 
networks linked to the Catholic church and to traditional elite colleges and universities of 
the City of Buenos Aires (Vommaro 2016). To move away from a past marked by old 
party ideologies and demagogic and corrupt politicians, Cambiemos political leaders 
defined themselves as ‘newcomers into the world of politics’. In doing so, they wanted to 
distance themselves from old political debates, set in terms of ‘left’ and ‘right’ ideologies, 
and to stress the fact that they were part of a new political ethic, an ethic inspired by the 
idea of introducing into the state those managerial qualities typical of the corporate world. 
Not surprisingly, the new political elite was driven by an ethos of volunteerism and 
entrepreneurship, which they wanted to infuse into the state, thus preparing the ground 
for a new institutional foundation based on institutional transparency and internal 
efficiency. They wanted to transform the state into a proficient, flexible and modern 
machinery, populated by pragmatic, proactive and progressive politicians with a 
collective spirit and the ability to work as a team.  
 
The project of political ‘renovation’ that Cambiemos sought to lead was evident from the 
very beginning. The composition and overall design of the new ministerial cabinets in all 
areas of government were enough to indicate the profound transformation that the 
ministries were about to experience. This new political elite comprised an overwhelming 
majority of men and some women, all of them relatively young, who mainly had four 
different professional origins.65 Most were linked to Mauricio Macri’s Propuesta 
Republicana party and had worked in different areas of government in the City of Buenos 
                                                          
65 I base this description in the study of the composition of the initial cabinet of President Mauricio Macri 
carried out by the Observatorio de las Elites Argentinas. See Canelo and Castellani (2016a; 016b). 
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Aires, some connected institutions (i.e. Banco Ciudad de Buenos Aires and Club Atlético 
Boca Juniors),66 and some non-governmental organizations associated with the party, 
such as Fundación Pensar, Grupo Sophia, Fundación Creer y Crecer. Others came from 
corporate positions as chief executive officers of large corporations with connections to 
different international markets.67 Some had been recruited as experts in specific areas. 
Finally, some politicians were linked to one of the other two parties forming the 
Cambiemos coalition (Vommaro and Gené 2017). All in all, it was a metropolitan group 
of people. This characteristic had a lot to do with the fact that many of them were directly 
transferred from different political areas of government of the City of Buenos Aires to 
equivalent areas at the national level. Like other Argentine cabinets in the past, the 
Cambiemos team had a very high educational level. However, one of its novel features 
was the importance of private universities as the primary providers of the new civil 
servants’ professional training. 
 
An interesting feature of the new administration was the fragmentation of the economic 
area into four different ministries (‘Energy’, ‘Production’, ‘Agroindustry’, and ‘Treasury 
and Finance’).68 According to several analysts, the reason behind such a strategy was 
Mauricio Macri’s desire to prevent a ‘superminister’ of finances ever potentially 
overshadowing his presidential power, as had been the case at other moments in the 
                                                          
66 Mauricio Macri began his political career as president of the Club Atlético Boca Juniors soccer club, 
which he chaired for three consecutive terms between 1995 and 2007. 
67 Several studies have highlighted that one of the main features of Mauricio Macri’s cabinet was the 
inclusion of a high proportion of ex-managers of important business groups, who came to occupy central 
political positions. According to a report published by the Observatorio de las Elites Argentinas, 31% of 
the new public officials had once occupied a managerial position in the private sector (Canelo & Castellani, 
2016). In addition, the new cabinet included leaders of the main business corporations, such as the Sociedad 
Rural Argentina and the Unión Industrial Argentina. When hiring these men, president Macri thus 
transformed the government into a space that was subject to profound and direct influence by the business 
world. To justify such a policy decision, members of the ruling party relied on justifications and arguments 
based on the unique qualities that the new members would bring to the State, which would have a positive 
impact on the expertise and efficiency with which decisions were taken. Moreover, it was argued that if 
they had built successful careers in the private sector, they were ‘the best men available’ to carry out the 
different managerial tasks within their area of expertise. Also, since they already enjoyed privileged 
economic positions, they would not seek to build a personal fortune at the expense of the public treasury. 
And, finally, as they did not come from party politics, they would have the independence to apply 
technocratic management criteria. However, the corporate profile involved several risks that the executive 
denied but which were reported by journalists, academics, and opposition politicians alike. Among them 
were the anti-state and pro-market bias that permeated the ideology of the ex-CEOs and managers, and the 
loyalties to their former colleagues in the private sector that they brought with them to the bosom of the 
State. This situation increased the probability of conflicts of interest and the permeability of the State to the 
pressures of the economic groups. On this topic see: Canelo and Castellani (2016a; 016b); Vommaro 
(2016); Vommaro and Gené (2017). 
68 At the end of 2016, President Mauricio Macri requested the resignation of the minister of treasury and 
finance at the time, Alfonso Prat-Gay, and divided the ministry into two different portfolios that were 
entrusted to Nicolás Dujovne (treasury) and Luis Caputo (finance). 
 
174 
national history. In line with what was happening in other areas of the new administration, 
the politicians appointed to fill the central positions in the four different economic 
ministries were also educated to a very high level. However, in contrast with other 
ministries, where the new politicians were newcomers to the world of politics, many of 
those who were part of the economic cabinet had mixed professional trajectories, that is, 
they had alternately held positions in both the public and private sectors. In the private 
sector, many of them had held senior positions in large financial companies and banks, as 
was the case of the new minister of finances Alfonso Prat-Gay, who had worked for J.P. 
Morgan in London, New York, and Buenos Aires.69 
 
In the case of the Central Bank of Argentina, following a common political practice in 
the country, Mauricio Macri sought to fill it with men who shared his political vision. It 
is worth noting in this regard that although the Legal Mandate of the Central Bank of 
Argentina establishes that “in the exercise of its functions and powers” the institution 
would not be subject to “orders, indications or instructions from the national executive 
power, nor may it assume obligations of any nature that imply to condition, restrict or 
delegate” any of its functions and powers “without express authorization of the national 
congress”, the norm also states that “the governor, the deputy governor and other 
members of the board will be appointed by the national executive power with the 
agreement of the national senate”.70 In practical terms, such norms have resulted in the 
central positions being occupied by individuals who were personally close to the president 
of the nation and/or to the minister of finances, and who had a high political affinity with 
the general line of the government. Moreover, even though this situation has not 
necessarily restricted the formal independence of the central bank, it has permeated its 
policies in such a way that it has reflected, most of the time, the guiding principles 
imposed by the government in office. In addition to this institutional reality, in Argentina, 
there is also a high turnover among officials of both the central bank and the ministry of 
                                                          
69 Alfonso Prat-Gay, a 50-year-old economist trained at Universidad Católica Argentina with a master’s 
degree in economics from the University of Pennsylvania, took over as Mauricio Macri’s treasury and 
finance minister on December 2015. At the time of taking office he had already held numerous positions in 
the public sector. He had been governor of the central bank between 2002 and 2004 and national legislator 
(Coalición Civica ARI) for the City of Buenos Aires between 2009 and 2013. In addition, he had experience 
working in the private sector in the areas of economics and finance. Prat-Gay worked for J.P. Morgan in 
Buenos Aires, London, and New York, and was a senior analyst in several private consultant companies. 
He also worked as economic advisor of the Argentine multimillionaire Amalia Fortabat. Finally, he was a 
professor at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and Universidad Católica Argentina. 
70 See the Central Bank of Argentina’s Legal Mandate (Law 24.144) [Carta Orgánica del BCRA.; Ley 
24.144], articles 4 and 7. Available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/Pdfs/BCRA/CartaOrganica2012.pdf.  
 
175 
finances, which speaks of the strong institutional instability afflicting the country. For 
example, in the four years of Mauricio Macri’s government, the central bank had three 
governors.71 
 
At the time of taking office, Mauricio Macri appointed nine new board members (out of 
a total of twelve) to the central bank, including a new governor and a new deputy 
governor. To govern the bank he chose Federico Sturzenegger, a renowned economist, 
whom he had known for several years. Sturzenegger had first served as director of the 
Banco Ciudad de Buenos Aires and then as a national legislator of Propuesta Republicana 
for the City of Buenos Aires. Besides, he had coordinated the area of macroeconomics at 
Fundación Pensar, Propuesta Republicana’s political ideas factory. Upon joining the 
central bank, Sturzenegger not only sought to get rid of those members of the board who 
were close to the previous administration,72 he also brought with him men of his trust, 
such as Lucas Llach, Demián Reidel and Mariano Flores Vidal, who would accompany 
him during his two and a half years in power and would become the main makers of the 
new monetary policy. 
 
A new central bank73  
 
The Central Bank of Argentina is the financial agent of the Argentine state. Since its 
creation in 1935, the central bank underwent several transformations. As of today, the 
                                                          
71 These have been: Federico Sturzenegger, Luis Caputo, and the current governor, Guido Sandleris. 
Similarly, during the 12 years of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner’s governments, the central bank had 5 
governors: Alfonso Prat-Gay, Martin Redrado, Mercedes Marcó del Pont, Juan Carlos Fabrega, and 
Alejandro Vanolli. The replacement of board members is even more frequent. At the same time, it is worth 
noting that, from 2000 onwards, Argentina has had a total of 18 ministers of finance, who have held office 
for an average of one year each, with Domingo Cavallo holding the position longest (5 years) and Rodolfo 
Frigeri shortest (a total of one week, in the midst of the 2001 crisis). 
72 They were Pedro Biscay, German Feldman, and Juan Miguel Cuattromo, who were close to the former 
minister of finance Axel Kicillof and to the former Central Bank Governor Alejandro Vanolli. See the 
article published on Infobae on December 11, 2015, by Leandro Gabin, “Federico Sturzenegger asume en 
el Banco Central y habría renuncias masivas de los directores de Kicillof”. Available at: 
https://www.infobae.com/2015/12/11/1775822-federico-sturzenegger-asume-el-banco-central-y-habria-
renuncias-masivas-los-directores-kicillof/. Last access: 15.06.2019.  
73 Much of the data used for this characterization was provided by the Observatorio de las Elites Argentinas 
(UMET-CONICET), directed by Dr. Paula Canelo and Dr. Ana Castellani. The data was gathered from a 
set of public sources, among them: the Official Gazette [Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina], 
newspapers and journals with national scope (such as Clarín, La Nación, Perfil, Página 12, El Cronista 
Comercial, Ámbito Financiero, Revista Mercado, Revista Apertura, Revista Noticias, etc.), the curriculum 
vitae and other biographical data of the new government’s public officers published in the official web 
pages of the respective ministries, as well as other official publications. I am deeply grateful to both 
directors of the Observatorio and to Julia Gentile for their generosity.  
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institution’s primary functions are to concentrate and manage Argentinas reserves of gold 
and foreign currency, to execute its monetary and exchange-rate policies, and to 
contribute to the proper functioning of the financial market.74 The Central Bank of 
Argentina is a legally independent entity that is organized into a Governorship (which 
comprises the Governor, the Deputy Governor, and an Alternate Deputy Governor), and 
a Board of Directors (integrated by the three members of the governorship plus eight 
additional members). The central bank also has a Supervisory Auditor and a Deputy 
Supervisory Auditor. Finally, there is a General Management Office, which comprises 
six sub-offices, plus two other offices that depend directly on the governorship (General 
Audit and Legal Services). 
 
With the appointment of Federico Sturzenegger as governor of the central bank, and the 
arrival of his right-hand men, the board of directors consisted of: Lucas Llach and Demián 
Reidel were appointed deputy governor and an alternate deputy governor, respectively. 
Meanwhile, four new directors were appointed to the board. They were Fabián Zampone, 
Francisco Grismondi, Horacio Tomas Liendo and Pablo Curat. The other three members 
of the board were Pedro Biscay, German Feldman and Miguel Cuattromo. They were 
right-hand men of the former governor, Alejadro Vaniolli, and the former minister of 
finances, Axel Kicillof. The three men had been appointed members of the board during 
the previous administration. They remained in their position for a while despite 
Sturzenegger’s displeasure since because the national senate had confirmed such 
positions.75 Also, upon Sturzenegger’s arrival, Juan Carlos Isi was appointed supervisory 
auditor. At the same time, Paola López, the only woman with a senior position, remained 
as deputy supervisory auditor, a position she had occupied since March 2011. 
 
Federico Sturzenegger, the new governor of the Central Bank of Argentina, was a 49-
year-old economist, married, with three children, native of the province of Santa Fe, an 
important city of the Argentine inland. He had begun his career in the public sector as 
                                                          
74 See the Central Bank of Argentine’s Legal Mandate (Law 24.144) [Carta Orgánica del BCRA; Ley 
24.144], articles 1, 4 and 6.  
75 Germán Feldman and Juan Miguel Cuattromo continued in office until September 2016, when their term 
came to an end. Pedro Biscay, on the other hand, remained on the board until July 2017, when 
Sturzenegger’s administration succeeded in removing him from his position thanks to a presidential decree 
alleging charges of unprofessional performance. Biscay was always very critical of the new administration 
and had openly criticized the adoption of an inflation targeting regime as well as the management of the 
monetary policy, which heavily relied on the issuance of short-term bills (known as LEBAC). Biscay had 
also severely criticized the absent role of the board of directors in highlighting the detrimental effects of 
balance of payments imbalances, which were ultimately related to the indebtment policy of the Treasury. 
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secretary of economic policy at the ministry of finances. His professional relationship 
with Mauricio Macri had begun in 2008, when he was appointed president of the Banco 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires and had deepened in the following years, in which Sturzenegger 
was a national legislator of Propuesta Republicana, representing the City of Buenos Aires. 
Before entering into politics, Sturzenegger had held several positions in the private sector, 
among them, he had been chief economist of the oil company YPF and private consultant 
for several internationally renowned organizations, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Bank of 
England, and the United Nations, among others. He also had an outstanding academic 
career. Indeed, after receiving his bachelor’s degree in economics from a public university 
in Argentina, Sturzenegger had received his Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and had managed to establish himself as a recognized specialist 
in monetary economics and exchange-rate issues within the national and international 
academic communities.76 
 
The new deputy governor, Lucas Llach was a 42-year-old economist and historian, also 
from Santa Fe, who had devoted a large part of his career to academic life, specializing 
in Argentine economic history. After completing his undergraduate degree and part of his 
postgraduate studies at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Llach had obtained his Ph.D. 
in history from Harvard University. Later on, he had worked for more than ten years as a 
full-time professor at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, although he had also spent time in 
some other academic spaces.77 The political experience of the eccentric new deputy 
governor, who followed a ‘Paleolithic’ diet’78 and declared himself a fan of ‘barefoot 
running’, was scarce, as well as his experience in the world of private companies.79  
                                                          
76 Sturzenegger published both textbooks directed to the general public as well as academic articles in the 
field of finance and macroeconomics. His classification on exchange rate regimes (which he published 
together with his colleague from the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Eduardo Levi Yeyati) is well-known 
in the field. Sturzenegger was also dean of the Business School of the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and 
visiting professor at several internationally renowned universities, including Harvard University and 
University of California (UCLA).  
77 Lucas Llach was part-time professor at Universidad de Bologna, New York University (Buenos Aires), 
and Universidad de San Andres. 
78 A Paleolithic diet is a diet requiring the sole or predominant eating of foods presumed to have been 
available to humans during the Paleolithic era, mostly meat, fruit and vegetables, and nothing artificial or 
processed. 
79 Within the public sector, Llach had been advisor at the Argentine Ministry of Finance (2000) and a 
candidate for vice president during the internal elections of Cambiemos, during June 2015, where he had 
represented the Unión Civica Radical together with Ernesto Sanz. In the private sector, Llach had been 
president of Tiptype (a start-up focused on developing apps for android cellphones), and private consultant 
for different national enterprises, such as Grupo IRSA and Banco Hipotecario, among others.  
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Third in the line of the new governorship was the alternate deputy governor Demián 
Reidel. He decided to quit his job at Wall Street to take over as member of the board of 
directors at the Argentine central bank. “My job was to buy and sell currencies depending 
on what a central bank was doing; today I’m on the other side”, he confessed to the 
newspaper Clarín a few days after arriving to Buenos Aires.80 His career was quite 
singular. After obtaining his bachelor’s degree in physics from the renowned Instituto 
Balseiro, Demián Reidel had changed his professional life and specialized in high 
finances. He had a master’s degree in financial mathematics from the University of 
Chicago and a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University. Along with his studies, he 
had worked in the financial sector, first as an associate at J.P. Morgan, and after as 
executive vice-president at Goldman-Sachs, always on areas related to emerging markets’ 
investments. Just like his teammates, he had been a professor at Universidad Torcuato Di 
Tella. 
 
Finally, Sturzenegger had also brought along some of his closest advisors. Among them 
was Mariano Flores Vidal, Sturzenegger’s former chief of advisors at the Banco Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires, who would be appointed general manager of the central bank. Agustín 
Collazo would be appointed general deputy manager of operations. All these five men 
would be the members of the monetary policy committee. They would be in charge of the 
main monetary policy decisions (most importantly, setting the benchmark interest-rate, 
which would be the main policy instrument within the new inflation targeting regime).81 
Finally, the other new board members were Fabián Zampone, Francisco Grismondi, Pablo 
Curat, and Horacio Liendo. They were all trained professionals with experience working 
in both the private and the public sectors. They were also part of the same social networks 
as their colleagues. Finally, Sturzenegger had also appointed Juan Carlos Isi, a career civil 
servant of the central bank, as supervisory auditor and Ivan Wernig, first, and Guido 
Sandleris, later, as representatives of the ministry of finances at the central bank.  
 
                                                          
80 See the article published at Clarín on March 6, 2016 by Ezequiel Burgo “Perfil. Demian Reidel, director 
del BCRA. El físico y economista que dejó Wall Street por el Banco Central”. Available at: 
https://www.clarin.com/economia/fisico-economista-dejo-wall-street-banco-central_0_4yJGcvVnx.html . 
Last access: 20.06.2019. 
81 On the constitution of the monetary policy committee [In Spanish: consejo de política monetaria], see: 
Sturzenegger, Federico. “Presentación de la metodología del régimen de metas de inflación” [In English: 
Presentation of the inflation targeting regime and its methodology]. Speech held at the Central Bank of 
Argentina, September 26, 2016, 00:31:39-00:32:42.  
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A new promise of value 
 
Faithful to his literary vocation, Federico Sturzenegger began his inaugural speech as 
governor of the Central Bank of Argentina quoting the Spanish writer Javier Cercas: “few 
things degrade us more as a political society than to practice a false ethic, an ethic in 
which instead of paying attention to what should really matter to those in power - the 
future and the responsibilities they have ahead -, gets lost in blaming others for the faults 
made in the past”.82 With this quote, Sturzenegger aligned himself closely with the new 
Cambiemos cabinet, whose members were permanently pointing out that the new 
administration had come to inaugurate a new way of doing politics. According to the new 
political leaders, Argentina was on the verge of a new political era, an era in which 
politicians would no longer be looking into the past but into the future. “We begin our 
government with a new spirit, a spirit that does not look into the past but into the future. 
We believe this is the only way to face the present [...]. Thus, we will not be seeking 
revenge; but on the contrary, we will put our energy in what is yet to come, we will focus 
on building the future we all want for our country and our children”.83 Just as Cambiemos 
party members had proclaimed they would build a new country, the new officers of the 
central bank proclaimed they had the recipes that will allow Argentina to finally overcome 
its traumatic history of monetary imbalances and to build a stable monetary regime. 
Sturzenegger confessed during his first speech as the new governor of the central bank: 
“when the president called me for this task, he told me: ‘we must regain people’s vote of 
confidence’; and he stated that my primary task would be ‘to give back the Argentines 
their currency’”.84  
 
His goals were ambitious. Indeed, he wanted nothing less than to create monetary stability 
in a country that, since the foundation of its central bank in 1935, had suffered all kinds 
of monetary disorders without ever succeeding to stabilize its currency for long-sustained 
periods (excluding the significant exception of the convertibility regime). He wanted 
                                                          
82 Sturzenegger, Federico “Discurso de inicio y lineamientos de gestión” [in English: Initial Speech and 
policy guidelines]. Speech held at the Central Bank of Argentina, December 14, 2015, pp. 1. Many quotes 
used in this chapter have been taken from speeches given by the central bank governor, Federico 
Sturzenegger. In most cases I used the audiovisual version of these speeches. In those cases in which the 
audiovisual version was not available I used the written version. I quote either the time of recording or the 
page number, depending on which version has been used. All quotes have been translated from Spanish by 
the author.  
83 Ibídem, pp. 1.   
84 Ibídem., pp. 2. 
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nothing less than to create monetary stability in a country that, since the end of the Second 
World War, had been mercilessly beaten by high and almost continuous inflation; a 
country that, during that same period, have had five different national currencies and more 
than a dozen of provincial quasi-currencies; a country that had suffered two hyperinflation 
crises, five confiscations of bank deposits, and a significant amount of exchange-rate 
shocks. As I showed, all these circumstances had fostered the development and the 
strengthening of a close, long-lasting, and conflictive relationship between the domestic 
currency and the US dollar. But the new board did not seem intimidated by the 
circumstances. Its members trusted deeply in the power of their monetary models and in 
their capacity to easily translate the concepts and notions extracted from books and papers 
into effective tools that would help them correct the imbalances of the Argentine 
economy. Not only they had no doubts they would successfully achieve their goals, but, 
even more importantly, they had a clear-cut and uncomplicated diagnose of which were, 
in their views, the causes of Argentina’s long-lasting imbalances. In particular, they 
believed that the previous administration had neglected its responsibility over monetary 
policy opting for financing the fiscal deficit by printing new money. This situation had 
ultimately led to an unsustainable environment of high inflation.85 From now onwards, 
however, they will set back the country’s monetary policy into its right course and watch 
over the value of the currency. Their ultimate goal was to provide the country with a stable 
and reliable currency, which in their own eyes simply meant “to keep inflation low, and 
to have a free-convertible currency”.86 As I will show in the following, such an approach 
to the idea of currency stability was somehow new in the history of Argentine monetary 
policies.  
 
The new members of the board were confident of their goals. However, the willingness 
to eradicate inflation for good was nothing new in Argentina. In the last two chapters, I 
showed how, since 1952, the different Argentine governments had tried everything that 
economic theory had proposed to them to eradicate inflation without ever achieving long-
lasting results. Moreover, from the 1970s onwards, and in a world that did not offer any 
precise and standardized treatment against inflation, local specialists had ended up 
                                                          
85 Sturzenegger, Federico “Los primeros 100 días de un Banco Central que vuelve a ocuparse de sus 
objetivos primordiales” [In English: The first 100 days of a Central Banks that takes care of its primary 
tasks]. Speech held at Bloomberg Argentina Summit, April 5, 2016, recording time 00:01:12-00:02:33. 
86 Sturzenegger, Federico “Discurso de inicio…”. Speech held at the Central Bank of Argentina, December 
14, 2015, pp. 2. 
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making use of each and every tool available in the international economic toolkit to fight 
it: from orthodox plans, based on monetary and fiscal adjustments, to heterodox plans, 
which proposed to freeze prices and salaries, as well as occasionally complementing them 
with other tools drawn from different theories. But beyond good intentions and extensive 
expertise, the only long-lasting result of this uninterrupted succession of anti-inflation 
policies had been to transform the country into an exceptional economic laboratory 
(Heredia, 2016). Within this endless succession of experiments, trials and errors, all based 
on different interpretations and diagnoses on the causes of inflation and with divergent 
proposals on the most effective ways to fight against it, there had been, however, some 
persistent ingredients, such as the search for foreign capital, the request of conditional 
support from international financial organizations and, above all, the use of a specific 
nominal anchor, namely, the nominal exchange rate between the Argentine peso and the 
US dollar. Indeed, as I have described in detail in the previous chapter, many stabilization 
plans in Argentine history used the exchange rate as the primary tool to coordinate 
inflation expectations during a phase of transition towards price stability. However, 
despite the popularity among local economists of using such a strategy, the new 
administration of the central bank considered that pegging the exchange rate to the dollar 
was not without costs. In their view, using this strategy would only be an easy ‘shortcut’ 
which, even if useful for reducing inflation in the short-run, will end up creating long-
term rigidities that will force Argentina into a new economic crisis. Sturzenegger would 
indeed make this argument in several of his speeches: 
 
“Historically in Argentina, especially when we are about to engage in 
a process of disinflation, like we are about to do now, [...] it has been 
very tempting to use the exchange-rate as a nominal anchor; to say ‘let’s 
fix the exchange-rate and in doing so the exchange-rate will help us 
coordinate inflation expectations [during a phase of transition] towards 
a lower inflation level’. But, just as this option is very tempting - because 
fixing the exchange-rate allows us to quickly coordinate expectations -, 
it ends up being a trap, because it puts the Argentine economy, or any 
economy that relies in such a strategy, in an inflexible position, [in a 
position] that when the moment comes that one has to make corrections 
[...] there are no margins to do them, or at least there are no margins to 
do them without a very severe recession as we have seen at the end of 
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the convertibility regime crisis [...]. So, even when fixing the exchange-
rate makes lowering inflation easier [...] in the end [this strategy] leads 
to more economic rigidity and the situation can only be solved by a 
crisis. And this is what we are trying to avoid. [Exchange-rate pegging] 
was used in the 1970s, you know the examples, it was used [in the 1980s] 
during the Radicalismo government - the Austral Plan also relied on 
that strategy -, it was used during the convertibility regime and it was 
used, I think, during the last government. And always, in the end, the 
economy was unable to generate proper [adjustment] mechanisms. So, 
[during our administration] there is an attempt to build a new 
institutional framework which is a [different] institutional framework 
[...]. And this is more difficult at the beginning because we have to 
coordinate inflation expectations without having that element (the 
exchange-rate) as a coordination tool, which means that [we need to 
constantly reaffirm] the central bank’s willingness [to lower inflation] 
and explain what we do, [our monetary policy] to the public”.87  
 
But, as Sturzenegger rightly pointed out, with the monetary authorities no longer targeting 
the exchange-rate, another mechanism was needed to anchor expectations. To this end, 
the central bank’s new authorities embraced inflation targeting. And they did so despite 
the objections that this monetary policy framework was not a useful one to actually lower 
inflation and that it should only be implemented once inflation was already low. Just like 
in other countries, the new policy required that the central bank announced specific 
inflation targets and commit to them. Also, the monetary authorities needed to adopt a 
very transparent communication strategy, which included the regular publication of an 
inflation report88 in which the central bank should present its assessment of the current 
economic conditions and its views on the prospects for inflation and growth, and explain 
the rationale behind recent monetary policy decisions. At the same time, the new policy 
will provide a new nominal anchor: the inflation target. This target was no more than a 
fixed inflation-rate, to which the central bank was committed, and which would serve the 
                                                          
87 Sturzenegger, Federico “Informe al Congreso de la Nación sobre los alcances de las políticas monetarias, 
cambiarias y financieras en ejecución” [in English: Report to the Congress on the scope of the economic, 
monetary and financial policies implemented]. Speech held at the Argentine National Congress, May 18, 
2016, recording time 00:09:03-00:10:59. 
88 In Argentina the inflation report was known as Monetary Policy Report.  
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purpose of guiding economic agents’ expectations on future inflation, thus helping to tie 
down the level of prices in the long-run. In this sense, the purpose of the monetary 
authorities was to establish a new coordination tool, one which would help Argentines 
not to fall into the trap, once again, of relying on the price of the US dollar to try to defeat 
inflation. At the same time, the adoption of an inflation-targeting monetary policy 
framework meant that price stability would have to become the main goal of the new 
central bank’s monetary policy, and that the benchmark interest-rate would be its main 
monetary policy tool. The specific price of the dollar, on the other hand, would no longer 
be controlled by the central bank, but left for the market to regulate. Overall, the new 
authorities’ main aim was to build “a new institutional framework”, an institutional 
framework “based on the Central Bank’s credibility and not on the non-permanent 
anchor provided by the exchange-rate at some specific point in time”.89 In their views, 
such institutional framework would be crucial in helping Argentina to build “a different 
macroeconomy, a more stable macroeconomy, one in which domestic prices would 
eventually dissociate from exchange-rate movements”.90 It was thus time to leave behind 
the old recipes and try out new directions, time to “do something that Argentina had not 
yet tried out”.91  
 
This change on the overall strategy of national monetary policy could not be more clearly 
expressed than it was in the words of the central bank governor during his first press 
conference: 
 
“We have left the peso holder helpless for too long. [...] [From now 
onwards] the main focus of this institution will be to strengthen our 
currency, which is nothing more than to achieve an inflation-rate which 
is in line with international parameters. To make the concept clearer, I 
affirm that this institution will pay more attention to the evolution of the 
inflation-rate than to the price of the dollar, which in the last years has 
become an obsession. To care for the value of the peso means to make 
sure that inflation is low, not that the price of the dollar is constant. We 
should not be paying attention to the amount of dollars we can purchase 
                                                          
89 Sturzenegger, Federico “Informe al Congreso…”. Speech held at the Argentine National Congress, May 
18, 2016, recording time 00:29:04-00:29:30.  
90 Ibídem, recording time 00:29:30-00:29:48.  
91 Ibídem, recording time 00:06:35-00:06:44. 
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with a peso. Instead, we should be paying attention to the amount of real 
goods we can purchase with a peso, which is ultimately what workers 
care for. Our reaction function (as is called in academic circles) should 
be following the changes in the evolution of good’s prices, not the 
changes in the price of the dollar. This change of perspective requires 
that we redirect our monetary policy towards an inflation targeting 
policy framework, combined with a managed but floating exchange-
rate”.92 
 
Indeed, in the views of the central bank’s new authorities, the new monetary policy 
framework and the accompanying free-floating exchange-rate regime were considered to 
be more sustainable in the long- run than an alternate system based on totally or partially 
pegging the exchange rate. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the chosen policy 
inspired trust because it was broadly accepted within international circles as the most 
effective way to keep inflation low.93 Therefore, once again, and just like many other 
times in the past, the new ruling elite claimed that the formula to succeed in the battle 
against inflation was to follow the international recipe book. According to the new 
authorities of the central bank, inflation targeting was the monetary policy framework 
which “all successful countries”94 had, those countries that Argentina should imitate. 
“We are not inventing anything here. [Indeed, this is] the monetary policy used in Chile, 
is the monetary policy used in Colombia, is the monetary policy used in Brazil, is the 
monetary policy used in Australia, is the monetary policy used in New Zealand, is the 
monetary policy used in Canada, is the monetary policy used in the United States, is the 
monetary policy used in England. That means that we are not bringing here an invention 
that we just came up with, but [that we are putting into practice something that is used 
all over the world]”.95 Quite paradoxically, the implementation of rigid exchange-rate 
regimes that, according to the new administration, had cost Argentina so much, had also 
been a decision in line with the international recipes of the 1990s. But nowadays recipes 
                                                          
92 Sturzenegger, Federico “Discurso de inicio…”. Speech held at the Central Bank of Argentina, December 
14, 2015, pp. 2-3. 
93 There is a wide set of literature that shows that, when compared to other regimes (i.e. exchange rate 
targeting, monetary targeting), inflation targeting has been very successful in keeping inflation low for 
sustained periods, both in industrialized and emerging economies. See for example Mishkin, 1999.  
94 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la Política Monetaria” [in English: Presentation of the Monetary 
Policy], Speech held at the Central Bank of Argentina, April 28, 2016, recording time 00:17:58-00:18:00. 
95 Sturzenegger, Federico “Informe al Congreso…”. Speech held at the Argentine National Congress, May 
18, 2016, recording time 00:06:49-00:07:36. 
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had changed and the modern world prescribed a new anti-inflation antidote: inflation 
targeting, with financial integration and exchange-rate flexibility; this was “the most 
effective and long-lasting remedy [...] which would allow Argentina to achieve long-
awaited price stability, while [ensuring] sustainable economic growth”.96 
 
As expected, in a country with an institutional tradition so biased towards the use of 
monetary policy frameworks which relied on exchange-rate pegging, questions emerged 
from several directions. While economists argued among themselves about the ability of 
the central bank to stabilize economic agents’ expectations by relying exclusively on the 
use of the benchmark interest-rate, and legislators raised their concerns about the 
economic recession that would follow from maintaining high interest rates for such a long 
period; journalists seem to ignore the turnaround of the national monetary policy and 
continued to report, with formidable detail, the daily variations in the price of the US 
currency. As if all that was not enough, the new authorities acknowledged that the very 
same institution they governed was biased towards the implementation of anti-inflation 
policies based on exchange-rate stabilization. “We are convinced [...] that these are both 
a monetary policy framework and an exchange-rate regime that will be useful for 
Argentina [...], [but in order to properly implement them, it is necessary that we are able 
to] de-dollarize the mind of the central bank itself, [...] and that we manage to make 
domestic inflation the main focus of this institution, instead of this focus being the 
exchange-rate, as it was so many times in the past”.97  
 
But all in all, and despite the difficulties, the new policymakers had no doubts about the 
suitability of these policies for a country like Argentina. Not for one second, they lost 
their conviction, but continued to affirm that the new policies could be successfully 
implemented, if only a minimum of order, consistency and coherence was maintained on 
the part of policymakers.  
 
“There is no country in the world (with an independent central bank) that 
tried to lower inflation using inflation targeting and failed. There is not. 
Therefore, if we fail, we would be very bad policy makers. We are not 
                                                          
96 Sturzenegger, Federico “Los primeros 100 días…”. Speech held at Bloomberg Argentina Summit, April 
5, 2016, recording time 00:08:10-00:08:35. 
97 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the Central Bank of 
Argentina, April 28, 2016, recording time 00:19:07-00:20:07 
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inventing anything; but we are just looking at the world. […] I realize that 
[our society] is a very skeptical society, is a society that has been used to live 
with inflation for a very long time; it is a society that does not have trust. So, 
what I want to tell to the Argentine society is that this [monetary policy] has 
worked [in other places]; this [monetary policy] has been successful. And that 
is the reason why I insist, for example, in [talking about] the case of Israel, 
[a country] which went from an annual inflation-rate of 450% to 0% inflation 
in just a few years. Right there, on that podium, just a few weeks ago, was the 
governor of the Central Bank of Israel, and she was explaining to us how, 
today, the inflation-rate in Israel remains in 0%, even when she has been 
insistently trying to get it to 2%. But [quite paradoxically] today she cannot 
bring the inflation-rate from 0% to 2%. [It seems unbelievable, right?] […] 
So, my insistence is a message to the people, to the businessmen, to the whole 
society, that Argentina can do this; it can do this perfectly well, because many 
other countries did it, from Israel to Peru, from Australia to England. So there 
is nothing that stops us from following the same trajectory”.98  
 
Now, even though Sturzenegger’s beliefs were fervent and his intentions were firm, the 
problem remained that he underestimated the task at hand. Indeed, Sturzenegger wanted 
something that was not so easy to achieve in Argentina. In short, he wanted the people to 
stop making calculations about the amount of dollars they could purchase with a peso, 
and to focus instead on making calculations about how many goods they could purchase 
with a peso. That is to say, he wanted people’s attention to shift from the exchange-rate 
to the ability of the central bank to achieve its own inflation target and thus tame inflation. 
But, this apparently very simple shift in monetary policy’s general orientation actually 
required a deep transformation of the valuation scheme with which Argentines were used 
to measure their own currency. In such situation, the new authorities should not have 
overlooked the fact that one of the main long-lasting consequences of the endless series 
of anti-inflation policies that had been implemented by past governments, was that 
Argentines had learned to rely on the US currency as a reference value with which to 
measure both the present and the future value of their own currency. Thus, by relying on 
                                                          
98 Sturzenegger, Federico. “Presentación del Informe de Política Monetaria” [in English: Presentation of 
the Monetary Policy Report]. Speech held at the Central Bank of Argentina, October 18, 2016, recording 
time 01:09:36-01:11:05.  
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the use of the exchange-rate as the main coordination tool to help tying down prices in 
the long-run, past governments had fostered the widespread use of the exchange-rate 
between the Argentine peso and the US dollar as a reference point; a situation which, in 
time, led the dollar to become the reference point for the peso’s own value. Over time, 
the close relationship between the two currencies had only strengthened insofar as cash 
dollars - as well as other goods whose prices were denominated in dollars, typically real 
estate - had become the most common saving options of Argentines. Therefore, if the new 
monetary authorities wanted to restore and maintain the value of the national currency, 
thus encouraging monetary trust among citizens, first of all they needed to understand 
where such trust was grounded. Such a task, in turn, required that the authorities 
understood in which terms citizens acknowledged and measured money’s value.  
 
Naturally, I do not want to imply that the inflation-rate was not a crucial variable for 
Argentines. I showed, since 1946, the lack of ability of the national currency to maintain 
its purchasing power over time in terms of goods was perceived by the population with 
increasing distress. Indeed, inflation partially determined how much people distrusted the 
value of their national currency in the long-run. But the inflation rate was not the only 
measure Argentines used for assessing the peso’s loss of value. Since citizens were very 
much used to save in cash dollars and other dollarized options, they were very much 
concerned with calculations about the number of dollars they could purchase with their 
money.99 This situation, in turn, made the exchange-rate a very sensitive price. However, 
the new authorities intended to reduce Argentine’s money valuation scheme (which 
included two variables, the inflation rate, and the exchange rate) to a single variable 
scheme. They believed that, by adopting a free-floating exchange-rate regime, the central 
bank would guarantee a sufficient degree of volatility in the price of the US dollar, so 
that, after some time, domestic prices would no longer follow the exchange-rate.100 What 
was needed, they argued, was “to make ‘the market’ used to the dynamics of a free-
floating exchange-rate regime, thus helping to dissociate domestic prices’ behavior and 
inflation expectations from the dynamics of the exchange rate”. That would be, in the 
view of the new authorities, “the most effective way (which will, of course, require some 
                                                          
99 Of course, these two variables (the inflation-rate and the exchange-rate), are related. Typically, the 
interaction between both variables is expressed by the exchange-rate pass-through coefficient. 
100 On this topic see: Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the 
Central Bank of Argentina, April 28, 2016, recording time 00:19:32-00:19:46. 
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work) to downplay the exchange rate’s central role in the formation of inflation 
expectations”.101   
 
For more than two years, the central bank of Argentina tried to create trust in the currency 
on these completely new grounds. However, as I will show in the following, this trust 
proved unruly. As long as the cravings of the Argentines for US dollars were more 
difficult to curb than the economic team would have wished, the successful 
implementation of inflation targeting found strong limits. Indeed, if on the one hand these 
limits arose from the central bank’s own inability to formulate credible inflation targets 
that could become an effective anchor of inflation expectations; on the other hand, the 
unhealthy obsession of Argentines with the dollar, cultivated for decades, emerged as a 
second limitation that ended up undermining the attempt to establish a different monetary 
policy framework. Actually, the monetary authorities were never able to divert Argentine 
citizens’ attention from the variations of the exchange-rate. Thus, despite their efforts to 
convince Argentines to stop using the price of the dollar as their main reference point to 
assess the state of the economy, and despite their insistence that, in the new monetary 
policy scheme, the specific value of the exchange-rate was no longer a policy objective; 
the questioning over the peso-dollar exchange-rate’s value never stopped. No matter what 
the monetary authorities did, at every presentation, at every discourse, at every press 
conference, journalists, academics and financial experts alike kept relentlessly asking 
which was the expected value of the dollar for the upcoming months, or whether the 
monetary authorities considered that, due to high inflation, the exchange-rate was lagging 
behind, thus increasing the chances of a currency shock. And, even though the central 
bank’s authorities insisted, again and again, that there was no such thing as an expected 
value for the dollar in the upcoming months, and that Argentina’s exchange-rate regime 
was a free-floating one; their answers sounded extremely insufficient. And the worst was 
yet to come. 
 
Starting on December 28, 2017, right after a press conference in which the central bank 
announced a relaxation of its own inflation target, a sudden loss of confidence hit the 
Argentine financial market hard and speculative foreign capital began to leave the country 
en masse. Immediately, the exchange rate between the Argentine peso and the US dollar 
                                                          
101 Sturzenegger, Federico “Los primeros 100 días…”. Speech held at Bloomberg Argentina Summit, April 
5, 2016, recording time 00:13:18-00:13:40. 
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skyrocketed. Once again, the crisis soon occupied the front page of all national and 
international newspapers. At the national level, television shows were packed with 
specialists who tried to explain to a broad and unskilled audience the reasons behind the 
sudden rise of the exchange-rate, in an attempt to hold back widespread unease. 
Meanwhile, social networks exploded with comments and jokes about the skyrocketing 
price of the dollar. And as the days went by, and as the value of the Argentine currency 
continue falling with no end in sight, widespread monetary unrest led Argentines to 
withdraw, once again, their deposits from the banks. Despite the central bank’s efforts to 
build a new monetary rationality, the crisis made dramatically clear that the price of the 
dollar remained a fundamental variable for Argentines. The fragility of inflation targeting 
was then more evident than ever, and so was the new monetary authorities’ inability to 
freely implement a free-floating exchange-rate regime, as their monetary models foretold.  
 
Towards a new monetary pedagogy: the establishment of inflation 
targeting in Argentina 
 
To go back in time to the beginnings of inflation targeting in Argentina, it was on March 
1st, 2016, that the central bank of Argentina began its transition towards inflation 
targeting. At the time, the new monetary authorities were seeking what others in their 
place had sought many times: to stabilize the national currency. But this time, 
Sturzenegger and its team had chosen inflation targeting as the new monetary policy 
framework. In their view, such a choice would allow Argentina to achieve long-awaited 
monetary stability. And to be fair such choice was not entirely surprising. In fact, around 
the world, inflation targeting as a fruitful monetary policy framework has been growing 
in popularity in recent years. What is more, the truth is that when it comes to controlling 
inflation, the empirical records of inflation targeting do not look bad at all. Indeed, most 
of the countries that adopted inflation targeting as their main monetary policy managed 
to keep inflation low, without any significant cost in terms of growth. However, it is 
important to note that, most of the time, central banks waited until inflation was under 
control before formally introducing inflation targeting. The main reason for this delay is 
the difficulty for central banks to forecast inflation and hit the inflation target in conditions 
of high and volatile inflation. In such circumstances, the risk of losing credibility from 
target misses is very high (Hammond 2012). As a consequence, with a few exceptions -
such as Turkey and Guatemala, which used inflation targeting to effectively reduce their 
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inflation-rate in a significant manner-, we know very little about the efficacy of inflation 
targeting as a policy to fight against chronic inflation (Libman & Palazzo, 2019).  
 
However, despite all the warnings, the new authorities of the central bank were convinced 
that inflation targeting was the “right monetary policy” for Argentina to adopt, a policy 
that will provide “a new coordination mechanism for price makers and price takers within 
society”;102 and that, in doing so, will help the central bank “to coordinate economic 
agents’ expectations and to bring them into line with the parameters already 
prestablished by the monetary authorities”.103 Thus, despite the uncertainty surrounding 
the country when the new authorities took office, Sturzenegger and his team set 
themselves ambitious goals.  
 
Indeed, at the beginning of 2016, uncertainty about the future was growing in Argentina 
as the country faced several challenges. On the one hand, there was the problem that the 
inflation-rate was already in danger of reaching even higher levels than in the previous 
years. In fact, given that during the second half of 2015, the previous administration had 
put in place a strong expansionary monetary policy aiming at financing the treasury, the 
monetary market was flooded with cash surpluses. This situation, in turn, prevented the 
central bank from freely setting its inflation targets for 2016. Thus, during their first three 
months in office, and in order to rectify the situation, the new monetary authorities put in 
place a very tight monetary policy, which sought to drain the market of the excessive 
pesos. However, it was already clear that no anti-inflation policy could work as long as 
the central bank had to continue issuing money in order to finance the treasury. In concrete 
terms, this meant that no matter which anti-inflation policy the government pursue, this 
policy had to be accompanied by fiscal tightening. Now, in a context of economic 
recession and political fragility, in which the government was facing increasing social 
pressures, Mauricio Macri and his economic team had little room for maneuver. Against 
this backdrop, the new politicians decided that fiscal tightening had to be gradual. The 
new fiscal policy would thus be based on two fundamental pillars. First, the reduction of 
public expenditure would be effective but gradual, which in practice meant that the central 
bank had to continue financing the treasury for some time. However, the value of these 
                                                          
102 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la metodología…”. Speech held at the Central Bank of 
Argentina, September 26, 2016, recording time 00:03:23-00:03:32. 
103 Sturzenegger, Federico “Panorama económico y financiero: perspectivas nacionales e internacionales”. 
Speech held at Universidad de Tel Aviv, Buenos Aires, August 30, 2016, pp.3. 
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money transfers from the central bank to the treasury would be limited to a specific 
amount which, according to the monetary authorities, would not jeopardize the announced 
inflation targets.104  
 
At the same time, the second pillar which ensured the sustainability of such fiscal 
gradualism was the possibility to cover any additional financial needs that the treasury 
could have through international loans. In these circumstances, the fact that Argentina 
had recently regained access to international financial markets allowed the government 
to potentially satisfy any pressing additional need for financing - one that was above the 
amount already provided by the central bank -, by accessing to international funding. This 
possibility, in turn, gave the government greater freedom to decide the pace at which it 
wanted to reduce its own deficit. All in all, in the views of the new monetary authorities, 
the overall fiscal and monetary program would make it possible to gradually reduce the 
fiscal deficit while, at the same time, lowering inflation and reactivating economic 
growth.  
 
However, even if the government decided that fiscal tightening would be gradually 
implemented, this still meant that public spending needed to be severely limited. For this 
reason, shortly after taking office, Mauricio Macri’s new economic cabinet put in place a 
series of measures whose main aim was to reduce the fiscal deficit. One such measure 
was an aggressive policy of subsidy reduction which, overall, sought to eliminate state 
subsidies to private companies in some key areas. Thus, to the extent that the government 
stopped financing many private companies which provided public services, the costs of 
many services (i.e., electricity, gas and water supply, sewage and drains maintenance, 
fuel and urban transport, among others) were transferred to the people, causing sharp price 
increases which made the monetary authorities’ fight against inflation infinitely more 
difficult.105  
                                                          
104 Specifically, in 2016, financing from the central bank to the treasury was limited to 160 billion pesos 
(equivalent to 2.5% of GDP). At the same time, during 2017 and 2018 the central bank agreed to transfer 
the treasury an amount of pesos equivalent to 1.5% and 1% of GDP, respectively. The rationale for 
consenting these transfers was that, to the extent that the process of disinflation was expected to be gradual, 
there was still some room in the money market for monetary expansion. Put differently, the assumption was 
that the money market would be capable of absorbing these transfers without the need of any sterilization 
process.  
105 Only in the first quarter of 2016, price increases on the costs of many public services were exorbitant. 
This is especially true for the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and its metropolitan area. Indeed, the 
average increase on the cost of the water supply was 300%. The average increase on the cost of electricity 
supply was 250%. The average increase on the cost of gas supply was 195%. Also, the costs for 
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A second challenge for the new economic cabinet was posed by the lack of reliable 
statistics in the country. In fact, by the time Mauricio Macri took office, in December 
2015, Argentina’s public statistics were facing an unprecedented crisis of confidence, 
circumstances which led the new president to publicly state that the country was in a 
situation of ‘national statistical emergency’ (Daniel and Lanata Briones 2019). The 
origins of such a crisis have to be traced back to 2007, the point in time when the Kirchner 
administration took control of the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos (INDEC, 
National Institute of Statistics and Censuses), and replaced many of the most recognized 
and experienced public officials in the institute. As a result, many methodological 
procedures were severely modified and the credibility of many of the most fundamental 
national indexes - such as the consumer prices index and the unemployment and economic 
growth rates -, was severely damaged. Consequently, from 2007 onwards, while official 
statistics continue to lose credibility, a great number of alternative indexes proliferated. 
Some of these alternative indexes were published by national or provincial state agencies 
which were still credible, while private consultants provided others. But in any case, the 
fact remained that when the new administration of the central bank took office, there were 
no official inflation indexes in the country; a situation that made it extremely difficult for 
the government to put in place an inflation targeting policy framework right away. 
Certainly, not only the lack of trustworthy official inflation indexes limited the central 
bank’s capacity to study the economic dynamics, and thus, its ability to set realistic future 
inflation targets. Moreover, it also made it extremely difficult for society as a whole to be 
able to judge whether the new policy was successful. There can be no doubt that, from 
the moment they took office, the new authorities of the central bank had significant 
challenges ahead. However, this did not stop them from setting ambitious goals, which, 
as I will show in the following, they had to renegotiate many times later on, in a process 
of constant back and forth in which they tried to convince both ‘the market’ and the 
society of the credibility of the anti-inflation policy, a goal which they never actually 
entirely achieved.  
 
In the light of such uncertain economic circumstances, the new administration decided 
that the transition towards a new and fully-fledged inflation targeting monetary policy 
                                                          
transportation (bus and urban train) rose 100%. In this sense, we must not lose sight of the fact that, since 
subsidies for public services were concentrated in the metropolitan area of the City of Buenos Aires, the 
impact of price increases was different in the different regions of the country. 
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framework would have to be done in three phases.106 The first phase began in December 
2015, when the new authorities of the central bank took office and extended until 
February 29th, 2016. Within this initial phase, known as the correction of imbalances 
phase,107 the main aim of the new monetary policy was to prepare the ground for a smooth 
transition to the new policy framework. With this purpose in mind, the new authorities of 
the central bank put in place a set of measures oriented towards two main goals: to 
reestablish the equilibrium of the money market, on the one hand, and to unify the foreign 
currency market, on the other. Accordingly, between December 2015 and February 2016, 
the central bank’s new authorities pursued a very tight monetary policy, which 
considerably decreased the amount of money in circulation within the Argentine 
economy. At the same time, they lifted all restrictions to the purchase of foreign currency 
in record time, a policy mostly aimed at unifying the currency market and putting an end 
to both the illegal dollar market and the exchange-rate gap between the so-called ‘official’ 
and ‘blue’ dollars. It was only in March 2016, after these first three months of initial 
stabilization, that the Central Bank of Argentina began its formal migration towards a 
fully-fledged inflation targeting policy framework, a policy framework in which the main 
monetary policy tool would be the benchmark interest rate. This second phase of 
transition lasted approximately nine months during which the central bank sought to 
safeguard a smooth and successful transition towards fully-fledged inflation targeting. 
This transition would be fully completed by January 2017. However, the shift to the new 
monetary policy framework was not without complexities. Indeed, such shift required the 
central bank to convince a skeptical society about the advantages of the new policy for 
achieving a long-awaited goal: to bring inflation down and to ensure monetary stability. 
But considering that during the past seventy years, the Argentine society had witnessed 
more than a dozen unsuccessful attempts to bring inflation down, its people were very 
suspicious of anti-inflation policies in general. However, to be fair, it must also be 
acknowledged that, compared to the old recipes, the new anti-inflation policy brought 
some interesting innovations along.  
 
                                                          
106 On this topic see the following speeches by Federico Sturzenegger: “La gestión de la política monetaria”. 
Speech held at the Consejo Profesional de Ciencias Económicas de Buenos Aires, April 26, 2016; 
“Presentación de la Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the Central Bank of Argentina, April 28, 2016; and 
“Presentación del Informe de Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the Central Bank of Argentina, May 12, 
2016.  
107 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the Central Bank of 
Argentina, April 28, 2016.  
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A first innovation of the new monetary policy framework was that, for Argentina, just 
like for other countries, embracing inflation targeting meant making price stability the 
main focus of its monetary policy. In this regard, the views of the central bank’s new 
monetary authorities were completely in line with the prevalent governing international 
consensus on monetary policy, which clearly states that price stability is the greatest 
contribution that a central bank can make to the process of economic development. Of 
course, it goes without saying that this specific view on monetary policy did not always 
prevail. In fact, such a view is a product of the last half-century, a period in which central 
banks had significantly redefined how they approach their macroeconomic stabilization 
functions. Actually, as recently as the 1970s, the picture was very different from today 
and views still diverged across advanced economy central banks with regard to the 
efficacy of monetary policy in delivering price stability. Some, such as the Bundesbank 
and the Swiss National Bank, were already committed to using monetary measures to 
control inflation. But others, such as the Federal Reserve and various European central 
banks, remained more pessimistic in their outlook, believing that monetary policy was an 
inefficient means to tame inflation and that other policies should be better employed. 
Illustrating this view, Fed Chairman William Miller observed in his first FOMC108 
meeting in March 1978 that “inflation is going to be left to the Federal Reserve and that’s 
going to be bad news. An effective program to reduce the rate of inflation has to extend 
beyond monetary policy and needs to be complemented by programs designed to enhance 
competition and to correct structural problems”.109 However, from late 1979 onwards –
with Volcker’s assumption of the Fed chairmanship– central banks converged towards a 
new consensus and took ownership for fulfilling their inflation mandates.  
 
Within this new international consensus, disbelief regarding the efficacy of monetary 
policy to tame inflation was replaced by a new paradigm which presupposes that 
sustainable growth cannot be separated from price stability, and that price stability, in 
turn, depends exclusively on a credible and committed monetary policy. In other words, 
those who adhere to this new consensus share a series of convictions, such as: that low 
inflation is a prerequisite for economic growth, that inflation itself is an exclusively 
                                                          
108 FMOC is the abbreviation of Federal Open Market Committee, which is responsible for open market 
operations of the Federal Reserve. 
109 Praet, Peter “The ECB’s fight against low inflation: reasons and consequences” [en español: “La lucha 
del Banco Central Europeo contra la baja inflación: razones y consecuencias”]. Speech held at the Luiss 
School of European Political Economy, Rome, April 4, 2016, pp. 1.   
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monetary phenomenon and that, as a consequence, it can be effectively controlled by 
using monetary policy instruments alone. Indeed, within such a paradigm, inflation occurs 
when there is more money within the economy than people want110; therefore, the only 
thing that a central bank needs to do in order to bring inflation down is to reestablish the 
equilibrium in the money market. That is why, as long as the central bank succeeds in 
setting up a scheme where money supply and money demand balance each other, prices 
will accommodate naturally, switching off the mechanisms that fueled inflation.  
 
Faithful defenders of this new international consensus in monetary policy, the new 
authorities of the Central Bank of Argentina were certain that their main contribution to 
the process of national economic development was to achieve and maintain price stability. 
Moreover, in their view, delivering price stability depended exclusively on the central 
bank’s ability to pursue a credible and committed monetary policy: “All over the world 
inflation has been defeated. And this defeat has been inflicted because central banks were 
committed to this task. What is more, monetary policy instruments have proved to be 
sufficient for achieving this goal, leading us to conclusive results”.111 Thus, unlike their 
predecessors, who had followed an expansionary monetary policy aimed at increasing 
government spending, maintaining full employment and promoting economic growth in 
the short-run (more in line with a Keynesian paradigm), the central bank’s new authorities 
were convinced that delivering price stability was the most important contribution that 
the central bank could make for achieving long-term economic growth. In this situation, 
the new authorities had two main aims: to bring inflation down and keep it low. As for 
the central bank’s other responsibilities as established in its legal mandate (i.e. to promote 
financial stability, full-employment, economic development and overall social welfare), 
should be subordinated to this first objective of price stability.  
 
“I would like to be very clear with regard to this specific point, because 
it has to do with what we consider to be our main duty [as the central 
bank’s new authorities]. Our ability to contribute to the well-being of 
the Argentine society is to ensure price stability and, in doing so, to 
                                                          
110 This is so because the model assumes that, ultimately, the price level is the representation of money’s 
price. As a consequence, if there is more money within the economy than people want, the price of money 
will fall, or, in other words, the price of goods (relative to money) will rise. 
111 Sturzenegger, Federico “Panorama económico y financiero…”. Speech held at Universidad de Tel Aviv, 
Buenos Aires, August 30, 2016, pp.3. 
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safeguard the purchasing power of our national currency. Indeed, no 
other goal is feasible. This definition is central, because we have moved 
away from a central bank that thought that it could do everything and 
that it had nothing to do with inflation, towards a central bank that 
thinks it can do almost nothing but to lower inflation. It is thus easy to 
understand why, in this new phase - and in order to fully comply with 
the goals set in the central bank’s legal mandate - we have given 
absolute priority to gradually bring down the inherited inflation-rate, 
thus ensuring monetary stability”.112  
 
A second and relatively new element of the new anti-inflation policy was that it required 
that the central bank had statutory independence, a feature that, as we will see, was not 
so easy to achieve during the two and a half years that Sturzenegger and his team were in 
office. Indeed, to a great extent, it was the widespread perception of the central bank’s 
lack of independence that ultimately precipitated Sturzenegger administration’s dramatic 
early end. However, it remains a widely-held idea within economics that inflation 
targeting central banks should be independent of government influence, a feature that, in 
theory, allows them to generate credible inflation expectations. But this independence of 
monetary policy from political oversight was not always a requirement. Actually, the need 
to create and maintain independent central banks, whose policies are insulated, even 
shielded, from direct political oversight, grew in importance side by side with the 
increasing role of price stability as the main monetary policy goal of developed economies 
central banks. Thus, since the 1980s, while monetarist ideas gained salience within 
economics, monetary policy converged towards this new ideal of independent central 
banks. That means central banks in which monetary policy decisions are isolated from 
the immediate financial needs of the state, and where the monetary authorities are 
expected to rely on clear, explicit and preferably quantitative rules (i.e. inflation targets 
or the Taylor rule, for example), and to communicate them to the public in a transparent 
manner, thus allowing both, ‘the market’ and the society to assess the consistency or their 
actions with the broader objectives of monetary policy. Often, the literature on central 
banking distinguishes between ‘goal independence’ (i.e. the central bank has autonomy 
in setting the goals of monetary policy), and ‘instrument independence’, (i.e. the central 
                                                          
112 Sturzenegger, Federico “Los primeros 100 días…”. Speech held at Bloomberg Argentina Summit, April 
5, 2016, pp. 3. I quote the written version because the audiovisual version is not audible in that part. 
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bank conducts monetary policy to achieve the inflation target independent of government 
influence). In practice, of course, the distinction is less clear-cut. 
 
Accordingly, and just like in other inflation targeting countries, in Argentina, the 
turnaround of the country’s monetary policy towards inflation targeting required an 
independent central bank; a central bank committed to protect the long-term value of the 
national currency and, thus, able to take whatever actions were needed to hit its own 
inflation targets. Such independence, it was argued, would also be a guarantee that the 
monetary authorities would not pursue an expansionary monetary policy intended to 
promote short-run economic growth. Actually, and even though during this period the 
Central Bank of Argentina did not actually have goal independence – since the inflation 
targets were jointly determined by the central bank’s authorities together with the ministry 
of finances –, Sturzenegger and his team were confident that the central bank would 
always be able to keep its operational independence, and to freely conduct its monetary 
policy isolated from political oversight. So, despite the fact that Argentina’s history does 
not have many examples of such a high degree of central bank independence, and perhaps 
a little surprisingly, the central bank’s new authorities were confident about their ability 
to maintain their independency: “This institutional design is a novelty in Argentine history 
which, in a nutshell, shows that we now have an independent central bank that sets its 
own inflation targets and that uses all its monetary policy toolkit to meet these targets. In 
this new institutional framework, monetary policy will not accommodate itself to inflation 
expectations; on the contrary, it will act upon these expectations, thus helping to make 
the actions of economic agents consistent with the inflation targets set by the central 
bank”. 113   
 
Finally, the third innovation of the new anti-inflation policy was the introduction of a 
numerical inflation target as the nominal variable which would help to coordinate the 
future inflation expectations of the private sector and, in doing so, to tie down the price 
level in the long-run. Therefore, the introduction of a new nominal anchor meant that the 
central bank would no longer rely on the exchange rate as the main coordination monetary 
policy tool. “It is important to emphasize this particular element, because historically 
Argentina has always mixed its exchange-rate policy with its anti-inflation policy. And, 
                                                          
113 Sturzenegger, Federico “Política Monetaria, Inflación, Crecimiento”. Speech held at Fundación de 
Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL), Buenos Aires, September 29, 2016, pp. 7. 
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even today, there is still a great temptation to keep using the exchange-rate as the main 
instrument to stabilize the economy [...]. And here we are, yet again, debating how to 
fight against inflation. So it’s obvious that it’s time to try a different recipe”.114  
 
As we have already mentioned, the new authorities of the central bank were convinced 
that reorienting economic actors’ attention towards the dynamics of prices in the domestic 
market would produce good results in the long-run. In these circumstances, they were 
prepared to work round the clock in order to make sure that Argentines would stop using 
the nominal peso-dollar exchange-rate as the main variable with which to assess the 
overall health of their national currency. And even if this turnaround of the country’s 
monetary policy was not an easy one, they felt completely up to the task. “When I speak 
of the path we are about to follow, I speak of a path where the exchange-rate will float, 
and where there will be a new anchor for [inflation] expectations, [an anchor] that will 
be provided by the central bank and by its commitment to price stability. If we achieve 
our goal, Argentina will have better monetary institutions, which will allow it to grow 
steadily. In this new scheme, domestic prices will follow the parameters pre-established 
by the central bank; and in doing so they will allow the exchange-rate to finally play its 
stabilizing role”.115 So, once more very much in line with the prevalent governing 
international consensus on monetary policy, the new authorities of the central bank 
claimed that Argentina needed a free-floating exchange-rate regime. In their view, such 
a scheme would bring great benefits. On the one hand, it would help the national economy 
to better cope with possible external shocks, while at the same time, preventing some 
imbalances “from growing more than they should”.116 Last but not least, a more volatile 
exchange-rate would help to de-dollarize the domestic economy over time. Thus, in 
Sturzenegger’s opinion, even if in the short-run inflation targeting posed great challenges, 
it would eventually lead to “a more sustainable macroeconomic scheme, one which would 
be much more appropriate for the Argentine economy in the long-run”. 117  
 
                                                          
114 Sturzenegger, Federico “Estrategia del BCRA”. Speech held at the Instituto Argentino de Ejecutivos de 
Finanzas (IAEF), May 11, 2016, pp. 4. 
115 Ibídem, pp.5. 
116 See the interview to Federico Sturzenegger published at the newspaper Perfil on January 28, 2018, by 
Jorge Fontevecchia, “Ahora, a cumplir la meta del 15%”. Available at: 
https://www.perfil.com/noticias/politica/ahora-a-cumplir-la-meta-del-15.phtml. Last access: 13/10/2019. 
117 Sturzenegger, Federico “Los primeros 100 días…”. Speech held at Bloomberg Argentina Summit, April 
5, 2016, recording time 00:10:50-00:11:05. 
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“I don’t want to minimize the topic, because it is true that we, 
Argentines [...], live with our own history, right? And the Argentine 
history has always been that stabilization programs were based on the 
use of the exchange-rate [as a nominal anchor]. So this has always 
been a one-way street. I mean, the exchange-rate was used as a 
reference point to anchor [inflation expectations]. Hence, as soon as 
the inflation process kept on going, it forced the nominal exchange-
rate to appreciate. And in these circumstances we were always 
wondering: ‘and now what? How do we get out of here? How do we 
get out of this situation?’ Only through deflation. And this is what is 
different [in the new policy framework]. And it is precisely this change 
that I am trying [...] to emphasize all the time. [I am trying to show 
you] that this situation can change. [...] And I think that it is very 
important to understand that this central bank’s main goal is not to 
keep the exchange-rate within a certain value, this central bank’s main 
goal is to keep the inflation-rate within a certain value”.118  
 
The new monetary authorities had placed their bet and sealed their fate. From now 
onwards, in order to effectively defeat inflation, they would have to convince Argentines 
of four key points. First, that currency stability and price stability were synonymous. 
Second, that since inflation was essentially a monetary phenomenon the central bank’s 
monetary policy toolkit was all that was needed to bring prices down. Third, that the main 
tool in this fight against inflation would be the benchmark interest-rate. And, fourth, that, 
in the new scheme, economic agents had to turn their attention from the nominal peso-
dollar exchange-rate to the ability of the central bank to meet its inflation targets. In this, 
the ability of the new policy makers to put in place a successful inflation-control policy 
depended, to a great extent, on the exercise of a new and effective monetary pedagogy. 
Indeed, as Jaqueline Best (2019) has rightly pointed out in a recent paper, for any specific 
inflation-control policy to work it needs to be both understood and made to be credible. 
This, in turn, means that social actors (and especially certain key actors) need to learn that 
this is ‘how inflation works’ in a specific monetary paradigm, and to put into place a 
whole range of supporting practices that reflect and reproduce this conviction. In other 
                                                          
118 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación del Informe de Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the Central 
Bank of Argentina, April 18, 2017, recording time 01:19:38-01:21:31. 
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words, for any given anti-inflation policy to work (i.e. quantitative rules, income policies, 
fiscal policy), social actors need to believe that, due to certain particular causes (i.e. 
monetary, wage-driven, demand-driven), such policy is the best way to manage inflation 
credibly (Best 2019, 628). In this sense, in order to be effective, monetary policies do not 
necessarily have to be accurate, but they do have to be widely accepted. It is for this 
reason that, when studying any given monetary policy and its effects, we must recognize 
that a monetary policy rule only makes sense in the context of a broader, deeply 
sociological, construction of what the economy is and how it works. Economic theories 
play a fundamental role here since they provide credible narratives about what the 
different economic phenomena are, what causes them, and how to manage them 
successfully (Beckert 2016; Holmes 2009).  
 
Fully aware of this reality, the central bank’s new authorities knew that, if they wanted 
the new anti-inflation policy to succeed, they needed to educate Argentines and teach 
them that ‘this was how inflation worked’ under the new monetary paradigm. In this way, 
society would not only be able to understand the new monetary policy but, even more 
importantly, it would also believe in its efficacy. Therefore, as is typical for inflation 
targeting central banks, the new monetary authorities established an encompassing 
communication strategy whose ultimate goal was to hold the central bank accountable for 
its conduct of monetary policy. As such, this communication strategy consisted of 
different vehicles of communication, which became a key piece of the central bank’s new 
pedagogical exercise. The main objectives were to communicate monetary policy 
decisions, to make explicit the rationale behind them, and to always reinforce the idea 
that all these decisions were consistent and coherent with the overall goal of meeting the 
inflation targets.119 Thus, with the adoption of inflation targeting, periodic 
                                                          
119 There were different occasions for communication with the press. Typically, the main vehicle for 
communicating monetary policy was the Monetary Policy Report, which was published quarterly (in 
January, April, July and October each year). This report was accompanied by a press conference in which 
the members of the Monetary Policy Committee summarized the most relevant data and explained the 
rationale behind the main monetary policy decisions. The presentations of the monetary policy report were 
held in the Central Bank’s conference room and journalists from different media as well as financial experts 
were invited. The conferences were also streamed through the official Youtube channel of the Central Bank 
of Argentina. There were also some other written vehicles of communication. The most important was the 
‘Lebac Communiqués’, which was published every Tuesday afternoon and which contained a weekly 
overview of the monetary policy decisions. There was also a Monthly Monetary Report which was 
accompanied by an editorial note and described the state of the money market. In addition, in December 
each year, the Central Bank of Argentina published the Monetary Policy Objectives for the following year. 
Finally, once a year, the governor Federico Sturzenegger reported and explained the most important 
monetary policy decisions to the National Congress. There were also some additional occasions were both 
the governor and the deputy governor shared the most recent monetary policy decisions with specific 
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communication with both the press and with financial analysts became a central part of 
the new public officials’ daily work. Again, to the extent that the central bank’s new 
authorities were deeply aware that, in order to succeed, they needed economic actors to 
understand the logics behind their decisions and to believe in their efficacy, they utilized 
these vehicles of communication as real pedagogical opportunities. Accordingly, they 
made use of each speech, each press conference, each presentation of the monetary policy 
report, as an opportunity to explain the rationale behind monetary policy decisions, to 
point out which measures had been taken to influence the path and pace of disinflation, 
educate the public and correct those interpretations that were mistaken.  
 
Now, considering that Argentina had been fighting inflation for almost seventy years, the 
topic naturally had considerable salience within the public debate. This situation, in turn, 
added complexity to the pedagogical endeavor of the new monetary authorities. In fact, 
one of the main consequences of the endless succession of inflation-control policies was 
that public debate on the drivers of national inflation had been flooded with as many 
different concepts and theories about inflation as there had been anti-inflationary plans in 
Argentina. Where on the one hand, economists had contributed transforming the public 
debate into an increasingly technical space where countless concepts coexisted in a 
confused tangle of ideas, on the other hand, the media had also contributed to this exercise 
of diffusion, bringing debates on the causes and consequences of inflation closer to the 
public, giving rise to a melting pot of divergent explanations that permanently circulated 
in the national debate. Additionally, politicians, who through their speeches and public 
appearances had sought to make society understand the logics behind whatever was the 
anti-inflation policy of the day, had also helped to make economic theories become more 
accessible to the people. The result of all these actions was to turn inflation into the object 
of a feverish polemic that had been growing for more than half a century (Heredia 2015; 
2018). As was only to be expected, imposing a clear narrative on the subject was not an 
easy task in the midst of so much contestation. However, as we have already stated, the 
success of the anti-inflation program depended on the new monetary authorities being 
able to convince economic actors of the efficacy of their policy. And for that, imposing a 
theory of inflation was an unavoidable step.  
                                                          
audiences, such as trade unions, professional networks, etc. Most of these speeches can be found on 
Federico Sturzenegger’s personal blog. Available at: https://www.fsturzenegger.com.ar/actividad-bcra. 
Last access: 13/10/2019. 
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Contested futures: the performance of inflation targeting in 
Argentina  
 
The new authorities set to work right after taking office. The new monetary policy, 
however, was not officially announced until April 28th, 2016, at a press conference which 
took place in the central bank’s conference room and lasted about an hour.120 There, in 
front of an audience full of journalists and financial experts, Sturzenegger presented the 
general guidelines of the new monetary policy. In doing so, he also sparked off a wider 
and heated debate about the drivers of the Argentine inflation and the better ways to fight 
against it; a debate that would turn into a fierce, long-lasting battle of ideas, which would 
end with the monetary authorities being both exhausted and discredited. The success of 
the new monetary policy was conditional on the authorities creating a new monetary-
anchor, a reference point that should become a clear and precise guide for economic 
agents’ inflation expectations during a phase of transition. This monetary-anchor, which 
for many decades had been the price of the dollar, would now be the inflation target 
established by the central bank. Therefore, one of the first steps for the new monetary 
authorities was to establish explicit quantitative inflation targets, targets that “could offer 
the Argentine society a stable and predictable unit of value”,121 and could become a clear 
indication of what was the level of inflation that the central bank was looking for. In doing 
so, these targets would lead economic agents’ future inflation expectations in the direction 
of the objectives set by the central bank. Moreover, once the targets had been set, the 
central bank had to actually reach those inflation targets, thus helping Argentines to begin 
to recover their trust in the long-lasting value of their national currency. In this sense, the 
assumption of the monetary authorities was that, as soon as Argentines could see that 
inflation was following a downward and well-ordered path, and could verify that the 
national currency was gradually recovering its capacity to maintain its value over time; 
they would slowly regain their peace of mind and a climate of greater financial stability 
would prevail.  
 
                                                          
120 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the Central Bank of 
Argentina, April 28, 2016.  
121 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la metodología…”. Speech held at the Central Bank of 
Argentina, September 26, 2016, recording time 00:03:35-00:03:38. 
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Under these circumstances, in early 2016 the central bank together with the ministry of 
finances defined a long-term inflation target, which set an ultimate goal for the process 
of disinflation: to achieve an annual inflation rate of 5% by the end of Mauricio Macri’s 
presidency in December 2019. However, given that during the two years prior to the 
arrival of Sturzenegger and his team to the central bank the annual inflation-rate in 
Argentina was above 25%,122 a very steep disinflation process was needed in order to 
meet this long-term target. In this sense, the monetary authorities knew that they had to 
provide concrete guidelines on the path and pace of disinflation expected by the central 
bank. Therefore, aside from this single long-term inflation target, they needed to set 
different targets with different time frames. Thus, as the months went by, the monetary 
authorities set three additional annual inflation targets and some monthly inflation targets 
which, together, provided intermediate reference points, thus giving a clear signal on the 
rhythm of disinflation expected by the central bank. Yet, only one of these intermediate 
annual targets was announced at the conference of April 28, 2016. In fact, and even 
though the new authorities were aware that setting concrete intermediate inflation targets 
was crucial for the success of the new anti-inflation policy, the reality was that in 
Argentina inflation targeting began without clear inflation targets. As we have already 
stated, this was because of the lack of trustworthy inflation indexes made extremely 
difficult for the new monetary authorities to know exactly what the actual inflation-rate 
was, and to set realistic inflation targets for the near future.  
 
But no matter how atypical the situation in the country was, the new administration of the 
central bank knew that establishing explicit inflation targets was an unavoidable step 
within the monetary policy framework they had chosen. As a result, and despite the lack 
of reliable national inflation indexes, by the end of April 2016, Sturzenegger was forced 
to provide a ‘provisional’ annual inflation target for 2016, which consisted of bringing 
the annual inflation rate ‘as close as possible to 25%’. In contrast, the inflation targets for 
2017 and 2018 were only announced in September 2016 and set in terms of ranges.123 For 
2017, the monetary authorities set an annual inflation target of between 12% and 17%, 
while for 2018 they set an inflation range target of between 8% to 12%. As for 
                                                          
122 According to the statistical data published by the Argentine province of San Luis, cumulative annual 
(from January to December) reached 33.5% in 2014 and 27.8% in 2015. According to the statistical data 
published by the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires accumulated annual inflation reached 32.6% in 2014 
and 24.3% in 2015. 
123 Sturzenegger, Federico. “Presentación de la metodología del régimen de metas de inflación”. Speech 
held at the Central Bank of Argentina, September 26, 2016. 
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measurement, like in most inflation targeting countries, in Argentina the monetary 
authorities chose to use the headline measure of the consumer prices index (hereinafter 
CPI) as their main target measure. The choice largely responded to both practical and 
operational reasons. Indeed, the CPI is available on a monthly basis, whereas other 
measures, which might be preferred for theoretical reasons, such as the GDP deflator, are 
only available quarterly. Also, while the core measure is less volatile and may be more 
responsive to the policy rate, the headline measure has the overwhelming advantage of 
being familiar to the public, which makes communication easier. In particular, given some 
regional disparities in prices in different regions of the country, the index used by the 
Central Bank of Argentina was the headline measure of the CPI provided by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC, National Institute of Statistics and Censuses) 
with the largest geographical coverage.124   
 
The truth is that inflation targeting in Argentina had a hesitant beginning. Indeed, during 
the first months of 2016, not only were inflation targets provisional, but the discourse of 
the monetary authorities was also extremely ambiguous. If on the one hand, Sturzenegger 
tried to always look confident that Argentina would succeed in reducing inflation, at the 
same time he constantly repeated that, given the lack of reliable statistics, he could not 
actually provide an accurate quantitative inflation target for 2016. However, he provided 
a provisional quantitative inflation target. Thus, during the conference on April, 28th, 
2016, he stated that, even if this was “a very particular year in terms of measuring the 
inflation-rate, […] the two goals we set ourselves for this year are to bring the annual 
inflation-rate as close as possible to 25% and to start guiding inflation expectations, so 
that in 2017 they will be within the range we have established […]. This is the main point 
we want to make here today, this is the goal to which we are committing ourselves”.125 
In this way, by setting themselves their first monetary policy goal, the monetary 
authorities began a long journey, which continued for approximately two and a half years, 
and in which they would try to restore the central bank’s long-lost credibility. 
                                                          
124 Indeed, the Central Bank of Argentina made clear that the target measure would be the consumer prices 
index with the greatest geographic coverage, from those periodically published by the INDEC. Between 
May and December 2016, this index was the IPC-AMBA: the consumer prices index calculated for the 
Metropolitan Area of the City of Buenos Aires (a district which includes not only the City of Buenos Aires 
but also part of the province of the same name, which is adjacent to that district). On the other hand, from 
January 2017 onwards, the INDEC began to publish a national inflation index, which was then subsequently 
adopted by the central bank as the target measure used to evaluate if the central bank met the inflation 
target.  
125 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the Central Bank of 
Argentina, April 28, 2016, recording time 00:33:00-00:33:35. 
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With this objective in mind, one of the first tasks on which they focused their attention 
was the study of the inflation process and its tendencies. But given that the INDEC had 
not yet resumed the periodical publication of the main national economic indexes at the 
beginning of 2016, the central bank’s analysts had to rely on alternative indexes. Some of 
these alternative indexes were periodically published by state agencies that were still 
trustworthy, while others were provided by private consultants.126 In particular, analysts 
at the central bank mostly relied on disaggregated inflation indexes (indexes which 
distinguished core inflation from seasonal inflation, as well as inflation due to adjustments 
in prices regulated by the government), which were all published with different 
frequencies (daily, weekly or monthly). With this information, the central bank’s analysts 
tried to distinguish persistent from temporary trends,127 to make a diagnosis of the general 
situation and to identify broad inflation dynamics. In turn, the monetary authorities relied 
on these assessments to take policy decisions on how to meet the inflation target. “When 
we take a [monetary policy] decision we usually have a lot of information, and that 
information sometimes goes in one direction, sometimes goes in another direction; so in 
the end we cannot take all this information into account, we cannot react to every number, 
because that would be very unstable. What we have to do instead is to visualize an overall 
inflation process, to imagine how this process is going to continue, and to convince 
ourselves of what are, in our views, the main dynamics; only then can we take a decision, 
based on an overall assessment. Indeed, it is only when we observe the process in the 
long-run, that all the numbers align and the path of the inflation process becomes very 
clear”.128 
 
                                                          
126 The central bank’s analysts used inflation indexes published by state agencies that were still credible, 
specifically those periodically published by the Argentine provinces of San Luis, Córdoba, Mendoza and 
the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. At the same time, they used inflation indexes provided by private 
consultants, such as PriceStats and Latin American Concensus Forecast. The national indexes published 
by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) were only available from May 2016 onwards. 
So it was only after that date that they were also used by the central bank to evaluate the inflation dynamics. 
Moreover, as of July 2016, the central bank resumed its Survey of Inflation Expectations (REM), on a 
monthly basis. This information was also incorporated to the analysis of inflation dynamics. 
127 The central bank used both, headline inflation indexes as well as disaggregated versions of these indexes 
(when available). These disaggregated indexes include, for example, seasonal inflation indexes (which 
show the monthly variation of prices that do not vary uniformly throughout the year) and regulated prices 
indexes (which measure the monthly variation of prices regulated by the government), as well as core 
inflation indexes (which exclude volatile components such as food). In general, economic models assume 
that core inflation gives a better idea of the underlying inflationary pressures. 
128 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación de la Política Monetaria”. Speech held at the Central Bank of 
Argentina, January 25, 2017recording time 00:09:45-00:10:24. 
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But in order to be able to act upon observed trends, thus channeling inflation into the 
desired and pre-established path, the monetary authorities needed to translate their 
monetary policy goals  into a whole set of technical practices ultimately designed to 
manage the price level. Put differently, in order to meet its inflation targets, the central 
bank had to operationalize these targets, to translate them into a series of specific technical 
practices that were supposed to bring about the disinflation process. And again, the 
selection of these specific technical practices ultimately depended on a theory of inflation. 
In this regard, and as we have already pointed out, the views of the new monetary 
authorities on inflation were eminently monetarist. Famously synthesized by Milton 
Friedman, the monetarist model states that “long-continued inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon that arises from a more rapid expansion in the 
quantity of money than in total output” (Friedman, 1974: 2). In line with this idea, the 
new authorities of the Central Bank of Argentina understood that the main cause of 
Argentina’s high inflation rate was the excessive money issuance carried out by the 
previous administration with the purpose of financing a high public deficit. Thus, to the 
extent that this increase in the amount of money in circulation within the economy had 
not been accompanied by an equivalent increase in total output, the consequence had been 
the rise of inflation. As a result, according to the central bank’s new authorities, all the 
central bank had to do in order to completely correct the situation was to put in place a 
contractionary monetary policy.  
Moreover, in such a view, the setting of benchmark interest rate was the only technical 
instrument required to successfully manage the price level.129 Indeed, by setting the policy 
rate, the monetary authorities would be able to act upon the real economy through three 
different transmission mechanisms.130 Overall, and beyond the specificities of each of 
                                                          
129 Typically, within inflation targeting, the monetary authorities can decide to use a specific interest rate 
of the economy as the benchmark interest rate, or the interest rate corresponding to some central bank 
operation itself. In the case of Argentina, during the two and a half years of inflation targeting, the central 
bank used two different policy rates. Between March and December 2016, it used the interest rate of the 
LEBACS (central bank notes sold every thirty-five days). As of January 2017, it used the interest rate of 
the PASES (notes sold exclusively to the financial system that were liquidated every seven-days)    
130 These mechanisms were three. First, a direct channel in which the benchmark interest rate impacted 
directly on the market interest rates, liquidity and credit; and indirectly on aggregate expense and inflation. 
Second, the exchange-rate channel, which was captured by the transfer coefficient. And third, the channel 
of expectations, in which each decision of the central bank on the specific level of the benchmark interest 
rate, influenced the inflation expectations of the economic agents. Ii is important to notice that the 
magnitude and relative importance of each one of these mechanisms depends on the structural 
characteristics of an economy (i.e. the degree of credit depth, or the opening of the economy) and on the 
form of its institutions. In Argentina the most important channel is the exchange rate. To understand the 
Argentina central bank’s perspective on this topic, see section 6 of the Monetary Policy Report [Informe 
de Política Monetaria] May 2016, pp. 42-43. 
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these transmission mechanisms, the benchmark interest-rate would act as a signal of how 
tight the monetary policy was. Thus, if inflation was above the target, the monetary 
authorities would raise the policy interest rate, thus decreasing the amount of money 
within the economy, slowing prices down and moderating inflation expectations. On the 
other hand, if the inflation rate started to decline or was consistently below the central 
bank’s targets, the monetary authorities would reduce the policy rate. All in all, during 
the two and a half years of Sturzenegger’s administration, Argentina pursued a 
contractionary monetary policy. In fact, during the whole period, the authorities 
maintained the policy rate on a nominal value that was around 30%, with the ultimate aim 
of having a positive real interest rate for deposits of about 4% per year.  
But at this point it is important to understand that, even if the credibility of the central 
bank was, to a large extent, tied to its technical capacity to control inflation; the ultimate 
source of this credibility was its political capacity to effectively govern economic actors’ 
inflation expectations and to impose a common image of the future. Indeed, if the central 
bank’s new authorities wanted to restore monetary trust, they needed to persuade the 
population, to make them believe that Argentina was actually heading towards a future in 
which inflation went down, the central bank succeeded in keeping money’s value over 
time and in fostering economic growth, and in which a climate of prosperity and harmony 
prevailed. In other words, if the central bank’s new authorities wanted to restore monetary 
trust, being able to grasp the underlying dynamics of the inflation process and to act upon 
them was not enough. The reason for this was that the ultimate source of monetary trust 
lay not in the central bank’s technical capacity to diagnose the dynamics underlying 
inflation, but in its political capacity to govern the inflation expectations of the population 
and to impose an image of a desirable and reachable monetary future in which the national 
currency recovered its value. Thus, above all, the success of the new anti-inflation policy 
depended on the success of the central bank’s policy of expectations. Why was this the 
case? Basically because, to the extent that inflation targeting regimes are based on the 
anticipation of potential threats - threats upon which the central bank has to act today, to 
prevent them from materializing in the future -, the reality is that the actual results of such 
a monetary policy can never be confirmed. Indeed, if a central bank is successful in 
impeding potential inflation outbursts, those outbursts will never occur, and therefore it 
will never be possible to know whether it was indeed the intervention of the central bank 
that helped to prevent these outbursts, or whether there was no danger of such outbursts 
in the first place, in which case monetary policy would not have made any difference at 
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all. The point here is that central bank interventions must prevent the realization of that 
potential future upon which the authorities decided to act in the first place. So, since it is 
not possible to observe whether inflation targeting actually helps delivering price 
stability, the question of whether such policy is successful remains an open one. Still, 
given that inflation targets have performative effects, some have argued that the most 
relevant thing for the success of such regimes is, precisely, that the monetary authority is 
capable of governing economic agents’ future expectations and of convincing them that 
the economy is gradually moving toward an economically stable future without inflation. 
Aware of this reality, Sturzenegger knew that his main task was not to anticipate the 
emergence of purely economic threats and to act upon them, thus being capable of 
actually govern inflation dynamics. Above all, his main task was to govern the inflation 
expectations and the economic fears of Argentines, to calm down their anxieties and 
channel their thoughts and emotions into a desirable and fruitful direction. And in this 
regard, his efforts to persuade the population were constant. From the very beginning, the 
new governor of the central bank sought to convince Argentines that the country was 
slowly moving into a monetary future which was different from the past and from the 
present, a monetary future not only desirable but also reachable, and in which the national 
currency recovered its value. “They say we can divide countries in two types, those who 
remember and those who imagine. Personally, I think Argentina has already spent too 
much time remembering. It’s time to change our attitude and start imagining. And today 
I want to invite you to imagine an Argentina without inflation”,131 the governor stated in 
front of a group of experts. He longed for Argentines to imagine an Argentina where the 
inflation-rate was gradually falling from an average annual rate of 25% in 2016, to an 
average annual rate of 15% in 2017, of 10% in 2018 and of 5% in 2019. He longed for 
Argentines to imagine they could finally live in “a normal country, [...] in a country 
where people are no longer wondering how much prices will increase, [a country] where 
Argentines have no interest in hearing the governor of the central bank talk about 
inflation anymore, [a country] where macroeconomics is no longer a concern, but a firm 
and invisible support for the development of each person”.132 
 
                                                          
131 Sturzenegger, Federico “Política Monetaria, Inflación, Crecimiento”. Speech held at the Fundación de 
Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL), Buenos Aires, September 29, 2016, pp. 1 
132 Sturzenegger, Federico “Panorama económico y financiero…”. Speech held at Universidad de Tel Aviv, 
Buenos Aires, August 30, 2016, pp. 9-10. 
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But considering that by the beginning of May 2016, the annual accumulated inflation rate 
was already reaching 14%, meeting an annual inflation target of 25% seemed highly 
unlikely, and Argentines had little trust this could be achieved. Used to decades of 
political ups and downs and tired of the sterile announcements of the politicians of the 
day, Argentines were not easily convinced. On the contrary, they needed proof that, this 
time, anti-inflation policies would bring the results announced by the monetary 
authorities. To make matters worse, as time went by, and further inflation figures were 
published, mistrust grew. Indeed, when the INDEC resumed the publication of the official 
inflation indexes in June 2016, the news were as devastating for the population as for the 
monetary authorities. According to official indexes, the monthly inflation rate in the 
metropolitan area of the City of Buenos Aires during the month of May had reached an 
alarming 4.2%. That is, a number much higher than the central bank’s monthly target of 
2%. Thus, despite the efforts of the monetary authorities to persuade Argentines of the 
efficacy of the anti-inflation policy, it was very difficult to win their trust when it was so 
evident that the monetary policy was not meeting its goals. In the following months the 
inflation rates failed to improve and the overall situation worsened. In fact, depending on 
which indexes we use, by July 2016, the accumulated annual inflation rate in the City of 
Buenos Aires was already reaching 28.3%, while in the rest of the country this figure 
reached between 21% and 27%. Thus, with such figures, the annual inflation target of 
25% was little more than an expression of desire.  
 
Inflation was not going down and the situation was tense. Indeed, despite the efforts of 
the monetary authorities to formulate credible and convincing explanations of the main 
causes and the potential solutions to the problem of inflation, journalists, financial 
insiders and opposition politicians alike expressed serious doubts regarding the central 
bank’s capacity to grasp the complexity of the inflation process and to effectively fight 
against it. Such was the case, for example, of Senator María Graciela De la Rosa (FPV) 
who, during Sturzenegger’s first presentation to the National Congress in May 2016, 
severely questioned the effective capacity of the new monetary policy to control inflation. 
 
“Here we have a philosophical, ideological and political discussion 
about the nature of inflation as a monetary phenomenon. [...] I believe 
that inflation is not a monetary phenomenon, it does have components 
that have to do with monetary policy, with money issuance, but I 
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believe that inflation is a structural, global, social, political, economic 
phenomenon that has to do with interest bidding, it has to do with... 
with so many things in Argentina. And above all it is also [a 
phenomenon that in Argentina is] very much linked to the dollar, 
[because] this is an absolutely dollarized country. [...] [So] when you 
talk about using the interest rate as an anchor to curb inflation or to 
lower inflation to a single digit, it seems [to me that this is] too 
ambitious. I do not believe that the central bank, with a monetary 
policy [like the one you are proposing] and using a [single] tool, such 
as the benchmark interest rate, can manage to lower inflation on its 
own, because, [I insist], I believe that this is a much more complex 
economic phenomenon”. 133 
 
And indeed, one of the most pressing problems that the monetary authorities faced was 
that Senator Maria Graciela de la Rosa was not alone in her doubts. In fact, many senators 
and deputies from parties opposed to the government raised similar questions. To make 
matters worse, it was not just the congressmen who had doubts. For instance, recognized 
specialists from various national scientific and technical organizations also pointed out 
that the monetary authorities had incorrectly diagnosed the causes of inflation, and, 
therefore, they also did not believe in the proposed solutions. The international 
community also expressed misgivings. But despite the criticism, Sturzenegger and his 
team did not give in. With stubborn insistence, the governor of the central bank repeated, 
almost like a mantra, that even admitting that there could be many factors fueling 
inflation, the fact remained that, in order for any inflation process to continue, the central 
bank needed to validate this dynamic by increasing the amount of money in the economy 
accordingly. Therefore, as long as this did not occur and the central bank maintained its 
contractionary monetary policy, the inflation process would eventually stop, regardless 
of the role played by other factors. 
 
"We can talk a lot about inflation, about whether inflation is a 
monetary or a non-monetary phenomenon. When one wonders where 
does inflation come from, for example, distributive struggles [are 
                                                          
133 Sturzenegger, Federico “Informe al Congreso…”, Speech held at the Argentine National Congress, May 
18, 2016, intervention of the senator María Graciela De la Rosa (FPV), recording time 01:54:07-01:55:39. 
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always mentioned]. And [whenever I face these questions] I always 
give the same answer, that is, that distributive struggles are universal; 
we find them in absolutely every society in the world. [Indeed], I don’t 
see that the owners of the supermarkets in Brazil or in France act 
differently nor have different interests [to the owners of the 
supermarkets in Argentina]. I don’t see that [in other countries the 
companies] don’t fight for their own interests, in fact these are even 
the same companies. [...] [So that cannot be the ultimate explanation]. 
[What I mean by this is that] there cannot be sustained processes of 
inflation if the amount of money does not validate such processes”.134 
 
Thus, even though inflation was still higher than they expected, the monetary authorities 
were optimistic and confident that by keeping interest rates sufficiently high, inflation 
would eventually fall. And even though they admitted that there were many challenges 
ahead and that there could be several ups and downs during the process of disinflation, 
they kept stressing that the underlying dynamics showed that inflation in the country was 
already going down and that the population simply needed to be patient. “Just as we know 
that inflation can be effectively reduced with an adequate monetary policy, we also know 
that disinflation processes are complex, mainly because we have to coordinate the 
expectations of economic agents among themselves and [to bring these into line with] the 
path of disinflation planned by the authorities”.135 But to the extent that the actual 
inflation figures were still higher than the central bank’s targets, mistrust became 
widespread and the people had more and more questions.  
 
The discussions between the monetary authorities and the journalists that took place 
during the three press conferences held between April and August 2016 in the central 
bank’s conference room are a clear example of the general state of affairs. Restlessness 
and nervousness flooded the room. One after the other, journalists from different media 
asked Sturzenegger with concern why the forecasts were wrong. Such was, for example, 
the case of journalist Ricardo Blotini from Canal 9, who in May 2016 said to 
Sturzenegger: “I would like you to explain [the current situation to the people], because 
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[...] I hear you state that inflation is going down; but what I see all day long on the streets, 
is - at least in my view and in the views of the people around me -, that this is not the case, 
[and that in fact] inflation [is not going down]. [...] [On the contrary], the real inflation 
rate, the inflation rate that people suffer every day, has been 20% in the four months since 
Mauricio Macri took office”.136 And only a month later, in June 2016, journalist Javier 
Blanco from the newspaper La Nación expressed similar concerns: “The widespread 
feeling, not only among the analysts but among the citizens as well, is that, so far, the 
central bank has been more successful in anchoring inflation expectations than in 
actually lowering inflation. And in the streets, tiredness is evident. So I want to know what 
is your level of commitment [regarding what you have promised, given the 
circumstances]? And what is your [level of] commitment for the future”.137 And while 
they could not deny the reality, the monetary authorities remained firm in their conviction 
that the general trends showed that inflation in Argentina was going down. Moreover, 
they claimed that, even if inflation in the City of Buenos Aires was stubbornly persistent, 
other parts of the country were already showing a decline in the inflation rate.     
 
“Well, obviously, our commitment is always greater. But I think that 
it was very important that during this presentation we could finally 
show you, [as we did], the numbers in both places, the City of Buenos 
Aires itself and also its metropolitan area, as well as the numbers in 
the Argentine inland; because really the numbers during the month of 
June are significantly different [in the different districts]. In fact, we 
are talking about an inflation rate of 2% in Mendoza and of 2.6% in 
Cordoba, which are still very high numbers for us, given our targets, 
but that really speak of a very significant reduction of inflation. I think 
that what surprised [the population this month] was that the inflation 
rate in the metropolitan area of the City of Buenos Aires was not below 
3%, [and those were bad news]. But I repeat that, when you 
distinguish the second-round effects caused by changes in those prices 
regulated by the government, [from the core inflation trends] […] you 
can better understand why [the inflation rate was so high in the City 
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of Buenos Aires]. And this situation makes us very optimistic that 
inflation in the country has been, and still is, falling sharply. [...] But 
well, the reality is the reality and our commitment is to reach the 
targets we have set ourselves”. 138  
 
Thus, in the view of the monetary authorities, it was only a matter of time before these 
downward trends began to manifest themselves in statistical data across the country. Still, 
in a context where it was already obvious that the target of having an annual inflation rate 
of 25% would not be met, the monetary authorities were forced to adjust their targets. 
Thus, little by little, they abandoned their first goal - bringing the annual inflation rate as 
close to 25% as possible -, and focused instead on a new target: achieving a monthly 
inflation rate of 1.5% or less during the last quarter of 2016. And, as if by magic or whim 
of fate, the change of target coincided with a much better period. In fact, as Table 1 
illustrates, while during the first semester of 2016 the inflation targets deviated 
considerably from the guideline band, monthly inflation rates in the second semester were 




Source: own elaboration based on data from the Central Bank of Argentina  
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For example, in November and December 2016, the monthly inflation rates reached 1.8% 
and 1.4%, respectively. And by January 2017 this figure dropped to 1.3%. Moreover, 
even if during some months in the second half of 2016 (i.e. August and October), the 
inflation rate deviated significantly from the target, the average monthly inflation rate 
during that period was indeed 1.5% per month. Thus, put differently, despite the volatility 
shown by the monthly inflation indexes during the second half of 2016, on average, the 
inflation target set by the central bank for that period was met. And this was noted by 
Sturzenegger during the press conference on January 17, 2017:  
 
“Regarding the targets set by the Central Bank [...] we talked about 
hitting a monthly inflation target of 1.5% per month, or less, in the last 
quarter of the year. And [...] [you can see in the slide that] the average 
monthly inflation rate in the last six months of the year was indeed 
1.4%, [...] That is, [we reached our target] not only in the last quarter 
of the year, but actually in the last semester of the year. Moreover, 
those figures are equivalent to an annual inflation rate of 18.5%. In 
other words, [what I mean is that] during the last six months, the 
Argentine economy has been running […] at an annual inflation rate 
below 20%. So today we can confirm that in the second half of 2016 
inflation in Argentina has been running at 18.5%, which is the 
annualized average of the second semester. So [...] you [can verify 
that] the Central Bank met its inflation target. [I highlight this 
because] I remember that at the time when we set this inflation target, 
the general response was skepticism, but the truth is that, luckily, we 
have met the target”. 139 
 
Confident of their success, the monetary authorities emphasized their triumph. Even when 
it had not been possible to meet the annual target of bringing inflation close to 25%, the 
work done throughout the year had finally led to positive results. Despite the fact that 
monetary policy worked with time lags, sooner than later high interest rates had paid off 
and inflation was falling. And even though there were still quite a few economists who 
had serious doubts regarding Argentina’s monetary program and its efficacy for 
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mitigating inflation in the long-run, there were many others who began to trust. Many 
journalists were optimistic. And with good reason. After nearly a decade of double-digit 
inflation, the central bank finally seemed to be hitting the nail on the head. Yet, even if 
the overall climate during the presentations of the monetary policy report was more 
relaxed between late 2016 and early 2017, fears had not cleared up completely, and the 
monetary authorities still had to face some questioning. Thus, for example, during the 
press conference of January 17, 2017, journalist Liliana Franco, from the newspaper 
Ámbito financiero, pointed out the following:     
 
“You have convinced me that you have a spectacular prognostic 
ability. So I am going to ask you, why is it then that, not only some 
private consultants but also the International Monetary Fund have 
doubts regarding your forecasts of two of the most important 
variables. One is growth […] and the other is the [forecasted] 
inflation-rate. And [perhaps] a third point is that there are some 
papers from the [International Monetary] Fund that also speak of 
doubts regarding the value of the exchange-rate in Argentina, 
especially because of the uncertainty generated by the United States 
and the possible appreciation of [the dollar in the upcoming months]. 
So, now that your prognosis ability is so good and [now that the 
inflation targets] have been met, I would like to know what [do you 
think of these issues]”.140 
 
Sturzenegger, for his part, showed confidence in the results of the economic program and 
pointed out that he did not understand very well the reasons behind this lack of confidence 
that some still showed.  
 
“I told you that for us [this lack of trust] is a bit paradoxical. Actually, 
some time ago we said [that we were going to reach] a monthly 
inflation rate of 1.5% in the last quarter of the year. And [we know 
that] central banks have the tools for keeping inflation in check, here 
and anywhere else in the world. Of course, disinflation processes 
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require that we [central bankers] build credibility, so that is [a] very 
important [factor to consider/that has to be considered]. Indeed, when 
we started this process in the first semester [of 2016], the credibility 
conditions were perhaps not the ones that were given afterwards, nor 
the ones that are going to happen in 2017 and later, right? And 
gradual processes of credibility construction are not something 
unique to Argentina. [...] So the only thing that we care about in the 
end is to say something and try to fulfil it. So this year we were very 
categorical, we promised something and we accomplished it. And so, 
people acknowledge and [draw their own conclusions], and they 
either believe or do not believe and depending on that they start 
drawing their perspectives for the next year, right? So, we promised 
that [we would reach an inflation rate of] 1.5% [during the last 
quarter of 2016]. We also promised [that the transfers to the treasury 
would reach a maximum amount of] 160,000 [millions of pesos]. And 
in both cases we fulfilled [our promises]. […] And we are going to 
[continue] working day and night throughout the year to continue 
building this credibility; and we think that, eventually, [the 
expectations of the market analysts] will converge [with our own]. The 
truth is that sometimes I want to shake someone up, but I can’t do 
it”.141   
 
Thus, after months of constant work, the Argentine central bank was finally 
accomplishing its goals and, thus, regaining its long-lost credibility. And as the central 
bank start regaining its credibility, market analysts’ inflation forecasts also began to 
gradually converge with the official targets. In fact, even if in January 2017 the inflation 
forecasts of private market analysts were still higher than the official inflation targets, the 
figures were getting closer. Moreover, temporary price movements were no longer 
affecting medium-term inflation forecasts. A clear proof of this situation was that, as 
Table 2 shows, between July 2016 and March 2017, markets analysts’ inflation forecasts 
not only remained stable, but even showed much less volatility than the actual inflation 
rate itself. This, in turn, was a clear indication that ‘the market’ increasingly started to 
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trust in the ability of central bank to stabilize inflation along a pre-designed path. All in 
all, inflation targets seemed to be finally acting as a guide that was bringing the private 
sector’s inflation expectations into line with the disinflation trajectory established by the 
monetary authorities. Sturzenegger, on his part, sought to make society understand how 
beneficial this situation was. Indeed, by ‘anchoring’ inflation expectations, the central 
bank’s monetary policy was fostering a climate of greater predictability, thus making a 
significant contribution to the process of economic development. “It is evident that today 
inflation expectations are anchored. [...] And this is how it is supposed to be in an 
inflation targeting scheme. That is to say, the Central Bank states ‘this is my target’, the 
economic agents believe it or don’t believe it, [in other words] they are convinced or they 
are not convinced, and they generate their inflation expectations accordingly. [...] And it 
seems to me that this is already happening [in Argentina] [...] and that ‘the market’ is 





Source: own elaboration based on data from the Central Bank of Argentina  
and from the Centro de Investigación en Finanzas (Universidad Torcuato di Tella).   
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Finally, they were succeeding and Argentina’s uncontrollable inflation was giving way. 
Indeed, this optimism lasted for several months during which the new monetary 
authorities breathed a sigh of relief. What is more, as the inflation rate dropped, the central 
bank also relaxed interest rates. As a matter of fact, between April and December 2016, 
the nominal value of the benchmark interest rate dropped from 38% to 24.7% (see Table 
3). And as inflation fell, the government continued, at a steady pace, nurturing the image 
of an encouraging future, a future in which Argentina managed to finally stabilize its 
currency. And actually, this future, which was in tune with what the authorities had 
planned, was already happening. 
 
“Looking into the future, I imagine a vibrant and active financial sector in 
Argentina, a deeper financial sector with much more impact than the current 
one. [...] A financial sector [that] will not only allow us and help us to save, 
but that will also provide us with financial instruments that will allow us to 
reduce our labor and financial risks. [In this future] the access to financing 
will be directly related to our tastes and to our lifestyle. The relationship with 
the financial sector will be richer, more complex and interactive. In this 
future, perhaps not so distant [...] savings will be much more abundant than 
they are today. [...] This will be a world where the access to finance will be 
easy... [...] Who can deny that we envision a promising future? [...] That is 
where we are going. But where are we today? Well, I would say that still a 
little far, but at least we are on the right track”.143 
 
“I can assure you of several things on which we have set explicit objectives: 
[I can assure you] that Argentina will finally achieve low and stable inflation, 
that low inflation will bring greater economic growth, that low inflation will 
allow us to rebuild our credit market, and to create a society with more equal 
opportunities and lower levels of poverty. We will have a predictable 
macroeconomic scheme, with lower costs for capital, and where the 
exchange-rate will not be artificially diverted from its logical level, and will 
act as a buffer for economic activity. [Where the exchange-rate will be] a 
shock absorber, that Argentina never knew how to create. [And all of this will 
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be achieved] in a context of dialogue, of search for joint solutions, of respect 
for the institutions that make a true Republic. Our message is based on 
coherence, austerity and work. We believe these are the ingredients for 
having a national industry which is finally able to grow and develop without 
restraints, looking at the world while serving a robust and growing domestic 
market”.144 
 
And even though not everyone agreed with this optimistic assessment and there were still 
those who pointed out that there were still many reasons to be worried, given that, in fact, 
the annual inflation rate in 2016 had exceeded 30%, the truth is that by early 2017 the 
credibility of the Argentine Central Bank was on the rise.  
 
But, for the misfortune of the new authorities, and of society as a whole, Argentine 
inflation was not so easy to tame. Thus, contrary to all the auspicious forecasts, inflation 
soared in February 2017. Perplexed, analysts tried to find explanations for this new 
inflationary upsurge. While some blame wage-setting dynamics (which are typical of the 
first semester in Argentina), others blamed the monetary authorities for having 
excessively relaxed the monetary policy. Others, on the other hand, blamed sharp price 
increases related to the government’s subsidy reduction policy. And, of course, there were 
those who pointed out that, actually, the monetary authorities had never really understood 
the causes behind inflation and that the decline of the previous months had been mere 
luck. But there can be no doubt that, for whatever reasons, between February and April 
2017, monthly inflation rates were notably higher than the range stipulated by the central 
bank. 
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Source: own elaboration based on data from the Central Bank of Argentina, the Instituto Nacional de 
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And hand in hand with these new inflation figures, long rooted fears within society were 
also unleashed. In contrast to the positive image of the future that the monetary authorities 
had been nurturing, an image of a desirable, and reachable, monetary future in which the 
country finally managed to overcome its historical imbalances and recover its long-
awaited monetary stability; the image of a fearsome, unstable and fragile future began to 
gain strength. A dreadful future, one in which Argentines seemed to be doomed to forever 
inhabit an unstable country, condemned to repeat the same mistakes over and over and to 
experience their own traumas over and over. Everything seemed like a perpetual circle. 
Such fears were evident, for example, in the comments of the journalist Marcelo Gatti 
from Agencia de Noticias DIN, during the press conference of July 18th, 2017. “What we 
all know, appealing to the numbers that are available, is that during the first-half of the 
year the inflation rate was 11.8%. According to a calculation made by [the consulting 
firm] Elipsis, the monthly average [inflation rate] in the second half of the year has to be 
0.76%. for [the annual goal] of 17% to be met. And [the truth is that] already in July, in 
the best of cases, the inflation rate will be equal to that of June, or even 5 tenths more 
than 0.76%. And [as a corollary] you just said [Federico] that the central bank expects 
that the inflation rate in the last quarter of the year will be a little less than 1%. So, in 
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other words, one turns the numbers round any way and still does not meet the annual 
target of 17%. What do we have to think/believe, what [secret instruments] does the 
central bank have so that we don’t think that the annual target of 17% is no more than 
an expression of desire?”.145 And although the president of the central bank tried, once 
again, to bring peace to the population and to calm things down, to the extent that panic 
and discontent grew, the inflation expectations of Argentines became ungovernable.  
 
Indeed, in the months that followed the inflationary upsurge of early 2017, criticism was 
widespread, and no matter how optimistic the monetary authorities might want to look, 
they faced increasing difficulties in convincing the population. From practically every 
corner, journalists, specialists and politicians alike pointed out, again and again, with 
great concern, the monetary blindness of the new authorities. In most peoples’ opinion, 
the new authorities had completely underestimated the domestic importance of certain 
key factors for the reproduction of inflation. These included, for example, the inflationary 
effects caused by distributive struggles, exchange-rate variations, and price increases 
related to the government’s subsidy reduction policy. In fact, for many economists, 
Argentina’s untamable inflation had little to do with the supposedly excessive monetary 
issuing of the past and much to do, instead, with the substantial price increases of many 
public services. In this sense, according to many economists, one of the major culprits of 
the rising inflation was the sustained rise in the costs of public services, a rise that had 
been fostered by Mauricio Macri’s own economic cabinet. Considering the 
circumstances, these economists argued that the most sensible thing for the government 
to do was to wait until prices had found their new equilibrium before trying to put in place 
any kind of inflation-control policy. In such a view, even if it was painful, Argentines had 
to accept that, while prices were still readjusting, they would need to accept the situation 
as it was and to put up with an inflation rate which was higher than what was desired by 
society and the authorities themselves.  
 
“Argentina’s monetary policy was wrong from the very beginning, 
[partly because] it suffered from major diagnostic problems. Let’s 
focus on the monetary policy. I mean, we know that the fiscal policy 
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proposed a gradual cut of [public] spending. [...] Now, the monetary 
policy thought that its [main] objective was to bring inflation down, 
[and thought it could] achieve this goal thanks to its institutional 
power, thanks to the signals that [the central bank] was sending out, 
signals that, for example, the central bank was committed to [a 
specific inflation target] [...]. And [it also thought] that it would [be 
enough to] use the interest rate [as an instrument]. But this was a 
mistake. Because [any economist knows that to stabilize the economy] 
first you need to have relative prices more or less in order. Relative 
prices, essentially the exchange-rate and the prices of public services 
[need to be in equilibrium], before you start with any inflation-control 
policy. In other words, if the exchange-rate and if the prices of most 
public services are lagging behind, it is useless to try to put in place 
an inflation-control policy, because the moment these prices jump, the 
inflation rate is going to jump as well [...]. So again, this transition 
[towards price equilibrium] can be very costly, very painful, but [it 
has to be done]. So this is the number one step. And [only once] [...] 
you have those relative prices in equilibrium, only once you have those 
relative prices in order, you can [...] [focus in developing a] successful 
inflation-control [policy]. [But to lower inflation], unfortunately you 
have to first go through a phase in which you establish the initial 
conditions, [a phase] which essentially involves putting relative prices 
where you more or less feel comfortable to start the inflation-control 
policy. [...] Because to try to lower inflation [with relative prices that 
are not in equilibrium] [...] is a little bread for today and a lot of 
hunger for tomorrow”. 146 
 
And there were not just the local economists who were critical. At that point, even the 
International Monetary Fund itself failed to believe that inflation targeting was the 
solution to Argentina’s old inflation problems. As journalist Roberto Pico from Agencia 
de noticias DIN said during the press conference of April 18, 2017, at this point, the 
government’s economic plan seemed to have no defenders outside Mauricio Macri’s inner 
circle.  
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“Today even the IMF rectified Argentina’s inflation forecasts and put 
it at [a higher figure than the one projected locally]. [...] Those 
economists who used to be closer to the view of the government have 
all been very harsh and very critical. In the last few weeks not only the 
coherence of the economic plan has been severely criticized, but also 
the goals of the central bank. Indeed, there are many who say that the 
economic plan is not going anywhere... [In short], many very hard 
things have been said [about the economic program]. It’s practically 
only you [at the central bank] and the government defending your 
policy. My question, then, is how do you politically stand in a context 
where you don’t have a single defender outside the government?”. 147 
 
But, once again, the monetary authorities did not give in. On the contrary, with stubborn 
firmness, they insisted that their monetary policy was the right one and pointed out once 
more that, ultimately, what mattered was the general liquidity of the economy, which, in 
turn, determined how far prices could collectively rise. Therefore, even in these 
conditions of high uncertainty, where indeed many relative prices were still changing, as 
long as the central bank maintained a contractionary monetary policy and a positive real 
interest rate, the money market would eventually reach its equilibrium and inflation in the 
economy would fall to the desired levels.  
 
“The fact that some specific prices are still changing (those of fuel, public services, etc.), 
should not worry you because, in the end, what matters is the final price [...] of all goods. 
In other words, when a price rises, in a way it takes away purchasing power from the 
other goods. [...] Part of my task today is to coordinate expectations, [and so] I try to talk 
to price setters and to tell them ‘look, you should know that this is the monetary policy, 
and that this is the [inflation] target, so that means that [...] today the amount of money 
[in the economy] is only 22% higher than it was a year ago. So close your eyes [and 
imagine] that if you set your prices higher than 22% [more of what you had them] last 
year, and if everyone [would do the same and] set prices more than 22% [higher than] 
they [had them] last year, [then] we have a problem, because the pesos [we have in the 
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economy] are not enough [to pay for those goods]. So, when a specific sector raises its 
prices, it actually takes away purchasing power from the rest. So, perhaps in the very 
short term, as we had seen in May or April, [this equilibrating mechanism] does not work 
properly, but [in the long-run this mechanism works, and that is the reason why], 
ultimately, the general level of prices does not depend so much on a specific price, but on 
the general liquidity of the economy”.148       
 
The authorities’ optimism and certainty in their ability to bring inflation within the pre-
established range seemed unwavering. Where critics found signs of weakness, and 
highlighted the resilience of price increases; the members of the monetary policy 
committee insisted tirelessly on the efficacy of the new policy. Even if reality showed 
daily that by mid-2017 there were still many prices rising above the range set by the 
monetary authority, Sturzenegger’s team emphasized over and over that the upsurge of 
inflation of April had simply been an expected and isolated event due to occasional cost 
increases. Still, journalists insisted with their untiring questions and asked the monetary 
authorities how plausible it actually was to reach the goal of having an annual inflation 
rate of between 12% and 17%. Sturzenegger, for his part, replied firmly and without 
losing cool: “I will answer you simply by asking you and the people that are watching us, 
to please remember what happened last year. Last year [...] the inflation rate was three 
times higher in the first semester than in the second semester. And [I repeat, that for this 
year] we knew that February, March and April were going to be delicate [months] 
because there were a whole set of price readjustments [...] that were concentrated in these 
months. So you don’t have to extrapolate what’s going on in these months [to the rest of 
the year]. [...] All the countries [that have put in place inflation targeting] had succeeded 
in [lowering inflation]. So why wouldn’t Argentina? It’s just a matter of being coherent, 
being consistent, doing what needs to be done, and I think we’re on that path”. 149   
 
But at this point, economic analysts’ widespread belief was that the new monetary policy 
would not help to tame inflation. Thus, while the central bank authorities insisted on 
maintaining high nominal interest rates, thus assuring having a slightly positive real 
interest rate throughout the whole disinflation period, discontent was spreading more and 
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more. Even within the private sector, the general perception was that not only was the 
policy of high interest rates not helping to lower inflation, but worse still, it was causing 
a severe recession that only deepened the stagflation of the economy. And so, noted 
journalist Marcelo Pelae from Canal 13 and Todo Noticias during the press conference 
of April 18, 2017, when he asked Sturzenegger if he “could explain how can the 
Argentine productive system grow when today the central bank offers investors financial 
yields that are above the projected inflation rate? For example, as of today, between the 
forecasted inflation rate for this year and the policy rate there is a difference of 8%”.150 
 
And so, in addition to the disagreements about which were the main drivers of the 
Argentine inflation, a second disagreement emerged about which were the most effective 
tools to tame inflation. In fact, even if the monetary authorities insisted on following to 
the letter the most orthodox version possible of the international monetary recipe book, 
which indicates that the fundamental monetary policy tool within inflation targeting is the 
benchmark interest rate; for many local economists such a policy was not adequate for a 
country like Argentina. Indeed, since the Argentine economy had a very small financial 
market (about 15% of credits per of GDP), it was natural to assume that, in such a small 
credit market, the impact of rising interest rates was, to say the least, very limited. 
Therefore, there were many specialists who thought that a policy based on raising the 
interest-rate would not help to tame inflation, nor would it increase the overall level of 
deposits in the domestic financial system.     
 
“To use the interest rate [as a monetary policy tool], especially in countries with a very 
low level of financialization and with such a small financial system [does not make sense]. 
The interest-rate is useless when it comes to stimulating credit [in an economy like 
Argentina’s]. It is literally useless. And to think that because you have a low interest rate, 
you’re going to raise the level of credit, is to be an idiot. In this country [to think that 
way] is to be an idiot. What you have to do [if you want to increase the level of credit] is 
to give multiple lines of credit. But these are both very different types of policies, or 
policies that] act in very different ways. One seeks [to manipulate] a price, that is because 
the interest-rate is a price of the economy; while the other [policy seeks to manipulate] 
                                                          
150 Sturzenegger, Federico “Presentación del Informe de Política Monetaria”, Speech held at the Central 
Bank of Argentina, April 18, 2017, intervention of the journalist Marcelo Pelae (Canal 13 y Todo Noticias), 
recording time: 00:59:58-01:00:33.  
 
226 
quantities, so you grant loans, and more loans, and more loans. [...] Today [the situation 
in Argentina] is unsustainable because there is no other instrument [of monetary policy]. 
[...] That’s why I’m against using only one thing, [against using a single monetary policy 
tool]. And what I’m saying is precisely that you have to have more instruments and use 
them well. Is the interest rate a possible useful instrument? Yes, indeed. But [the problem 
is that] today this is the only instrument [of the central bank’s monetary policy toolkit], 
and with that one single instrument you want to do eight hundred fifty thousand things. 
You want to stimulate the real economy, you want to slow down the real economy, you 
want to calm down the dollar, you want to calm down inflation, that is, you have to do 
eighty thousand things, and three quarters of them are incompatible. So what I’m telling 
you is ‘use more things, use more instruments’. [...] For example, you can have different 
interest rates. [...] You can use different rates, different lines of credit. [...] [But no matter 
what you do] please use more things, not just one. That’s my view... You don’t have to be 
satisfied with just one tool, you don’t have to have such a narrow vision”. 151 
 
Indeed, the debate about the negative impact of the new monetary policy and the costs of 
keeping nominal interest rates so high was so virulent that in April 2017 the central bank 
decided to add a special section to its monetary policy report in which it made express 
mention of the benefits of lowering inflation. Moreover, during the presentation of that 
report, Sturzenegger did not hide his surprise regarding the wide social debate about the 
need to tame inflation. In his view, the argentine society did not seem to be convinced 
that it was necessary to lower inflation, and this was a fact that he found extremely 
puzzling. “In today’s presentation [...] we are going to stress again the benefits of 
lowering inflation. Obviously, this is a debate that is taking place in Argentina. [And to 
be honest, I confess that we] didn’t really think that we were going to have to come back 
to this debate again. Actually, we thought that in Argentina the benefits of lowering 
inflation were going to be very well understood and not questioned. But the truth is that 
we feel that in many places people highlight the costs of lowering inflation, and so these 
costs are often discussed more than the benefits of lowering inflation. So we think that it 
is important to come back to this topic again in more depth”.152     
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But no matter how many attempts the monetary authorities made to try to regain society’s 
trust and to convince economic analysts that inflation was under control, questions did 
not stop. To make matters worse, during the second half of 2017, and even when monthly 
inflation rates again dropped slightly, the monthly average inflation rate remained 
stubbornly higher than the inflation target. By October, accumulated inflation for the year 
reached 17.9%, making clear that, once again, the central bank would not meet its annual 
target. Once again, the journalists did not stay silent anything and became the privileged 
spokespersons of the fears of the Argentines before the monetary authorities. “I also want 
to insist on the idea of [...] expectations and trust. Last year’s inflation rate ended at 
around 36% and even though that number is extraordinarily high, this year’s inflation 
rate is not going to be the half of that figure. Actually, you [Federico] just mentioned that. 
So, why then should ‘the market’ trust and [why then] should we all trust, that next year’s 
inflation rate is going to be the half of this year’s inflation rate […]. Put differently, if the 
inflation rate this year is not going to be even the half of 36%, how are you going to do 
that next year’s inflation is even less than the half of 23%?153 And to the extent that during 
2017 the central bank could not show a substantial improvement on its control of inflation, 
its policy was lost all credibility.  
 
Fell into discredit, the monetary authorities persevered, however, in their strategy of 
maintaining high interest rates. Stubbornly, they insisted that, even if the disinflation 
process was occurring at a slower pace than everyone wanted, the most important thing 
was that inflation was falling and that private sector’s inflation forecasts showed that 
inflation would keep its downward trajectory. Moreover, they claimed their only mistake 
had been to be too optimistic, too ambitious.  
 
“[It is important not to lose sight of the fact that] there is a very [...] persistent 
consensus [in ‘the market’] [...] that the disinflation process is going to deepen 
in the upcoming months and the upcoming years. Of course, we still have a 
credibility gap, of course there is still that gap because our goal for next year, 
from the beginning to the end, is [to achieve an inflation rate of] 10% and the 
market is expecting an inflation rate of 15.8%; and our goal for 2019 is [to 
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achieve an inflation rate of] 5% and the market is expecting 11%. So that also 
means that we have to work harder and better to achieve that convergence of 
expectations in the upcoming months and definitely in the coming years. But 
what is important is that the disinflation process is clearly internalized in the 
expectations of ‘the market’.154 
 
But, at this point in time, virtually no one supported them. And there were good reasons 
for this lack of support. Indeed, seen from today’s perspective, the truth is that the results 
achieved during these two and a half years of inflation targeting left much to be desired. 
Not only monthly inflation rates deviated significantly from the targets, but the annual 
inflation targets were never actually met. During 2016, for example, the annual inflation 
rate comfortably exceeded 30%. Depending on the index we use to measure inflation, 
between January and December 2016 inflation was between 31.4% and 35%, that is, at 
least 6 points higher than the annual target of 25%. Additionally, during 2017, according 
to the figures published by INDEC, the accumulated inflation rate reached 25%, that is 8 
points higher than the annual target of 17% and 13 points higher than the annual target of 
12%. Last but not least, in 2018, following the devastating currency crisis of April-May, 
2018, the inflation rate reached a dramatic 49.3%.  
 
Finally, in a last attempt to regain their lost credibility, the monetary authorities did what 
they had sworn never to do: change their inflation target. Thus, on December 28, 2017, 
the chief of cabinet Marcos Peña, the minister of the treasury Nicolás Dujovne and the 
minister of finances Luis Caputo sat down together with Federico Sturzenegger and held 
a joint press conference in which they announced a ‘recalibration’ of the inflation targets 
for 2018 and 2019. In the new scheme, the goal of achieving an annual inflation target of 
between 8% and 12% (i.e. an annual average of 10%) was replaced by a new goal: to 
reach an inflation of 15% in 2018. In theory, the change was aimed at bringing the 
inflation targets closer to the real inflation rates, so that monetary policy would be more 
credible. Put differently, according to Sturzenegger’s own statements, given that the 
authorities were aware of the flaws in their inflation forecasts, and given that inflation 
was stubbornly higher than the old targets, the central bank wanted to bring the inflation 
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targets closer to the real inflation rates, thus making them more credible. But, to the 
authorities’ surprise, the attempt to make monetary policy more credible was not well 
received. Indeed, the reality was that what ‘the market’ felt was that the central bank had 
lost its independence. As a result, right after the change of targets, inflation expectations 
deteriorated more than they had done in the previous 15 months as a whole. What 
happened? The credibility of the central bank had collapsed. The situation only became 
worse in the months that followed. Indeed, during the first months of 2018, interest rate 
movements done by the Federal Reserve found a weak Argentina, an Argentina with a 
weakened central bank and with an extremely fragile currency. The result of this 
combination was a severe currency crisis, which ended up burying the inflation targeting 
regime. On June 14, 2018, weeks after the crisis, Sturzenegger submitted his resignation 
as president of the Central Bank of Argentina giving way to a new chapter in the history 




In December 2015, Mauricio Macri became president of Argentina and appointed 
Federico Sturzenegger as president of the central bank. “When the president called me 
for this task, he told me: ‘we must regain people’s vote of confidence’; and he stated that 
my primary task would be ‘to give back the Argentines their currency’”, the new governor 
confessed during his first speech at the central bank. The new governor had a great 
challenge ahead of him. In a country that, since the foundation of its central bank in 1935, 
had suffered all kinds of monetary disorders without ever succeeding to stabilize its 
currency for long-sustained periods, he wanted to ‘give back’ the Argentines their 
national currency. The task seemed titanic. However, during his two and a half years in 
office, Sturzenegger did not seem intimidated. Indeed, on December 14, 2015, just four 
days after taking office, standing in front of an audience full of journalists, financial 
experts and employees of the central bank, he presented the main guidelines and 
objectives the central bank would have during his management. He began by pointing out 
what he would highlight many times in all his conferences, that the main goal of the 
central bank’s new administration was to convert the Argentine peso into a reliable 
currency, into a currency capable of properly fulfilling its primary functions, among them 
the longed-for function as a reserve of value. His administration, his central bank, wanted 
to give Argentines something that their history had denied them until today: a currency 
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in which they could save. However, together with his promises, the new governor also 
warned that the value of the peso should be measured with a new yardstick. Unlike in the 
past, Argentines would have to stop measuring the value of their national currency in 
terms of comparing its price with that of the US dollar. In other words, it was necessary 
for Argentines to learn to use a different reference point with which to assess the value of 
their domestic economy, namely, the inflation targets established by the central bank.  
 
But if the monetary authorities wanted to make the expectations of Argentines stop 
focusing on the dollar and its price on the market, they needed to be able to establish 
another mechanism that could guide the expectations of economic agents. To this end, the 
new authorities of the Central Bank of Argentina embraced inflation targeting. Just like 
in other countries, the new policy required that the central bank announced specific 
inflation targets and commit to them. These targets, in turn, would provide a focal point 
which would help the central bank to coordinate economic agents’ expectations and to 
bring them into line with the parameters already prestablished by the monetary 
authorities. Thus, the moment had come for the Central Bank of Argentina to create a 
different monetary policy, a policy which would not rely on the ‘shortcut’ of using the 
exchange-rate between the Argentinean peso and the US dollar as a monetary-anchor to 
coordinate expectations during a phase of transition towards lower inflation levels. From 
now onwards Argentineans would have to stop using the dollar as a reference point and 
learn to focus their attention on the inflation targets established by the central bank. In the 
meantime, the price of the dollar should be left for the market to regulate.  
 
For more than two years, the central bank tried to create trust in the currency on these 
completely new grounds. However, as we have seen, this trust proved unruly. To the 
extent that the government never managed to fully convince Argentines of the efficacy of 
its anti-inflation policy, it also failed to establish a new coordination tool that could 
effectively replace the U.S. currency from that role. In fact, one of the most dramatic 
consequences of the lack of credibility on the new monetary policy was that Argentines 
went back to their old habits. Put differently, given the inability of the central bank to 
formulate credible inflation targets that could effectively become in an anchor for 
inflation expectations; the unhealthy obsession of Argentines with the dollar, cultivated 
for decades, remained intact. Thus, if on the one hand, the successful implementation of 
the new monetary policy was limited by the inability of the central bank to formulate 
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credible inflation targets, on the other, there were the Argentines’ old monetary routines 
of using the dollar as a reference point with which to assess the performance of their 
national currency, which ended up destroying all efforts to establish a different monetary 
policy framework.  
 
Despite the efforts of the new monetary authorities to stress that, within the new monetary 
policy framework, the price of the dollar was no longer a policy goal, the questions about 
the present and future value of the US currency never ceased. Indeed, at every 
presentation of Sturzenegger, at every press conference, journalists, academics and 
financial experts alike kept relentlessly asking what was the expected value of the dollar 
for the coming months; or whether it was true that, as some economists claimed, the 
exchange-rate was lagging behind, thus increasing the chances of a currency crisis; or 
whether the central bank’s reserves were sufficient to face one such crisis, and so on. And 
even though the monetary authorities replied over and over, with untiring firmness, that 
there was no expected value for the dollar, that Argentina was in a floating exchange-rate 
regime and that, therefore, there was no need for having an extraordinarily high amount 





7. Conclusions  
 
How is the value of a currency socially constructed? Why do we trust in money? What is 
it about money that spooks people? In the following pages, I will review some of the most 
relevant events in Argentina’s monetary history and provide an overall interpretation. I 
will argue that the Argentine monetary history illuminates three processes.  
 
The first conclusion drawn from the analysis of the Argentine monetary history is that the 
loss of trust in a currency is a process that has a passive and active dimension. Argentina’s 
monetary history clearly shows that monetary debates are not enough to break trust in 
money. On the contrary, for trust in money to fall apart, monetary routines have to be 
distorted. The state also plays a crucial role in maintaining trust in money. The state’s 
leading role in fostering or undermining trust in money is dramatically evident in 
Argentina’s history. Argentines lost credibility on the state’s ability to keep the value of 
money. Thus, they also lost trust in the value of their currency. For seventy years, the 
Argentine state repeatedly proved its inability to stabilize the national currency. It 
implemented seventeen anti-inflation plans; only one of them succeeded. Revealingly, 
the plan that succeeded was the one where the state quitted the task of maintaining the 
value of money.  
 
The second conclusion drawn from this study is that monetary crises break trust through 
a learning process engraved in people’s habitus. Crises reveal money’s institutional 
reality; thus, they cause people to stop believing in the fiction that money is a valuable 
commodity capable of storing value. Crises reveal the true nature of capitalist credit 
money. They expose that capitalist credit money is a hierarchical institution whose value 
is conventional and contingent. They also show that the stability of money’s value 
depends on the state’s capacity to guarantee it. Because crises reveal the institutional 
reality of money, they severely endangered trust in money.  
 
Finally, the study of Argentina’s monetary history shows how monetary periphery 
problems have intensified since 1944. In this regard, the study puts monetary instability 
into perspective and shows that global economic dynamics foster such instability. After 
1944, the hierarchical nature of the international monetary system intensified. As the 
importance of the dollar grew globally, countries with weak currencies started to suffer 
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increasing pressures. In a world where currencies are organized hierarchically, the rise of 
dollarization (both worldwide and in Argentina) intensified local monetary problems. The 
increasing dollarization made more evident the problems or the Argentine currency and 
significantly constrained Argentina’s political capacity to stabilize its currency. It also 
diminished the political capacity of the monetary authorities to decide its monetary policy 
framework freely. In the contemporary world, monetary policy options for countries like 
Argentina are minimal. The failure of inflation targeting in Argentina is proof of the 
limitations the country faces for being at the bottom of the monetary ladder.  
 
The passive and the active dimensions of monetary trust 
 
In 1881, Argentina issued its first national currency: the Peso Moneda Nacional. The 
Argentine state had to guarantee money’s conversion into gold to impose the circulation 
and use of its currency on the national level. It was the era of the gold standard. At that 
time, the prevailing idea was that money was a commodity whose value was a 
consequence of it being made of (or backed by) gold. Argentina adhered to the gold 
standard until 1931. However, during that time, the lack of genuine gold inflows 
frequently resulted in currency devaluations and long periods of inconvertibility. In 1930, 
the Great Depression caused the breakdown of the gold standard. The system of fixed 
exchange rates between currencies that were all convertible to gold broke down. Most 
countries suspended gold convertibility. In 1931 Argentina imposed exchange controls. 
Internationally, there were discussions on how to reform the global monetary system. 
Since there was not enough gold to sustain a rapidly expanding world trade, countries 
started to allow governments to supplement their gold reserves with foreign currency. As 
money’s value was no longer tied to gold, the concept of money as a commodity with 
intrinsic value was questioned. 
 
The worldwide discussions about money’s value also reached Argentina. In 1931, money 
became a salient political issue. Since then, the media and the various networks of 
economic experts have been questioning monetary imaginaries constantly. In doing so, 
they have deepened the Argentine society’s concerns about the long-lasting value of their 
national currency. However, despite public contestation, until 1946, Argentines trusted in 
their national currency. By the beginning of the 1940s, the country had managed to 
establish its central bank, implement a monetary policy capable of fostering economic 
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growth, and ensure stability conditions to sustain money’s value. One of the most 
persuasive evidence of trust in the peso was a financial system in which long-term savings 
options in pesos prevailed. 
 
However, in 1946 the situation changed abruptly. By that time, two fundamental changes 
took place in Argentina: the rise in inflation and the disappearance of savings options 
from the national financial system. Large sectors of society started to experience the loss 
of purchasing power of their currency. The loss of money’s value became part of everyday 
life. Monetary routines were disrupted. Thus, instead of having successful experiences 
using money, people started to experience problems. One such problem was that they had 
to find ways to preserve their wealth. Because saving options in pesos disappeared, the 
pesos deposited in the financial system flowed to other areas of the real economy, 
especially durable goods (such as cars and appliances) and, to a lesser extent, real estate. 
By 1958 Argentines started to save in cash dollars, which has remained a very popular 
practice ever since.  
 
Thus, the analysis of the Argentine monetary history shows that trust in money started to 
fall apart in 1946, not before. Although monetary debates were already salient, they were 
not enough to break the trust in the peso. On the contrary, what triggered the dramatic 
loss of trust in the peso was the feeling of concrete material loss that appeared with the 
rise of inflation. Trust in money started to disappear when passive trust in money was 
broken when monetary routines and habits were distorted. Since 1975, the loss of trust 
became more dramatic. On the one hand, what caused increasing distrust in the peso was 
that inflation increased even further. In 1973, the inflation rate in the country reached 
30%. In 1975, it rose to 300%. In 1986 Argentina experienced hyperinflation for the first 
time. Without a doubt, extreme inflation made the everyday experience of money’s loss 
of value increasingly dramatic. 
 
However, a second factor contributed to deepening people’s distrust in the peso’s value: 
the inability of the state to stabilize the value of the currency. Since 1975, active public 
trust in the peso (credibility) started to fall apart. The everyday experience of money’s 
loss of value was complemented by the national political and economic drama of a state 
that could not control its economy or its currency. In fact, between 1952 and 1991, the 
Argentine state put in place seventeen stabilization programs. Except for the 
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convertibility plan, none of the plans succeeded in controlling inflation. Revealingly, the 
plan that succeeded was the one in which the state quitted the task of maintaining the 
value of money.  
 
Institutional, political, and economic instability also contributed to the national drama and 
increased distrust in money. Since 1975 Argentina’s economic policy experienced harsh 
turns. Several times, the country went from total openness to complete regulation. The 
fights between monetarist and structuralist economists were also responsible for the 
drastic changes in the anti-inflation policies. The political fracture in national society and 
the different political projects of the ruling elites also contributed to fostering chaos. After 
1975, institutional instability became dramatic. Since ‘Isabel’ Peron took office, in 1974, 
to the end of the convertibility regime in 2001, all the transitions from one government to 
the next were dramatic. In the last months of ‘Isabel’s’ government, Argentina had five 
ministers of finance. In the last two years of the military government, it had three 
presidents and four finance ministers. With Alfonsín, the country had four ministers of 
finance again. In December 2001, there were five presidents in ten days during the 
outburst of the convertibility crisis. Logically, institutional instability also fostered 
distrust in the state and its ability to stabilize the currency.   
 
A critical remark is that I have argued, trust in a country’s monetary and financial system 
is not only based on the absence of crises. Since the design of capitalist economies is 
inherently unstable (Minsky 1982) crises are often unavoidable. However, as scenarios 
such as the 2008 crisis shows, in times of crisis, policy responses to crises and the 
successful management of expectations are key factors. In the case of Argentina, the 
effects of policy decisions in undermining trust are evident. In fact, before the 1940s, 
economic authorities were careful enough to (and certainly had the policy space to) 
resolve currency crises preserving the value of the most popular long-term savings 
options. For example, during the 1890s crises, the authorities maintained the value of the 
Cédulas Hipotecarias issued by the Banco Hipotecario Nacional. Furthermore, in doing 
so, they protected Argentine savers from suffering dramatic losses. True, other banks 
went bankrupt. Nevertheless, the authorities not only managed to safeguard the value of 
the country’s most important savings option. They also gave a clear signal of their 
commitment to savers. This changed in later times. In fact, since the 1950s, on many 
occasions, Argentine monetary crises were solved by implementing measures that 
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resulted in enormous losses to savers. Either because the state was subject to too much 
external pressure, or because policymakers disregarded the potentially long-lasting 
effects of their decisions, the Argentine state systematically broke its promise of 
maintaining money’s value and preserving savings and (financial) wealth. Not 
infrequently, the policies that ended up decimating Argentines’ savings were an explicit 
goal of the economic authorities. For example, during the ‘Rodrigazo’, the monetary 
authorities clearly stated their intention to design a ‘shock therapy’ that would ‘educate’ 
the population. Moreover, from 1964 onwards, the Argentine state forcibly pesified and 
confiscated the population’s savings (in dollars and pesos) more than once. The first 
forced conversion of dollar savings into pesos occurred for the first time in 1964, during 
the government of Arturo Illia. Since then, the state compulsory pesified savings on at 
least three more occasions, namely during the crises of 1981, 1989 and 2001. In each of 
these moments, Argentines experienced that their savings (often saved throughout their 
lives) could vanish in an eye’s blink. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Argentines 
have stopped keeping their savings in the financial system.    
 
All in all, I have argued that trust in money’s value depends on the existence of both 
passive and active trust. Passive trust depends on monetary stability and successful money 
use. Active trust is a socio-political construct that is ultimately based on the lasting 
promise that money has, and will maintain its purchasing power over time. In this respect, 
the state, the monetary authorities, and the financial sector (i.e., the central bank, the 
ministry of finance, and private banks) play a crucial role. The Argentine case shows 
paradigmatically how the state’s lack of ability to keep the promise of money’s value 
results in long-standing distrust in the national currency.  
 
Crises and the nature of money 
 
At the beginning of this study, I pointed out that trust in money is grounded in erroneous 
monetary beliefs. I stated that, in contemporary capitalist economies, there is a 
widespread belief that money is a commodity whose value is derived from its material 
characteristics. The dominant view of money is that it is an object with intrinsic value; it 
is long-lasting wealth. In this view, money’s value is seen as a characteristic of money, 
which stems from money’s material constituency. However, this image of money is an 
inaccurate version of money’s true nature. It is a false image of money and of the reasons 
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why money is capable of storing value. This image of money’s value rests on three 
fictions. The first fiction is the belief that there is ‘something’ behind money, a substance 
that sustains its value. The second is the belief that the value of money is stable and 
enduring. The third fiction of money is that money is homogeneous, is all-purpose money. 
It is the belief that all money is legal tender, standard, and uniform. However, the truth is 
that instead of being a material source of lasting wealth, contemporary money is an 
immaterial system of financial claims whose value is a collective and contingent 
convention that can, therefore, change abruptly. It follows then that there is a fundamental 
mismatch between what we collectively believe money to be and its true nature. 
 
In this dissertation, I argued that this mismatch becomes evident in monetary crises. The 
realization that money is not what we believe it to be is the reason for losing trust in 
money’s value. I argued that crises show that money’s value is not a property derived 
from its material characteristics. They also show that money is a hierarchical institution. 
In the thesis, I tried to show how, contrary to the widespread idea that money was a 
commodity capable of storing value, since 1946, Argentines have been confronted with 
the institutional reality of money. Through the experience of inflation, Argentines realized 
that money could lose its purchasing power. Hyperinflation made this realization even 
more dramatic. The experience that money could be worth no more than paper started to 
unveil that money’s value was an arbitrary number. Money only had value as long as the 
state could institutionally support this value. As stated initially, this was not a conscious 
learning process but a pragmatic process of realization engraved in people’s habitus. 
Currency devaluations also contributed to unveil money’s value conventional and 
contingent nature. Repeatedly, Argentines observed money’s value change sharply within 
a few days. With each devaluation, the perception of money as something immaterial, a 
number that changed without any logic, consolidated. Confiscations of savings and forced 
pesifications also contribute to breaking down the idea of money as a valuable material 
asset. Argentines experienced repeatedly the complete dematerialization of their bank 
deposits. The popular interpretation was that the savings that had been ‘materially’ in the 
bank had disappeared. However, what pacifications revealed is that there was no material 
asset backing money’s value. Money’s value was no more than a contingent convention 
that had no value behind its state guarantee. In short, through crises, Argentines learned 
that the value of money, its purchasing power, was nothing more than a socially shared 
and institutionally supported convention.  
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Finally, due to repeated monetary crises, Argentines also learned about the hierarchies of 
money. During crisis, the hierarchical nature of money (both at the national and 
international levels) becomes evident. Thus, if the differences between the peso and the 
dollar were already dramatic in standard times, during crises, they became more acute. 
Crises in Argentina also revealed the differences between outside and inside money. 
Because inside and outside money stopped trading at par, people realized that having 
money inside the financial system was not the same as having it outside. One example of 
events that made the distinction between inside and outside money clear is compulsory 
pesification. On several occasions, dollars within the financial system were transformed 
into pesos by the state. Meanwhile, dollars held outside the national financial system 
(often in cash) kept their purchasing power. Logically, not by chance, cash dollars became 
the preferred reserve asset of Argentines. It is essential to highlight that the preference for 
cash dollars is entirely logical. Cash dollars are the safest asset in the whole contemporary 
monetary system. This is because the dollar is the currency at the top of the currency 
hierarchy, and because cash dollars are the liability of the Federal Reserve. That means 
they have zero default risk. So, cash dollars top the international monetary hierarchy. This 
preference shows that the choices Argentines make on how to keep their savings ‘safe’ 
reflect real differences between different types of money in the contemporary monetary 
world. 
 
Seventy years of monetary misfortunes taught Argentines that the value of a currency is 
a contingent convention but forced them to remember it permanently. After so many 
reiterations that showed that money is a convention, a convention that must be endorsed 
and guaranteed by the state, but a convention, in the end, Argentinians finally understood 
that money was an accounting instrument that had no intrinsic value outside its state 
guarantee. Moreover, through this learning process, trust in the Argentine currency was 
broken to a point that was difficult to solve.     
 
Dollarization and monetary policy constraints  
 
Argentina had balance-of-payments issues since 1880. However, from 1949 onwards, 
Argentina’s monetary problems increased. From that moment on, currency crises became 
more severe and had an increasingly negative effect on the population and their trust in 
the value of money. Since 1949, the harsh movements in the peso’s external value (the 
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exchange rate) began to undermine, more and more, trust in the peso. However, what is 
the reasons for such a change in the effects caused by currency devaluations? Why the 
currency crisis that occurred before 1949 did not affect trust in money? There are probably 
several reasons to consider.  
 
The first reason is that, during the gold standard era, gold inconvertibility was far from 
being a local singularity. Also, until 1935, the backing of Argentina’s currency in gold 
was close to 100%. Although there were many periods when the currency was 
inconvertible, until 1935, Argentina’s gold reserves far exceeded the country’s needs. A 
second reason that can explain why currency crises started to affect trust in money more 
deeply after 1949 is that currency shocks became sharper and more frequent. Since 1955, 
Argentina has been suffering mega-devaluations. The intensification of Argentina’s 
balance of payments crises is related to the country’s increasing needs for dollars and its 
lack of ability to reestablish its trade balance. In fact, since 1949, Argentina’s external 
restriction (lack of dollars) has increased constantly. Several factors have contributed to 
the increasing lack of dollars. Industrialization increased the need for imports and, thus, 
for dollars. Market deregulation and increasing capital flight fostered financial 
dollarization and encouraged internal dollar demand. The internationalization of the 
economy resulted in more companies that wanted to send remittances abroad and also 
demanded dollars. All these factors fostered Argentina’s structural dollar dependence and 
made the national economy more vulnerable to suffer balance of payments crises. 
 
A third (and crucial) reason that explains why currency crises have more dramatic effects 
after 1949, is that the international monetary system’s hierarchy increased, and the dollar 
became a measure for money’s value. After 1944, the dollar became a socially widespread 
instrument to measure and quantify the losses caused by each monetary crisis. Before the 
Bretton Woods agreements, the US dollar was not yet in Argentina (nor in the world), a 
measure of money’s value, as it would be later on. After the signing of the Bretton Woods 
agreements, trust in the value of capitalist credit currencies became inextricably linked to 
the dollar. In Argentina, it was precisely in 1957 (the year in which Argentina joined the 
Bretton Woods system) that the dollar began to grow in importance, both symbolically 
and materially. On the one hand, in a scenario of recurring crises, the dollar began to 
colonize Argentines’ minds. It became a reference that made it possible to navigate 
different transactional spaces, an instrument to preserve some order in a terribly confusing 
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and dramatically changing economic universe. The dollar emerged as a socially 
generalized way of measuring and quantifying the losses caused by each monetary crisis. 
 
Moreover, from 1957 onwards, the material reality began to link, more and more closely, 
the Argentine’s savings to the US currency. Naturally, growing dollarization increased 
the effects of currency devaluations. With savings that, from 1957 onwards, began to be 
increasingly dollarized, the effects of devaluations became more acute. In a world where 
savings could be dollarized, the material losses that hit those who kept their savings in 
pesos after each devaluation were increasingly evident. For a population that could 
compare the effects of devaluations on their savings according to the currency in which 
they saved them, the experience of material loss after a devaluation became even more 
dramatic than before. Devaluations were no longer merely alarming news. They now hit 
people right in their pockets. With each devaluation, the real wage in the fixed-income 
sectors diminished even more. After 1975, the increasing inflation caused dollarization to 
increase even further. Logically, the intensification of dollarization amplified the 
psychological effects of each devaluation.  
 
In the contemporary world, the pressures imposed by global dollarization have not 
diminished. On the contrary, they have increased. Today the expectations about the value 
of the currency in Argentina are dollarized. Over the past 40 years, the central bank has 
encouraged the use of the dollar as a coordinator of expectations. The limitations of the 
Argentine monetary dynamic are evident. In the contemporary world, where rigid 
exchange rate regimes are no longer sustainable (a reality demonstrated after the 
exchange rate crises of 1997), pegging the currency to the dollar is not a viable solution 
anymore. However, in a country with dollarized expectations, it is not easy to impose 
another monetary policy. When Sturzenegger tried to impose inflation targeting, he found 
it difficult to change how Argentines measure the value of their currency. With pegs no 
longer an option and inflation targets that do not manage to coordinate expectations, 






Appendix I: Methodology and analysis 
 
This research’s empirical analysis is based on a content analysis of academic articles, 
written sources, and qualitative interviews.  
 
Academic sources are the base of the two historical chapters. These sources are cited 
following the traditional criteria. Fragments of original sources are included in the 
chapters in italics. In most cases, these fragments are taken from academic sources. 
Generally, the source is indicated in a footnote. Occasionally I use quotes from laws, 
decrees, and other legal sources. In all cases, the original source is indicated in a footnote.  
 
The chapter on Argentina’s implementation of an inflation-targeting regime between 
2015 and 2018 is based on an extensive qualitative analysis of different presentations and 
interactions between the monetary authorities and the general public. The list of sources 
analyzed includes written sources and audiovisual material. In all cases, I privileged the 
analysis of the video material when available. The reason for this preference is that it 
allowed me to incorporate the interactions between the monetary authorities and the press 
and to have access to the public’s reactions. The list of sources is included at the end of 
this appendix. The sources’ analysis was done through qualitative content analysis 
following the usual methodology of reading, coding, and analyzing content in subsequent 
rounds. In the case of written sources, I used the software MAXQDA to support the 
analysis and organize the sources.  
 
Overall, the list of sources used for this chapter include material corresponding to 
different types of interactions between the monetary authorities and the general public. 
The list includes the inaugural speech in which Sturzenegger presented the guidelines of 
the new monetary policy, as well as other speeches given at specific moments in which 
the central bank governor wanted to explain specific decisions or changes in the monetary 
and exchange rate policy, for example, the presentation of the inflation targeting regime 
in September 2016. The list also includes (i) all the presentations of the Monetary Policy 
Report (given quarterly), (ii) the two central bank’s reports to the Argentine Congress that 
took place during Sturzenegger’s administration, (iii) several presentations of the 
governor to different communities of experts, (iv) the press conference given by 
Sturzenegger together with other members of the economic cabinet in December 2017, 
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and (v) Sturzenegger’s only interview with the press (conducted by journalist Jorge 
Fontevecchia).  
 
The quantitative data that supports this research (i.e., inflation series, statistics on the 
degree of dollarization of the economy, interest rates and other data regarding the 
financial system) is mostly taken from Argentine public agencies’ open sources. In 
particular, I used the inflation series provided by the Instituo Nacional de Estadisticas y 
Censos (INDEC) and the series provided by two official statistical agencies: the statistical 
office of the province of San Luis and that of the City of Buenos Aires. I also used the 
inflation series provided by the National Congress (up to 2018) and by the Centro de 
Innovacion de los Trabajadores (CITRA). The data from the financial system (interest 
rates, pass rates, LEBACS, etc.) is taken from the official statistics of the Argentine 
central bank. Finally, the data on the composition of the asset portfolio of Argentine 
companies and families in 1941 is taken from the dissertation of Eduardo Corso (2015). 
The data presented in the appendix of that dissertation is the best available on the topic 
and comes from internal data provided by the central bank of Argentina to the author.  
 
Finally, the general analysis carried out in the thesis is supported by the insights obtained 
through the analysis of 50 qualitative interviews I carried out in the midst of the 2018 
financial crises. Although only a few interviews were used in this study, I conducted 50 
qualitative field interviews which support the analysis I do in this dissertation. I 
interviewed different categories of actors, including: (i) savers from the middle and upper-
middle classes in Argentina, (ii) employees and managers working in the financial system 
(bank managers, financial advisors, pension fund managers, etc.), (iii) financial 
journalists, and (iv) academics and specialists who participate in public debates regarding 
money and monetary policy in Argentina, and (v) public officials from the ministry of 
finance and the central bank. In this thesis, I have used fragments of interviews with 
specialists. The interview guide is not included because (in the case of interviews with 
experts) the guides were adjusted to each interviewee, so there is no general model. The 
interviews used in this thesis, anonymized, will be available for consultation through a 
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